What events occurred on October 2–4, 1993. Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Crimean Republican branch. Materials prepared by the editorial staff of the newspaper “Communist of Crimea”

1993 putsch

After the collapse of the USSR, in 1991. a new state appears - Russia, the Russian Federation. It included 89 regions, including 21 autonomous republics.

During this period, the country was in an economic and political crisis, therefore it was necessary to create new governing bodies and form Russian statehood.

By the end of the 80s, the Russian state apparatus consisted of a two-tier system of representative bodies of the Congress of People's Deputies and a bicameral Supreme Council. The head of the executive branch was President B.N., elected by popular vote. Yeltsin. He was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The highest judicial authority was the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The predominant role in the highest structures of power was played by former deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From among them, presidential advisers V. Shumeiko and Yu. Yarov, Chairman of the Constitutional Court V.D. were appointed. Zorkin, many heads of local administrations.

The essence of the conflict

In conditions when the Russian Constitution, in the opinion of supporters of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, became a brake on the implementation of reforms, and work on the new edition was carried out too slowly and ineffectively, the President issued Decree No. 1400 “On step-by-step constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” which ordered the Supreme The Council of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies (according to the Constitution, the highest body of state power of the Russian Federation) cease their activities.

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, convening for an emergency meeting, came to the conclusion that this decree violates the Russian Constitution in twelve places and, according to the Constitution, is the basis for the removal of President Yeltsin from office. The Supreme Council refused to obey the unconstitutional decree of the president and qualified his actions as a coup d'etat. It was decided to convene the X Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies. The police units subordinate to Yeltsin and Luzhkov were ordered to blockade the White House.

After the failure of negotiations through the mediation of Patriarch Alexy in Novo-Ogaryovo, a blockade of the Supreme Council began by the riot police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Electricity and water supply were turned on for a while in the Supreme Council building, then they were turned off again.

At 14:00, a rally authorized by the Moscow Council in support of the Supreme Council took place on Oktyabrskaya Square. When several thousand people gathered, information was received that at the last moment holding a rally on Oktyabrskaya Square was prohibited by the Moscow mayor's office. Riot police attempted to block the square. There were calls to move the meeting to another location.

In such a conflict-prone situation in Russia, what are the ways and means of finding political compromises and agreement? Today, their achievement depends to a large extent on the positions of opposing leaders and elites. The fate of the country largely depends on whether they are able to take into account the already existing socio-political pluralism, and not the dichotomy of society, to satisfy its basic needs, to sacrifice some power and property in order to mitigate and eliminate the main threats to society, and to implement the compromise agreements reached. Legitimation of state-political institutions and the policies pursued by them can also be significantly facilitated by truly free, equal and competitive elections in a multi-party system, which presuppose at least the absence of a monopoly on the media, abuse of financial and political power resources, and the conviction of the majority of voters that political parties , candidates for elective positions, election commissions and other participants and election organizers have equal rights and fully comply with election laws and instructions, and these laws and instructions themselves are fair.

In this regard, it should be noted that the results of the 1996 elections and, most importantly, their assessment from the point of view of fairness and equality, are undoubtedly influenced by the disparate difference in the volume and nature of the resources available to the contenders for the post of President of the Russian Federation. Leaving aside the revealed imperfections of the electoral legislation, sharp criticism from some voters was caused by the virtually complete monopoly of one of the candidates on the most influential types of media - television and radio. Some voters were also irritated by the transformation of leading members of the government, starting with its Chairman, into the central headquarters, and the heads of administrations of many regions and their subordinates into actual regional headquarters for the elections B.N. Yeltsin. In addition to the conspicuous extreme high cost of his own election campaign (the lack of reliable data on its cost is another source of dissatisfaction among some citizens), the multibillion-dollar distribution of debts and subsidies from the state budget by the current President of the Russian Federation, which were carried out essentially within the framework of his election campaign.

Such recipes for resolving political conflicts and achieving stability, which are regularly offered to society as postponing or even canceling elections, dissolving the opposition parliament, banning political parties, establishing a “democratic dictatorship” or a regime of personal power in the name of “order and the fight against crime,” can result in a tragic outcome. This is indisputably evidenced by the data of a study commissioned by the Central Election Commission in May 1996 on a representative all-Russian sample (authors of the research project: V.G. Andreenkov, E.G. Andryushchenko, Yu.A. Vedeneev, V.S. Komarovsky, V.V. Lapaeva, V.V. Smirnov). Almost 60% of Russians consider elections as the main means of forming government bodies. The fact that elections have become one of the basic political values ​​for the majority of Russian society is confirmed by the fact that only 16.4% of respondents approve of the use of refusal to participate in elections as a means of influencing the authorities. While 67.1% do not approve of voter absenteeism.

The civic maturity of the Russian voter is confirmed by other data from this study. Thus, the main motive (44.8% of respondents) for voting for a particular candidate is an assessment of what he can do for Russia. The stability of this position is evidenced by the answers to the question about the motives for the participation of respondents in the elections of deputies of the State Duma in December 1995: 42.6% were guided primarily by the fulfillment of their civic duty, and 23% did not want others to decide for them who should be authorities.

At the same time, in the political consciousness of compatriots there are a number of aspects unfavorable for achieving political agreement. First of all, this is a fairly large proportion of citizens who have a negative attitude towards the activities of federal bodies of all three branches of government:

to the Federation Council - 21.6%
to the Constitutional Court - 22.4%
to the State Duma - 38.9%
to the President of the Russian Federation - 42.5%

This means that no less than every fifth (and in the case of the President - almost every second) Russian is a potential supporter of the opposition. The mere presence of those dissatisfied with government and administrative bodies is not dangerous if citizens believe that by participating in elections they can change the situation in the country. However, 25.7% of compatriots do not believe in this to one degree or another.

Another institution of a democratic society that acts as a mediator between the citizen, on the one hand, and government bodies, civil servants and government leaders who ensure non-violent resolution of conflicts, on the other, are political parties. Alas, in our country political parties today are not able to play this mediating and consensual role. Only 20.4% of citizens consider themselves supporters of any political party; a candidate's affiliation with a particular political party ranks only fourth among the circumstances that a voter takes into account when choosing whom to vote for; Only 8.6% of voters are in favor of voting only according to party lists, and another 13.1% are in favor of a mixed electoral system, in which some deputies are elected according to party lists. Thus, we can state that the majority of Russians have a negative and alienated attitude towards political parties.

To achieve compromise and harmony in society, along with using the entire known arsenal of resolving political conflicts, their legalization is necessary. We are talking primarily about resolving conflicts within the framework of constitutional and legal norms and through predominantly judicial and legal institutions and procedures. This, in turn, involves restoring the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches of government. The danger is too great that someday one or another President of the Russian Federation will use the enormous constitutional powers, unprecedented for a democratic society, to establish once again an authoritarian regime for Russia.

As a result of the investigation of the Commission of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for additional study and analysis of the events that took place in the city of Moscow on September 21 - October 5, 1993, the actions of B. Yeltsin were condemned and found to be contrary to the Constitution of the RSFSR, which was in force at that time. Based on the materials of the investigation conducted by the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, it was not established that any of the victims were killed with weapons at the disposal of supporters of the Armed Forces.

Conclusion

Each of the parties to the conflict intended to achieve the removal of the opposite side from power while preserving and strengthening its power

Also, one of the reasons for the conflict was the issue of changing the current Constitution, amending the law, since the constitution, adopted at the extraordinary seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the ninth convocation on October 7, 1977, did not fit the new state system and many clauses of the constitution became invalid for expiration of time.

Time has passed since October 1993, when the conflict between the branches of power led to battles on the streets of Moscow, the shooting of the White House and hundreds of victims. But, as it turned out, few people remember about this. For many of our compatriots, the shooting death of October merges in their memory with August 1991 and the attempted coup carried out by the so-called State Emergency Committee. Therefore, they are increasingly trying to look for those responsible for the October drama in 1991.

The complex political and socio-psychological situation in Russia not only determines to a large extent the content of conflicts and the forms of their manifestation, but also affects their perception by the population, elites, and the effectiveness of the means of regulation used. The constitutional framework and legal norms for resolving conflicts have not been developed.

For this reason and due to the lack of experience in civilized and legitimate conflict management, forceful methods are most often used: not negotiations and compromise, but suppression of the enemy. The essentially conflictual methods of reforming Russian society continue to create conditions for continued confrontation. The alienation of the population from power and politics not only leads to a decrease in the legitimacy of the dominant political forces, but also causes instability in the functioning of the political system as a whole.

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In the fall of 1993, the conflict between the branches of power led to battles on the streets of Moscow, the shooting of the White House and hundreds of victims. According to many, the fate of not only the political structure of Russia, but also the integrity of the country was being decided then.

This event has many names - “Execution of the White House”, “October Uprising of 1993”, “Decree 1400”, “October Putsch”, “Yeltsin’s Coup of 1993”, “Black October”. However, it is the latter that is neutral in nature, reflecting the tragedy of the situation that arose due to the unwillingness of the warring parties to compromise.

The internal political crisis in the Russian Federation, which has been developing since the end of 1992, resulted in a clash between supporters of President Boris Yeltsin on the one hand and the Supreme Council on the other. Political scientists see in this the apogee of the conflict between two models of power: the new liberal democratic and the moribund Soviet one.

The result of the confrontation was the violent termination of the Supreme Council, which had existed in Russia since 1938, as the highest body of state power. In clashes between warring parties in Moscow, which peaked on October 3-4, 1993, according to official data, at least 158 ​​people were killed, and another 423 were wounded or otherwise damaged.

Russian society still does not have clear answers to a number of key questions about those tragic days. There are only versions of participants and eyewitnesses of the events, journalists, and political scientists. The investigation into the actions of the conflicting parties, initiated by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, remained unfinished. The investigative group was dissolved by the State Duma after a decision was made to grant an amnesty to all persons involved in the events of September 21 - October 4, 1993.

Remove from power

It all started in December 1992, when at the 7th Congress of People's Deputies, parliamentarians and the leadership of the Supreme Council sharply criticized the government of Yegor Gaidar. As a result, the candidacy of the reformer nominated by the president for the post of chairman of the government was not approved by the Congress.

Yeltsin responded by criticizing the deputies and proposed for discussion the idea of ​​an all-Russian referendum on the issue of trust. “What force pulled us into this dark period? - Yeltsin thought. – First of all, there is constitutional ambiguity. The oath is on the Constitution, the constitutional duty of the president. And at the same time, his rights are completely limited.”

On March 20, 1993, Yeltsin, in a televised address to the people, announced the suspension of the Constitution and the introduction of a “special procedure for governing the country.” Three days later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation reacted, recognizing Yeltsin’s actions as unconstitutional and seeing them as grounds for removing the president from office.

On March 28, the Congress of People's Deputies became involved, rejecting the project to call early presidential and parliamentary elections and holding a vote on Yeltsin's removal from office. But the impeachment attempt failed. 617 deputies voted in favor of removing the president from office, with the required 689 votes.

On April 25, a national referendum initiated by Yeltsin took place, in which the majority supported the president and the government and spoke in favor of holding early elections of people's deputies of the Russian Federation. Dissatisfied with the results of the referendum, opponents of Boris Yeltsin went out to a demonstration on May 1, which was dispersed by riot police. On this day the first blood was shed.

Fatal decree

But Yeltsin’s confrontation with the Supreme Council, headed by Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander Rutsky, was just beginning. On September 1, 1993, Yeltsin, by decree, temporarily suspended Rutskoi from his duties “in connection with the ongoing investigation, as well as due to the lack of instructions to the vice president.”

However, Rutskoi’s accusations of corruption were not confirmed - the incriminating documents were found to be fake. Parliamentarians then sharply condemned the presidential decree, considering that it had invaded the sphere of authority of the judicial bodies of state power.

But Yeltsin does not stop and on September 21 he signed the fatal decree No. 1400 “On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” which ultimately provoked mass unrest in the capital. The decree ordered the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council to cease their activities “in order to preserve the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation; leading the country out of the economic and political crisis.”

Boris Yeltsin directly accused the parliament and the Supreme Council of pursuing a policy of weakening the government and, ultimately, eliminating the president, having prepared and adopted “dozens of new anti-people decisions” in recent months.

A coup was brewing in the country. According to political scientists, Yeltsin's opponents had motives for removing the current president. By the time the Congress of People's Deputies was dissolved, Khasbulatov had lost his constituency, since Chechnya had de facto separated from Russia. Rutskoi had no chance of winning the presidential election, but as acting president he could count on increased popularity.

As a result of Decree No. 1400, in accordance with Article 121.6 of the current Constitution, Yeltsin was automatically removed from the post of president, since his powers could not be used to dissolve or suspend the activities of any legally elected government bodies. The post of head of state de jure passed to Vice President Rutskoi.

The President acts

Back in August 1993, Yeltsin predicted a “hot autumn.” He frequented the bases of key army units in the Moscow region, and at the same time they increased officer salaries two to three times.

In early September, by order of Yeltsin, the head of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, was deprived of a car with a special connection, and the building of the Constitutional Court itself was cleared of security. At the same time, the Grand Kremlin Palace was closed for repairs, and deputies who lost their work premises were forced to move to the White House.

On September 23, Yeltsin reached the White House. After deputies and members of the Supreme Council refused to leave the building, the government turned off heating, water, electricity and telephone. The White House was surrounded by three cordons of barbed wire and several thousand military personnel. However, the defenders of the Supreme Council also had weapons.

A few days before the events, Yeltsin met with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Director of the Federal Security Service Mikhail Barsukov at the government dacha in Zavidovo. The former head of the presidential security, Alexander Korzhakov, told how Barsukov proposed holding command post exercises to practice interaction between those units that may have to fight in the capital.

In response, Grachev perked up: “Are you panicking, Misha? Yes, I and my paratroopers will destroy everyone there.” And B.N. supported him: “Sergeich has fallen and knows better. He passed Afghanistan." And you, they say, are “parquet people,” keep quiet,” Korzhakov recalled the conversation.

Apogee

Patriarch of All Rus' Alexy II tried to prevent the brewing drama. With his mediation, on October 1, the conflicting parties signed a Protocol, which provided for the beginning of the withdrawal of troops from the House of Soviets and the disarmament of its defenders. However, the White House defense headquarters, together with deputies, denounced the Protocol and were ready to continue the confrontation.

On October 3, mass riots began in Moscow: the cordon around the White House building was broken by supporters of the Supreme Council, and a group of armed people led by General Albert Makashov seized the Moscow City Hall building. At the same time, demonstrations in support of the Supreme Council took place in many places in the capital, in which the protesters came into active conflict with the police.

After Rutskoi’s call, a crowd of demonstrators moved to the television center intending to seize it in order to give the parliamentary leaders the opportunity to address the people. However, the armed units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were ready for the meeting. When a young man with a grenade launcher fired a shot to break down the door, troops opened fire on the demonstrators and their sympathizers. According to the Prosecutor General's Office, at least 46 people were killed in the area of ​​the television center and subsequently died from their wounds.

After the bloodshed near Ostankino, Yeltsin convinced Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to order army units to storm the White House. The attack began on the morning of October 4. The lack of coordination in the actions of the military led to the fact that large-caliber machine guns and tanks fired not only at the building, but also at unarmed people who were in the cordoned off zone near the House of Soviets, which led to numerous casualties. By evening, the resistance of the White House defenders was suppressed.

Politician and blogger Alexander Verbin called the October 4 action “paid for by the military,” noting that special riot police units and specially trained snipers, on Yeltsin’s orders, shot defenders of the Constitution. According to the blogger, Western support played a significant role in the president’s behavior.

The figure of Yeltsin as the head of a state built on the fragments of the USSR completely tripled the West, primarily the United States, so Western politicians actually turned a blind eye to the shooting of parliament. Doctor of Law Alexander Domrin says that there are even facts indicating the Americans' intention to send troops to Moscow to support Yeltsin.

There is no unanimity

Politicians, journalists, and intellectuals were divided in their opinions about the events that took place in October 1993. For example, academician Dmitry Likhachev then expressed full support for Yeltsin’s actions: “The president is the only person elected by the people. This means that what he did was not only correct, but also logical. References to the fact that the Decree does not comply with the Constitution are nonsense.”

Russian publicist Igor Pykhalov sees Yeltsin’s victory as an attempt to establish a pro-Western regime in Russia. The trouble with those events is that we did not have an organizing force capable of resisting Western influence, Pykhalov believes. The Supreme Council, according to the publicist, had a significant drawback - the people who stood on its side did not have a single leadership or a single ideology. Therefore, they were unable to agree and develop a position understandable to the broad masses.

Yeltsin provoked the confrontation because he was losing, says American writer and journalist David Sutter. “The President has made no effort to engage with Parliament,” Sutter continues. “He did not try to influence legislators, did not explain what his policies were, and ignored parliamentary debates.”

Yeltsin subsequently interpreted the events between September 21 and October 4 as a confrontation between democracy and communist reaction. But experts tend to see this as a power struggle between former allies, for whom resentment over corruption in the executive branch was a powerful irritant.

Political scientist Evgeny Gilbo believes that the confrontation between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov was beneficial to both sides, since their policies did not have a constructive reform program, and the only form of existence for them was only confrontation.

“A stupid struggle for power” – this is how publicist Leonid Radzikhovsky categorically puts it. According to the Constitution in force at that time, the two branches of government squeezed each other. According to the stupid Soviet law, the Congress of People's Deputies had “full power,” writes Radzikhovsky. But since neither the deputies nor the members of the Supreme Council could lead the country, the president actually had power.

Confrontation legislative And executive power in Russia ended with bloody events in October 1993. One of the main reasons for the conflict was the fundamental difference of views on the issue of socio-economic And political course of Russia. The government headed by B.N. Yeltsin and E.T. Gaidar acted as a defender of radical market reforms, and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR headed by R.I. Khasbulatov and Vice-President of Russia A.B. Rutskoi resisted reforms, opposing the market regulated economy.

In December 1992 V.S. Chernomyrdin

replaced by E.T. Gaidar as head of government. But the expected change of course did not happen; only some adjustments were made to the monetarist course, which caused even greater indignation among legislators. The political situation in Russia in 1993 became increasingly tense.

An important reason for the growing antagonism between the two branches of government was their lack of experience in interaction within the framework of the system of separation of powers, which Russia practically did not know.

The Russian president was the first to strike at a political opponent. In a TV appearance September 21 he announced termination of powers of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council. At the same time, the presidential decree “On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation” came into force. It actually introduced temporary presidential rule and meant a radical breakdown of the entire existing state-political and constitutional system.

The Supreme Council, located in the White House, refused to obey the presidential decree and equated it to a coup d'etat. On the night of September 21-22, the Supreme Council took the oath of office as President of the Russian Federation Vice President A. Rutsky. On September 22, the Supreme Council decided to supplement the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with an article punishing unconstitutional activities, failure to comply with its decisions and the Congress, and obstruction of its activities “up to and including execution.” On the same day, the White House security service began distributing weapons to civilians.

Over the course of 10 days, the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government developed increasingly. September 27 - 28 The blockade of the White House began, surrounded by police and riot police. On the night of October 3-4, bloody skirmishes took place near and inside the television buildings; television broadcasts were interrupted, but attacks by the Supreme Council detachments were repulsed. By decree of B.N. Yeltsin in Moscow was introduced state of emergency, government troops began entering the capital. Yeltsin declared the White House's actions an “armed fascist-communist rebellion.”

On the morning of October 4 government troops began siege And tank attack on the White House. By the evening of the same day, it was captured, and its leadership, led by R. Khasbulatov and A. Rutsky, was arrested.

As a result of the storming of the White House, there were casualties on both sides, and, undoubtedly, October 1993 became a tragic page in Russian history. The blame for this tragedy lies on the shoulders of Russian politicians, who clashed in the fall of 1993 not only in fighting for their political goals, but also, to no lesser extent, in power struggle.

In September 1993 B.N. Yeltsin issued a Decree, according to which, in July 1994, early presidential elections. In the statement of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 8, i.e. After the defeat of the opposition, it was confirmed that elections to the highest legislative body would take place in December.

The internal political conflict of September 21 - October 4, 1993 was the culmination of the constitutional crisis in Russia that began in 1992. The crisis was caused by the confrontation between two political forces: on the one hand, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the government led by Viktor Chernomyrdin, a number of regional leaders, including the Moscow government, and some people's deputies; on the other, the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, most of the people's deputies, and Vice President of Russia Alexander Rutsky. The president's supporters advocated the adoption of a new Constitution, strengthening presidential power and liberal economic reforms; The Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies are for maintaining the full power of the Congress, according to Art. 104 of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1978, and against radical economic reforms.

September 21, 1993 In 2009, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 1400 “On step-by-step constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” voiced in a television address to Russian citizens. The Decree, in particular, ordered to interrupt the exercise of legislative, administrative and control functions by the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, not to convene the Congress of People's Deputies, and also to terminate the powers of people's deputies of the Russian Federation. By decree, elections to the first State Duma were scheduled for December 1993.

After the president’s address, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, Ruslan Khasbulatov, spoke on television and qualified Boris Yeltsin’s actions as a coup. On the same day, at an emergency meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Court, a resolution was adopted “On the immediate termination of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin.” The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, meeting for an emergency meeting, concluded that the presidential decree violates the Constitution in twelve points and is the basis for Yeltsin’s removal from office, according to Article 121-6 of the Basic Law and the Law “On the President of the RSFSR.” The Supreme Council decided to organize the defense of the White House. An open-ended rally of many thousands spontaneously formed outside the building.

September 22nd At the VII (emergency) session of the Supreme Council, a resolution was adopted to terminate Yeltsin’s powers from the moment he signed Decree No. 1400; the duties of the head of state were entrusted to Vice-President Alexander Rutsky. On Rutskoi’s proposal, the Supreme Court adopted resolutions on the appointment of Viktor Barannikov, Vladislav Achalov and Andrey Dunaev to the posts of Ministers of Security, Defense and Internal Affairs. The resolutions of the Supreme Court on the termination of Yeltsin's powers and their transfer to Rutskoi were approved on the evening of September 23 by the X /Extraordinary/ Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

To protect the Armed Forces building, units were formed from among volunteers, whose members were given firearms that belonged to the Armed Forces Security Department. President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin demanded that R. Khasbulatov and A. Rutsky withdraw people from the White House and surrender their weapons by October 4. By order of the government, telephone communications and electricity were cut off in the building.

In the following days, the situation around the White House deteriorated sharply. The building of the Supreme Council was cordoned off by units of internal troops and riot police, who were armed with firearms, special equipment, armored personnel carriers and water-jet installations. For their part, the defenders of the Supreme Council began to erect barricades in the center of Moscow.

October 1 In the St. Daniel Monastery, through the mediation of Patriarch Alexy II, negotiations began between representatives of the governments of Russia and Moscow and the Supreme Council. As a result, on the night of October 2, a protocol on the surrender of weapons was signed. Electricity was turned on at the White House and access restrictions were relaxed. However, a few hours later, at the initiative of the Supreme Council, the negotiations were stopped and the protocol was denounced.

2 October A rally of supporters of the Supreme Council began on Smolenskaya Square, which resulted in clashes between demonstrators and police and riot police.

October 3 The opposition rally that began on Oktyabrskaya Square attracted tens of thousands of people. Having broken through the riot police barriers, the protesters moved to the White House and unblocked it. On the orders of Alexander Rutsky, demonstrators seized the Moscow City Hall building and attempted to storm the Ostankino television center. When breaking through the cordon in the area of ​​the city hall, police officers used firearms. When storming the television center, demonstrators used military trucks. The broadcast of all TV channels was interrupted; only the second channel, operating from a backup studio, went on air. During the riots, an explosion occurred, which killed a special forces soldier, one of the defenders of the television center. After this, the special forces opened fire on the attackers. The attack on Ostankino was repelled.

In the evening of the same day, Boris Yeltsin’s decree on introducing a state of emergency in Moscow and releasing Rutskoi from his duties as vice president of the Russian Federation was broadcast on television. Units and divisions of the Taman and Kantemirovskaya divisions, the 27th separate motorized rifle brigade and several parachute regiments, the internal troops division named after. Dzerzhinsky.

In the morning The 4th of October government troops completely surrounded the White House and began shelling it with tank guns. A fire broke out in the building. At 5 p.m., White House defenders announced the cessation of resistance. A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov, V. Barannikov, A. Dunaev, V. Achalov, A. Makashov and others were arrested. The Alpha group took 1.7 thousand people under guard and evacuated from the building - deputies, employees of the Supreme Council apparatus, journalists.

October 6 Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On declaring mourning for the victims of the armed coup attempt.”

According to various sources, during the days of the armed conflict, from 140 to 160 people were killed and from 380 to 1000 people were injured. According to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office, 147 people are listed as dead. At parliamentary hearings in the State Duma in October 1995, the figure was announced - 160 dead. The State Duma Commission for Additional Study and Analysis of the Events of 1993, which worked from May 1998 to December 1999, published data on 158 deaths. At the same time, the Commission's materials indicated that "according to a rough estimate, in the events of September 21 - October 5, 1993, about 200 people were killed or died from their wounds."

February 26, 1994 Khasbulatov, Rutskoy, Makashov, Dunaev, Anpilov, Achalov - a total of 16 people accused of organizing the October events, in accordance with the State Duma amnesty resolution of February 23, 1994, were released from the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. The adoption of this decision was dictated by the conviction that “it is impossible to lead Russia out of the national crisis without an amnesty for all participants in the October 1993 events, impossible without a stable civil peace.” At the beginning of 1995, the criminal proceedings were terminated and archived.

The political results of the events of 1993 were the adoption of a new Constitution on December 12, 1993, the strengthening of presidential power, and the formation of a new bicameral parliament - the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

MOSCOW, October 4 – RIA Novosti. The October 1993 putsch was not accidental - it was prepared for two years and in the end actually killed people’s trust in power, says Sergei Filatov, president of the Foundation for Socio-Economic and Intellectual Programs, former head of President Yeltsin’s administration.

Twenty years ago, on October 3-4, 1993, clashes occurred in Moscow between supporters of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999). The confrontation between the two branches of Russian government, which had lasted since the collapse of the USSR - the executive represented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the legislative one represented by the parliament - the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR, headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, over the pace of reforms and methods of building a new state passed on October 3-4, 1993 into an armed clash and ended with tank shelling of the seat of parliament - the House of Soviets (White House).

The tension was rising

“What happened on October 3-4, 1993, was not predetermined in one day. It was an event that had been going on for two years. Over the course of two years, tension grew. And if you trace it at least through the congresses of people’s deputies, it becomes clear that this was a purposeful fight on the part of the Supreme Council against the reforms that the government was carrying out,” Filatov said at a multimedia round table on the topic: “October 1993 coup. Twenty years later...”, held at RIA Novosti on Friday.

According to him, the two top officials of the state - Boris Yeltsin and the head of the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov - failed to reach the “normal path of relationship.” Moreover, “absolute and deep mistrust” arose between the two top officials, he added.

Political scientist Leonid Polyakov also agreed with this opinion.

“In fact, the putsch of 1993 is a postponement of the State Emergency Committee of 1991. In 1991, these people, seeing hundreds of thousands of Muscovites who surrounded the White House, the leaders of the State Emergency Committee were simply, as they say, afraid. At first they themselves frightened them by bringing tanks into the capital , and then they themselves were afraid of what they had done. But those forces that stood behind it, and the people who sincerely believed in what turned out to be destroyed in August 91, they did not go away. And two years followed, the most difficult, the most difficult in our history, which included the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the state... By October 1993, this explosive potential had accumulated,” Polyakov noted.

conclusions

Conclusions from the events of 1993, according to Filatov, can be drawn both positive and negative.

“The fact that we eliminated dual power is positive, the fact that we adopted the Constitution is positive. And the fact that we actually killed people’s trust in power and this continued for the rest of the 20 years is an obvious fact that we have to restore to this day We can’t,” he says.

In turn, political scientist Polyakov expressed hope that the events of 1993 were “the last Russian revolution.”

Film about the events of 1993

During the round table, a film about the events of October 1993 was presented, filmed by RIA Novosti specialists in a web documentary format, which has received worldwide recognition due to the fact that the viewer has the opportunity to interact with the content and has greater freedom of action than the viewer of a plot with a linear form of storytelling, where the course of history is predetermined by the director. This is the third RIA Novosti film in 2013 in an interactive format.

“For each of the participants in these events, it was part of his life, part of his inner story. And it was these people we wanted to talk about in our film, interactive video; to make it possible to see through their eyes, through their emotions, through their memories those difficult days. Because now it seems like some rather distant and somewhat unusual event in our country. I really hope that it will continue to be so, because tanks shooting from the embankment at the White House is an absolutely terrible sight. And, probably, for every Muscovite and every resident of Russia, it was something absolutely incredible,” RIA Novosti Deputy Editor-in-Chief Ilya Lazarev shared his memories.

The film contains photographs of people who were later found by RIA Novosti and who spoke about their memories of those events.

“We brought photographs to life and tried to bring some episodes of the video into our present time... Our colleagues, directors, spent three months working on this format - this is a very difficult story. You can watch the film episodically, linearly, but the main story and task is to make it immersive this atmosphere, draw your own conclusions, but rather just get to know the people who lived through this story and let it pass through them,” added Lazarev.

As a result of the tragic events of October 3-4, 1993 in Moscow, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation were liquidated. Before the election of the Federal Assembly and the adoption of the new Constitution, direct presidential rule was established in the Russian Federation. By decree of October 7, 1993 “On legal regulation during the period of phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” the President established that before the start of the work of the Federal Assembly, issues of a budgetary and financial nature, land reform, property, civil service and social employment of the population, previously resolved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation , are now carried out by the President of the Russian Federation. By another decree of October 7, “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,” the president actually abolished this body. Boris Yeltsin also issued a number of decrees ending the activities of representative authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation and local Soviets.

On December 12, 1993, a new Constitution of Russia was adopted, in which such a government body as the Congress of People's Deputies was no longer mentioned.