Modern Russian history not very rich in lightning military victories. The 2008 five-day war against Georgia compares favorably with most campaigns that preceded and followed. Russian troops were opposed by a conventional army, and not a terrorist underground. Defending South Ossetia, Russian troops acted swiftly and decisively, demonstrating complete tactical and moral superiority over the enemy.

…In the early 90s, after the collapse of the USSR, South Ossetia achieved de facto independence from Georgia, but never became a recognized member of the international community. In 1992, the parties, through the mediation of the Russian Federation, concluded the Dagomys Agreements, which ensured peace for the next 12 years. The situation changed fundamentally in 2003, when the “Rose Revolution” won in Georgia. Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power, announced, among other things, his intention to “restore power over the lost territories.”

The day before

Georgia prepared thoroughly for the attack on the former province in 2008: the army was transferred to a brigade structure, its strength increased to 37 thousand people. Equipment and weapons were purchased from the USA, the Czech Republic, and Israel. Buk anti-aircraft missile systems were purchased from Ukraine, and trained anti-aircraft gunners may have been hired there. The contractual principle of formation and a salary of 600-700 dollars a month made military service quite popular in the impoverished republic.

The Ossetians could counter this force with 52 light armored vehicles, 15 tanks, and 24 self-propelled guns. But this is on paper. In particular, Colonel Barankevich, who led the Ossetians, noted in a conversation with journalists “we (on the move) had three tanks.” So when it came to shooting, the most powerful argument of the Ossetian side turned out to be old RPG-7 grenade launchers.

However, South Ossetia did not set as its goal to defeat an enemy many times superior in strength. The Republic needed to hold out until the Russian army arrived.

Behind the main ridge of the Caucasus stood the 58th Army - the most combat-ready and battle-hardened formation in our troops. However, she could only get onto the battlefield by squeezing through the eye of a needle in the Roki tunnel.

Large-scale exercises in the Caucasus were held annually. The scenario of providing assistance to the republic was also worked out regularly. Interesting fact: After completing regular maneuvers, the 76th Airborne Division departed for Pskov on August 2, and the paratroopers returned six days later. But already to war.

The worsening situation was no secret to anyone. Skirmishes on the border gradually turned into mortar attacks on Tskhinvali. Russian fighter jets shot down Georgian reconnaissance drones several times. The parties were heading towards war, but both Moscow and Washington believed that Saakashvili would not dare to attack the former province under the nose of the Russian army. But in vain...

Combat map.

Predators and prey

At dawn, Georgian infantry and armored vehicles reached the outskirts of Tskhinvali. At six o'clock in the morning their tanks attacked the positions of the peacekeepers. The observation post was shot first, then three Russian infantry fighting vehicles were burned. Five Russian soldiers died in the “boxes”. One of the attacking tanks was burned by return fire. Soon Georgian artillery began hitting the peacekeepers’ town. The shells destroyed the hospital and destroyed all transport. The surviving peacekeepers hid in the basements and held the line.

Early in the morning, the 4th Georgian brigade began to bypass Tskhinvali from the west, and the 3rd brigade from the east. However, their command was unable to conduct troops along the outskirts of the city. The aggressor got involved in street fighting. As a result, instead of a roundabout maneuver, both units went to the city center. About 4,000 thousand soldiers and about 600 armored vehicles took part in the offensive.

The Ossetian militia could not stop this armada. It also failed to build a single line of defense. The defenders of the city fought in small groups, thanks to them the Georgian army suffered losses and got stuck in the city.

During the day, Russian attack aircraft successfully bombed the 42nd battalion of the 4th brigade, which was resting west of Tskhinvali. The Rooks' strike immediately sent twenty Georgian soldiers to the next world, and several dozen more were wounded. The moral effect of the bombing turned out to be even more significant: the battalion command got into their cars and went to the rear. The rank and file fled to the surrounding area, abandoning both their wounded comrades and their serviceable equipment. The defeat of the battalion finally put an end to the plan to cover the city.

By mid-day, Russian troops deployed several MLRS batteries north of Tskhinvali. Now the Georgian military has experienced for themselves what a full salvo is like. By the end of the day, the command of the 58th Army managed to increase its forces to 3 thousand people and organize effective counter-battery fire against Georgian artillery.

However, the battle of August 8 was by no means a massacre of infants. Georgia had modern anti-tank systems, the victims of which were some Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Georgian Su-25 attack aircraft operated via Russian communications. However, with each passing hour the position of the aggressor became more and more hopeless. Instead of a handful of poorly armed militias and several hundred Russian soldiers, by the end of the day they were confronted by thousands of trained soldiers, dozens of tanks and self-propelled guns.

A building in Tskhinval after artillery strikes by Georgian troops on August 8, 2008.

Break the aggressor in 48 hours

August 9 became a black day for Russian aviation in that war. First, a Georgian Buk, which was probably controlled by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunner, managed to shoot down a Tu-22 heavy bomber. This was not the only loss. Despite this, Russian aircraft continued to strike Georgian military targets. An ammunition depot in Gori was destroyed. This strike, by the way, turned into a serious tragedy: exploding tank shells damaged nearby Khrushchev buildings, killing 14 civilians.

On the ninth, another very unpleasant incident occurred: the headquarters column of General Anatoly Khrulev, in which, in addition to officers, there were many journalists, ran into the advanced units of the 2nd Georgian brigade, which was preparing to carry out a second attack on Tskhinvali. The contact came as a surprise to both parties. Georgian soldiers shot unarmed reporters, Russian officers fired back with their service pistols. Khrulev himself was wounded in the leg.

A desperate situation developed in the peacekeepers' camp besieged by Georgians. Fierce fighting took place in Tskhinvali. GRU special forces and a company of the Chechen Vostok battalion came to the aid of the city’s defenders. The Black Sea Fleet, led by the cruiser Moskva, left Sevastopol for the shores of Abkhazia. In the evening, Georgian torpedo boats tried to break through to the Russian landing ships. However, on their way they were met by the corvettes Mirage and Suzdal. One of the Russian missiles sent a Georgian boat to the bottom, and the rest retreated.

Troops of the 58th Army remove Georgian villages and Tskhinvali.

At night, the Georgian naval base of Poti was hit by a Tochka missile, killing 35 sailors, and the work of the port was paralyzed. At night, a military base and a collection point for reservists in Senaki were bombed.

The turning point in the war came 48 hours after the start of the aggression. Georgia lost all combat-ready units with the exception of the 1st brigade, which was hastily returned by plane from Iraq. Its navy and air force were suppressed. The interaction between units is disrupted, the personnel are demoralized.

Later it became fashionable to claim that the small Georgian army was overwhelmed by numbers. Actually this is not true. About 3-3.5 thousand Russian soldiers and officers defeated the approximately 13,000-strong Georgian corps.

Russian losses, according to the list of names, amounted to 67 people. The Georgian army lost just under 200 people. Irregular formations of Ossetians and Abkhazians - about 40 fighters. Among the civilian population, 1,600 people died.

Destroyed Georgian T-72 in Tskhinvali.

Crime without punishment

Having defeated the Georgian army, Russia did not dare to change the regime in the republic. Moscow said that this is the American way, and the Russian Federation does not deal with such things. Mikheil Saakashvili, who had been preparing his country for an offensive war for many years and authorized the shelling of the city with Grads, escaped with a slight fright.

Saakashvili escaped with a slight fright...

The Georgian generals did not pay anything either. In fact, those who made the key decisions to start the massacre did not bear any responsibility.

Having won a brilliant military victory in 2008, Russia was never able to convert it into real geopolitical success, and in 2014 it faced exactly the same problem, only on a much larger scale.

War 08/08/08. The Art of Betrayal

This film is entirely based on documentary footage, eyewitness testimony and evidence collected by the South Ossetian prosecutor's office, as well as videos posted on YouTube, news stories from Russian and Western TV channels. The film crew brought more than 40 hours of video footage from South Ossetia - these are eyewitness accounts of those who saw the Georgian army destroy their relatives and friends. These are witness statements about war crimes by Georgian soldiers and mercenaries from the USA, Ukraine, the Baltic states and other countries. This is unique footage, which is enough to bring to court a war criminal who ordered shooting at sleeping Tskhinvali with weapons of mass destruction.

The tension grew gradually. Refugees have been leaving Tskhinvali all summer. Georgian and Russian troops demonstratively staged exercises in the area in front of each other. Politicians terminated some agreements and entered into others. And finally, the abscess burst.

Ossetian blitzkrieg

On the night of August 8, 2008, Georgian troops rained down shells from Grad rocket launchers on Tskhinvali. After artillery barrage, tanks moved towards the city at 03:30. The capital of South Ossetia was surrounded, and by the morning the Georgian army controlled the entire Zainur region.

Simultaneously with the start of the shelling, the commander of the Georgian Armed Forces announced to television that “a decision had been made to restore constitutional order in the conflict zone.”

By mid-afternoon on August 8 most of South Ossetia was occupied by Georgian government troops.

In response to an appeal from South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, the first Russian combat unit, the 1st battalion of the 135th regiment, passed through the Roki tunnel. Three battalion tactical groups from the 429th and 503rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division and the 135th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District entered South Ossetia, which deployed into battle formations in the Java and Gufta regions.

At 15:30, clashes between Russian and Georgian units began. By the end of the day, Russian troops cleared the bypass road and heights in the area of ​​Kverneti, Tbeti, Dzari and reached the western outskirts of Tskhinvali.

On the evening of August 8, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that government troops completely control the entire territory of South Ossetia, except for the high-mountainous settlement of Java.

On August 9, the transfer of troops from Russian territory to South Ossetia and the creation of a strike force continued. The 76th Pskov Airborne Division was transferred to the combat area. Russian ships entered Georgian territorial waters and began combat patrols.

Units and subunits of the 58th Army, having arrived on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, “begin preparations for an operation to enforce peace in the area of ​​responsibility of the peacekeepers,” artillery fires at firing points in the Tskhinvali area and conducts counter-battery warfare.

Not everything went smoothly. When trying to release the Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali by the forces of the battalion group of the 135th motorized rifle regiment, the group encountered Georgian troops, who launched a new assault on the city. The convoy, which contained the car of the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General Anatoly Khrulev, was ambushed by Georgian special forces. The driver of the car was killed, the army commander himself fired back with his service weapon, but was seriously wounded. Having suffered losses in people and equipment, the group retreated from the city.

On August 10, Russia increased its force in South Ossetia to four regimental tactical groups (135th, 429th and 503rd motorized rifle regiments and a regiment of the 76th Pskov Air Assault Division) and attracted significant artillery forces. The total number of troops was increased to approximately 10 thousand people.

In response, Georgia began the urgent transfer of its infantry brigade from Iraq. In addition, the formation of volunteer units, ready to go to the aid of Georgia. Ukrainian nationalists took the initiative. But the operation failed: air tickets to Tbilisi turned out to be too expensive.

Throughout the night from August 10 to 11, a battle raged in South Ossetia for the Prissky Heights dominating Tskhinvali. Georgian units continued shelling the city and a number of settlements in South Ossetia throughout the night, but by mid-day they were driven out of almost all areas of Tskhinvali. The Prissky Heights were also recaptured by Russian troops. During the fighting, Georgian enclaves north of the South Ossetian capital were blocked. The Georgian troops located in this area were cut off from the main group.

A group of ships arrived on the shores of Abkhazia Black Sea Fleet led by the missile cruiser "Moskva". The group also includes the Smetlivy patrol ship and support vessels. There were already three large landing ships in the area. Russian Navy ships repulsed an attack by Georgian missile boats with missile strikes and artillery fire, one of them was sunk.

In the afternoon, representatives of the Georgian Foreign Ministry handed the Russian consul a note with a message that the Georgian side was stopping military operations in South Ossetia. However, firefights continued in the conflict zone.

The Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Tochka-U tactical rocket systems entered Georgia through the Roki tunnel from Russian territory.

In the area of ​​three Georgian cities - Gori, Zugdidi and Senaki - there were battles between Russian and Georgian troops. Georgian units retreated from positions in the Gori area, abandoning military equipment and property. Late in the evening, fighting between Russian and Georgian troops broke out 25 km from Tbilisi, Georgian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Nikolaz Natbiladze said.

On August 12, in South Ossetia, Russian troops reached the administrative border with Georgia along almost its entire length, continuing to push the few remaining combat-ready Georgian units to the south.

“I have decided to complete the operation to force the Georgian authorities to peace. The goal has been achieved,” Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said at a working meeting in the Kremlin.

Battle in the skies

On the morning of August 8, Russian aviation began bombing targets in Georgia. The planes attacked a military base in Gori, the airfields of Vaziani and Marneuli, where Su-25 and L-39 aircraft were based, as well as a radar station 40 kilometers from Tbilisi. According to the Gori city administration, more than 20 people were killed and more than 400 were injured as a result of the raid.

The Russian side lost the Su-25 attack aircraft and the Tu-22 long-range supersonic bomber - a very powerful and expensive combat vehicle. Three pilots who ejected from a downed bomber were detained by Georgian security forces.

Several air battles took place in the combat area; a Georgian Su-25 attacking the positions of the 58th Army was shot down. On August 9, Russian military aircraft attacked a military airfield in western Georgia and struck the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, which is controlled by Georgia.

The bombing of Georgian territory caused panic among the authorities and the population. Thus, a representative of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that on August 10, early in the morning, Russian aviation carried out a raid on Tbilisi International Airport. He later clarified that the airstrike fell on the neighboring territory where the Tbilaviastroi plant was located.

On the night of August 10, Tbilisi, Batumi, Poti and Zugdidi were bombed by the Russian Air Force. At least 50 Russian bombers were operating simultaneously. Two more Su-25 attack aircraft were shot down in the battle.

On August 12, the Russian Air Force bombed Gori. Georgian television showed that Russian planes struck the city television tower and the mountains.

Evil War

The fighting on the streets of Tskhinvali was carried out in the most brutal manner. There were no regular Ossetian troops in the city, and the militia had practically nothing to oppose the tanks. During the battle, the district hospital was almost completely destroyed. The university and parliament buildings were set on fire. Targeted fire from multiple launch rocket systems was opened on the headquarters and barracks of Russian peacekeepers.

The war was fought without rules. The confrontation between the two peoples was too strong.

The population was hiding in the basements. The Georgian infantry, having entered the city, carried out “cleansing operations”. The military knew that the Ossetians were hiding in the basements, and they threw grenades there or fired from machine guns.

“I saw how Ossetian women prayed for Russian tanks, I talked with my grandfather, whose Georgian tank ran over a car with his son, wife and child,” wrote Solidarity newspaper correspondent Yulia Korvin.

Eyewitnesses say: “The center was bombed the most. The air bombing continued for days. The house where the women and children were hiding caught fire. The fire reached the basement. But the floor was earthen, and they began to burrow into the ground. The city's defenders came to the rescue. They were 16-17 years old. Residents were pulled out of the burning basement and ran to the school basement.

Meanwhile, Georgian tanks and infantry entered the city. One of the tanks began firing directly at the school building. The militia fought with tanks. They took plastic soda bottles, drained gasoline from cars, and threw this Molotov cocktail into Georgian tanks. It’s impossible to count how many guys were killed there, but they knocked out a tank.

According to official data, at least 2,000 residents were killed in Tskhinvali. The losses of Russian military personnel amounted to 71 people killed and 340 wounded. Georgia lost 215 military personnel, 70 were missing and 1,469 citizens of the country were wounded.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia took part in a number of wars. These military actions influenced the subsequent development of the Russian army, military equipment and military doctrine. One of the most striking examples of this is the reflection of Georgian aggression in South Ossetia by Russia and its allies, on the one hand, back in August 2008. Another name for this conflict is the “five-day war.”

Historical background

The border that arbitrarily divided Ossetians between the RSFSR and the Georgian SSR was established back in Soviet times. Back then they could not even imagine that it would become the border between two unfriendly blocs.

While Georgia was part of the USSR, things were peaceful here, and there was no talk of a possible ethnic conflict. But everything changed after perestroika, when the Georgian authorities began to slowly but surely move towards gaining independence. It was when it became clear that the exit of the Georgian SSR from the Union was quite real that the South Ossetian leadership, mostly gravitating toward Russia, began to think about its own sovereignty. And as a result, already in 1989, the autonomy of South Ossetia was declared, and in 1990 - its full sovereignty.

However, the Georgian government was against it. At the same time, in 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia declared the decree granting autonomy to South Ossetia invalid.

War 1991-1992

On January 5, 1991, Georgia sent a three-thousand-strong police force into the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali. However, just a few hours later, street fighting broke out in the city, often with the use of grenade launchers. During these battles, the futility of the solution became obvious Supreme Council Georgia, and the Georgian detachment itself was gradually pushed back to the city center. As a result, the Georgian contingent was withdrawn to positions in the center of Tskhinvali, where they began to prepare for long-term defense.

On January 25, 1991, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the Georgian contingent from Tskhinvali and their abandonment of the city, thanks to which the fire ceased for several days. However, new provocations from the Georgian side made the truce short-lived.

What also added fuel to the fire was the fact that, according to the Soviet constitution, autonomous entities within the Soviet socialist republics leaving the Union could independently make decisions about their stay within the USSR. Therefore, when Georgia seceded from the Soviet Union on April 9, 1991, the South Ossetian leadership hastened to announce its continued stay in the USSR.

However, the conflict flared up. The Georgian police and army controlled the territory and heights near Tskhinvali, thanks to which they could launch artillery strikes on the city. The situation there became truly catastrophic: destruction, loss of life and appalling conditions did not add sympathy to the Georgian side.

On December 21, 1991, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia adopted a declaration of independence of the republic, and a month later a corresponding referendum was held. It should be noted that this referendum was mainly boycotted by the Georgian population of the republic, so the absolute majority of votes (about 99%) were cast for independence. Naturally, the Georgian government did not recognize either the independence of the region or the referendum.

The conflict ended quite quickly, and the cause was political instability in Georgia. At the end of 1991, an outbreak broke out in this country Civil War, which significantly weakened Georgia’s position in the region. In addition, Russia, which was not happy with the smoldering hotbed of tension on the southern border, also intervened in the situation. Pressure was put on the Georgian government (even to the point of the possibility of an airstrike against Georgian forces in the Tskhinvali area), and in mid-July 1992 the shelling of the city stopped.

The result of this war was that the people and government of South Ossetia finally turned away from Georgia and continued to strive with all their might for recognition of their independence in the international arena. Total casualties during the conflict were approximately 1,000 killed and 2,500 wounded.

Period 1992-2008 Rising tensions

The period after the Georgian-South Ossetian war became a time of undulating tension in the region.

As a result of the conflict of 1991-1992. An agreement was reached between the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian sides on the deployment of a joint peacekeeping contingent to the territory of South Ossetia. This contingent consisted of three battalions (one from each side).

The first half of the nineties was characterized by a big diplomatic game played by all parties. On the one hand, South Ossetia sought to finally separate from Georgia in the eyes of the international community and become part of the Russian Federation. Georgia, in turn, methodically “squeezed out” South Ossetian independence and autonomy. The Russian side was interested in peace in South Ossetia, but soon focused its attention on Chechnya, another far from peaceful region.

However, negotiations continued throughout the first half of the nineties, and in October 1995, the first meeting between the Georgian and Ossetian sides took place in Tskhinvali. Representatives of Russia and the OSCE were present at the meeting. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to cancel the decree of the Georgian Supreme Council on the liquidation of the autonomy of South Ossetia, as well as the republic’s non-secession from Georgia. It is worth noting that, perhaps, the Russian leadership took such a step in exchange for Georgian President E. Shevardnadze’s non-recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and his support for the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya.

In the spring of 1996, a memorandum on the non-use of force in South Ossetia was signed in Moscow. It became a real step forward in Georgian-Ossetian relations. And on August 27 of the same year, the first meeting between Georgian President E. Shevardnadze and the Chairman of the Parliament (and in fact the head of state) of South Ossetia L. Chibirov took place. During this meeting, the parties outlined further ways to normalize the situation, however, after the meeting, E. Shevardnadze said that “it is too early to talk about the autonomy of South Ossetia.”

However, the situation by 2000 contributed to further peace in the region, the return of refugees and economic recovery. However, all the cards were confused by the coming to power in Georgia in January 2004 as a result of the “Rose Revolution” by M. Saakashvili. It was he who represented the young, nationalist-minded generation of Georgia, which, in pursuit of immediate success, did not disdain populist ideas, even if at times very absurd.

Even before his official election as President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili visited South Ossetia, and this visit was not coordinated with the South Ossetian authorities. At the same time, he allowed himself the remark that “2004 will be last year when South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not participate in elections in Georgia.” This statement contributed to the destabilization of the situation.

In 2004-2008 The situation around South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeping battalion on its territory continued to heat up. In the spring of 2006, the Georgian leadership declared Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia criminals. The reason for this loud statement it was that the servicemen from Russia did not have visas issued by the Georgian side and allegedly stayed on the territory of Georgia illegally. At the same time, the Georgian side demanded either the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers or their “legalization.”

Meanwhile, fighting flared up in a number of regions of South Ossetia. Skirmishes, provocations and shelling, including mortar attacks, are no longer rare. At the same time, the overwhelming number of provocations were carried out by the Georgian side. It is also worth mentioning the May 2006 statement by then Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who stated that by May 1, 2007, South Ossetia would become part of Georgia. In response to this clearly provocative statement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov guaranteed assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression against them.

It was in 2006 that the process of confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia took final shape. The Georgian leadership, in its nationalist hysteria, continued to declare that Georgian territory must be inviolable and restored by any means, even military means. It is in this regard that Georgia has set a course for rapprochement with the United States and NATO. American military equipment and instructors arrived in the Georgian army and became frequent guests.

At the same time, South Ossetia from the very beginning of its existence adhered to an exclusively pro-Russian course, so its “peaceful” unification with Georgia after Saakashvili came to power could not happen in principle. In November 2006, a referendum on support for independence was held in South Ossetia. As a result, approximately 99% of the residents of South Ossetia who voted were in favor of maintaining the independence of the republic and continuing its foreign policy course.

Thus, by August 2008, the situation in the region had deteriorated to the limit and a peaceful resolution of the issue was practically impossible. The Georgian “hawks” led by Saakashvili could no longer retreat - otherwise they would have lost their prestige and weight in the eyes of the United States.

Start of hostilities on August 8

On August 8, 2008, approximately 15 minutes after midnight, the Georgian army suddenly opened fire on Tskhinvali with Grad multiple rocket launchers. Three hours later, Georgian troops moved forward.

Thus, the truce was violated by the Georgian side, and the Georgian army, already in the first hours of the offensive, managed to capture a number of settlements on the territory of South Ossetia (Mugut, Didmukha), and also break into the outskirts of Tskhinvali. However, the South Ossetian militia units were able to inflict significant losses on the aggressor at the very beginning of the conflict and slow down the pace of the Georgian “blitzkrieg” with stubborn defense.

At this time, in Tskhinvali itself, as a result of the Georgian artillery attack, casualties appeared among the civilian population. The city was taken by surprise, but the residents bravely greeted the news of the Georgian invasion. Another tragic episode of the initial period of the war was the death of Russian peacekeepers from the fire of Georgian salvo launchers. This fact finally convinced the Russian leadership that there was no prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev announced the start of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace.

In the morning, Russian aircraft began carrying out air strikes on Georgian troops, thereby sharply reducing the pace of their advance. Russian columns of the 58th Army, which formed the main reserve and main defense forces in the South Ossetian direction, moved through the Roki tunnel to help the peacekeepers and South Ossetian militia units.

During the day, Georgian troops managed to significantly push back the Russian-South Ossetian troops and surround the barracks of the Russian peacekeepers, but they failed to decisively turn the situation in their favor. In fact, by the evening of August 8, it became clear that the Georgian “blitzkrieg” had failed and it would not be possible to immediately capture Tskhinvali. However, a victorious mood reigned in the Georgian media; It was announced that the assault on Tskhinvali was successful.

Further development of the conflict (August 9-11)

By the morning of August 9, fighting in Tskhinvali continued, but the Georgian troops no longer had significant superiority. Having gotten bogged down in street fighting, they now sought to seize as much territory as possible so that during subsequent peace negotiations (which no one doubted on August 9) they would have at least some trump cards in their hands. However, militia units and Russian peacekeepers continued to stubbornly defend the city's neighborhoods.

At the same time, a group consisting of units of the 58th Russian Army arrived in Tskhinvali; in addition, the 76th Airborne Division was transferred to the scene of events. A battalion group was also created, separated from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The task of the group was to release Russian peacekeepers and establish contact with them.

However, due to the fact that the offensive impulse of the Georgian troops had not yet been exhausted, and the troops themselves had a sufficient amount of manpower and equipment, as a result of the oncoming battle, the Russian battalion group suffered significant losses and was withdrawn from the city by the end of the day. However, this counter-strike contributed to the speedy stop of the Georgian offensive and the transition of Georgian forces to defense.

Throughout the day on August 9, there were Russian airstrikes against Georgian troops, as well as mutual artillery shelling. A group of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the territorial waters of Georgia in order to carry out patrols and prevent aggressive actions by Georgia at sea. Moreover, the very next day, August 10, 2008, an attempt by the Georgian naval forces to penetrate the conflict zone was repelled.

On August 10, Russian troops launched a counter-offensive and began to oust Georgian forces from Tskhinvali, and Russian-Abkhaz forces began moving out of the regions bordering Georgia. Thus, on the third day of the conflict, the Georgian offensive completely fizzled out, and the front line began to move in the opposite direction. The result of the defensive battles was, first of all, a complete stop of the Georgian troops, their losses and complete disorganization. It was at this point that the Georgian leadership began to panic, caused by the threat of complete military defeat. Saakashvili asked NATO countries to intervene in the conflict and “save Georgia from the clutches of the Russian aggressor.”

On August 11, Russian troops completed the liberation of the territories of South Ossetia seized by the aggressor and entered the territory of Georgia. Nevertheless, this event was covered in every possible way as the need to “force Georgia to peace.” On the same day, Russian troops occupied the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia without a fight, and the city of Gori was abandoned by Georgian troops.

Truce and end of the conflict

On August 12, Russian President D. Medvedev announced that there was no longer a danger to the civilian population of South Ossetia and Russian military personnel, which is why it makes sense to stop the operation to force the aggressor to peace. After this, through the mediation of the President of France and the President of the European Union, Nicolas Sarkozy, negotiations began between Russia and Georgia. The general meaning of the future peace agreement was based on the non-use of force to resolve controversial issues, the end of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied before the conflict, access for humanitarian aid to the region, as well as the beginning of an international discussion on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership agreed with all points of the agreement, except for the point on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This paragraph has been reformulated.

Over the next days, the process of withdrawing Russian troops from Georgian territory continued. On August 16, the peace agreement was signed by the heads of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. Thus, although this conflict is called a five-day war (due to the fact that the phase of active hostilities lasted from August 8 to 12, 2008), it actually ended on August 16.

Results and consequences of the five-day war

The results of the August conflict in South Ossetia are interpreted differently by each side of the conflict. The Russian leadership announced the victory of Russian and South Ossetian troops, curbing the aggressor, inflicting a serious defeat on him and excluding new large-scale military conflicts in the near future. However, isolated battles and artillery attacks, ambushes and firefights continued until the end of 2008.

The Georgian leadership announced the victory of the Georgian troops, and Georgian President M. Saakashvili stated that one Georgian brigade, equipped with the latest American weapons, managed to defeat the entire 58th Army. However, if we objectively evaluate the results of the conflict, it should be noted: the statement of the Georgian leadership was made solely for propaganda purposes and had nothing to do with reality.

As for the losses suffered by the parties to the conflict, their estimates also differ. According to Russian data, the losses of the troops of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in total amount to about 510 people killed and wounded, while the losses of Georgia are approximately 3000. The Georgian side claims that the losses of Georgian troops during the conflict amounted to about 410 killed and 1750 wounded, and the losses of Russian troops and their allies were approximately 1,500 killed and wounded. Thus, there was no such thing as “the defeat of an entire Russian army by a Georgian brigade.”

The objectively recognized result of the war in South Ossetia was the victory of Russia and its allies, as well as the heavy defeat of the Georgian army. At the same time, as a result of investigations conducted by the International Commission of the European Union, it was proven that it was Georgia that was the aggressor in the conflict, but at the same time it was pointed out that “Russia’s provocative behavior prompted Georgia to resolve the issue by force.” However, how this “provocative behavior” was linked to Russia’s refusal to accept South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the non-recognition of the independence of the republics, the Commission was unable to give an answer.

The consequences of the five-day war were Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the beginning of confrontation between the Russian Federation and Georgia (diplomatic relations were severed between the states in September 2008). The United States, despite the Commission's conclusions about Georgia's responsibility for starting the war, accused Russia of aggressively seeking to expand its borders. Thus, the conflict in South Ossetia can be called a new era in relations between Russia and the Western world.

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Video: Ivan Zhilin, Nadezhda Mironenko, Gleb Limansky / Novaya Gazeta

Leningor is the current name of the village of Akhalgori, the majority of whose population are ethnic Georgians. This village was previously controlled by the Georgian authorities; it became part of South Ossetia after the 2008 war.

“On August 16, my daughter and I were at a church service. Sometime in the afternoon, the director of the emergency room ran into the church. She shouted: “They are coming! Run." We ran into the mountains, into the forest. From there they saw the Georgian flag being taken down from the flagpole and the Ossetian one being hung up. I thought: “Will I come back or not?” — Local resident Tamara Mearakishvili recalls the day when the Russian military captured the Georgian village. The first day Tamara sat at home, then carefully went outside.

“I approached all the military men and said: “I am Georgian, but I ask you not to shoot at me.” And they took it well.”

Political life in South Ossetia cannot be called diverse—all parties, to varying degrees, are betting on joining Russia. It continues to be the main election promise — so far unfulfilled. This self-determined republic is still very financially dependent on Russia—according to the most optimistic estimates, South Ossetia has not yet managed to earn more than 40 percent of its own budget.

Read more in the Novaya Gazeta article.

Open doors

Pikria Shvelidze sat in the basement for two days without food or water, listening to shells exploding above. But even then I didn’t fully believe that this was really a war. “But then Georgian soldiers came and said something terrible: that people were fleeing from here and it was time for us to leave too. Only then did I realize that my life was changing and that grief had fallen on our heads.”

The Pikria family left their native village in a hurry, and they even left the door of their house open — like almost all the houses they passed by by car.

It soon became clear that neither the house nor the village itself was there anymore. Pikria has seen the photographs and the memories of them bring her down to earth every time she begins to dream of returning. Pikria now lives near the city of Gori in central Georgia.

Around the same time, another woman, Angela Guchmazova, fled from her house. Angela is an Ossetian, she ran in the opposite direction from Pikria, towards Russia, but from the car windows she also saw houses abandoned in a panicked rush:

“Everywhere we passed there were empty abandoned houses and many abandoned animals — dogs, pigs, cows. Somewhere along the road, a whole family, Ossetians, stood on the road; they stopped us and begged us to take at least the children with us. But we couldn’t help them, our little car was packed to the roof.”

The war will be put in a museum

The demarcation line between Georgia and the territory of South Ossetia, which it does not control, is stretched barbed wire and hang warning signs. Livestock often crosses this “border”; in such cases, the military (Russian or Ossetian) usually arrests the shepherd and does not release him until he pays a fine. The Russian military prohibits entry into the territory of partially recognized South Ossetia from Georgia. Even those who could cross the “border” on foot in 15 minutes must go to Vladikavkaz — that is, enter Georgia through the official border with Russia.

Lia Chichiladze believes that barbed wire on the border is the best way to prolong the conflict.

“Georgians and Ossetians are the closest peoples to each other and will always find a common language,” assures Leah. “Russia is therefore closing its borders to prevent Georgians and Ossetians from meeting.”

Liya is from Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, which Ossetians call Tskhinvali. But in 2008, Liya lived in Ergneti — this is a village nearby, it can be considered a Tskhinvali suburb. During the war, Leah's house burned to the ground, but she was able to partially restore it, and opened a museum in the basement.

It contains photographs of that period, shell fragments, abandoned things. Leah says that people continue to bring new artifacts and believes that one day the barbed wire that today separates Georgians and Ossetians will become a museum exhibit.

According to the report of the EU special commission, in the 2008 war, Georgia lost 412 civilians and military personnel, South Ossetia lost 365 civilians and military personnel, and Russia lost 67 military personnel.

The project was made by: Dimitri Avaliani, Nadezhda Apenko, Gvantsa Doluashvili, Ivan Zhilin, Gleb Limansky, Natalia Marshalkovich, Nadezhda Mironenko, Sergei Nazarov, Diana Petriashvili, David Pipia, Yuliana Skibitskaya, Anna Tsigima, Maxim Eristavi, Gana Yanovskaya.

With the support of Mediaset

Ten years ago, a short, five-day long, but bitter and furious war broke out with Georgia. Believing in his chosenness and invincibility and relying on the West, the political adventurer Saakashvili sent his troops to Tskhinvali. His army was trained for this war for five years. The Georgians were trained by hundreds of American instructors who had been tested in the hot spots of the planet. The attack plan was also developed with their active participation. Those who planned a small victorious war seemed to have taken everything into account. But apparently not entirely. And their defeat was crushing.

But we also had some unfortunate mistakes, otherwise the declared war would have lasted not five days, but one day. They are also worth mentioning so as not to repeat them in the future.

Uniqueness of the moment

The Georgian blitzkrieg was called pretentiously: “Open Field”. It was prepared in conditions of absolute secrecy. More than seventeen thousand people, eighty tanks and over a hundred heavy guns were involved in the action. Five hundred Russian and the same number of Ossetian peacekeepers were overwhelmed by three and a half thousand Georgian soldiers in the first wave of the attack alone, supported by fifty tanks.

The authors of the blitzkrieg took into account that the nearest Russian military base is located one hundred and fifty kilometers from the site of the attack (of which more than half is the Transcam mountain serpentine, the Trans-Caucasian Highway). Russian troops have just completed exercises and returned to their permanent deployment points. The personnel “cleaned their feathers” - put equipment and weapons in order. The “tired” equipment, which had previously gone through two Chechen wars, was in storage boxes and put into storage rooms. The personnel “washed and filed,” the officers “immersed themselves in their families.” Accordingly, they could not quickly move to help the peacekeepers.

At the same time, exercises took place in the Georgian army. But they moved the date of the maneuvers so that their exercises ended two or three days earlier. It was also taken into account that the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was not distinguished by decisiveness. Putin was at the opening of the Olympics in Beijing.

The Georgians also knew about the catastrophic results of the military reform that took place in the Russian army at that time. Its tragic consequence was the collapse of the army's combat command and control system. After forty-eight hours of battle in Tskhinvali, Russian troops were supposed to meet Georgian barriers on the border, behind which by that time would be South Ossetia, which had been cleared to zero, and “indivisible” Georgia, supported by the entire political power of the United States and Europe.

In general, all the stars seemed to be aligned successfully for the Georgians. Everything, but not everything.

Despite the fact that the reconnaissance of the Russian army worked extremely poorly and slept through both the preparation for the offensive (the Georgians managed to lull the vigilance of our “eyes and ears”), and the first waves of the attack, the Russians have some surprises up their sleeves in case of a sudden attack. there were.

First surprise. "Ambush Regiment"

After large-scale exercises of the 58th Army and the withdrawal of equipment to hangars, two battalion tactical groups still “lingered” in the mountains. They secretly positioned themselves on the approach to the Roki tunnel. Both groups were camouflaged and fully equipped with people, equipment, fuel and ammunition. As the military themselves say, the groups were “in a rush,” “at a low start.” There was not a single soldier in them who served less than six months. For the most part, these were contract soldiers. In addition, artillery units assigned to them remained in the mountains to support the groups’ actions.

The first operation of the battalion groups was the capture of the strategically important Guftinsky Bridge. After which one group went towards Tamarasheni, the second - along the Zar road, to the peacekeepers, to unblock and reinforce.

Second surprise. From the march to battle

On August 8, at five o'clock in the morning, the Georgian military was already swarming on the bridge when the first tactical group approached it. Russian tanks roared onto the bridge, sweeping Georgians off it. They ran away in panic, abandoning their equipment and weapons. The contract soldiers sitting on the tanks fell from the armor, quickly taking up a perimeter defense around the bridge. The battalion groups fought to the fullest in isolation from the main forces, and the long, serpentine green column of the 58th Army was already entering the Roki tunnel at that time.

Throw on Transcam

According to the army commander, Lieutenant General Anatoly Khrulev, the conduct of troops along the Transkam was a complex operation. When driving along a mountain serpentine, any mistake by a “wrecker mechanic” was fraught with tragedy. Here, even in peacetime, cars periodically fell into the abyss, but here - hundreds of units of multi-ton military equipment, dense traffic, maximum speed. The equipment was far from new, having gone through two Chechen wars. Collection points for faulty equipment were set up along the route; tractors were on duty, which immediately evacuated the faulty equipment and towed it to the site, where repairmen immediately surrounded the vehicle.

The traffic density was such that due to the gas pollution, the outlines of the car in front were not visible, only its side lights. It was impossible to ventilate the tunnel. At the entrance, all drivers were given wet gauze bandages to make it easier for them to breathe.

“Russians are scary with their improvisation and unpredictability...”

The Georgians could not be underestimated. According to American standards, they fought excellently - as they were taught. Until the last minute they tried to impose their scheme of combat operations on the 58th Army. According to eyewitnesses, Georgian snipers from an ambush with one shot killed drivers of passenger cars who were flying in small open areas with maximum speed. The enemy had excellent reconnaissance means and had practiced counter-battery warfare - the American school was felt. That is why our artillery did not work at one position for more than ten minutes. Within fifteen minutes after opening fire, Georgian shells rained down from the sky, howling and squealing, at the place from which the Russians were shooting. Our artillerymen made a mistake only once - and immediately suffered losses. The battery commander and two soldiers were killed...

It was possible to fight such an enemy only by breaking all patterns, imposing your initiative, not allowing him to come to his senses. The tactics of delivering painful strikes in small units and in several directions were adopted. Conducting constant military reconnaissance, the Russians looked for gaps in the Georgian battle formations, since in the Caucasus, as a rule, there is no continuous line of military operations.

Third surprise. Daring and improvisation

The war began, about which Bismarck warned all future enemies of Russia: “The Russian army is terrible for its improvisation and unpredictability...” The maneuver groups that went into radio silence (so that the Georgians did not scan all the negotiations) behind enemy lines fought “as best they can” - as far as they could audacity, fantasy and extravagance. And there was enough for a lot. Company and platoon groups, maneuvering here and there, “pulled away” the Georgians along the broken front line, pinned them down in battle, with daring and lightning-fast actions. Strike-retreat-strike, but in a different meta - this was the tactics of small detachments that suddenly appeared out of nowhere and just as quickly dissolved in the lilac fog of complete uncertainty. And so on ad infinitum. A typical military-guerrilla war, described in detail by Denis Davydov.

This tactic actually blinded the Georgians, tied them up in battle, and allowed the Russians to gain time until the main forces of the 58th Army arrived. And then, out of nowhere, the evil Chechens from Sulim Yamadayev’s “Vostok” battalion appeared...

Then army scientific minds will call this method “network-centric warfare.” The enemy has the opinion that there are many Russians, Russians all around, they circle around you like wasps, and sting, sting from all sides. These wandering detachments did not allow the Georgian headquarters to come to its senses, constantly disrupting its command and control of the troops.

One against three hundred

On the very first day of the war, contract reconnaissance officer of the 71st motorized rifle regiment Bato Dashidorzhiev, in the process of such improvisation, managed to single-handedly stand in the way of a column of Georgian special forces and stop it. He and his colleagues served at the checkpoint between Gori and Tskhinvali. The Georgians, thrown back from the capital of Ossetia, regrouped and decided to launch a second assault. However, on the way, they came across a freshly set up checkpoint, which the Russian military who arrived “at the light” managed to set up. The road to the Georgian column was blocked by the Ural.

Because of him, Private Dashidorzhiev ran out to meet the column. Spreading his legs wider for stability, he raised his machine gun and aimed at the column. The Georgians were taken aback. Then they shouted at him in Russian to get out of the way. Bato responded by sending Georgians to an address widely known among the people.

While the puzzled special forces were talking among themselves and thinking about what to do next, the daring Buryat was photographed by foreign journalists traveling in the convoy. Then they tried to persuade the machine gunner to give way. They were sent strictly there. And although Bato was still not completely alone (a platoon commander and another soldier lay a little further from him, bristling with gun barrels), this does not in the least detract from his courage.

The private's feat was appreciated all over the world. “Russian 300 is not necessary enough for one” (“Russians don’t need 300, one is enough”) – these were the headlines in the foreign media. Then, in one of the shootouts, Bato died. But the photo of the hero who stopped the convoy of equipment had by that time spread all over the world.

It was as if the air had been let out of them...

“The Georgian fuse was enough for two days,” recalls Army Commander Anatoly Khrulev. – Until the evening of August 9, they were still active, trying to turn the situation around, seize the initiative, and attacked quite recklessly. But by evening they began to run out of steam. We began to record more and more chaotic movements, less and less coordination. It was as if the air had been let out of them - like from a car inner tube or an air mattress. It began to dawn on them that time had been lost, Russian troops had already been drawn into South Ossetia, and their initial superiority in forces and means had vanished like smoke...”

Their plans also vanished. On the 10th, the Georgian units of the first echelon wavered and began to retreat from Tskhinvali.

Tskhinvali layer cake

The Russians also did not enter the city like a continuous avalanche. First, they carried out two diversionary strikes, pretending to be suitable reinforcements, and at the site of the future breakthrough, they defiantly turned around, dusted themselves, showing that they were leaving the heights. And they left... to the nearest lowland. We followed it through the bushes to the outskirts of Tskhinvali. From there the assault began.

At this point, the peacekeepers were already being finished off by Georgian tanks, and the war was raging in full swing in the city. The city was layered cake from Georgian units and Ossetian militias. The parts of this “pie” were fiercely thrashing each other. But as soon as units of the 58th Army appeared in the city, the Georgians seemed to be replaced. “Molotilovo” ended immediately. A disorderly flight began. Everything was like the classic: “timid Georgians fled”, and “evil Ossetian bullets” flew after them. And the volleys of Russian artillery rang out.

Why didn't they take Tbilisi?

This question concerns everyone who observed that conflict or was somehow involved in it. According to former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (who had already resigned at that time), the troops did not storm the capital of Georgia, which was ready to surrender without a fight to the mercy of the winner, for one simple reason. "What for? – he answered a question from a Kommersant journalist with a question. “There was no political meaning in this.” Military too. From a military point of view, we had to deal such a blow to the armed forces of Georgia that in the foreseeable future they could not repeat the same adventure - because Saakashvili remained in power. And who could give guarantees that this, excuse me, idiot, would not repeat his adventure - if he still had the strength to do so?

The answer is more than contradictory. On the one hand, the former defense minister openly admits that it was Saakashvili who started this war. “I got off the leash,” Sergei Ivanov caustically remarked in the same interview. On the other hand, for some reason no one was going to overthrow this “off-leash” guy. Although at that moment it was easy to do. The troops were flying to Tbilisi at full speed, and Saakashvili himself, who had recently been chewing his tie in despair (which was calmly recorded by a television camera), was flying at full speed from Tbilisi to Batumi - to seek salvation at the international airport. Eyewitnesses admit that at that moment there was a traffic jam on the Batumi highway from refugees and alarmists such as had never happened in the entire history of Georgia. Officials, military, police, administration representatives - they all left the capital in horror and wild haste. The popular cry at that moment was “Russians and Chechens (fighters of the Vostok battalion under the command of Sulim Yamadayev) are going to burn Samshoblo!” horrified everyone. “The Georgians ran away from us in their underpants...” Sulim Yamadayev later recalled with pleasure. His fighters were licking their lips and trembling with impatience, anticipating the brightest “fire show with stripping and running away” in their lives...

The column was deployed literally a few kilometers from Tbilisi. The strip show did not take place. But Saakashvili did not risk breaking off the leash a second time.

Western reaction

The West swallowed this enchanting defeat of the Georgian army like a bitter pill. “All subsequent developments of events, including the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the reaction of the West to this showed that Western leaders understood perfectly well who was to blame for this situation,” recalls Sergei Ivanov. – They yelled, of course, sorry for the bad manners, but they quickly turned down this tone. Because they understood perfectly well that their creature, their satellite Saakashvili, had broken all his promises and crossed the red line...”

Results

“Georgians, learn military science the real way!” – some wit from the 58th Army wrote on the wall of one of the abandoned Georgian barracks.

10 years have passed since that war. Since then, Georgians have managed to fight in Afghanistan and other hot spots on the planet. At the height of the Armenian Maidan, the Georgian army took part in another large-scale exercise of NATO countries. On the eve of the 10th anniversary of the liberation of South Ossetia, the President of Georgia again accused Russia of aggression and violating the integrity of his republic. Over the years, the Russian army has been reformed in the most fundamental way and has acquired invaluable experience in combat operations in Syria.

Will Georgians get off the leash again?