The dialectic of being and non-being in the dialogue of the sophist. Plato's dialectics in the dialogue “Parmenides. Major philosophical works of Plato

The dialogue "Theaetetus", which criticized the philosophy of pure fluidity, came to the conclusion that for knowledge, in addition to continuous sensory fluidity, a special kind of criteria is also needed that would allow both to distinguish one thing from another and to think of discontinuous images or concepts, which is necessary for understanding of fluidity itself. However, having come to such an important conclusion, Plato in Theaetetus did not develop it, but only postulated it as a necessary principle of knowledge. In the Sophist this cognitive criterion is already discussed specifically. At the same time, Plato does not dwell on individual cases or types of revealing truth or lies. He wants to master these concepts in their final form, i.e. utmost significance. For this approach, it is no longer enough to state various facts of truth and falsehood, significant or insignificant; it is necessary to take these categories in their universal meaning. As for truth or falsehood in their pseudo-universal meaning, in the time of Plato they were put forward mainly by the sophists. After all, a sophist, according to Plato, is not just someone who deceives someone, even for selfish purposes. Protagoras said that there is no lie at all, but only truth. He needed this in order to prove the truth of any lie. It is this universal and, from Plato’s point of view, pseudo-universal understanding of truth and lies that he criticizes in The Sophist.

More specifically, it was necessary to prove that there is not only truth, but also lies, and that it is quite possible to refute the truth, but, of course, for the sake of lies. "Sophist" is filled with different definitions of the very concept of sophist. But all these definitions are preliminary and incomplete. Completeness of argumentation is possible, according to Plato, only when we, forgetting all details, talk about truth and lies as such. But truth as such is an indication of some kind of real reality, and a lie is an indication of something that does not exist, i.e. to the non-existent, or to non-existence. Thus, it turns out that, having considered being and non-being as such, we thereby find criteria for individual statements about something partially true or about something partially false. But in human life, truth and falsehood are mixed with each other, since truth is often denied and falsehood is often affirmed. This state of affairs, according to Plato, is possible only as a distortion of the true relationship between the very categories of truth or falsehood, being or non-being. In this case, Plato calls this relationship between being and non-being in their idea “dialectics.” From here it becomes clear that the main and essential theme of the Sophist is a theme devoted to the dialectic of being and non-being as a condition for the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood.

COMPOSITION OF DIALOGUE

I. Introduction
(216a 218b)

Meeting of Theodore of Cyrene, a guest from Elea (he is not named), Theaetetus and Socrates. Of the three main problems that interest the interlocutors, namely, from the questions of what a sophist, a politician and a philosopher are (217a), the interlocutors come to the conclusion that it is necessary, first of all, to define what a sophist is.

II. Initial partial definitions of sophist
(218s 236s)

1. The sophist is a fisherman or, more precisely, a hunter of rich young men with the help of the art of persuasion(218c 223b). The art of fishing belongs to the art of acquisition, and not creative (219a-d), to the art of subjugation, and not to exchange (219de), to the art of not fighting, but hunting (219e) for animate beings, i.e. animals (219e 220a), namely those swimming in water, but not land animals (220a), i.e. aquatic (fishing), which is caught by blow, not by nets (220b-d), and not by air (birding) (220b), by day, not by night (220d), with hooks (220de), from bottom to top, but not vice versa (221a). The result of this division and the transition to the next method of division, where the sophist and the fisherman disagree with each other in that the first hunts for land creatures, and not for water creatures (221b 222b). In the following, we mean hunting for a person, and not for animals (222c), and, moreover, not with the use of force, but with persuasion (222cd), privately, and not publicly (222d), for the purpose of monetary reward, and not the giving of gifts ( 222de), and also in words for the purposes of virtue, and not for pleasure (223a). This is the first true definition of sophistry (223b).
2. A sophist is a merchant of knowledge(223c 224d). The exchange is either gifts or trade (223c), while the merchant sells either his own products or only those of others (223d), received either in his own city, or also imported from another (223d), to nourish either the body or the soul (223e) , and goods for the soul are understood as works of all art (224аb), as well as knowledge (224b), i.e. or knowledge of other arts or virtues (224c). Sophistry is the trade in research and knowledge concerning virtue (224d).
3. A sophist is a trader in his own and others' knowledge and reasoning for the sake of acquiring money.(224e). Here Plato makes no distinction between large and small sales, while below, where a summary of these definitions of the sophist is made (231d), these types of trade are listed each separately, so that, taking into account the fourth and fifth definitions of the sophist in Plato further (231de), we no longer get five, but six definitions.
4. A sophist is a master of dissent for the purpose of making money(225a 226a). Sophistry is a struggle, namely a competition, but not a battle (225a), a verbal competition, and the dispute is not public, but private (225b), not artless, but skillful (225c), not chatter, but an argument for the purpose of making money (225d 226a).
5. The sophist cleanses the soul of opinions for the sake of imaginary knowledge(226a 236c). Sophistry is the distinction between one thing and another (226a-c), i.e. discrimination between better and worse, or purification (226de), mental, and not bodily (227a-c), and, moreover, purification from evil (227d) or, more precisely, from vices or diseases of the soul (227e 228d), or, more precisely , from disproportion and error (228de), and, while bodily illness is cured by healing, and mental depravity by justice (229a), mental error is cured by education (229b), freeing from ignorance, i.e. education (229cd) through instructive rather than condemning speeches (229e 230a) and by exposing empty superstition (230b 231b). Summary of these definitions (231de).

   However, to cleanse the soul of opinion for the sake of knowing something that does not exist in the world means proceeding from imaginary knowledge; and therefore the sophist purifies the soul not for true, but for imaginary knowledge, creating ghostly similarities of this knowledge, but not true reflections corresponding to reality (232a 236c).

III. Dialectics of being and non-being
(236d 259d)

1. The need for this dialectic(236d 239b). All previous definitions of the sophist are insufficient because they talk about being and non-being or about truth and lies in a random, arbitrary, i.e., generally speaking, uncritical sense of the word, since the sophist is not that at all. who simply deceive by offering false opinions instead of true knowledge. A sophist should be considered someone who obviously does not distinguish truth from lies, i.e. being from non-being, and, therefore, can consider all being both true from beginning to end, and false at every point. Therefore, in order to finally finish off the sophist, it is necessary to distinguish being in the most precise way from non-existence, but in such a way that non-existence and lies still, in a certain sense, exist next to being and truth. And this leads us to the dialectic of being and non-being. The teaching of Parmenides that no non-existence exists greatly hinders its comprehension, and this necessarily leads to the denial of all lies. That is why the refutation of Parmenides is next (239c 242a).
2. Refutation of Parmenides and other ancient philosophers on the question of being and non-being(242b 250e). Plato considers it necessary to consider Parmenides together with other ancient philosophers, who either combined being with two other principles, or did not specifically talk about any being, but spoke only about two elements, for example, wet and dry or warm and cold. Parmenides stands out from them with his doctrine of a single being, which is opposed by philosophers who unite the one and the many (242b 243d). A difficulty arises: if each of the individual principles is one, then there are many one, which is absurd; if the beginning is not something one, then it is not a beginning at all, and, finally, if for Parmenides being and the one are one and the same, then two terms are not needed; and if Parmenides’ two terms are truly different, then his one is not one at all (243d 244d). Further, in Parmenides the unity is not only called the whole, but is even depicted as a ball. But both the whole and the ball are completely divisible. Consequently, Parmenides himself deviates from his principle of absolute unity (244e 245e). Those who recognize only the corporeal also do not stand up to criticism, since wisdom, justice and other faculties of the soul, if not the soul itself, are devoid of corporeality. They are perceived by the mind, not by sensations. Moreover, everything corporeal acts and suffers. But action and suffering are not that which acts and suffers, and, therefore, what acts and suffers cannot claim exclusive and unique existence (247e). The doctrine of being among those who recognize only ideal being in the sense of complete immobility and the absence of any influence on becoming being is also no good: ideas will then turn out to be dead being, and everything that becomes is meaningless being, while all real being and thinks, and lives, and acts. Consequently, both those who reduce everything to the corporeal and those who reduce everything to the ideal preach a dead existence that does not act in any way and does not suffer in any way (248b 249d). The general conclusion: movement and rest must be involved in being, and this again means that, taken in itself, it is higher than both rest and movement (249e 250e). From here, as we must conclude, the necessity of a general dialectic of being, movement and rest naturally follows, to which Plato later also adds the categories of identity and difference.
3. Positive dialectic of five main categories(251a 259d). Neither a complete absence of communication between ideas, nor communication of all ideas with each other is possible, since in the first case, movement and rest could not be involved in being and the Universe could not be at rest or in motion, and in the second case, with universal mutual of participation, rest would move, and motion would be at rest (251a 252d). After discussing dialectics as the ability to divide genera into species and clearly distinguish one species from another (253ab), i.e. after the division of the discrete set, including the corresponding discrete parts of it, after the establishment of wholeness, including its moments that bear the meaning of the whole (253de), and after a short interlude about sophists hiding in the darkness of non-existence, and philosophers contemplating what really exists, those. the brilliance of divine things (254ab), the question is raised about which genera or species communicate with each other, how they communicate and in what cases they do not communicate (254bc). Rest exists and movement exists; consequently, both rest and motion communicate with existence or being, while they themselves do not communicate and are incompatible. However, in order for rest and movement to be mixed with being, the categories of identity and difference are also necessary.* When rest is mixed with being, it is identified with it, although it remains itself, i.e. different from being; and the same must be said about movement. But it is clear that rest in itself is not identity at all and movement in itself is not difference at all. In other words, all these five main categories - being, rest, movement, identity and difference - are both identical and different from each other. Since each of these categories is not the other, it does not exist; since she is herself without reference, i.e. without connection with other categories, it exists. Accordingly, the same must be said about all five categories considered. And therefore what does not exist necessarily exists because it separates one category from another, and everything that exists necessarily does not exist because it is not any other of the said categories (254d 257b). This dialectical theory is illustrated by examples of the beautiful, the great and the just (257c 258c). This is why Parmenides' doctrine of the non-existence of non-existents is incorrect (258c 259d).

   * In Plato, the category of difference is designated by the word “other” (άλλο). However, in many cases in the Sophist, as well as in Parmenides, along with άλλο, the word έτερον (“other”) is used in the same meaning, although there is a difference between these terms: άλλο means “other in general” (not A as opposed to Α), έτερον specific other (IN as opposed to A).

IV. Possibility of lies in speeches and opinions
The final refutation of sophistic doctrine
that everything that is said and thought about existing things is true
(259e 268d).

At the end of the dialogue, the need is put forward to apply the dialectic of being and non-being also to all human opinions and to all human speech, i.e. primarily to grammatical sentences (259e 261e).

1. Speech, i.e. offer(λόγος), is the simplest (263a-c) combination of a noun and a verb, but it must express some object and its properties so as not to be an empty set of words (262a-e). Moreover, it must be true or false (263a 264b).
2. Therefore, the Sophists are certainly they are wrong when they say that nothing is false(264c-e).
3. It follows from this that detailed definition of a sophist. His activity relates to creative art (and not just acquiring), namely to imitative art (265ab). And since creativity is either divine (i.e., creating elemental objects and their reflections) or human (i.e., creating artificial objects and their reflections), the sophist acts in the field of only human imitation, and specifically imitation in reflections ( 265с 266d). And since creativity in the field of human imitations can either correspond to objects and create images, or not correspond to objects and create ghosts, and ghosts are created either with the help of special tools, or by the creator of ghosts himself, with his body, voice and other things, then the sophist is the creator himself ghosts are a face whose ghostly art is usually called imitation (266e 267a). Moreover, the sophist is an imitator without knowing what he is imitating, i.e. his imitation is based not on knowledge, but on opinion (267b-e); and in his imitation he is a conscious hypocrite, and not a simple-minded imitator, and does not pursue any state or public goals, but simply perverts wisdom in personal conversations, entangling his interlocutor in contradictions (268a-c).
4. Summing up Grand total all previous definitions of sophist (268d).

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE DIALOGUE

1. Regarding the Sophist, negative reviews have been repeatedly expressed by researchers and lovers of Plato in the sense that it is too overloaded with many unnecessary divisions and subdivisions, which only interfere with grasping the general idea of ​​this dialogue. One can only join this opinion. Starting with some very general and meaningless definition of a sophist, Plato, through a dichotomous division, reaches a more specific definition of a sophist; but then it turns out that this specific definition is still not enough, but one must proceed from some other, also very general concept of the sophist and gradually narrow this concept to the most specific. In the analysis of the composition, it was indicated that such definitions of the sophist are given in the dialogue, according to Plato’s own inaccurate count, either five or six. This exercise in logical operations of dividing concepts can really cause some kind of depressing impression; and from a philosophical point of view, it could easily be more concise and more understandable and not obscure the idea of ​​dialogue to such an extent.
2. The dichotomous method of dividing concepts in the Sophist, if we approach it philosophically, has both its positive and negative sides. The main feature of this division is consistent increase in specificity the desired concept. If in a given generic concept we find some kind of it, and then, discarding all other types, we find a subspecies of the found type and, discarding all other subspecies of a given species, we move on to further less and less general subspecies, then it is clear that finding all the signs the desired concept receives some kind of structure, i.e. this concept grows in its specificity and in its definitions gradually, methodically.

   On the other hand, however, the inconvenience of this dichotomous method is also strikingly obvious. The fact is that, in essence, we do not know why exactly this species is distinguished in a given genus, and not some other, and why exactly this subspecies is taken for a given species, and not another. In other words, upon closer examination, the very methodological nature of this dichotomy weakens significantly until it is completely lost. Obviously, already at the stage of using the very first type, we must clearly understand the final definition to which we must arrive. And therefore the dichotomy in the Sophist is not so much a method of research as method of presentation. Knowing in advance the definition of our concept, we only try to list the characteristics of this concept not at random, but methodically, namely in the order of gradual decrease in their generality. This method of defining a concept is not so bad, but logic also knows other ways of structurally ordering the features of the sought-for concept. And these methods are not so cumbersome, more obvious and more advantageous in their brevity.

3. The fact that any given thing is possible only when it is precisely it, and not something else, i.e. when it is determined by certain essential features, that is, it has its own idea, we already know this from all of Plato’s previous dialogues. What is perhaps new here is that even the concept of non-existence has its own idea, since non-existence is also itself, and not something else, and since without the presence of non-existence one cannot imagine being itself. But this is not the most important thing in the dialogue. The most important thing is that, having moved on to those basic categories without which neither thinking nor meaningful speech is possible, Plato here for the first time gives their exact enumeration and tries to understand them in their dialectical coherence.

   There are a number of these categories in this dialogue five. Namely, if something exists, then non-existence is also possible. And this means that existence is different from non-existence, and that which differs from something must itself be something and cannot cease to be something, since the slightest shift in it would already make it something else. This means that being is not only different from non-being, but for the same reason it is also identically With myself. However, it is impossible to remain in the realm of the categories of only difference and identity, because what is different is also a being, i.e. being, and the identical also exists, i.e. identical with being. But if everything in these categories is being, then, obviously, we can distinguish them only when we moved on from one to another. However, it is also impossible to move so far that what is passing ceases to be itself. With any transitions to something else, at the same time it must also rest in itself. So, being, difference, identity, rest and movement these are those necessary categories, without which no comprehension and no reasonable speech are possible. Only thanks to this dialectic of being and non-being is it possible to express both truth and falsehood.

   Plato here very cleverly grabs the sophist by the throat. The sophist says: “There is no lie, but only truth.” But Plato asks a deadly question: is truth different from lies for you, or is it no different? If it is no different from a lie, then instead of the word true you can put the word lie and you must say that everything is a lie. And if, in your opinion, the truth is somehow different from a lie, then tell me, how is it different? In order to maintain the meaningfulness of his position, the sophist must, willy-nilly, distinguish truth from falsehood. But truth is an affirmation of some kind of being, and a lie is its negation. This is how Plato comes to his dialectic of being and non-being as a condition for the possibility of distinguishing truth and falsehood.

4. One can and, perhaps, should think that Plato could have presented this dialectic of his five categories much more clearly if he had not been hampered by the colloquial way of presenting this dialectic and various deviations to the side that were usual for him. Therefore, the presentation of these categories that we have now proposed is much clearer than that of Plato, being the product of commentary work. But of the many things implied by Plato, but not expressed by him or expressed in an unclear form, we would suggest paying attention to strict structure the very result of this dialectic in Plato.

   After all, each of the proposed categories is itself, and not itself, but any of all the others, so that it is all five categories, taken as a whole and indivisible, and at the same time is not this whole, but exists itself according to to yourself. The concept of the whole is very important here. If we connect what is said about wholeness in different parts of the dialogue (244b 245e and especially 253d), then it becomes clear that Plato distinguishes between separate discrete parts of the whole, which do not reflect this whole and therefore represent not the whole itself, but a mechanical the sum of discrete parts (in Plato’s terminology “everything”), and such wholeness, which is higher than its parts and, we would say now, represents a completely new quality, is not divided into its parts entirely and the parts of which, remaining themselves, already reflect within itself an indivisible integrity (in Plato’s terminology, “the whole” as opposed to “the whole” as a mechanical sum of discrete parts). It is important here that Plato immediately calls this establishment of genera and clearly distinct species dialectics. If we now understand the five main categories indicated as a whole, then this whole will turn out to be a single whole, and this is what modern science calls structure. Consequently, Plato in the Sophist defines being as a structure, i.e. it is a being that is defined as self-identical difference mobile rest. This is, according to Plato, eidos, or idea. In it everything is identical and everything is different; in it there is a continual transition from one different thing to another, so that this movement turns out to be at the same time rest. This is the structural result of the dialectic of being and non-being in Plato's Sophist.

5. In this dialectic of being and non-being, a number of points are noteworthy. Non-existence entered into a dialectical connection with being, so that they were interpenetrated. Non-existence, permeating being, gave birth to being as a single wholeness, in which one element exists both for itself and for the whole and at the same time does not exist independently and for the whole. This is also a very subtle dialectic. Finally, to explain real-life, real-human contradictions, the moment of non-existence is introduced into existence itself in order to dismember it and thereby make it possible both the correct reproduction of this ideal unity, and any distortion of it, which means that the idea is thought out here as criterion of real human lies, and thought out from the point of view of contradiction as the main driving force both in the field of everything ideal and in the field of everything material. However, for objective idealism it is not enough that there is an idea with its own categories and that it comprehends matter with all its contradictions. It is clear that clarification is required and ontological the relationship between idea and matter, and not just semantic or ideological. This whole problem is almost completely absent from the Sophist, but special dialogues will be devoted to it, and above all Parmenides and Philebus.

Life of Plato

Plato was born in Athens, his real name is Aristocles. Plato (“broad-shouldered”) is a nickname to which he owes his powerful torso. The philosopher came from a noble family, received a good education, and at the age of about 20 he became a student of Socrates. At first, Plato prepared himself for political activity; after the death of his teacher, he left Athens and traveled a lot, mainly in Italy. Disillusioned with politics and almost falling into slavery, Plato returns to Athens, where he creates his famous school - the Academy (it is located in a grove planted in honor of the Greek hero Academus), which existed for more than 900 years. They taught here not only philosophy and politics, but also geometry, astronomy, geography, botany, and gymnastics classes were held every day. Training was based on lectures, discussions and collaborative conversations. Almost all the works that have come down to us are written in the form of a dialogue, the main character of which is Socrates, expressing the views of Plato himself.

Major philosophical works of Plato

“Apology of Socrates”, “Meno”, “Symposium”, “Phaedrus”, “Parmenides”, “State”, “Laws”.

Plato's philosophy

The main issue of pre-Socratic philosophy was the development of natural philosophy, the problem of finding the beginning, an attempt to explain the origin and existence of the world. Previous philosophers understood nature and space as a world of visible and sensory things, but were never able to explain the world using causes based only on the “elements” or their properties (water, air, fire, earth, hot, cold, rarefaction and so on.).

Plato's merit lies in the fact that he introduces a new, exclusively rational view of the explanation and knowledge of the world, and comes to the discovery of another reality - a supersensible, supraphysical, intelligible space. This leads to an understanding of two planes of existence: the phenomenal, visible, and the invisible, metaphysical, captured exclusively by the intellect; Thus, Plato for the first time emphasizes the intrinsic value of the ideal.

Since then, there has been a demarcation of philosophers into materialists, for whom true existence is the material, sensually perceived world (Democritus’s line), and idealists, for whom true existence is the immaterial, supersensible, supraphysical, intelligible world (Plato’s line).

Plato's philosophy has the character of objective idealism, when the impersonal universal spirit, supra-individual consciousness is taken as the fundamental principle of existence.

Theory of ideas

The World of Plato's Ideas

Plato sees the true causes of things not in physical reality, but in the intelligible world and calls them “ideas” or “eidos”. Things in the material world can change, are born and die, but their causes must be eternal and unchanging, must express the essence of things. Plato's main thesis is that “...things can be seen, but not thought; ideas, on the contrary, can be thought, but not seen.”

Ideas represent the universal, as opposed to individual things - and only the universal, according to Plato, is worthy of knowledge. This principle applies to all subjects of study, but in his dialogues Plato pays great attention to the consideration of the essence of beauty. The dialogue “Hippias the Greater” describes a dispute about beauty between Socrates, representing Plato’s point of view, and the sophist Hippias, who is depicted as a simple-minded, even stupid person. To the question: “What is beautiful?”, Hippias cites the first particular case that comes to mind and answers that this is a beautiful girl. Socrates says that then we must recognize a beautiful horse, a beautiful lyre, and even a beautiful pot as beautiful, but all these things are beautiful only in a relative sense. “Or are you not able to remember that I asked about the beautiful in itself, which makes everything beautiful, no matter what it is attached to, - a stone, a tree, a person, a god, and any act, any knowledge.” . We are talking about such beauty, which “could never seem ugly to anyone, anywhere,” about “what is beautiful for everyone and always.” The beautiful understood in this sense is an idea, or a form, or an eidos.

We can say that the idea is the supersensible cause, sample, goal and prototype of all things, the source of their reality in this world. Plato writes: “...ideas exist in nature, as it were, in the form of models, but other things are similar to them and are their similarities, and the very participation of things in ideas consists in nothing other than their likeness to them.”

Thus, we can highlight the main features of ideas:

• eternity
• immutability
• objectivity
• irrelevance
• independence from feelings
• independence from space and time conditions

The structure of an ideal world.

Plato understands the world of ideas as a hierarchically organized system in which ideas differ from each other in the degree of generality. The ideas of the lower tier - it includes ideas of natural, natural things, ideas of physical phenomena, ideas of mathematical formulas - are subordinated to higher ideas. The highest and more valuable ideas are those that are designed to explain human existence - ideas of beauty, truth, justice. At the top of the hierarchy is the idea of ​​the Good, which is the condition of all other ideas and is not conditioned by any other; it is the goal towards which all things and all living beings strive. Thus, the idea of ​​the Good (in other sources Plato calls it “One”) testifies to the unity of the world and its expediency.

The world of ideas and the world of things

The world of ideas, according to Plato, is the world of truly existing being. It is contrasted with the world of non-existence - this is matter, the unlimited beginning and the condition for the spatial isolation of the multiplicity of things. Both of these principles are equally necessary for the existence of the world of things, but primacy is given to the world of ideas: if there were no ideas, there would be no matter. The world of things, the sensory world, is a product of the world of ideas and the world of matter, that is, being and non-being. With this division, Plato emphasizes that the sphere of the ideal, the spiritual has independent value.

Each thing, being involved in the world of ideas, is a semblance of an idea with its eternity and immutability, and the thing “owes” its divisibility and isolation to matter. Thus, the world of sensory things combines two opposites and is in the area of ​​formation and development.

Idea as a concept. In addition to the ontological meaning, Plato’s idea is also considered in terms of knowledge: an idea is both being and a thought about it, and therefore a concept about it corresponding to being. In this epistemological sense, Plato’s idea is a general, or generic, concept of the essence of a conceivable object. Thus, he touches on the important philosophical problem of the formation of general concepts that express the essence of things.

Plato's dialectics.

In his works, Plato calls dialectics the science of existence. Developing the dialectical ideas of Socrates, he understands dialectics as a combination of opposites, and turns it into a universal philosophical method.

In the activity of active thought, devoid of sensory perception, Plato distinguishes “ascending” and “descending” paths. “Ascent” is to move upward from idea to idea, up to the highest, seeking the one in many. In the dialogue “Phaedrus” he views this as a generalizing “...the ability, embracing everything with a general gaze, to elevate to a single idea that which is scattered everywhere...”. Having touched this single beginning, the mind begins to move in a “descending” way. It represents the ability to divide everything into types, going from more general to specific ideas. Plato writes: “...this, on the contrary, is the ability to divide everything into types, into natural components, while trying not to crush any of them, as happens with bad cooks...”. Plato calls these processes “dialectics,” and the philosopher, by definition, is a “dialectician.”

Plato's dialectics covers various spheres: being and non-being, identical and different, rest and movement, one and many. In his dialogue “Parmenides,” Plato opposes the dualism of ideas and things and argues that if the ideas of things are separated from the things themselves, then a thing that does not contain any idea of ​​itself cannot contain any signs and properties, that is, it will cease to exist. be yourself. In addition, he considers the principle of the idea as any one thing, and not only as a supersensible one, and the principle of matter as any other thing in comparison with one, and not only as the material sensory world. Thus, the dialectic of one and the other is formalized in Plato into an extremely generalized dialectic of idea and matter.

Plato's theory of knowledge

Plato continues the reflections begun by his predecessors on the nature of knowledge and develops his own theory of knowledge. He defines the place of philosophy in knowledge, which is between complete knowledge and ignorance. In his opinion, philosophy as the love of wisdom is impossible neither for one who already possesses true knowledge (gods), nor for one who knows nothing. According to Plato, a philosopher is one who strives to ascend from less perfect knowledge to more perfect knowledge.

When developing the question of knowledge and its types, Plato proceeds from the fact that the types of knowledge must correspond to the types, or spheres, of being. In the dialogue “The State,” he divides knowledge into sensory and intellectual, each of which, in turn, is divided into two types. Sensory knowledge consists of “faith” and “likeness”. Through “faith” we perceive things as existing, and “similarity” is some representation of things, a mental construction based on “faith”. Knowledge of this kind is not true, and Plato calls it opinion, which is neither knowledge nor ignorance and lies between both.

Intellectual knowledge is accessible only to those who love to contemplate the truth, and is divided into thinking and reason. By thinking, Plato understands the activity of the mind that directly contemplates intellectual objects. In the sphere of reason, the knower also uses the mind, but in order to understand sensory things as images. The intellectual type of knowledge is the cognitive activity of people who contemplate existence with their minds. Thus, sensible things are comprehended by opinion, and in relation to them knowledge is impossible. Through knowledge only ideas are comprehended, and only in relation to them is knowledge possible.

In the dialogue "Meno" Plato develops the doctrine of recollection, answering the question of how we know what we know, or how to know what we do not know, for we must have prior knowledge of what we are going to know. The dialogue between Socrates and the uneducated slave leads to the fact that Socrates, asking him leading questions, discovers in the slave the ability to escape from the world of phenomena and rise to abstract mathematical “ideas.” This means that the soul always knows, since it is immortal, and, having come into contact with the sensory world, it begins to remember the essences of things already known to it.

Plato's doctrine of the ideal state

Plato pays great attention to the development of views on society and the state. He creates a theory of an ideal state, the principles of which are confirmed by history, but remain unrealizable to the end like any ideal.

Plato believes that the state arises when a person cannot satisfy his needs on his own and needs the help of others. The philosopher writes: “The state arises, as I believe, when each of us cannot satisfy himself, but still needs much.” Man, first of all, needs food, clothing, shelter and the services of those who produce and supply it; then people need protection and security and, finally, those who know how to practically manage.

In this principle of division of labor, Plato sees the foundation of his entire contemporary social and state structure. Being the basic principle of building a state, the division of labor also underlies the division of society into various classes:

• 1. peasants, artisans, merchants
• 2. guards
• 3. rulers

But for Plato, it is important not only the division based on professional characteristics, but also the moral qualities inherent in the corresponding categories of citizens of the state. In this regard, he identifies the virtues or virtues of a perfect state:

1. The first class is formed from people in whom the lustful part of the soul predominates, that is, the most elementary, therefore they must maintain the discipline of desires and pleasures, and possess the virtue of moderation.

2. Among people of the second estate, the strong-willed part of the soul predominates; their profession requires special education and special knowledge, therefore the main valor of guard warriors is courage.

3. Rulers can be those who have a predominant rational part of the soul, who are able to fulfill their duty with the greatest zeal, who know how to know and contemplate the Good, and are endowed with the highest virtue - wisdom. Plato also identifies a fourth virtue - justice - this is the harmony that reigns between the other three virtues, and is realized by every citizen of any class, understanding his place in society and doing his job in the best possible way.

So, a perfect state is when three categories of citizens form a harmonious whole, and the state is governed by a few people endowed with wisdom, that is, philosophers. “Until in the states,” says Plato, “either philosophers reign, or the so-called current kings and rulers begin to philosophize nobly and thoroughly and this merges into one, state power and philosophy, and until those people are necessarily removed - and there are many of them - who now strive separately either for power or for philosophy, until then states cannot get rid of evils...”

So, Plato:

• is the founder of objective idealism
• for the first time emphasizes the intrinsic value of the ideal
• creates a doctrine of the unity and purposefulness of the world, which is based on supersensible, intelligible reality
• brings a rational view to the explanation and knowledge of the world
• examines the philosophical problem of concept formation
• turns dialectics into a universal philosophical method
• creates the doctrine of an ideal state, paying great attention to the moral qualities of citizens and rulers

Plato's teaching - idealism, according to his statements, really exists, not a sensory object, but only its intelligible, incorporeal essence, not perceived by the senses. At the same time, this teaching is objective idealism, because, according to Plato, the “idea” exists in itself, exists as something common to all objects. In Plato, the word “idea” is used to denote the essence of an object, as well as to denote “form”, “figure”, “appearance”, “appearance”. His ‹‹idea›› (or ‹‹view››) is a form that is comprehended not by the senses, but by the mind - ‹‹...immutable essences can be comprehended only with the help of reflection - they are formless and invisible.››. One of the important provisions of Platonic ontology is the division of reality into two worlds: the world of ideas and the world of sensory things. ‹‹Ideas exist in nature as if in the form of samples, but other things are similar to them››. The material world that surrounds us, and which we know through the senses, is only a “shadow” and is derived from the world of ideas, i.e. the material world is secondary. All phenomena and objects of the material world are transitory, arise, perish and change (and therefore cannot be truly existing), while ideas are unchanging, immobile and eternal. Each of them is ‹‹uniform and existing in itself, always unchangeable and identical and never, under any circumstances, subject to the slightest change››. For these properties, Plato recognizes them as ‹‹authentic, real being and elevates them to the rank of the only subject of genuine true knowledge››. To explain the diversity of the sensory world, Plato introduces the concept of matter. Matter, according to Plato, is the “receiver and, as it were, the nurse of every birth.” Plato believes that matter can take any form because it is completely formless, indefinite, since its purpose ‹‹is to well perceive in its entirety the imprints of all eternally existing things››, accordingly ‹‹to be its nature alien to any forms››. According to Plato, “ideas” are truly existing being, and matter is non-existence, and without “ideas”, matter could not exist.

Between the world of ideas, as truly real being, and non-existence (i.e., matter as such), according to Plato, there exists “apparent being” (i.e., the world of truly real, sensory phenomena and things), which separates true being from non-existence. So, since the world of sensory things, according to Paton, occupies a “middle” position between the realm of being and non-being, being a product of both of these regions, then it to some extent combines opposites, it is the unity of opposites: being and non-being, identical and non-identical, unchanging and changeable, motionless and moving, involved in the singular and the plural.

Plato pays a lot of attention to the issue of “hierarchization of ideas”. This hierarchization represents a certain ordered system of objective idealism. Asmus A.F. reveals the following classification of ideas in Plato. Firstly, the ‹‹ideas›› of the highest values ​​- the ‹‹ideas›› of good, truth, beauty and justice. Secondly, “ideas” of physical phenomena and processes: fire, peace, movement, color, sound, etc. Thirdly, “ideas” also exist for certain categories of creatures, such as animals and humans. Fourthly, sometimes Plato admits the existence of “ideas” for objects produced by man. Fifthly, the “ideas of relationships” were of great importance in Plato’s theory of “ideas”. The highest idea of ​​ideas is an abstract good, identical to absolute beauty. In every material thing it is necessary to look for a reflection of ideal beauty, its essence. When a person is able to “see with his mind,” in the words of Losev A.F., a beautiful individual thing, “he will know what is beautiful in many things.” In this way one can gradually rise to the most general concept of good. “The idea of ​​good is the most important knowledge,” we read in “The State,” “through it justice and everything else become suitable and useful.”

In the concept of an idea, notes Boldyrev N.F., “in Plato, what makes an “idea” is 1) the cause or source of the existence of things, their properties, their relationships; 2) a model, looking at which the demiurge creates the world of things; 3) the goal towards which everything that exists strives, as the supreme good.

In his dialogues, Plato gave specific experimental examples of the construction of his doctrine of ideas. The doctrine of ideas is united and identified by Plato with mythology, and is based on a certain mystical and social experience.

In my opinion, Losev A.F. in his work ‹‹Plato›› briefly summarizes Plato’s theory of ideas in the most successful way:

1. ‹‹The idea of ​​a thing is the meaning of the thing››. After all, in order to distinguish things, it is necessary to answer the question regarding each thing: what is this thing and how does it differ from all other things? The idea of ​​a thing is precisely the answer to the question of what a given thing is; therefore, the idea of ​​a thing is, first of all, the meaning of the thing.

2. The idea of ​​a thing is the integrity of all its constituent parts, indivisible into these parts. ‹‹One side of a triangle is not the whole triangle. So is the other, so is the third party. However, due to a certain combination of these three segments, something new, a new quality is obtained, namely a triangle››.

3. ‹‹The idea of ​​a thing is that community of its constituent features and singularities, which is the law for the emergence and receipt of these individual manifestations of a thing››. The fact that the idea of ​​a thing is a general law that comprehends the appearance and manifestation of its individual individual features can be seen in any thing, and the more complex a thing is, the more visible its general ideological pattern is. Asmus A.F. considers the example of a watch, the mechanism of which indicates that the wheels and screws that make it up are arranged according to some “general idea”, without which all these details would remain “alien to each other” and no clock mechanism would be formed ››.

4. ‹‹The idea of ​​a thing is immaterial››. It is obvious that the thing itself can undergo all kinds of changes, but the idea of ​​the thing cannot change. One of the simplest examples is water. Water can be in a solid or liquid state, and can also evaporate. But the idea of ​​water cannot change its state of aggregation.

5. ‹‹The idea of ​​a thing has its own and completely independent existence, it is also a special kind of ideal thing, or substance, which in its full and perfect form exists only in heaven or above heaven››. From this point of view, Plato preaches three varieties of being. First, that the celestial ideas are eternal and immovable. They represent the “ultimate perfection of every single thing and of all existence as a whole.” Secondly, there is our earthly world, full of instability, ‹‹imperfection, chaos of birth and death››. And thirdly, there is the cosmos as a whole, which consists of an eternal rotation, while the vault of heaven constantly returns to the same stable picture, so that ‹‹the entire celestial rotation is the best realization of the highest ideas and therefore the most perfect beauty, then is a necessary subject of our contemplation and constant imitation››.

Plato's teaching about the idea as the principle of understanding things, about their general integrity, which is the law of their individual manifestations, cannot be questioned no matter what changes occur in nature and in society.

Plato's epistemology.

Plato's doctrine of knowledge is inseparable from his doctrine of being, from his psychology, cosmology and mythology. The doctrine of knowledge turns into a myth. According to Plato, our soul is immortal. Before it moved onto the earth and took on a bodily shell, the soul supposedly contemplated the truly existing existence and retained knowledge about it. A person will know without learning from anyone, but only by answering questions, that is, he will gain knowledge in himself, therefore, he will remember. Therefore, the essence of the process of cognition, according to Plato, is the recollection by the soul of those ideas that it had already contemplated. Plato wrote that “and since everything in nature is related to each other, and the soul has known everything, nothing prevents the one who remembers one thing - people call this knowledge - from finding everything else himself, if only he is tireless in search " Therefore, the nature of the soul must be akin to the nature of “ideas.”

Only thinking gives true meaning. Thinking is an absolutely independent process of remembering, independent of sensory perceptions. Sense perception gives rise only to opinions about things. In this regard, the process of cognition is defined by Plato as dialectics, that is, the art of speaking, the art of asking questions and answering them, awakening memories. In other words, this is a reasonable comprehension of truly existing types of being or ideas - “the most perfect knowledge.” Plato's dialectic is the path or movement of thought through the untrue to the true. An impression or a thought that contains a contradiction can provoke the soul to think. “What affects sensations simultaneously with its opposite, I have defined as stimulating,” says Plato, “and what does not influence in this way does not awaken thought.” The first half of the task of dialectical, in the Platonic sense, research consists in determining an unambiguous, precisely fixed definition of “type.” It is necessary, in the words of Plato himself, “covering everything with a general view, elevating to a single idea what is scattered everywhere, so that, by giving a definition to each, the subject of teaching is made clear.” The second half of the same task is to “divide into species, into natural constituent parts, while being careful not to fragment any of them.”

“Plato’s dialectics was an important stage in the development of logic. According to Plato, knowledge is not possible for everyone. “Philosophy,” literally “the love of wisdom,” is impossible either for one who already has true knowledge (the gods already have it) or for one who knows nothing at all (the ignorant does not think he needs knowledge). Therefore, a philosopher is one who stands between complete knowledge and ignorance and strives from less perfect knowledge to ascend to more and more perfect knowledge.

The subject of the dialogue “Theaetetus” is the question of the essence of knowledge. The dialogue refutes three solutions to this issue that are untenable from Plato’s point of view: 1) knowledge is sensory perception; 2) knowledge – correct opinion; 3) knowledge – correct opinion with meaning. In the first question, Plato starts from the doctrine of the unconditional fluidity and relativity of everything that exists. The sensory, as fluid, must be preceded by something that is not fluid and not sensory; therefore, knowledge is not identical to sensory perception. Secondly, knowledge cannot be defined as a true opinion, regardless of the relationship between a true opinion and a false opinion. If we take an opinion just as an opinion, then nothing can be said about either its truth or its falsity. Correct opinion cannot be determined at all without pure knowledge as such. And thirdly, how can one not understand “meaning” - as an explanation in the form of words as such, as an explanation in the form of an integral structure of words, as an indication of a distinctive feature - in all these cases, adding “meaning” to the “correct opinion” does not can create knowledge. So, knowledge, according to Plato, is neither sensation, nor correct opinion, nor the combination of correct opinion with meaning. Knowledge must be a combination of sensibility and mind, and the mind must comprehend the elements of sensory experience.

For Plato, the main science that defines all others is dialectics - the method of dividing the one into the many, reducing the many to the one and structurally representing the whole as a single multiplicity. Dialectics, entering the realm of confused things, dismembers them so that each thing receives its own meaning, its own idea. This meaning, or idea of ​​a thing, is taken as the principle of the thing, as its “hypothesis”, the law (“nomos”), which in Plato leads from scattered sensuality to an ordered idea and back; This is exactly how Plato understands logos. Dialectics is therefore the establishment of mental foundations for things, a kind of objective a priori categories or forms of meaning. These logos - idea - hypothes - foundation are also interpreted as the limit (“goal”) of sensory formation. Such a universal goal is good in the Republic, Philebus, Gorgias, or beauty in the Symposium. This limit of the formation of a thing contains in a compressed form the entire formation of a thing and is, as it were, its plan, its structure. In this regard, dialectics in Plato is a doctrine of indivisible wholes; as such it is at once discursive and intuitive; making all kinds of logical divisions, she knows how to merge everything together. A dialectician, according to Plato, has a “total vision” of the sciences, “sees everything at once.”

According to Plato's teachings, only the world of ideas represents true existence, and concrete things are something between being and non-being, they are only shadows of ideas. The world of ideas is the divine kingdom, in which before the birth of a person his immortal soul resides. Then she ends up on the sinful earth, where, temporarily being a human. body, like a prisoner in a dungeon, she remembers the world of ideas. Existence contains contradictions: it is one and multiple, eternal and transitory, unchanging and changeable.

“The Sophist,” like “Parmenides,” are dialogues in which Plato reveals the essence of his philosophy, the theme of ideas. Plato’s very presentation of his thought changes noticeably. The myth with its figurative significance is replaced by a terminologically refined and strictly conceptual presentation. The intellectual framework of Platonism, already outlined in both the Symposium and the Phaedrus, remains unchanged. The problematic that lies in Plato’s field of vision is also unchanged; it can be felt in the very names of the dialogues “Sophist” and “Parmenides” - they, of course, capture the most important of the ideological currents of pre-Platonic philosophy that fed Platonism and made Plato’s synthesis so clear as if elastic and convex. Both the Sophists in their pathos of “all-corroding” thinking in the theme of relationship, absorbing and dissolving being, and Parmenides in his theme of being, denying relationship, are characteristic and integral in the highest sense of the word. The main problematic of the Sophist as a whole can be deduced from the thesis of Parmenides of Eleatic “being and thinking are one and the same”, in the interpretation of Parmenides himself and in the interpretation of the Sophists. If Parmenides understood “one and the same” as the indistinguishability of true being from true thinking, both are fused to the point of indistinguishability into “is.” The sophists understood “one and the same thing” in a divisive sense, since only what is initially different can be the same, moreover, this difference is absolute and insurmountable: being in general is one, the being that we think about is another, about which we reason - third. This is the thesis of Gorgias. The sophists opposed Parmenides' cognitive optimism not so much with their skepticism, but with another optimism associated with the omnipotence of thinking - the measure of those judging what being should be. Gorgias in Parmenides’ “one and the same” sees not unity, but three different types of being, into which the “one and the same,” which seemed so monolithic, falls apart if we seriously begin to think about it. From the point of view of the sophists, initially difference is a relationship to another, and not unity is a relationship to oneself. This, according to the sophists, is the nature of thinking, the only organ of cognition of existence for the philosopher. Plato faces a seemingly insurmountable task: to guess the commonality in mutually exclusive approaches, to discover the truth behind the opposing truths of the Eleatics and Sophists. Indeed, one cannot disagree with Parmenides: in order to know something, the object must be finite - complete, correlated only and exclusively with itself, unchangeable and motionless. Only about such a reality can we say “is.” But the sophistic-Socratic experience of being is irreplaceable. We think of being, like any thing in general, which means we compare, correlate and contrast, no matter what we take - it is already correlated with another and pulls with it the whole variety of countless relationships, which means it is in constant formation - changing internal and external connections. Plurality is the fragmentation of being and is grasped by thinking, since it itself is complex, even if we think about ourselves, it is a dyad - a two, and not a monad - a single (as Parmenides wanted to imagine).

The period of high classics in ancient philosophy begins with the Socratic revolution. Plato became the most talented student. In contrast to Socrates, he came from a very noble family: on his mother’s side, his family went back to Solomon. On the father's side, no man died a natural death, being involved in the political games of the high society of Athens.

The whole life of this philosopher is shrouded in legends: in one, he is prescribed divine origin with the intervention of Apollo, in another, divine bees endow him with the gift of eloquence.

Plato developed the legacy of the teacher primarily through the ontologization of Socrates' ethical rationalism: Plato returns to the teachings of the Eleatics, who were the first to reflect on ontology as a doctrine of being, but does this at a new qualitative level, enriched by the Socratic understanding of the actual philosophical subject and method.

The truly existing being of Plato is the eternal perfect ideas (Greek Idea-concept, representation), or eidos (Greek Eidos-view, image; in Plato - substantial ideas), namely the ideas of good, beauty, courage, justice, wisdom, truths, etc. The eternal perfect ideas of Plato are the same virtues of Socrates, but now quite clearly reflected as elements of true existence. The world of things, according to Plato, is a world of shadows. Things exist as a material reality, but due to its temporality, perishability, fluidity, and transitory nature, it appears only as a more or less clear reflection of eternal perfect ideas. Speaking in extremely abstract philosophical language, according to the teachings of Plato, eternal perfect ideas are primary, and matter is secondary. This means that the foundation of human existence in the world is made up of eternal perfect ideas. This principle contains a deep, life-affirming meaning: each of us exists to the extent that we clearly embody the idea of ​​goodness, beauty, courage, justice, etc.

Plato’s eternal perfect ideas perform the following main functions in relation to the world of things:

they are the reason for the existence of the world of things

they are the essence of things

they are a model for the world of things

they are the purpose of the existence of the world of things

Thus, the main theoretical characteristics of Plato's ontology are as follows:

classic of objective idealism

metaphysician

it is characterized by theology as a doctrine of expediency, which originated in the teaching of Anaxagoras, but was first reflected by him.

Plato believed that knowledge is not:

sensory perception

correct opinion (although opinion is expressed in logical forms, it is subjective)

even the correct opinion “with meaning”, i.e. especially loaded informed opinion.

What then is knowledge according to Plato? Knowledge is the comprehension of the essence of eternal perfect ideas. How can this be achieved? Plato develops the concept of the human soul remembering eternal perfect ideas, in the realm of which it arrived before connecting with the body. What determines that some people have fairly clear ideas about the essence of eternal perfect ideas, while others have very vague ones? Plato believes that the reason for this lies in eros, that is, in how much the soul is in love with this world of eternal perfect ideas, the wingspan of the soul and the height of its flight depend on this. With all the romanticism of this concept, it leads to the following important conclusion: if you do not love your memory, then it will respond in kind, and to love means devoting time.

The One is one of the main concepts of philosophy. The One is conceived as the beginning of indivisibility, unity and integrity of both a really existing thing, soul, consciousness, personality, and ideal being - a concept, law, number. In philosophy, E. (unity) serves as a prerequisite for such concepts as the Whole (unity of many), continuous, identity, equality, etc. For philosophy, the concept of E. is as important as the concept being. Depending on which of these concepts is recognized as the supreme principle, we can talk about two types metaphysics- about the metaphysics of E., or genology and metaphysics of being. Plato belongs to the representatives of genology. The discussion of E. in ancient philosophy began with the Pythagoreans and Eleatics. For the Pythagoreans, the concept of E. - the monad - serves as the beginning of number, and number is the condition for the possibility of all knowledge. Among the Eleatics, the concepts of E. and existence are used as synonyms. Plato also considers E. as an essence, but makes significant changes to its interpretation by the Eleatics. Even claiming that “E. exists,” we attribute to it the predicate of being and, therefore, we think “two” - E. and being, and two is the beginning of plurality. The transition from E. to being (i.e., to “two”) is the principle of generating number and eliminating E. as E. From here Plato draws the conclusion: once “the existing E.” - is no longer one, which means E. is not being, it is super-existent. As such, it cannot be the subject of thought, because the thought of E. is already “two”; Consequently, E. is incomprehensible to thinking; the subject of the latter can only be existence (being). However, as a super-existential and incomprehensible principle that cannot enter into any relationship, E., according to Plato, is a necessary prerequisite for both being (plurality) and knowledge. “The One Existing” is, according to Plato, the world of intelligible supersensible ideas, which form a correlated set - the integrity of the ideal world. Every idea carries within itself the beginning of unity.