Book of Memory and Glory - Upper Silesian offensive operation. Battle for Lower Silesia

After the defeat of the German troops during the Vistula-Oder operation, the Wehrmacht quickly created a new defensive line, the basis of which were the fortified cities of Breslau, Glogau and Liegnitz.

In February - March 1945, battles unfolded in Nizhnyaya and Upper Silesia.

The 1st Ukrainian Front, which included the 10th Guards Ural-Lvov Volunteer Tank Corps, was given the task:

Task: defeat the enemy's Silesian group, reach the Neisse River line and take more advantageous starting positions for subsequent attacks in the Berlin and Dresden directions.

Lower Silesian offensive operation (8–24 February 1945)

As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder River at the end of January.

Defending directly in the front zone were: one corps of the 9th Army of the Vistula Army Group, the 4th Tank and 17th Armies of the Center Army Group (commanded by Colonel General F. Schörner).

The main blow against this enemy group was planned to be delivered from two large bridgeheads on the Oder - north and south of Breslau (Wroclaw).

North of Breslau a strike force was created consisting of

3rd Guards, 13th, 52nd and 6th Combined Arms Armies, 3rd Guards and

4th Tank Army, 25th Tank and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps.

The 5th Guards and 21st armies concentrated on the bridgehead south of Breslau,

4th Guards Tank and 31st Tank Corps.

On the left wing of the front it was supposed to operate

third group - 59th, 60th armies and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps,

striking from a bridgehead southwest of Oppeln (Opole)

along the northern slopes of the Sudeten Mountains.

Actions of the front troopssupported by the 2nd Air Army.

On February 8, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, after artillery preparation, went on the offensive and on the very first day broke through the enemy’s defenses in the center and on the right wing of the front, the 59th and 60th armies were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses and on February 10, by order of the command, they crossed to defense. Developing the offensive, the main forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front defeated the approaching enemy reserves, overcame intermediate defensive lines and by February 15 advanced 60–110 kilometers, occupying a number of administrative and industrial centers of Lower Silesia, as well as the cities of Naumburg (Nowogrodziec), Liegnitz (Legnitz) ), Bunzlau (Boleslawiec), Sorau (Zary) and others. The remnants of the Wehrmacht's 4th Panzer Army retreated across the Bober River.

Sappers build a bridge across the Oder, 1945.

Two German garrisons remained in the rear, surrounded in the city of Breslau (about 40 thousand people, the garrison was liquidated by May 6) and the city of Glogau (Glogow) (about 18 thousand people, was liquidated by April 1). By February 24, front troops reached the same line on the Neisse River with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, occupying an advantageous operational-strategic position for the final blow in the Berlin direction and covering the position in relation to the Upper Silesian (Oppeln) enemy group.

Task: During the Lower Silesian operation, the 10th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps was ordered, together with formations of the 13th Army, to attack the cities of Sorau and Forst.

Three days after the start of the operation, a dam on the Bubr River near the city of Zagan was captured. The 29th Guards Unechskaya Motorized Rifle Brigade, reinforced by tanks from the 62nd Guards Perm-Keletsky Tank Brigade, occupied a working hydroelectric power station. During the capture of the crossing on the Bubr River, driver-mechanic A.G. Tereshchenko distinguished himself; with his tank he crushed 3 enemy guns, 4 machine guns, destroyed more than 50 Nazis, and after the battle, seriously wounded, he took his tank to a safe place. On February 13, units of the corps broke into the city of Sorau. During fierce street battles, tankers and motorized riflemen, supported by the fire of mortarmen of a mortar regiment, overcoming the ambushes of the Nazis holed up in basements and attics, destroyed enemy tanks and firing points and on the same day completely cleared the city of Nazi troops. After the capture of Sorau, parts of the corps continued their offensive and reached the Neisse River near the city of Forst. On February 21, the corps, like other formations and units of the 4th Tank Army, was withdrawn to the front reserve for replenishment with people and equipment.

Tank repair in field conditions. 1944–1945. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

For the successful completion of combat missions during the Lower Silesian operation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief twice expressed gratitude to the corps personnel on February 14 and 15, 1945.

Thus, during the Lower Silesian operation, which lasted 17 days, the enemy’s 4th tank and 17th field armies suffered a serious defeat. The enemy's defenses along the Oder River on a front of 250 kilometers were destroyed, the remnants of the troops were thrown back to the left bank of the Neisse River, that is, more than 100 kilometers from starting position. With the entry of front formations to the Neisse River, the enemy lost very important military-industrial areas in the southeastern part of Germany, which until now had supplied the Wehrmacht with military equipment, synthetic fuel and ammunition.

Repairing a tank in the field. 1944–1945.

The operational-strategic significance of the operation was that the front troops captured advantageous positions for the final blow in the Berlin direction. In addition, his formations took an enveloping position in relation to the enemy’s Upper Silesian group and were able to prepare a further offensive in the direction of the cities of Dresden and Leipzig, as well as in the central regions of Czechoslovakia.

During the Lower Silesian operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command repeatedly drew the attention of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the danger of a significant lag (up to 200 kilometers) of the left wing troops from the main group. Taking this into account, on February 28, the Military Council presented to Headquarters a plan for an offensive operation of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Upper Silesia.

Upper Silesian operation (15–31 March 1945)

The Upper Silesian operation was part of the Red Army’s strategic offensive in January–March 1945 on a 1,200-kilometer front from the Baltic Sea to the Danube. As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation and the Lower Silesian operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder River and the Neisse River, occupying an enveloping position in relation to the Upper Silesian group of fascist German troops.

The task of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the defeat of the Oppeln-Ratibor group of fascist German troops opposing the southern wing of the front and the exit of the troops of the left wing of the front into the foothills of the Sudetenland.

To accomplish the task, two strike groups were created: northern and southern.

The northern group included the 4th Tank Army.

Directly in the zone of the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops, they defended

17th Army and Heinrici Army Group of Army Group Center,

1st Tank and 17th Armies of Army Group Center,

numbering about 20 divisions, 340 tanks and assault guns,

about 5 thousand guns and mortars and 750 aircraft.

The front commander created two strike groups:

one (4th Tank Army, 21st Army, 34th Rifle Corps

and 4th Guards Tank Corps) –

to the north and another (59th and 60th armies,

7th Guards Mechanized and

31st Panzer Corps) - south of Oppeln.

On March 15, both Soviet groups went on the offensive, overcame the enemy’s tactical defense zone within three days, and on March 18 closed the encirclement ring around five enemy divisions southwest of Oppeln. On March 19–20, the surrounded group was eliminated. The Nazi troops lost about 60 thousand people, including 18 thousand as prisoners.

As a result of the Upper Silesian operation, the Red Army captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia and by March 31 reached the border of the city of Strehlen, the Neisse River - in the foothills of the Sudetenland, occupying an advantageous position for striking in the Dresden and Prague directions.

Task: During the Upper Silesian operation, the army command assigned the Ural Tank Corps the following task: together with the 117th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army, strike the enemy and reach the area of ​​the cities of Neustadt and Sultz.

On March 17, the corps crossed the Neisse River. After completing the crossing, the corps moved to Neustadt and part of its forces to Sultz. By the evening of March 18, the 61st Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade captured the city of Neustadt on the move. The main forces of the corps reached the Sülz area, where they linked up with units of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps. The encirclement of the enemy Oppeln group was completed.

On the same day, March 18, a telegram was received from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the transformation of the 4th Tank Army into the 4th Guards Tank Army. This news was received by the tankers with great enthusiasm.

The surrounded Nazi formations and units made desperate attempts to escape from the “cauldron.” An order was received to destroy the enemy.

By the morning of March 22, the encircled enemy group was completely eliminated. Following the destruction of the enemy Oppeln group, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were to capture the city of Ratibor, a stronghold and industrial center of Upper Silesia. The 4th Guards Tank Army took part in solving this combat mission together with the 60th Army. The Ural tank crews were ordered to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the city of Leobschütz on the night of March 24-25. On March 25, the corps was brought into battle to build up the attack of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

The Red Army is on the offensive. 1945

Trying at all costs to hold the western part of the Upper Silesian basin, the only coal and metallurgical base remaining after the loss of the Ruhr, the Nazi command brought here several formations withdrawn from other sectors of the front, including the 16th and 17th tank divisions, the tank SS division "Fuhrer's Guard".

Heavy fighting ensued. The SS division "Fuhrer's Guard", on which the German command placed special hopes, acted against the Urals. The Ural tank crews once again showed their ability to successfully fight with the best connections enemy. The enemy defenses began to fall apart.

Together with the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, volunteer tankers took part in the encirclement of two fascist divisions in the area of ​​​​the city of Biskau. The Sverdlovsk tank brigade - all the remaining available tanks of other brigades of the corps were brought into it - went to the rear of the enemy's Ratibor group and captured the city of Reisnitz. Here, the tankmen of the guard battalion of Captain V.A. Markov, who were the first to break into the city, especially distinguished themselves.

V. A. Markov sets a task for the tank crews. 1945 From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

On March 31, together with the 60th Army, our tankers began an assault on Ratibor, and the enemy could not withstand the onslaught of the Red Army.

On March 31, 1945, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief expressed gratitude to the corps personnel, including the soldiers of the 61st Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade, for excellent military operations during the capture of the cities of Ratibor and Biskau.

Upper Silesian offensive ended with the encirclement and destruction of more than five enemy divisions, and the rest of his forces were thrown back into the foothills of the Sudetenland.

As a result of the February-March offensive, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front overcame the powerful enemy defense line on the Oder River, relying on which the Nazis hoped to reliably cover the Berlin and Dresden directions.

Thus, by the end of March, the Red Army, in cooperation with the Polish Army, having completed the liberation of Poland, reached the coast of the Baltic Sea and the Oder and Neisse rivers. As a result of the operations carried out, Nazi Germany lost important military-industrial and agricultural areas, and its armed forces suffered new, irreparable losses. All this created the necessary conditions for subsequent attacks on the enemy in the Berlin, Dresden and Prague directions.

In the second half of February 1945, the armies of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, with access to the Oder and Neisse rivers, were almost 200 km ahead of the formations operating on its left wing. The situation that developed on the line of contact between the parties allowed the enemy to launch a counterattack from the area of ​​the Oppel salient, which called into question the prospects for a further offensive in the Berlin direction. In order to exclude such a development of events, the commander of the front troops, Marshal Soviet Union I.S. Konev decided to encircle the formations of the German 17th Army and the Heinrici Army Group, concentrated southwest of Oppeln, which posed a serious danger, and after their defeat, reach the line of Strehlen, Patschau, Opava, that is, in the foothills of the Sudetenland.

The plan of the operation was to strike in directions converging on Neustadt with the forces of two groups - the Oppeln (northern) and the Ratibor (southern) groups. The first of them included the 21st and 4th (from March 17, 1945 - 4th Guards) tank armies of Colonel General D.N. Gusev and D.D. Lelyushenko, 34th Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army (Colonel General A.S. Zhadov) and 4th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General P.P. Poluboyarov). The basis of the southern group was the 59th and 60th armies of Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov and Colonel General P.A. Kurochkin, 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General I.P. Korchagin and the 31st Tank Corps of Major General G.G. Kuznetsova. Support for ground forces was entrusted to the 2nd Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation S.A. Krasovsky. In total, 31 rifle divisions (average strength - 3-5 thousand people), 5,640 guns and mortars, 988 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 1,700 aircraft were involved in the offensive.

The Soviet troops were opposed by up to 15 divisions, over 1,420 guns and mortars, 94 tanks and assault guns, operating with the support of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet. Taking into account the shallow construction of the enemy’s defense, as well as the great superiority of the front over it in military equipment and weapons, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev planned to achieve the goal of the operation in a short time. Therefore, the main role in the offensive was assigned to formations of the 4th Tank Army, 7th Guards Mechanized and 31st Tank Corps. They were supposed to, together with rifle units, break through the enemy’s defenses, and then quickly move into depth in order to deprive the German command of the opportunity to respond in a timely manner to changes in the situation.

On March 15, after artillery preparation, formations of two strike groups attacked the front line of the enemy defense. However, from the very beginning, bad weather made adjustments to the plans of the front-line command. Due to poor weather conditions, aviation began to operate only after noon. Of the total number of 2,995 sorties planned for the day, it was able to carry out only 1,283. During the preparation for the attack and at its start, only artillery carried out fire on the enemy, which was unable to destroy the majority of anti-tank weapons. In such conditions, the expectation of using mobile formations in the first echelon to break through the defense did not justify itself. The tank corps suffered heavy losses. For example, in the 31st Tank Corps they made up more than 30% of combat vehicles.

The actions of the tanks, moreover, were significantly complicated by the spring thaw. They were forced to move mainly along roads on which German units had prepared strong centers of resistance and ambushes in advance. There were battles for every height, road junction, and populated area. As a result, by the end of the day, the northern strike group was able to break through only two enemy defense positions. The southern group was more successful, covering from 8 to 10 km.

The slow advance of Soviet troops allowed the enemy command to take measures to strengthen the threatened areas. During March 15-16, it began to transfer motorized, tank and infantry divisions to them. To forestall them in occupying defensive lines, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev ordered not to stop the offensive at night, for which purpose one reinforced rifle battalion from each division should be allocated every day. As a result of the measures taken, the formations of the two strike groups completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and on March 18 established contact in the Neustadt area. Units of the 20th SS Infantry Division, the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, the 18th SS Motorized Division, and several separate regiments and battalions were surrounded.

The content of the method of defeating the enemy chosen by the front commander was to immediately deliver several strikes without additional preparation, cut the encircled group into pieces, isolate them from each other, disrupt interaction and disorganize control. He entrusted the implementation of these tasks to the 21st and 59th armies, while simultaneously ordering the 4th Guards Tank Army to exclude the approach of enemy reserves from the area west of Neisse. During March 19-20, this army thwarted all attempts by the German command to release its troops and created the conditions for their liquidation by rifle formations.

Subsequently, the offensive was carried out in separate directions with the goal of reaching the foothills of the Sudetenland. The most favorable situation for pursuing the enemy developed in the zone of the 21st Army. Here, on March 24, its units, together with units of the 4th Guards Tank Army, after intense street fighting, captured a large junction of railways and highways - the city of Neisse. Thus, they deprived the enemy command of the opportunity to operate the rock railway connecting Army Groups “Center” and “South”.

In more difficult conditions, at the final stage of the operation, the 60th Army had to operate, which struck in the direction of Ratibor, Opava. If it reached Opava, it would create a threat to the rear of the enemy group covering the Moravska-Ostrava industrial region. Therefore, the German command tried in every possible way to delay the further advance of the army, for which it transferred two additional tank divisions against it. In order to break the increased resistance of the enemy, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev decided to withdraw the 4th Guards Tank Army from the battle in the 21st Army zone and regroup it into the 60th Army zone.

The arrival of tank formations made it possible to increase the overall pace of the offensive. On March 27, the divisions of the 60th Army liberated the city of Rybnik, but were stopped on the approaches to Ratibor. The turning point in the fighting came after two breakthrough artillery divisions and most of the army artillery were concentrated here. Their massive use left the enemy no chance of success. On March 31, Soviet troops completed the liberation of the city.

As a result of the operation, the armies of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia and occupied an advantageous position for subsequent attacks on the Dresden and Prague directions. They destroyed more than 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, captured 14 thousand people, disabled 280 tanks and assault guns (including those that arrived during the fighting), up to 600 field guns, a large number of another military equipment. At the same time, the front's losses in people amounted to 66,801 people, of which 15,876 were killed, dead or missing.

Anatoly Borschov,
senior researcher at the Research Institute
Institute ( military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Upper Silesian operation

The 1st Ukrainian Front was not allowed to rest and recuperate before the final push to Berlin. While the troops of Zhukov and Rokossovsky fought for Danzig, the Altdamm bridgehead and Küstrin, several armies of Konev fought the last battle before Berlin on their left flank. The offensive operation was initiated by Headquarters. Even during the February offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Lower Silesia, the Supreme High Command repeatedly drew the attention of I.S. Konev to a serious lag of the troops of the left wing of the front. It emphasized that this circumstance could subsequently complicate the preparation and conduct of operations by front forces in the Berlin direction.

To be precise, it was not so much the flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front that lagged behind, but rather the 4th Ukrainian Front of I.E. Petrov, advancing into Upper Silesia from the east. Back on February 13, 1945 I.E. Petrov presented a report to Headquarters with an operation plan to capture the Moravian-Ostravian industrial region. The purpose of the operation in the report was formulated as follows: “dealing a concentrated blow with the forces of two armies (38 and 1 Guards A) in the direction of Olomouc, Pardubice, defeat the opposing enemy and, reaching the line of the river with the main forces. Vltava, take possession of Prague." To carry out the operation, the 126th and 127th light mountain rifle corps and the 5th Guards were transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front. mechanized body. By Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11029 of February 17, the plan presented by the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front was approved. I.E. Petrov was recommended: “The operation should begin no later than March 10.” In terms of the March offensives, the desire of the Soviet command to carry out a coordinated operation on adjacent flanks of two fronts is clearly visible. Advancing into Upper Silesia from the north, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went to the flank and rear of the Heinrici army group, which was defending itself in front of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Following the instructions of Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed an offensive plan in Upper Silesia and on February 28 submitted it for approval. In his memoirs, Konev described his plan as follows: “When planning the Upper Silesian operation, we counted primarily on the encirclement of that part of the Nazi troops that were located on the Oppeln ledge itself and directly in Oppeln.” On March 1, the plan submitted to Headquarters was approved.

To solve the problem posed by Headquarters, I.S. Konev decided to use the overhanging position of the bridgehead captured by Soviet troops in the Grottkau area. To some extent, it repeated the operation to encircle Breslau, carried out in February 1945. In Upper Silesia, it was also planned to launch attacks in converging directions from two bridgeheads on the Oder. In accordance with the general plan for the operation, the front commander created two strike groups - the Oppeln group (in the ledge northwest of Oppeln) and the Ratibor group (on the bridgehead north of Ratibor).

The shelling of Gdynia is carried out by a 203-mm howitzer B-4.

The Oppeln group included the 21st Combined Arms and 4th Tank Armies, the 34th Guards. Rifle Corps 5th Guards. army and 4th Guards. tank corps. It was supposed to strike in the general direction of Grottkau, Neisse, Neustadt, where it would connect with the Ratibor group. The Ratibor group included the 59th and 60th armies, the 7th Guards. mechanized and 31st tank corps. This group had the task of striking from a bridgehead north of Ratibor in a westerly direction towards the troops of the Oppeln group and by the end of the third day of the operation connecting with it in the area of ​​Neustadt and Sülz.

Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet command could concentrate tank rams in any direction, providing itself with at least the advantage of the first strike. The 4th Panzer Army, which had just operated in a westerly direction between the Beaver and Neisse rivers, was moving far to the southeast. In particular, the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps of the 4th Panzer Army withdrew from the bridgehead at Steinau on March 4–6 and set off on night marches past the encircled Breslau to the southeast. He concentrated in the designated area by March 10th. The corps, battered in the February battles, left the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade in the previous area of ​​deployment. There were only 4 T-34 tanks left in it. But in general, in 1945, equipment was replenished regularly. During the preparation for the operation, the 4th Tank Army received 159 T-34-85, 45 IS-2, 21 SU-100 and 2 °SU-76 for completion. The newest SU-100s were received in the form of a brand new 1727th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. In total, by March 14 in the army D.D. Lelyushenko there were combat-ready 302 T-34-85, 11 T-34-76, 47 IS-2, 2 SU-122, 21 SU-100, 5 SU-85, 52 SU-57, 38 SU-76 and 4 Valentine » Mk.IX/X. Another 6 vehicles (2 T-34-85, 3 IS-2 and 1 SU-85) were in current repairs due to minor malfunctions and were put into operation by the morning of March 15.

The 3rd Guards, which survived the meat grinder at Lauban in early March. the tank army was not ready for new operation. Therefore, the second “claw” in the encirclement operation was made up of separate mobile units of the front. The 7th Guards, which surrounded Breslau in February. mechanized and 4th Guards. The tank corps moved along with the 4th Panzer Army to the south and concentrated on the bridgehead at Ratibor. This maneuver allowed the Soviet command to achieve superiority in forces in the selected area of ​​​​operations. The enemy could only react by moving reserves to the emerging crisis after the success of the first strike of the Soviet troops.

"Cauldron" on the banks of the Oder

Information about the impending Soviet offensive leaked to the Germans in early March 1945. From interrogations of prisoners, data was even obtained about the approximate start date of the offensive - March 10. Colonel General Heinrici decided to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Soviet bridgehead between Kozel and Ratibor. With a counterattack on the launch site of the Soviet offensive, it was necessary to defeat the concentrating troops and reduce the bridgehead. The maximum program was the elimination of the bridgehead. For the counterattack, a Jaeger battle group was created consisting of the 97th Jaeger Division and part of the 1st Ski Jaeger Division. It concentrated against the southern front of the bridgehead. The battle group was led by Lieutenant General von Pappenheim. Also, the units of General von Bünau's XI Army Corps, the 371st Infantry Division and the 18th SS Division Horst Wessel, defending along the perimeter of the bridgehead were to participate in the offensive. Since the Germans considered the start date of the Soviet operation to be March 10, the counterattack was supposed to be launched on the night of March 8.

The German counter-offensive began at the appointed time. The Jaeger battle group advanced north along the banks of the Oder. The 371st Infantry Division advanced towards the rangers from the west. Two strike groups were supposed to connect and encircle Soviet units in the southern part of the bridgehead. At first the offensive developed successfully, but after three days of fighting it fizzled out. The Germans failed to encircle at least part of the Soviet troops on the bridgehead. Only a few kilometers were recaptured on the southern front of the bridgehead. After stopping the counteroffensive, the Germans regrouped units along the perimeter of the bridgehead. They had to wait for its “opening” by Soviet troops.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began on March 15 with the actions of the advanced battalions of the 21st and 5th Guards armies from the Grottkau region. Artillery preparation began at 7.00 and lasted 1.5 hours. At 8.40 the main forces of the 21st and 4th tank armies went on the offensive. Overcoming the enemy's stubborn fire resistance and repelling repeated counterattacks from his tactical reserves, by the end of the first day of the offensive, the army formations broke through two fortified enemy positions on an 8-kilometer front and advanced 8 km into the depths of the enemy defense.

The troops of the 59th and 60th armies, advancing from the bridgehead north of Ratibor in the direction of Neustadt, went on the offensive after 80 minutes of artillery preparation. Having broken the enemy's resistance, they broke through the main line of his defense on a 12-kilometer front and advanced 6–8 km during the day of fighting.

The relatively low rate of advance on the first day of the operation was explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, the enemy’s defense system was not completely suppressed by artillery preparation. Aviation training on March 15, due to bad weather, turned out to be less intensive than planned. Until 12.00, due to bad weather, Soviet aviation did not carry out combat sorties. Only from 12.00, as the weather improved, aviation began to carry out bombing attacks on enemy strongholds, headquarters and communications centers. However, instead of 2,995 sorties planned for the first day of the operation, aviation carried out only 1,283 sorties. Secondly, the fighting was inevitably influenced by the spring thaw. In the combat log of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps noted: “The terrain in the area of ​​action is moderately rough and open. The soil is loamy and sandy loam in places; spring made the soil loose and muddy, as a result the tanks could only operate on roads, which deprived the corps of the main element in the offensive - maneuver on the battlefield." It was much easier for the enemy to build defenses along roads than to maintain a continuous front. Also in the offensive, the “edge effect” manifested itself - the advance of the 4th Guards Front, which was on the right flank of the Oppeln group. the tank corps on the first day of the operation was insignificant. However, in general, the Soviet offensive developed successfully: the defenses of the 45th Infantry Division in the Grottkau area were breached, and the division's regiments lost contact with each other.

Self-propelled gun SU-85 on the approaches to Gdynia.

Despite the information received from prisoners about the impending Soviet offensive, the Germans clearly underestimated its scope. Therefore, before the start of the operation, they did not accumulate reserves in close proximity to the Soviet bridgeheads. The actual scale of the Soviet offensive was realized by the German command only after it began. On March 16, an entry appeared in the combat log of the Wehrmacht operational leadership headquarters: “South of Grottkau, the enemy managed to drive a deep wedge. The 4th Tank Army appeared here, the location of which remained unknown.” Mechanized units could become a “lifesaver.” The 20th Panzer, 10th Panzergrenadier and 19th Panzer divisions were withdrawn from the Strehlen and Schwednitsa area and rushed to the rescue. They still retained their combat capability. On March 15, the 20th Panzer Division had 9 Pz.V "Panther", 21 Pz.IV, 13 StuGIII self-propelled guns, 10 PanzerjaegerIV/70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV, in the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division - 29 StuGIII and StuGIV self-propelled guns and 9 PanzerjaegerIV/70, in the 19th Panzer Division - 17 Pz.V “Panther”, 20 Pz.IV and 11 PanzerjaegerIV/70. Not all of these divisions were actually tank divisions by name. The 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division was reduced in number to a battle group. The name “battle group” itself meant a temporary unification of tank, motorized infantry, engineer and artillery units under a single command to solve a tactical problem. As a rule, a tank, tank-grenadier or infantry division was split into two or three battle groups. The fact that a division became a "battlegroup" meant that only half, a third, or even a smaller proportion of its strength remained. In other words, the remaining units from the division were only sufficient to create one standard battle group. Separate units were also deployed to repel the Soviet offensive. The 300th assault gun brigade was transferred from the Striegau area.

The arrival of enemy reserves inevitably complicated the situation on the flank of the Oppeln group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In this regard, one cannot help but note Konev’s thoughtful construction of the front’s right-flank strike group in the Upper Silesian operation. Two tank and mechanized corps walked parallel routes and began to move in a ledge in the depths of the enemy’s defense. 4th Guards Tank Corps and 6th Guards. The mechanized corps of the 4th Tank Army operated on the outer front of the emerging encirclement, the 10th Guards. tank corps - on the inside. The movement of the ledge led to the fact that a possible counterattack on the flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps in the direction from west to east inevitably came under attack from the 6th Guards. mechanized corps moving from north to south. The attack on the flank of the entire tank army was under attack from the north of the 4th Guards. tank corps. The Germans met the expectations of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and acted exactly as he expected. Therefore, the greatest burden in the operation fell on the 4th Guards. tank and 6th Guards. mechanized body. They were supposed to prevent the direct impact of German reserves on the enveloping maneuver and repel relief attacks.

March 16 became the day of the attackers’ fight against the arriving mechanized enemy formations. As usually happens, reserves were brought into battle in parts. The first to enter the battle were the 19th Panzer Division and the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division. They could not fill the front torn into shreds. Therefore, the 10th Guards. Tank Corps 4th Guards. The tank army quickly found a gap in the enemy's formation and moved far forward, beginning a maneuver to encircle the enemy. Two other corps of the Oppeln group of the 1st Ukrainian Front were drawn into battles with enemy reserves. The battle group of the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division covered the city of Neisse from the north. The 19th Panzer Division encountered a dense barrier at the base of the breakthrough created by the 4th Guards. tank corps and the 34th Guards. rifle corps. 6th Guards The mechanized corps, meanwhile, felt for gaps in the restored defenses for a breakthrough to the southwest. 16th and 17th Guards. Mechanized brigades began to bypass the Neisse from the west. Opposition was provided by counterattacks by units of the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division and artillery of the 405th People's Artillery Corps. The intensity of the fighting increased sharply. If on March 15, 6th Guards. The mechanized corps lost 7 people killed and 18 wounded, 16 tanks burned out and damaged, then on March 16, corps losses amounted to 149 people killed and 247 wounded, 36 tanks and 2 SU-100. The number of tanks in the 16th and 17th Guards. The corps' mechanized brigades dropped to 16 vehicles.

Street fighting in Gdynia. For the 1st Guards. for the tank army they became a rehearsal for the battles for Berlin.

March 17 became the day of throwing. On the previous day of the 10th Guards. The tank corps successfully advanced towards the river. Neisse is east of the town of Neisse. At 3.00 am D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps should turn around after its faster advancing neighbor and cross the Neisse at Rotthaus. However, the corps commander could send only one 16th Guards to Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards the mechanized brigade was left on the line captured the previous day as flank cover. At 8.20, the commander of the 4th Tank Army changed his decision and ordered the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps to capture the city of Ottmahau, and the 10th Guards. building - the city of Neisse.

10th Guards The tank corps crossed the river at 13.00 on March 17. Neisse at Rotthaus with the forces of the 61st Guards. tank brigade and expanded its success to Neustadt. 62nd Guards The tank brigade was placed in a flank barrier to avoid counterattacks from Neisse. In a futile attempt to stop the advance of Soviet tanks towards units of the 10th Panzer Corps, police from Neisse, armed only with light small arms, were sent in. This led to the immediate destruction of the Nijsen city police. Naturally, people who went into battle with unsuitable weapons and without hope of success tried to look for a better fate for themselves. However, Scherner restored order with draconian measures: deserters were mercilessly shot.

It cannot be said that overcoming the 10th Guards. tank corps of the Neisse River passed painlessly. The commander of the 10th Guards died in battle near Rotthaus. Tank Corps Colonel N.D. Chuprov. Major General E.E. took command of the corps. Belov - Deputy Commander of the 4th Tank Army. 6th Guards The mechanized corps had to reap the consequences of throwing between two directions on the afternoon of March 17. The stumbling block was the settlement of Stephansdorf on the way to Ottomachau. In the middle of the day it was stormed by the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, and in the afternoon - the 16th Guards, returned from Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards In the afternoon, the mechanized brigade defended with a front to the west - the advanced units of the enemy’s 20th Tank Division pulled up to the battlefield.

At the height of the battle in Upper Silesia, March 17, 1945, the 4th Panzer Army D.D. Lelyushenko received the rank of Guards. Of the six Soviet tank armies that existed at that time, the army of D.D. Lelyushenko was the last to receive the guard. Formed in 1944, the 6th Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko received a guards rank in September of the same year. Formed almost simultaneously with the 4th Tank Army, the 2nd Tank Army became a guards army in November 1944. 1st Tank Army M.E. Katukova joined the Soviet Guard in April 1944. The 3rd and 5th Tank Armies had held the Guard rank since the spring of 1943.

ISU-122 in Danzig.

The 4th Tank Army celebrated its conferment of the guards rank with successes on the battlefield. The task of closing the ring around the formations of the LVI tank corps was successfully solved by the 10th Guards. tank corps. At the end of the day on March 18, the 61st Guards. The corps' tank brigade and the 93rd separate tank brigade reached the Buchensdorf area, where they linked up with units of the 7th Guards. mechanized corps and the 31st tank corps, advancing from the east. The lid of the “cauldron” for four German divisions slammed shut. The following were surrounded: the 20th SS Infantry Division (1st Estonian), the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, part of the forces of the 18th SS Division Horst Wessel.

Expected I.S. The horse's counterattacks could no longer prevent the ring from closing. They were carried out by formations of Army Group Center, transferred from other sectors of the front. The delay was caused by the need to make long marches to reach the Neisse area. Already on the first day of the Soviet offensive, March 15, 1945, the 1st Parachute Tank Division "Hermann Goering" received an order to move to a new concentration area. By that time, the division had been withdrawn from the bridgehead at Muskau and was on vacation in the Görlitz area. The first parts of the Hermann Goering were unloaded from the trains at Ottmachau on March 17. The division was given the task of attacking the extended flank of the "claw" of Soviet troops surrounding the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps. The starting positions for the counterattack were the area southeast of the city of Neisse. However, the offensive of the Soviet troops disrupted the concentration of the Hermann Goering at the initial positions for the counteroffensive. If not for the throwing of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps between the two directions on March 17, the starting positions for the counterattack would have simply been captured by Soviet troops.

On March 18, the reserves thrown into battle by the Germans encountered aggressive cover of the flank of the Oppeln group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 6th Guards The mechanized corps advanced in a southwestern direction. The task of the corps was to capture Ottmachau - the very station at which Hermann Goering was unloaded. In the early morning of March 18, the 16th and 17th Guards. The mechanized brigades jointly captured the Stephansdorf road junction, which they had stormed individually the previous day, and continued their attack on Ottmachau. However, the advanced detachments of the corps were met by ambushes, and further advance was stopped. The Soviet mechanized corps stretched out like a wedge in the direction of Ottmachau.

The middle of the day was spent repelling counterattacks by the arriving units of Hermann Goering and the 20th Panzer Division. 6th Guards the mechanized corps created a direct threat to the Hermann Goering flank and thereby prevented an effective counterattack. Resistance from the front was weak, but the threat to the flank forced the Germans to stop their advance to the east and deal with the threat from the north. Massive fire of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, as well as all artillery of the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade and corps artillery group, all counterattacks of Hermann Goering units were repulsed. Also unsuccessful was the offensive of the 20th Panzer Division on the flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The received 4th Guards took part in repelling enemy attacks. tank army shortly before the operation in Upper Silesia self-propelled guns SU-100. Realizing the importance of covering the flank, the commander of the 4th Guards. The tank army also sent units of army subordination to support the mechanized corps: the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade with Lend-Lease SU-57s and the 57th motorcycle battalion.

Commander of the 6th Guards. Mechanized Corps Colonel V.I. Koretsky.

The repulsion of German counterattacks was personally led by the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. However, an excellent view of the battlefield from the front line also had a downside - the risk of falling under enemy fire. A shell that exploded at the command post mortally wounded the commander of the 6th Guards. Mechanized Corps General V.F. Orlov, head of the corps' reconnaissance department, Major Chernyshev, and commander of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Churilov. The chief of staff of the guard, Colonel V.I., took command of the corps. Koretsky. Despite the fairly calm development of events, the Upper Silesian operation became for the 4th Guards. tank army during a period of loss of command personnel. Total losses of the 6th Guards. Mechanized corps on March 18 amounted to 99 people killed, 318 wounded, 8 tanks burned.

The commander of the Fuhrer Escort division, Otto-Ernst Römer (pictured with the rank of lieutenant colonel).

Formations transferred from other sectors of the Army Group Center front were also brought into battle immediately south of the newly formed “cauldron”. An enemy well known to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the XXIV Panzer Corps of Nering, was advancing to the Leobschütz area. The 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, the 78th Assault Division and the Fuhrer Escort Division were subordinate to him. On March 15, the 16th Panzer Division had 14 Pz.V "Panther" and 31 self-propelled guns "Hetzer" combat-ready, the division "Fuhrer Escort" - 10 Pz.V "Panther", 7 Pz.IV, 2°StuGIII, 12 PanzerjaegerIV /70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV. The condition of all these formations was far from brilliant, but they could still play their role in the battle.

However, the encircled German divisions did not wait for relief. In the second half of the war, waiting for outside help could already lead to fatal consequences. Memories of the fate of the destroyed “festungs” made me nervous. The commander of the 344th Infantry Division, General Jolasse, recalled: “Responses to all requests from the division regarding a possible breakthrough to the south through Deutsch-Rasselwitz were slowed down by the XXIV Panzer Corps.” At 15.00 on March 19, Jolasse decided “to act independently in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation.” He signed the order for the breakthrough, which was originally scheduled for 17.00. The general insisted in his memoirs that he made the decision to break through on his own. The breakthrough began at 19.00 on the same day. The 18th SS Division and the 344th Infantry Division made the breakthrough. To call a spade a spade, the German troops southwest of Oppeln (north of the positions of the Jolasse division) were thrown to the mercy of fate by this breakthrough. They soon found themselves in a separate “cauldron” with no hope of salvation. When the commanders of the formations believed less and less in the promises of the command about a speedy release, the principle of “every man for himself” inevitably began to operate.

The target of the breakthrough was the village of Deutsch-Rasselwitz. The area was open, without any natural shelter. As a result, the fire of Soviet guns and mortars punched holes in the ranks of the German units, mixed with refugees, going to break through. A desperate dash paved the way to salvation for a lucky few. Deutsch-Rasselwitz was captured around 10 p.m. There was a river 2 km from the village, but the bridge across it was blown up. Some sought salvation by swimming, others waited until a ford was found. The next point of breakthrough was the village of Hotzenplotz on the banks of the river of the same name. Here the bridges across the river were also prudently blown up by Soviet sappers. General Jolasse recalled: “The river bank was turned into a continuous muddy mess and was under continuous enemy artillery fire. Here we suffered significant losses. Many vehicles, guns and the last self-propelled guns got stuck trying to cross Hotzenplotz. They were all blown up and abandoned." Those who were able to break through Hotzenplotz soon reached the positions of units of the XXIV Panzer Corps.

If the threat from the west from “Hermann Goering”, the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions managed to fend off the 4th Guards. tank and 6th Guards. mechanized corps, then Nering’s XXIV Panzer Corps could well have delivered a strong relief blow. However, without waiting for outside help, the remnants of the encircled troops made a breakthrough. Therefore, the XXIV Panzer Corps had to restore the integrity of the front, in which, after the encirclement of the LVI Panzer Corps, a large gap had formed.

While the encircled German units were breaking out of the encirclement, to the north-west of the city of Neisse, Soviet troops repelled enemy counterattacks. 6th Guards The mechanized corps itself did not move forward, but retained the positions captured in the previous days. In the combat log of the Wehrmacht operational leadership headquarters, the situation on March 20 was described as follows: “The troops cut off between the bridgeheads are retreating. The attacks of the Hermann Goering division failed. The enemy managed to finally link the bridgeheads and form a large bridgehead on the western bank of the [Oder].”

T-34-85 tank with infantry landing in the Danzig area.

Within five days, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front encircled and eliminated a large enemy group on the western bank of the Oder. As a result of this, the possibility of an enemy flank attack on front troops from Upper Silesia during the Berlin operation was eliminated. The Soviet offensive also forced the German command to remove the mechanized formations concentrated in the area of ​​​​Zobten and Schweidnitz and throw them into battle in the Neisse area. Thus, plans to release Breslau were thwarted. On March 5, Lieutenant General Hermann Niehoff was appointed commandant of Breslau. He flew to the fortress by plane with Scherner's promise to break through to the surrounded city from the outside. This promise remained unfulfilled. The losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the first stage of the operation can be assessed as moderate. The irretrievable losses of armored vehicles in the front forces for the period from March 15 to March 20 amounted to 259 armored units (196 tanks and 63 self-propelled guns).

Losses of equipment of the 4th Guards. tank army for the period March 15–22 and their distribution by nature of damage is shown in the table. There were no losses from aviation or from faustpatrons in parts of Lelyushenko’s army during this period. This is explained by the dominance of the Soviet Air Force in the air and the absence of street fighting. Failure due to technical faults mainly fell on the development of motor resources in throwing along the roads of Poland and Germany. By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Tank Army had 123 tanks that had worked 1.5–2 times the norm.

Table

LOSSES of the 4th Guards. TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 15 TO MARCH 22, 1945 AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CAUSE OF DAMAGE

Just like the East Pomeranian operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, the Upper Silesian operation took place in conditions of spring thaw. This inevitably affected the losses. In the report of the armored supply and repair department of the 4th Guards. The tank army states that “the operation in the period from 15.3 to 22.3.45 took place during the spring thaw, off-road movement was impossible even for tanks, which explains the large number of stuck tanks; stuck tanks, as a rule, were hit by the enemy.”

Failure I.E. Petrova and its consequences

If the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was quite successful, then the 4th Ukrainian Front could not boast of any significant achievements. The ambitious plan of I.E. Petrova began to collapse without even having time to achieve the goals of the first stage of the operation. The armies in the direction of the main attack were commanded by future dignitaries of the upper echelon of power of the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev era. The 38th Army was led by K.S. Moskalenko, 1st Guards Army - A.A. Grechko. In the auxiliary direction, the 18th Army of Lieutenant General A.I. was deployed on a 70-kilometer front. Gastilovich. Like most Soviet armies on the Soviet-German front, they could not boast of a good complement of rifle formations. The number of personnel in the rifle divisions of the 18th and 38th armies ranged from 3 to 4 thousand people. Only two divisions of the 38th Army had 5 thousand people each. The number of rifle divisions of the 1st Guards Army ranged from 4 to 5.5 thousand people.

The reasons for the failures were quite trivial. Firstly, the date for the start of the operation - March 10 - was perceived as unshakable. Perhaps the fact that the notorious L.Z. was a member of the front’s Military Council played a role here. Mehlis. It is his pressure that can explain the impeccable fulfillment of the Headquarters instructions “to begin the operation no later than March 10.” As a result, the offensive began in conditions of incomplete preparation of troops for it. Instead of reporting to the top about the troops’ unpreparedness for an offensive, the front command chose to remain silent about the difficulties that arose.

Secondly, the technique of withdrawing troops from the first trench worked against the strike force of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Information about the Soviet offensive leaked to the Germans. The start date has become known - March 10. On the evening of March 9, the German units defending in the direction of the supposed attack of the Soviet troops received an order to withdraw to the second line of trenches. The withdrawal was completed before dawn on March 10th. The withdrawal, carried out under the cover of a snowstorm, was not noticed and the artillery strike hit an almost empty area. The results of this blunder were immediate. Instead of breaking through to a depth of 23–25 km, army troops on March 10 wedged 3–4 km into enemy defenses on a 15 km front. The penetration of Soviet troops into the defense of the Heinrici group attracted mobile reserves in the form of the 8th Panzer Division. As of March 15, this division included 42 Pz.IV (of which 11 were serviceable), 10 Pz.V “Panther” (of which 9 were serviceable) and 30 PanzerjaegerIV/70 (of which 6 were serviceable). By the end of March 17, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front managed to advance only 12 km.

The obvious failure, as usual, was followed by organizational conclusions. Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11045 I.E. On March 25, Petrov was removed from the post of commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front with the wording: “for attempting to deceive Headquarters about the true position of the front troops, who were not fully prepared for an offensive on the appointed date.” Place I.E. Petrov was taken over by A.I. Eremenko. A few days later, the chief of staff of the front was replaced: General F.K. Korzhenevich was replaced by Colonel General L.M. Sandalov.

Commander's armored personnel carrier SdKfz.251 abandoned on the shore of Danzig Bay. Pay attention to the “broom” of the antenna of a powerful radio station.

To bring the offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front out of the crisis, a proven method was used - shifting the direction of the main attack. K.S. Moskalenko, who commanded the 38th Army, described in his memoirs his impressions of observing the front line in the new direction:

“One and a half kilometers south of the height was the small town of Zorau. It was small, but it was a junction of seven highways and three railways, radiating in all directions. Even closer, directly at the slopes of the height, a small river flowed. Its valley, up to 500 m wide, was a wetland with many artificial ponds and covered Sorau from the northeast. We approached the city even closer, as far as the front line allowed. Now we were separated from Sorau by a distance of up to 1 km. The streets were clearly visible, quiet and calm. Soldiers walked slowly and just as calmly along them. They didn't seem to expect the blow. Meanwhile, it should have been applied right here. Moreover, to the northeast of Sorau a forest was visible, which could provide a secret concentration of troops and equipment" ( Moskalenko K.S. In a south-west direction. M.: Science. P. 568).

The decision to attack through Zorau was approved by I.E. Petrov, but A.I. had to reap its results. Eremenko. For the breakthrough, the 95th Rifle and 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps of the 38th Army were concentrated. Each of them received a tank brigade. The offensive in the new direction began on March 24 and developed much more successfully than on March 10. In the main direction, the 95th Rifle Corps and the 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps that day advanced to a depth of 7 km, and the 101st Rifle Corps in the auxiliary direction - by 4 km.

The German command tried to plug the breakthrough that had formed at Sorau with the 715th Infantry Division of General von Rohr, which arrived by rail. The division arrived from Italy, and its soldiers and officers were completely unprepared for the realities of the Eastern Front. Having come under attack from the mountain rifle units of the 38th Army, it was scattered into pieces and suffered heavy losses. For the failure of his division, its commander was instantly demoted to the rank of colonel “by order of the Fuhrer.” Also, by order of Hitler, soldiers and officers of the 715th Infantry Division were stripped of all awards and insignia.

During March 25–28, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front advanced at an average daily pace of 4–5 km. By March 28, they were 20 km from Moravian Ostrava. At this line they encountered increased enemy resistance and were unable to advance further. Realizing the importance of the Moravian-Ostravian industrial region, the enemy nominated the 16th and 19th tank divisions and the 10th tank-grenadier division to defend it. The 8th Panzer Division also moved here, successfully participating in repelling the Soviet offensive on March 10–18. The fighting here froze until mid-April.

Second phase of the Upper Silesian Operation

With the 4th Ukrainian Front hopelessly stuck, after the encirclement and defeat of the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps divisions, the 1st Ukrainian Front's operation did not stop. The collapse of the enemy front made it possible to move forward the rifle divisions of the combined arms armies and reinforce the mechanized and tank brigades with them. 6th Guards The mechanized corps, in cooperation with the 382nd and 72nd rifle divisions, was supposed to attack the city of Neisse from the north and clear the northern bank of the Neisse River from the enemy. The next task was to advance along the northern bank of the river towards Ottmahau. The task of flank cover was entrusted to the 128th Infantry Division. Closing the encirclement of the 10th Guards. The tank corps was turning around and, in cooperation with the 55th Rifle Corps, was supposed to attack the city of Neisse, which had been bypassed a few days earlier, from the southeast.

SU-76 enter the streets of Neisse.

March 23, 6th Guards. The mechanized corps and the approaching rifle divisions solved two tasks simultaneously: they defended with a front to the west and advanced to the south. The part of the city of Neisse lying on the northern bank of the Neisse was captured. By 20.00 on March 23, the 10th Guards reached the eastern outskirts of Neisse. tank and 55th rifle corps. The defenders of the city had only one way to escape - to the west.

The city of Neisse was once a fortress, but in 1945 it was completely unsuitable for this role. As the commander of the 17th Army, General Schultz, put it, “the fortifications of Neisse were suitable for battle in the time of Frederick the Great, but not during the Second World War.” The main problem was the lack and limited capabilities of defenders. In the city of Neisse at the end of January the 273rd and 274th Volkssturm battalions were formed. But their capabilities were simply insignificant. Each consisted of four companies numbering about 60 people. Each company had one heavy machine gun and up to 15 Faust cartridges. The Volkssturmists had about 60 cartridges per carbine. In addition, circumstances did not allow the Volkssturm to take advantage of the battle on the city streets. The 273rd Volkssturm Neisse battalion was withdrawn from the city and took up the battle in open areas. Under these conditions, the outcome of the struggle for Neisse was a foregone conclusion. By the end of the day on March 24, the southern part of the city was cleared of German troops by the forces of the 10th Guards. tank and 55th rifle corps.

A Volkssturmist examines holes from Faust cartridges in the sides of the turret and hull of the Soviet T-34-85 tank.

After the surrender of Neisse, the commander of Army Group Center, Scherner, demanded a death sentence for its commandant, Colonel Georg Sparre. Neisse, like many other German cities, was declared a "festung" (fortress). Sparre managed to save his life only by bluffing, revealing that he was the brother-in-law of Reichsleiter Bormann. Having heard the name of one of the highest dignitaries of the Third Reich, the judge stopped the trial with a predetermined result. Therefore, instead of appearing before a squad of soldiers with rifles, Colonel Sparre went to the Glatz fortress for further proceedings. There, from a prisoner, he soon became a prisoner of war of the Soviet troops.

In the meantime, it was necessary to galvanize the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Ratibor area. The 60th Army of P.A. was advancing here. Kurochkina. On the first day of the offensive, she advanced 8 km. In the memoirs of I.S. Konev wrote: “Such a pace of advance did not suit us in any way, and I brought in two corps of the 4th Guards Tank to help the 60th Army. The tankers were supposed to deliver an additional attack from the north.” To be precise, army units and one of the army corps were initially deployed to the new direction. On the morning of March 24, 10th Guards. tank corps of the 4th Guards. The tank army was ordered to continue fighting for the southern part of Neisse in cooperation with the 55th Rifle Corps. Corps E.E. Belov also transferred the 1727th self-propelled artillery regiment to the SU-100. The remaining forces of the D.D. army Lelyushenko was supposed to be withdrawn from the Neisse area and already on March 25 go on the offensive in a new direction.

Damaged SU-85M. Silesia, March 1945

In addition, the 4th Guards. The tank army received a new formation with which it had to end the war. From March 24, 1945, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps of Major General of Tank Forces B.M. was included in the tank army. Skvortsova. Initially, it was part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, but failure to carry out an offensive operation led to the transfer of the corps to the subordination of the more effective advancing 1st Ukrainian Front. Completeness of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps can be assessed as high. By the time of transfer to the subordination of D.D. Lelyushenko mechanized corps B.M. Skvortsov counted 171 tanks and self-propelled guns in service (116 T-34-85, 17 IS-2, 18 SU-85, 2 °SU-76). Since June 1944, Skvortsov's corps has been in reserve at the Supreme Command Headquarters, and by February 7–8, 1945 it was fully equipped with tanks. However, the corps was sorely lacking in vehicles. Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front I.E. Petrov was annoyed in February: “5 Mk, concentrated in the Debica area, is fully staffed with personnel and tanks, but does not have vehicles - the shortage is expressed in 1243 units. The 800 planned vehicles for the corps are on the way and some have not yet been shipped. Their delivery to the building is scheduled for February 20, 1945.” As a result, the corps went into battle only on March 10 and managed to irretrievably lose only 35 T-34-85s. Therefore, the 5th Guards. The mechanized corps was well preserved by the time when most of the mobile formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were thoroughly beaten in battle. Entering control, army units and one badly battered corps of the 4th Guards. tank army, the front commander did not so much strengthen the 60th Army as strive to increase the level of command and control in the Ratibor area.

New formation of the 4th Guards. The tank army was the first to launch an offensive at the new stage of the operation. 5th Guards The mechanized corps at 8.00 on March 24 went on the offensive in the direction of Leobschütz-Troppau. On the first day of the offensive towards the corps of B.M. Skvortsov was joined only by certain units of army subordination: the 93rd separate tank and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades. However, instead of a gap in the collapsed front of the 4th Guards. The tank army met the defense of the XXIV Panzer Corps. As a result, the advance of Soviet troops was only 3–4 km.

Stubborn resistance instead of loose ruins of defense on the site of the liquidated “cauldron” was an unpleasant surprise. Conclusion of the 4th Guards. The tank army followed the new direction in a modified order relative to the original plan. The first to be withdrawn from the captured city of Neisse was the 10th Guards. tank corps. Corps E.E. Belova was brought into battle on March 25 to build up the attack to the left of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps. But by coincidence, several German tank formations were assembled in the planned direction of attack, sent to Oppeln and Ratibor as a “fire brigade”: the 16th and 17th tank divisions, the Fuhrer Escort division, the 254th Infantry and the 78th I am an assault division. Despite the fact that the 17th Panzer Division was in the status of a “battle group”, it could boast on March 15 14 PzKpfw.IV (of which 10 were serviceable), 23 PzKpfw.V “Panther” (of which only 4 were serviceable), 19 PanzerjaegerIV/70 (of which 18 are operational) and 3 anti-aircraft Flakpanzer.IV.

The unfinished XXI series submarines captured by Soviet troops in Danzig are a matter of concern for the Allies.

However, German reserves in 1945 could not be omnipresent. The path to success lay in testing new directions with blows. 6th Guards The mechanized corps surrendered its positions to the infantry after a two-day pause. The transfer of positions by the corps to the formations of the 21st Army took place on the night of March 27, and already in the morning of March 28 it was necessary to go on the offensive. D.D.’s decision Lelyushenko explained in his memoirs this way: “I decide on March 28 to bring the corps into battle in the direction of Steuberwitz, where the enemy did not expect our attack at all.” By that time, the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps consisted of 15 T-34s in the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade, 16 T-34s in the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, 9 IS-2 in the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment, 17 T-34s in the 95th separate motorcycle battalion and 14 SU-76s in the 1433rd self-propelled artillery regiment. Compared to the mass of tanks in Skvortsov’s mechanized corps, Koretsky’s mechanized corps, which remained in two brigades, was much weaker. But even two brigades in right time V in the right place could play a significant role. The 107th Infantry Division was supposed to make a hole in the enemy’s defenses, and the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps was tasked with attacking Troppau from the northeast. This blow brought the mechanized corps to the rear of the enemy's XXIV Tank Corps. According to the plan of the 6th Guards unit. The mechanized corps were supposed to break into Troppau on the evening of March 28. 5th Guards mechanized and 10th Guards. The tank corps were to advance in the same direction, leading to Troppau from the north. Thus, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were supposed to form another “cauldron” in Upper Silesia.

The operation began at 12.00 on March 28 with the offensive of the 107th Infantry Division and the 31st Tank Corps. At 18.00 he was joined by units of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The offensive progressed on the whole successfully, but the pace was still much lower than the planned rush to Troppau. The approaches to the Stolmotz road junction, which lay on the path of advance of the corps brigades, were heavily mined, and the bridge over the Zinna River was blown up. The enemy also prevented the outflanking maneuver with fire from Stolmotz. Clearing the roads, searching for a ford and crossing Zinna took time, and Stolmotz was taken by the 17th Mechanized Brigade by 1.00 on March 29th. The defense of Stolmotz was surrendered to the 95th Motorcycle Battalion, and the two mechanized brigades continued the advance.

By the evening of March 29, the 31st Tank Corps captured Ratibor and linked up with units of the 60th Army advancing on the city from the east. It should be noted the decisive role of artillery in the battles for Ratibor. For several days, the troops of the 60th Army unsuccessfully tried to capture this strong point of enemy resistance. Then I.S. Konev ordered the concentration of the 17th breakthrough artillery division, the 25th breakthrough artillery division, which had just arrived at the front, in the Ratibor area, as well as most of the army’s military artillery. The enemy's resistance was quickly broken by the massive fire of this artillery, and Soviet troops captured the city.

The capture of Ratibor reliably covered the left flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. On the contrary, the remaining formations of the 4th Guards. The tank army could not yet boast of great successes. Right flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps and the left flank of the 5th Guards. The mechanized corps advanced only 2 km. At 18.00 D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps to create a mobile detachment and throw it forward to intercept the communications of the surrounded enemy. The detachment was created from the 95th separate motorcycle battalion, battalion of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade and two IS-2 tanks of the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment. In total, the detachment consisted of 14 T-34s and 2 IS-2s. The detachment was headed by the commander of the 17th Guards. Mechanized Guard Brigade Major Bushmakin. The detachment received orders to advance through Reisnitz to Piltsch.

However, the moment for a sudden breakthrough into depth was missed. In the direction of the attack of the 6th Guards. The Fuhrer Escort division was deployed to the mechanized corps. On March 30, Bushmakin’s detachment came under counterattacks from newly arrived units, lost 10 tanks and 110 infantry and retreated. Two brigades of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps continued to push forward.

Sandomierz-Silesian offensive operation (January 12 – February 3, 1945) The chapter “First Guards Tank Army” talks in detail about the plans of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the 1945 winter campaign. Her