07/14/2003, Photo: AP, GAMMA, ITAR-TASS

Contract for terrorist attack

The practice of terrorist attacks using kamikazes was brought to Chechnya by Arab mercenaries. They are the ones behind the preparation and financing of the latest terrorist attack in Tushino. He talks about who is fighting in Chechnya and for how long and is training terrorists there. Olga Allenova .

There were three Arabs, they were lying on the frozen ground, next to the trench in which they had fought off the advancing federals for several days. There were spent cartridges, used syringes, some papers and brochures in Arabic lying everywhere. The Arabs had waxen faces, bare feet and torn trousers. All the rest of their clothes lay in a heap of rags nearby. It was in the fall of 1999 on the Tersky Ridge, which had just been recaptured by the federals.

Mercenaries,” explained the army officer assigned to accompany us. “It’s good that they died here, but would have fallen into our hands... Apparently, the Muslim god took pity on them.”

These Arabs came to the Tersky Range from the nearby Chechen village of Serzhen-Yurt, where for a long time there was the camp of the field commander Khattab, the man who opened the way to Chechnya for foreign mercenaries.

Khattab was enriched by the war

Mercenary as a phenomenon appeared in the territory former USSR in the early 90s, when the country was torn apart by local conflicts. Abkhazia, Transnistria, Fergana, Karabakh - wherever another interethnic war broke out, people appeared who were ready to sacrifice their lives for money. The Ukrainian organization UNA-UNSO was especially famous at that time: in 1992 it sent several detachments to protect the Ukrainians of Transnistria, in July 1993 it sent the Argo expeditionary force to Abkhazia, which fought near Sukhumi on the side of Georgia (seven “UNS members”, the Georgian government posthumously awarded the Order of Vakhtang Gorgasal); and in 1994, the UNA-UNSO Viking unit arrived in Chechnya. They were received everywhere with open arms, because they knew: the “Unsovites” are good, disciplined warriors, and paying money good warrior no pity. Ukrainians were used to create special units in the regular army of Ichkeria; they were used as instructors to train Chechen soldiers.

However, by that time, the “king of mercenaries”, the Jordanian Khattab, had already appeared in Chechnya, who brought with him 200 dark-skinned fighters - they became the main military force of young Ichkeria. These fighters, who went through the war in Afghanistan, were supposed to teach inexperienced Chechen soldiers all the rules of the art of war.

The peak of mercenary activity came at the beginning of the second Chechen war - Wahhabism dominated in Chechnya and the mountains of Dagestan, and a lot of money went to the Caucasus to maintain and spread it. By that time, several camps for training militants and terrorists (including suicide bombers) were already operating on the territory of the republic, the instructors of which were exclusively foreign mercenaries, mainly from Arab countries. According to operational data, these camps trained up to 40 people for suicide bombers alone. This “concern” was led directly by Khattab, who received money from international terrorist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. It was at the instigation of Khattab that the second Chechen war was especially bloody, more intelligent and protracted. During this war, the Jordanian became a wealthy man, earning, according to operational data, about $20 million, and his assistants Abubakar and Abu al-Walid, according to various estimates, about $5-7 million.

Road to hell

People become mercenaries deliberately. Those who are not afraid of risk and, in principle, are ready to die, but for good money, go for it. This method of earning money is especially common in the Middle East: the standard of living there is low, families are large, and not everyone has the opportunity to feed their family and provide it with a decent future.

It all starts with the recruiter gathering a small group and the recruits immediately receive an agreed amount to leave money for the family. Usually it’s $1-2 thousand. “If you become a real mujahideen, you will receive

Big money, enough to last a lifetime,” the recruiter promises the recruit. Then a group of future Mujahideen are transported “to the base”, where they will be molded into militants.

In a number of countries there are clandestine centers for training mercenaries. Almost all the mercenaries who ended up in Chechnya went through such centers in Afghanistan, not counting Khattab and his closest associates - they “received their education” in the United States.

Training lasts a couple of months, and by the end of this period, inexperienced recruits turn out to be real “dogs of war.” They wield any type of weapon, can make a landmine from a used artillery shell, and read and make maps. They have skills in contact combat, sniper and mine-sabotage warfare. They know how to fight in the city and in the mountains, how to lure them into a “sack” and break up a military column, and how to survive in a winter forest.

If someone shows technical ability, the instructor takes him to a special group specializing in sabotage activities. A demolition specialist is highly valued by commanders; he is paid more, because often the earnings of the entire squad depend on his work. As a rule, explosions and attacks on columns are recorded on film so that the customer can be sure that the work is done and the money paid is not in vain.

Graduates of the sabotage camp are divided into small groups and secretly transported to the conflict zone. In the case of Chechnya, the mercenaries used the routes Turkey-Georgia-Chechnya or Azerbaijan-Dagestan-Chechnya.

Mercenaries receive weapons, uniforms and medicines on the spot. A small first aid kit must contain potent drugs: sometimes they are used to relieve the pain of a wound, and sometimes before a battle to gain courage. They are taught this wisdom back in the camp: “If you want to kill fear, give an injection.” Many people can no longer do without these injections.

In the first battle, they are still checked to see if the hand will tremble, if the person will take pity on the wounded enemy, if he will not run away from the battlefield. However, for the frightened, awkward and insecure, the first battle still becomes the last: they get lost and fall under bullets. The survivors are formed into units that are already assigned complex tasks.

After each successful operation, the squad leader receives the money and distributes it among his men, usually keeping the lion's share for himself. For example, for the destruction of a military column, a detachment receives $40 thousand: the commander takes 20 of them for himself, 10 is divided between two or three of his deputies, and the rest is given to the soldiers. An ordinary militant who participated in the defeat of the convoy receives approximately $1 thousand for his work. And the one who plants a landmine on the road receives only a hundred dollars.

Most mercenaries realize after a couple of months that they won’t see the big money promised, but they have nowhere to go: when they try to escape, they can shoot their own as a traitor, or the federals will cover them. However, many fighters in civilian life would not be able to earn even a third of the amount they receive, so the thought of returning home rarely occurs to them.

Live to Die

In the winter of 2000, a detachment of Arab mercenaries was leaving the high-mountainous Shatoi region, heading towards the Russian-Georgian border, and was ambushed by FSB special forces. After a fierce battle, the detachment was left with six seriously wounded mercenaries, of which only one, a Yemeni, reached the military base in Khankala. His name was Abdu-Salam Zurka, his spine was crushed and his foot was torn off. He almost didn’t answer questions; it was useless to beat him: the military doctor who examined the prisoner said that he had a day or two to live. Therefore, the security officers postponed the usual interrogation procedure. In order to demonstrate the Arab mercenary to journalists, he was taken out of the FSB tent on a stretcher and laid on the ground. He didn't notice anything - neither the TV cameramen running around, nor the newspaper men looking at him like a rare animal - he simply crossed his arms over his chest and looked detachedly at the sky. Looking at his face, it was difficult to understand whether he was alive or already on his way to another world.

Zurka was the commander of a detachment of 50 people and reported to Khattab. In the winter of 2000, his detachment distinguished itself in the battles for Grozny and left the city only after the field commander Basayev, who commanded the defense of the Chechen capital, decided to do so. Together with Basayev's fighters, the Arabs fell into a trap set by General Shamanov - in a minefield, Zurka lost half of his squad, and he himself was wounded.

But most The Yemeni spent his time in Chechnya in the vicinity of Serzhen-Yurt, where Khattab’s base was located. Zurka was quite close to the Jordanian himself: he received money for the detachment directly from him.

The military learned these details from captured Arabs who did not live to reach Khankala. They also named the amount that the Yemeni earned from this war - about $500 thousand.

The official army fiercely hates mercenaries, and they understand: if they fall into the hands of soldiers, the chances of getting out alive are reduced to zero. If a Chechen was captured, relatives brought money for him, organized rallies, and sometimes organized an exchange. Nobody asked for the captured mercenaries - they were captured mainly because their comrades abandoned them wounded on the battlefield. Moreover, even after the heaviest battle, the Chechens carried away their wounded and dead. And the wounded or killed mercenaries were left to the federales. However, the mercenaries never recognized the cult of death, widespread in Chechnya, otherwise they would hardly have gone to fight in a foreign country, where people like them were not even buried - they simply dumped their bodies in a hole and covered them with earth.

Their escape routes are also cut off. If a Chechen militant can change clothes and return home, where it will not be easy to identify him, then a mercenary who decides to relax for a couple of days in a village will probably fall into the hands of the special services: after all, it is difficult to explain what a foreigner is doing in a conflict zone.

Chinese chefs

In fact, it is virtually impossible to prove that a detained foreigner (if he is captured without weapons) is a mercenary. Not a single one of the detainees, even under torture, admits that they shot at representatives of the official authorities. Moreover, according to Russian laws, a foreigner detained in a combat zone must be released if guilt is not proven. But this irritated the military in Chechnya very much. “We know that this nit shot at our boys, and so that we let him go?!” - both soldiers and officers reasoned approximately this way. Therefore, few foreigners returned to their homeland: the lucky ones were those about whom the media managed to tell and in whom their embassies became interested. Although for some, returning to their homeland promises even more trouble.

In March 2000, after fierce fighting in the Chechen village of Komsomolskoye, FSB officers detained 11 militants from Ruslan Gelayev’s detachment, among whom were two Chinese citizens, ethnic Uyghurs. Saidi Aishan and Aymayerdzyan Amuti tried to get out of the encirclement under the guise of refugees. During interrogations, they said that they worked as cooks in Grozny: Saidi Aishan explained that he was the owner of a cafe, and the second Uighur helped him. When the bombing of Grozny began, they, together with the Chechens, went to the mountains and ended up in the Komsomolskoye area. When asked what the Uyghurs did in the militant group, the detainees replied: “We cooked food, we can’t do anything else.” They said the same thing to journalists, and the story about restaurant business in Grozny looked very plausible.

The feds were never able to prove their guilt, despite the fact that after a week of interrogation the Uighurs were barely moving. True, they were nevertheless charged with illegally crossing the state border. It turned out that before Chechnya, Aishan and Amuti lived in Alma-Ata, where a large Uighur diaspora settled - their compatriots recognized them. Here they were engaged in racketeering of Chinese shuttle traders trading in markets in Kazakhstan. Here they ended up in the underground terrorist organization “Liberation of East Turkestan”. After six months of consultations with Chinese side The FSB decided to hand over the Uyghurs to the Chinese Embassy. For Aishan and Amuti, staying in Russia would be a blessing, because in their homeland they faced the death penalty for participating in gangs.

Court in uniform

But many of those with whom the Uyghurs shared bread in the Chechen mountains were not even dealt with. At the height of hostilities, these could easily be attributed to combat losses. During the battles for Komsomolskoye, either special forces, or the GRU, or the FSB brought three bloodied Arabs to Khankala: they were unloaded from a helicopter and taken to a special tent that served as a pre-trial detention center. In the evening, the guys from the special forces came to the journalists to call home on a satellite phone. We started asking them about the detainees.

We were working with a house that was on the edge; it was too early to go deeper,” the guys readily said. “The house was blown up, six people were taken, but we don’t know how many of them were there in total.”

But they only brought three,” we were surprised. “Where are the other three?”

Yes, they accidentally fell out of the helicopter,” the guys laughed.

And then I got into a conversation with one of these special forces.

“In my memory, there are at least four foreigners with whom we worked directly,” he said. “I can’t talk about the whole of Chechnya, because we worked point-by-point: we gave a tip that strangers had appeared in such and such a village, and we Let's move there. In one of these raids they took a gang of seven people - they came to the village to rest and pick up supplies that had already been prepared for them. Among them were two Arabs and one Jordanian. We held them for almost two months, but didn’t get anything out of them. They have a story they know by heart: “We came to help our brothers in faith, because we thought that the Russians were oppressing Islam, but then we realized that we were mistaken, and it was too late to leave, they were bombing all around.” We cross-examined them, and made threats, and made all sorts of promises, but they understand perfectly well: once you confess to being a mercenary, that’s it, you can’t get out. In short, two were sent to their homeland, where their relatives came to the rescue, and the third died, something happened to his heart. But the most interesting incident happened later, near Urus-Martan they captured three more - two Chechens and a Turk. The Turk claimed that he came to Chechnya to teach Islam in schools. We collected information, it turned out that he doesn’t even know Arabic, how did he read the Koran? Locals, however, confirmed that he actually taught before the war, but not in a regular school, but in a Wahhabi school, there was such a school in Urus-Martan. And when the war began, he went with the militants to the mountains. It is clear that he did not read books in the detachment. But it is impossible to prove this. He also stayed with us for several months, groveling, ready to crawl on his knees, but he never confessed. When asked if he had picked up a weapon, he swore that he had not. “I’m a scientist,” he said. We let him go. Yes, that’s how they released me, to Urus-Martan. Where should I put it? We can’t pay for his way home, but what should we do with him? He was in Urus-Martan for several days and then disappeared. Where? Don't know. I know that people from Gelayev came to the city and tried to take him to Georgia. Apparently he was a big man after all. But they didn’t find it. Someone must have swatted the poor guy.

Maybe he really didn’t fight? - I asked.

That's what they all say. Whoever you detain, he will either pretend to be a builder or a cook. Or even a hostage. Only we have radio interception data, we hear Arabic speech, we hear them discussing the operations they carried out. And they don’t hide about the money: for a small terrorist attack it’s 100 bucks, for a medium one - 500-1000, and a large one like blowing up an entire column will cost 15 “pieces”.

The end is just the beginning

With the death of the "black god of war" Khattab, the mercenary movement was decapitated. The Jordanian's assistants tried to clean up profitable business to their own hands, but the customers had less confidence in them, and many commanders who had their own ideas for vacant positions refused to obey them. In addition, the aggravated situation in Palestine and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq forced Arab “financiers” to switch to other territories. The Chechen resistance began to fade away. Today in the mountains of Chechnya there are no more than a dozen mercenaries who simply do not know how to get out of Chechnya, which is actually blocked by the federals. They are not included in the amnesty announced to members of gangs.

Mercenaries died, but not the war waged by mercenaries. The ranks of the resistance have been replenished with “ideological” fighters “for the freedom of Ichkeria,” and these fighters will not be stopped by hunger, cold, or empty pockets. This was confirmed by the latest terrorist attack at the festival in Tushino, where two Chechen women, who, according to operational data, had undergone combat and ideological training from Arab instructors, exploded in the crowd.

Achievement list. The most famous mercenary of Chechnya

Information about the life of Habib Abd-el-Rahman Khattab is very contradictory. Born in 1963 (according to other sources, in 1965, 1966, 1970) in Jordan or Saudi Arabia in a wealthy Chechen family.

In 1987, he graduated from high school and went to college in the United States (a number of media reported that Khattab “took part in hostilities in Afghanistan” and “served in the Circassian guard of King Hussein” since 1982). In the 90s, according to the media, he fought in Afghanistan (in mujahideen detachments), Tajikistan (on the side of the Islamic opposition), Iraq (with whom the war was fought is unknown). He was wounded several times and lost two fingers.

At the same time, he met bin Laden and the leading theoretician of Islamic extremism, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, Seyid Qutb. Supposedly graduated military academy in Amman. He became an expert in explosives and all types of light weapons, as well as sabotage operations. In 1994 or 1995 he arrived in Chechnya, where he became one of the field commanders. He became widely known in April 1996 after organizing an ambush on a convoy of the 245th motorized rifle regiment near the village of Yarysh-Mardy in the Argun Gorge. Then 53 soldiers were killed and 52 were wounded.

In the summer of 1998, he became close to Shamil Basayev on the basis of organizing the Islamic Imamate in the North Caucasus. He created a number of sabotage schools, in which women also studied, who later became martyrs. Together with Basayev, he led the invasion of Dagestan in August 1999. In September 1999, according to the Prosecutor General's Office, he organized explosions in Buinaksk, Volgodonsk and Moscow, earning about $700 thousand from this. And in March 2001 - terrorist attacks in Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Karachay-Cherkessia. Khattab's largest operation was the breakthrough of one and a half thousand Mujahideen from the Vedeno Gorge in February-March 2000.

Personnel. How many mercenaries are there in Chechnya?

According to the operational directorate of the North Caucasus Military District, during the first war (1994-1996), one large unit of up to 200 people from Khattab’s Arab mercenaries operated on the territory of Chechnya. In addition to this detachment, volunteers (mainly from Ukraine and the Baltic states) also fought in the rank and file of the armed forces of Ichkeria. Moreover, Khattab’s detachment, nicknamed “Indians” by the federal forces, continued sabotage activities even after the signing of the Khasavyurt agreement, not limiting itself to the borders of Chechnya. In 1997, he blew up and fired at a convoy in North Ossetia.

The most intense influx of mercenaries into Chechnya was observed in 1998-1999 before and during the militant invasion of Dagestan. Military analysts associate the increased interest of foreign mercenaries in the republic with the growing role of Wahhabi ideology in Chechnya. By that time, several training camps were already operating in the republic, the instructors of which were exclusively foreigners. General leadership volunteers were carried out by the same Khattab.

From 1999 to 2000, the number of mercenaries in the republic remained unchanged - within 600-700 people. In 2000, a strong outflow of volunteers from Chechnya began due to the successful actions of federal troops and the strained relations between Khattab and Maskhadov. In addition, the aggravation of the situation in Palestine played a role - the main financial flows to fuel terrorism were redirected there.

By 2001, the number of mercenaries remaining in Chechnya had been reduced to 200-250 people. The intensification of the Afghan Taliban, which caused an even greater outflow of volunteers from Chechnya, and the intensified work of the special services after September 11 affected both the financing of mercenaries and their freedom of movement. Since 2000, the Pankisi Gorge has become the main base for volunteers, and clashes involving Arabs occurred mainly in the border regions of Chechnya.

Today, the total number of mercenaries operating on the territory of the Chechen Republic is negligible. After the liquidation of Khattab, the command of the units subordinate to him passed to his closest associate Abu al-Walid, and the flow of money to support volunteers in Chechnya practically ceased. In addition, some of the mercenaries who fought in Chechnya left Russia during the aggravation of the situation around Iraq.

A murderous chronicle. Suicide bombers and suicide bombers

Terrorist attacks using kamikazes were the hallmark of Arab extremists. In Russia they began to take place after Arab instructors and preachers of Wahhabism appeared here.

June 6, 2000 In Chechnya, they carried out a suicide bombing attack for the first time. It was performed by Arbi Barayeva's niece Khava. She broke through to the commandant's office building in Alkhan-Yurt in a truck with TNT. Security shot up the truck. As a result of the explosion, two riot policemen and Barayev were killed.

June 11, 2000 At a checkpoint in Grozny, a suicide bomber blew up a car. Two servicemen were killed and one was wounded.

July 2, 2000 In Chechnya, suicide bombers carried out five terrorist attacks. Two explosions occurred in Gudermes, one each in Novogroznensky, Urus-Martan and Argun. 33 police officers were killed and 84 were injured.

December 19, 2000 Mareta Dudueva tried to break through with explosives to the building of the Leninsky regional police department in Grozny, but was wounded and did not carry out the explosion.

April 9, 2001 In the toilet of the Government House building in Grozny, an explosion killed a cleaner and injured two women. The deceased was a suicide bomber.

November 29, 2001 The suicide bomber blew herself up together with the commandant of Urus-Martan, Heydar Gadzhiev.

February 5, 2002 16-year-old Zarema Inarkaeva carried explosives into the building of the Zavodsky District Department of Internal Affairs in Grozny, but only she herself suffered from the explosion.

October 23, 2002 in Moscow, Movsar Barayev’s group, which included female suicide bombers, captured about 900 people in the theater center on Dubrovka. During the operation of the special services, all terrorists were destroyed. 129 hostages died.

December 27, 2002 A 15-year-old girl and two men blew up two cars near the Government House in Grozny. 72 people were killed, 210 were injured.

May 12, 2003 In the village of Znamenskoye, Nadterechny district of Chechnya, two women and a man blew up a KamAZ truck near the district administration building. 60 people were killed and more than 250 were injured.

May 14, 2003 near the village of Iliskhan-Yurt, Gudermes region of Chechnya, a terrorist blew herself up in a crowd of people at a religious holiday. 16 people were killed and more than 140 were injured.

June 5, 2003 In Mozdok, a woman blew herself up near a bus carrying personnel from a military airfield. 20 people were killed, 14 were injured.

June 20, 2003 In Grozny, a woman and a man blew up a KamAZ truck with explosives near the building of the operational search bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 36 people were injured. Only terrorists died.

July 5, 2003 In Moscow, two female suicide bombers blew themselves up at the rock festival in Tushino. 13 people were killed and 50 were injured.

05.10.2004 - 09:52

Where does the guy get Caucasian sadness? Our information: UNA - UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian National Self-Defense). The militants of this extremist organization of Ukrainian radicals participated (or at least declared their participation) in almost all armed conflicts in the CIS. They fought in Transnistria, in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in both Chechen companies, participated in the attack on Dagestan, and were in Gelayev’s detachment, defeated in the fall of 2001. in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. DEBUT

The Unsovites started at home, in Ukraine, as an ultra-radical wing Ukrainian nationalists- independent people. In the early 90s they were quite integrated into social life Ukraine, working closely with the “People's Movement”. The first steps of the organization were pogroms Orthodox churches in Western Ukraine. Even then, the militants drew attention to themselves for the cruelty with which they beat clergy and parishioners.

The next step was actions in Crimea, where they tried to push Crimean Tatars to “cleanse” the peninsula of Russian speakers. It was not possible to unleash hostilities, but working contacts with Tatar nationalists were established. In 95 UNSO instructors in secret military camps located in the Crimean mountains trained Tatar youth. In 1992 The Unsovites went to the warring Transnistria, hoping to turn the unrecognized republic into the main base of the UNA-UNSO. But no matter how much the staff propagandists later extolled the numerous exploits of the “self-defense fighters” on the banks of the Dniester, their real contribution was more than modest. Many did not even notice several dozen militants with chevrons decorated with the “Jerusalem cross” and a trident, against the backdrop of thousands of Cossacks and volunteers from Russia. In the same year, hot guys appeared in the Caucasus. One of the leaders of the organization, Anatoly Lupinos, a criminal who spent 25 years in camps, through his prison “sidekick” Jabu Ioseliani, the leader of the Georgian armed forces “Mkhedrioni,” organized the sending of militants for the war against Abkhazia. Moreover, Jaba took upon himself all expenses for the transfer, weapons and payment of mercenaries. A detachment "Argo" was formed from the Unsovites, headed by Valery Bobrovich - the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk UNSO, a former merchant marine sailor, written off for drunkenness and profiteering, but posing as an officer, a participant in the Vietnam War. Abkhaz sources claim that the detachment decided mainly propaganda tasks, demonstrating to the Georgian army that "abroad will help us". Nevertheless, the “Argonauts” managed to be seen participating in reprisals against civilians. Fourteen of the mercenaries received the Order of Vakhtang Gorgasal - highest award Georgia. As a form of gratitude, they received one of the Mkhedrioni bases in the Kakheti mountains under their jurisdiction.

The organization’s first contacts with Chechen rebels date back to 1993, when Lupinos handed over to Dzhokhar Dudayev instructions for organizing terrorist attacks against civilians, developed by “scientific circles close to the UNSO.” Contacts were continued when a number of UNSO leaders, led by its then leader Dmitry Korchinsky, arrived in Grozny. And although it was not possible to meet with Dudayev, meetings took place with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov. With the latter, Korchinsky agreed that the UNSO would recruit air defense and air force specialists in Ukraine. Ukrainian mercenaries were supposed to receive three thousand dollars a month. To begin recruitment, the Chechens transferred foreign currency funds to the account of the Unsovo Eurasia Center, which was headed by the current leader of the organization, Andrei Shkil. But the outbreak of war mixed up the plans: the rebel aircraft were destroyed at the airfields, and there was also no need to talk about any air defense system. It is known that at the time of the storming of Grozny by the opposition on November 24, 1994. Korchinsky was there, and subsequently took part in the interrogations of Russian tank crews taken prisoner by the militants.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the Prometheus detachment was sent to Chechnya at the expense of Eurasia, the backbone of which was made up of militants trained in Kakheti. According to information from the Russian special services, the bulk of Ukrainian mercenaries in the rebellious republic were not “ideological” party extremists, but marginalized criminal elements recruited to participate in hostilities by special structures of the UNSO. But this contingent is also undergoing political training.

As a rule, the combat value of these “soldiers of fortune” left much to be desired, and Chechen employers did not stand on ceremony with them. So, during the assault on Novogroznensky by federal troops in 1996, By order of Raduev, five Ukrainian mercenaries were shot. Based on the testimony of captured militants, it was possible to recreate the picture of the death of the unlucky Landsknechts. When the federals pressed the rebels hard, the mercenaries “suddenly remembered” that their contract had expired and came to Raduev for payment. He said that we first needed to hand over the machine guns and ammunition. When the Ukrainians disarmed, he ordered his nukers to take them out.

Strictly speaking, two categories of Ukrainian “volunteers” in Chechnya can be distinguished. The first is UNSO activists, such as the Prometheus fighters; they solved mainly propaganda problems, showing “the solidarity of the Ukrainian people with the struggling Ichkeria.”

Along with direct participation in hostilities, members of the UNSO provided the Chechen rebels with powerful propaganda support. On the basis of local UNSO organizations, committees “in support of Chechnya” and information centers “Chechen-Press” were created in major cities Ukraine. Most of these structures subsequently became legal “roofs” of Chechen criminal communities.

In 1998 Dmitry Korchinsky organized the Caucasus Institute, the goal of which was declared to be “the creation of a broad anti-Russian front” in this region. There is information that Magomed Tagaev’s well-known book “Our Struggle, or the Rebel Army of Islam” was written by specialists from this “institute.” Wahhabi literature published by this organization is still supplied to the Volga regions, where a significant part of the population is Muslim, distributed among the diasporas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and supplied to Central Asia.

The Caucasus Institute and the Eurasia Center work closely with the Caucasus Center of Movladi Udugov and the Vainakh Congress of Ruslan Akaev, which controls the activities of Chechen communities in Europe.

To this day, UNSO wields significant weight in the Ukrainian establishment. For example, a member of the UNA was Leonid Kuchma’s adviser on issues social protection military personnel, Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association "Fatherland", Major General Vilen Martirosyan. The organization receives great support from the Ukrainian self-sacred “patriarch” Filaret, who achieved registration of the UNA-UNSO, from which it was removed for extremism. The Unsovites also had serious connections in the apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. For a long time, the human rights commission of the Verkhovna Rada was headed by the former leader of the UNA Oleg Vitovich. Unsovites are looking for contacts with extremist organizations in Russia.

The attempt to “make friends” with the RNE failed - the Barkashovites refused any “consultations” with the UNSO. But they managed to establish interaction with a certain Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky, a failed film director and leader of the People’s National Party (whose emblem is also the “Jerusalem” cross). According to media reports, a couple of years ago, according to the idea of ​​​​Korchinsky and Udugov, Sukharevsky was going to head the “Russian liberation army"(ROA-!?), which should be composed of the Slavs fighting on the side of the rebels.

In addition, UNA-UNSO is trying to create its own cells in the Stavropol region, Kuban, and Rostov region. Through the underground Greek Catholic order, the UNSO interacts with the intelligence structures of the Vatican, is in contact with the leader of the Italian “Red Brigades” Pietro Danutzoo, and also (according to Korchinsky) with the Masonic lodge “P-2”. Since the mid-90s, contacts have been established with Algerian fundamentalists, the IRA, American and German neo-Nazis, and the South African Iron Guard. Interviews with the leaders of these organizations, analysis of their activities, and “exchange of experience” filled the pages of UNS newspapers and magazines. It is curious that almost simultaneously the UNSO established contacts with the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Turkish Gray Wolves.

Through the Turks they reached Afghan Mujahideen Hekmatyar, and even suggested that they create an “International of the Offended,” which would include terrorist organizations from all over the world, but they did not meet with “understanding.” There is information that contact with the Taliban movement was once established through Udugov and Yandarbiev.

Thus, Russian special services have information that the participation of UNSO militants in mass riots organized by the Belarusian opposition in Minsk was paid from a special fund created by Western “sponsors” to overthrow Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. But these contacts, oddly enough, are not advertised.

In 1991, a coup took place in Chechnya and Dudayev came to power, declaring independence from the Russian Federation. Russia actually recognized Chechen independence for 3 years, giving the Chechen people a chance to build a fair, worthy state. When genocide against the Russian-speaking population and bandit lawlessness became absolutely intolerable, Russia at the end of 1994. sent in its troops and launched a counter-terrorism operation. How did Ukraine behave in relation to this armed conflict?

Bandera in the mountains of Chechnya

The Ukrainian authorities openly hosted not only refugees from Chechnya; assistance was provided to wounded militants in Crimean sanatoriums. A Kyiv commercial company paid for the treatment. Only one batch of militants who arrived in Crimea numbered 200 people. They were provided with places in several sanatoriums of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. People from Chechnya did not hesitate to express anti-Russian views in the Ukrainian media and, with the knowledge of the Ukrainian authorities, organized Chechen diaspora organizations to fight Russia. Chechens were given the opportunity to create their own public associations, who do not hide their aggressiveness towards Russia and Russians. Even in Crimea, it was allowed to hold provocative rallies under Chechen flags, proclaim chauvinistic slogans and threaten Russians. Ukrainian politicians turned a blind eye to the participation of Ukrainians in hostilities against Russia. Ukrainian militants, without any opposition from the Ukrainian authorities, arrived in Chechnya through the neighboring CIS republics. It is significant that one of the streets in Lviv was named after Dudayev. A number of UNSO leaders personally met with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov. With the latter, the leader of the UNSO, Korchinsky, agreed that the UNSO would recruit air defense and air force specialists in Ukraine. Ukrainian mercenaries were supposed to receive three thousand dollars a month. To begin recruitment, the Chechens transferred foreign currency funds to the account of the Unsovo Eurasia Center, which was headed by Andrei Shkil. But the outbreak of war mixed up the plans: the rebel aircraft were destroyed at the airfields, and there was also no need to talk about any air defense system.

It is known that at the time of the storming of Grozny by the opposition on November 24, 1994. Korchinsky was there, and subsequently took part in the interrogations of Russian tank crews taken prisoner by the militants. After the outbreak of hostilities, the Prometheus detachment was sent to Chechnya, at the expense of Eurasia, the backbone of which was made up of Ukrainian militants trained in Kakheti. During the first campaign, the Unsovo press intensively advertised the exploits of the Viking detachment, led by the head of the Rivne UNSO Alexander Muzychko (Sashko Bily). They say that, under the guise of a refugee, he penetrated the location of Russian troops, and, volunteering to be a guide, led them into an ambush. He was nominated for the Ichkeria Order of "Hero of the Nation". After he took part in a gang war in Rivne and was arrested, Maskhadov personally petitioned Kuchma for a “hero.” As is already known, this “hero” was found not only by the Chechen order, but also by a Ukrainian bullet. There is information that Ukrainians took part in the development of Basayev’s action in Budenovsk; the Unsovites, thanks to their Slavic appearance, provided some stages of this operation. On average, taking into account regular rotation, at least a hundred Ukrainian nationalists constantly fought on the side of the Chechen separatists, the majority in a separate detachment. Along with direct participation in hostilities, members of the UNSO provided the Chechen rebels with powerful propaganda support. On the basis of local UNSO organizations, committees “in support of Chechnya” and information centers “Chechen Press” were created in large cities of Ukraine. Most of these structures subsequently became legal “roofs” of Chechen criminal communities.

In 1998 Dmitry Korchinsky organized the Caucasus Institute, the goal of which was declared to be “the creation of a broad anti-Russian front” in this region. There is information that Magomed Tagaev’s well-known book “Our Struggle, or the Rebel Army of Islam” was written by specialists from this “institute.” Wahhabi literature published by this organization is still supplied to the Volga regions, where a significant part of the population is Muslim, distributed among the diasporas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and supplied to Central Asia. The Caucasus Institute and the Eurasia Center work closely with the Caucasus Center of Movladi Udugov and the Vainakh Congress of Ruslan Akaev, which controls the activities of Chechen communities in Europe. In December 2006, Prime Minister of the Republic of Chechnya R. A. Kadyrov stated that “Foreign fighters who are representatives of different states. Previously, they were divided into groups: there was a Turkish group, a Ukrainian group, as well as mercenaries from Saudi Arabia - and now this structure is completely destroyed,” Kadyrov noted.

In March 2014 investigative committee Russia along the North Caucasus federal district a criminal case has been initiated against Ukrainian citizens who were members of the UNA-UNSO: Igor Mazur, Valery Bobrovich, Dmitry Korchinsky, Andrei and Oleg Tyagnibok, Dmitry Yarosh, Vladimir Mamalyga and other persons not yet identified by the investigation. Depending on the role of each, they are suspected of committing crimes under Part. 1, 2 tbsp. 209 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (creation of a stable armed group (gang) for the purpose of attacking citizens, leadership of such a group (gang) and participation in attacks committed by it). According to the magazine “Soldier of Fortune,” citing sources in the UNA-UNSO, about 10 Ukrainian militants were killed and about 20 wounded in Chechnya. Reference: UNA - UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian National Self-Defense). Militants of this organization participated in many armed conflicts in the CIS.

Today, rabid nationalism and Russophobia have become official ideology Ukrainian authorities. So is it any wonder that Russia is reacting harshly to an outright threat?

Sources:
Connections between Chechens and Bandera

MERCENARY

Jordanian Khalid al-Hayad had an affair in his country. A small company selling office equipment and a hairdressing salon provided good profits. In addition, the connections acquired while studying at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute helped open a branch in Ukraine. There, in Kyiv, he met resourceful guys from Chechnya. They helped establish close commercial relations with the relatives of Ruslan Gelayev. At that time, it seemed to Khalid that the Russians were oppressing a small, unfortunate people, trampling on ancient customs and destroying the Muslim faith. Without much hesitation, he accepted the offer to go to Chechnya, especially since the trip promised not only moral satisfaction for providing all possible assistance and spiritual support to the long-suffering Chechens, but also, in the Jordanian’s opinion, should have resulted in considerable profit - the militants were in dire need of satellite communications.

Khalid al-Khayad spent several months among the Chechen bandits. He fought with them, suffered from hunger and suffered hardships in the mountains, and left Grozny through minefields. A zealous Islamist, he was sure that every devout Muslim should fight Russia. However, after the defeat of Gelayev’s gang in the village of Komsomolskoye, Khalid decided to surrender to Russian troops. Voluntarily. After everything he saw in Chechnya, his beliefs changed radically.

Mercenaries, of course, are different. For most people, money is the main measure of life. But there are also convinced enemies of Russia, Russians, and Christians. The motivation here is political. Such are, for example, the Kosovo Albanians, who cannot forgive Russia for its sympathy for the Serbs. Most of them arrived in Chechnya before the start of the war, in the summer of 1999. Khattab established connections, and the guys from the Kosovo Liberation Army went to North Caucasus- some through Azerbaijan, some through Georgia - to slaughter the Russians. Most of the Albanians have already been killed. So are the Taliban. They seem to be fighting here for faith, that is, they are killing Christians. But how they explain to themselves the aggression against Dagestan (almost entirely Muslim) is unknown. There are haters of everything Russian from among the Baltic states and Ukrainians. According to some reports, in December 1999 in Grozny, about 300 mercenaries from Ukraine were under the arms of bandits. Some of them fought in the first Chechen war. First of all, these are representatives of the extremely nationalist organization UNA-UNSO, which actively supplies live goods to the “Chechen front”.

“Lard in the trenches,” is what Russian soldiers in Chechnya call Ukrainian mercenaries. And our closest neighbors and blood brothers do not expect mercy from the “federals.” That's why they fight desperately. As a rule, they do not surrender. Firstly, legally they are not subject to amnesty (like citizens of another country). Secondly, every mercenary, in theory, is devoid of moral principles, since he fights only for money. Romance and thirst for adventure do not count here. The boys from Ukraine, unlike the Chechens, cannot say that they are defending their land and their families, the sovereignty of their republic and the honor of the mountaineers (despite the dubiousness of these arguments). They, Christians, cannot defend Islamic values ​​against the “aggression of Orthodoxy,” which is the ideological basis of the Wahhabis.

It is this betrayal of brothers by faith and blood that most irritates the Russian military. Moreover, there are many Ukrainians in the ranks of the federal army - soldiers, officers, and generals. And they serve heroically. However, even on the bandit side, Ukrainians fight to the last bullet. For example, female snipers from Poltava and Nikolaev acted desperately: they killed more than one Russian fighter with their rifles. They were tracked for a long time, hunted and eventually killed.

The Russians who are fighting in Chechnya against the “federals” stand apart. These are mostly criminals hiding in territory not controlled by the Russian authorities. By the will of fate, they were forced to take up arms and found themselves in the same trench with local “thugs.” There are also drug addicts among Russians who are addicted to the Chechen drug. Among them there are also former Russian military personnel who, for one reason or another, converted to Islam and fought on the side of the militants. Two of these, former servicemen of the internal troops from the Sofrinsky brigade, were recently sentenced by a military court to long terms of imprisonment.

However, the most surprising thing is that among the mercenaries there are also romances. A. Korchinsky, the former leader of UNA-UNSO, who has now fallen out with his comrades, wrote about them in his book of memoirs. At one time, the Una-Uns fought in Transnistria, in Abkhazia, in the first Chechen war, they are still fighting in the mountains of Chechnya. Many of them, when signing a contract, were guided more by a thirst for adventure than by a desire to make money. The former leader of UNA-UNSO recalls an incident when his squad, planning to fight on the side of the Abkhazians, ended up on the Georgian side. They stayed there. They shot at the Abkhazians and their allies solely due to ridiculous circumstances. By by and large, they didn’t care which side to fight on.

Before the second Chechen war, the republic essentially turned into an international gangster enclave. There you could meet mercenaries from all over the world. True, during the counter-terrorist operation of mercenaries from countries far abroad decreased noticeably. Firstly, due to the active and successful actions of federal forces. There are fewer and fewer people from Arab countries, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Kosovo willing to go to Chechnya for slaughter. In addition, the appearance of Arabs and Taliban differs from the appearance of Chechens. And if the latter have the opportunity to disguise themselves as a local civilian, then no makeup will help an Arab, Taliban or Kosovo Albanian with a characteristic “face”, and even without knowledge of the Chechen and Russian languages. They have no escape routes. There are very few Arabs left in the ranks of the militants, mostly Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Latvians.

Secondly, the material incentive - the main motive for the actions of the mercenary - is clearly discredited by Basayev and Khattab and “swindlers” like them. Mercenaries were often paid in counterfeit dollars printed in Urus-Martan.

In addition, most contracts specifically stipulated that the militant receives money only if he proves the murder of a Russian soldier or officer. A separate fee for a damaged tank or armored personnel carrier. In general, the payment system is quite strict. Radio interceptions of militants' conversations indicate the complete disappointment of the mercenaries.

“We didn’t agree like that,” the foreigners reproach the Chechen field commanders, “you promised that there would be military equipment, but there is none, you said that the aviation would not attack, but it does not give us a break.

What did the militant commanders answer? They said that the Russians themselves deceived them - they fought too competently. But it is not in their power to revise the contract.

In general, in addition to the natural loss of mercenaries from the attacks of the “federals,” there was also an outflow of them from the trenches for financial reasons.

The mercenaries also became outcasts among the local population, that is, among the Chechens themselves, because they were engaged in robberies, taking everything in sight: both clothes and food. Some apartments and houses in Grozny were raided two or three times. Even field commanders tried to stop the theft: they only allowed people to take food and forbade people from entering locked doors. The mercenaries understood these orders in their own way: if they could not enter the doors, they climbed through the windows.

Among them, I repeat, there were many drug addicts. After federal troops captured Grozny in a tight ring, the potion became in great short supply, and its prices increased fabulously. Even under air and artillery fire, the mercenaries were ready to carry bags of loot to the market all day long, so that by the evening, having sold all their belongings, they would receive a syringe with a dose and relax.

No matter how the mercenaries hide in the caves of mountainous Chechnya, a terrible ending awaits them. This is not just my conclusion. This is also the opinion of the Jordanian Khalid I mentioned, who said at a press conference: “Those Muslims who are going to go to Chechnya to fight will only face death. The same fate will befall the Slavic mercenaries. If such volunteers are not killed Chechen fighters, then they will inevitably come under fire from Russian aviation and artillery. It's better to sit at home and live a normal life. Those who still hold weapons actually don’t want to fight anymore. I just don't advise anyone to go here. In Chechnya, many people die in vain. A person here is like a commodity. People are stolen and trafficked here.”

This was said not by me, a Russian general, but by a former Wahhabi, an anti-Russian Muslim, a recent ally of the Basayevs and Khattabs.