At the Documentary Film Center, as part of the joint project of the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and the Free Historical Society “Historical Moment”, a discussion was held on the topic “The First Russian Revolution: Failure or Prologue?”, the participants of which were Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of RANEPA Konstantin Morozov and Doctor of Historical Sciences, leading researcher at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Kirill Solovyov. The conversation was moderated by historian and TV presenter Nikolai Svanidze. Lenta.ru publishes the main points of speeches by historians.

The revolution has begun

Konstantin Morozov:

The revolution of 1905 stands on a par with other European revolutions, which led to the fall of dilapidated and incapable of responding to new historical challenges absolute monarchies. The conservation of outdated social relations and the reluctance to take into account the interests of new classes (bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, proletariat) had dire consequences for pre-revolutionary Russia. Even the highest aristocracy realized that autocracy was an anachronism and hindered the further development of the country. It is important to understand that any revolution first occurs in people’s heads and only then is put into practice, although the period of its gestation can last a very long time.

The revolution of 1905 came as a surprise to everyone, although Russia had been moving toward it for a long time. For example, the American historian Richard Pipes considers it a prologue to the student unrest of 1899. Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky believed that the tsarist regime began to collapse under Alexander III, and publicist Mark Vishnyak counted the end of autocracy from the mid-1870s, when Alexander II stopped the Great Reforms and decided to “freeze” the country. Russia and the ruling dynasty could only be saved from revolution by the introduction of a constitutional monarchy. But the last Romanovs, in an effort to preserve the autocratic foundations of their power unshakable, eventually lost everything and led the country to the disaster of 1917.

Kirill Soloviev:

Revolution is, first of all, a diagnosis of the ruling regime. The main driving force of the Russian revolution was the government itself, whose fundamental vices gave rise to discontent in society. The historian Alexander Stepansky rightly said that no one contributed to it as much as Nicholas II (naturally, without wanting it). The cause of any uprising is not the force of public pressure, but the sudden weakness of the supreme power, when it suddenly discovers a vacuum and emptiness around itself, and it has no one else to rely on. A similar situation arose in October 1905, when the emperor’s inner circle became the main opposition force, because conversations about the constitution in Russia had been going on for many decades, and many representatives of the highest bureaucracy also sought change.

After the revolution, Russia became a qualitatively different country. Elected representation, a free press appeared, and most importantly, the monarchy ceased to be unlimited. Of course, the manifesto of October 17, 1905, in its essence, was not a constitution, but a declaration of intentions, but Nicholas II himself admitted in private correspondence that he had signed a constitutional act.

Non-parliamentary Duma monarchy

Kirill Soloviev:

Any revolution is like a big explosion, after which the entire system is reassembled piece by piece. But after the first Russian revolution, the new political mechanism of the Russian Empire was created from old archaic elements, so it had many anachronisms and contradictions. Its main distinguishing feature was the constant struggle between liberals and revolutionaries on the one hand, who considered the concessions of Nicholas II insufficient, and conservatives on the other hand, who considered these innovations excessive.

Of course, the Duma monarchy in Russia after 1905 was a sick system, although not hopeless. She had every chance to recover, but this was prevented by the First World War, which exacerbated all her vices and contradictions to the extreme.

Konstantin Morozov:

The country's political system after the first Russian revolution remained under-reformed, so it is impossible to talk about any new quality. The State Duma never became a full-fledged parliament, although it was more similar to it than the current one.

One step was missing - allowing the Duma to approve the appointment of ministers, but this is precisely what Nicholas II lacked the political will to do. After June 3, 1907, he again tried to “freeze” the situation, refusing dialogue with society and the further path to transform Russia into a constitutional monarchy. After this, the events of 1917 became inevitable.

Revolutionary terror and Stolypin repressions

Konstantin Morozov:

Opposition terrorism, which manifested itself strongly during the first Russian revolution, arose on the crest of the revolutionary movement that swept Russia in the second half of the 19th century against the backdrop of confrontation between the authorities and the intelligentsia. Why did the intelligentsia join the revolution? People in the humanitarian professions could not realize themselves without creative freedom, inseparable from political freedom, which the authorities were in no hurry to provide.

These contradictions, which matured over several decades, ultimately led to general bitterness, the result of which was revolutionary terrorism. It was fueled both by state terror in the form of a backlash and by widespread public support. Why did the intelligentsia largely sympathize with terrorists? By that time, everyone was tired of the government, which, with its lack of control and ineffectiveness, aroused universal hatred and contempt.

Kirill Soloviev:

If we talk about Stolypin’s repressions against revolutionaries, about the notorious “Stolypin ties” and “Stolypin carriages,” then their scale was incommensurate with the rampant opposition terrorism. During the entire existence of military justice in Russia, about 2,800 people were executed (a colossal figure for that time), but there were several times more victims of revolutionary terror.

Of course, Pyotr Stolypin in many ways embodied the ideas of his predecessor, Sergei Witte, although, unlike him, Stolypin was a public politician and looked quite natural on the podium of the State Duma. Stolypin's tragedy was that he became a victim of his own ideas, since the main obstacle to the systemic reforms he conceived was the very Duma, which was supposed to be their main support. Therefore, the most important reforms (judicial, local government) failed or were significantly distorted.

Unlearned lessons of the Russian revolutions

Kirill Soloviev:

Revolutions always happen unexpectedly, since most often power does not collapse under the blow of a powerful social element, but crumbles under the weight of its own mistakes, vices and contradictions. The trouble with Russia is that changes in our society have always outpaced the evolution of the ruling regime. Such asynchronous development of the country constantly created a situation of eternal confrontation between the government and society, which at the beginning of the 20th century naturally ended in revolution.

Konstantin Morozov:

The history of Russia has developed in such a way that for many decades the ruling dynasty could not decide on radical changes, although the need for them was obvious to Catherine II and especially Alexander I, who provided a constitution to Poland, Finland and even Bessarabia, but not to the entire empire. The endless delay in solving pressing socio-economic and political problems ultimately led Russia to tragedy.

The main lesson of the Russian revolutions is that the country's leadership must always adequately perceive reality, without trying to ignore it or adjust it to their own selfish interests. The inability of the authorities to respond to new historical challenges can sweep away not only the ruling elite, but also bring down the entire state. The peculiarity of Russia is that its ruling regimes did not fall under the pressure of an indignant people, but rotted from within for a long time, subsequently disappearing in two or three days. This happened in February 1917, and the same thing happened again in August 1991.

We continue the topic of teaching national history with the publication of an articleDoctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Humanitarian Disciplines of the Federal State Institution of the Russian Academy of National Economy and State. service under the President of the Russian Federation and professor of the Department of History of Russia in Modern Times of the Russian State Humanitarian University, deputy. Chairman of the Board of the Scientific Information and Educational Center "Memorial" Konstantin Morozov.

In recent months, many of those who did not miss the announcement of plans to write a “single history textbook”, without having yet had time to fully comprehend this news, have again become puzzled, but this time with the question of what the authorities’ maneuvers from a “single history textbook” to a “single history textbook” actually mean. “a single historical and cultural standard” and several “like-minded” textbooks? It was indeed a swift maneuver when, within one week, they first announced the creation of a single history textbook and outlined the timing of the entire procedure for the process, and soon, after discussing these plans “at a meeting of representatives of ministries and academic structures,” they announced that it was decided to abandon the idea of ​​a single textbook and from old terms. It turned out that instead, by July 1, the experts would present for discussion a Unified Historical and Cultural Standard, which would contain the concept of Russian history and its interpretation. The discussion will take place in July and August, when people go on vacation and, as the deputy “joked.” Head of the Russian Historical Society Andrei Petrov: “Citizens will be interested in reading the concept while lying by the sea.” At the same time of calm, when by definition there is no serious discussion or resonance, the authors of the concept will conduct two sociological surveys to determine the attitude of Russians towards controversial moments and figures in the country’s history. And in September the concept will be adopted, and several teams will begin writing new history textbooks. D. Livanov, changing his position right before our eyes, said at the meeting: “It is incorrect to talk about one history textbook, there may be several of them, but they all must correspond to the historical and cultural standard.” And Minister of Culture V. Medinsky states that new textbooks should instill patriotism and “socially acceptable views.”

What does this unexpected maneuver mean? On the one hand, “representatives of ministries and academic structures”, even at this stage, responded to criticism from historians and the public, which had just begun to unfold and threatened to turn into a barrage by November, when the concepts were going to be made public.

And the first thing they did was cheat - the discussion during the holiday months would be crumpled, and the concept of “representatives of ministries and academic structures” would be accepted without much public outcry. The second solution is more elegant - it was decided to abandon the “single textbook”, and introduce standards according to which several textbooks will be written! What is the elegance and subtlety of this move? The odiousness of the very fact of creating a “single textbook” is removed and the appearance of decency is maintained! But the main thing is what will be fixed in the standard, and not at all whether there will be one textbook or three, because they will all be written within the narrow confines of the standard. But the appearance of pluralism and democratic approaches remains. There is no single “Short Course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”, but several short courses written by different teams and different words, but with the same semantic content and interpretations! Again, the publishers of school textbooks and groups of historians writing textbooks, who suddenly wanted to monopolize the market with one textbook, will calm down!

So, essentially nothing has changed - the introduction of historical unanimity in Russia and in school textbooks will continue! Moreover, it will continue faster, smarter and more sophisticated! Instead of a “single history textbook,” we are faced with several “like-minded” history textbooks, creating the appearance of pluralism. And now it would be a mistake to reduce the conversation only to the single history textbook itself, however, now “a single history textbook with many faces,” which does not yet exist, or to its yet unpublished concept (we will read it on July 1, and not in November), or to 31 “controversial issues” in the history of Russia, since, on the one hand, this conversation is still ahead, when the standard concept appears (and most importantly, the texts of these “different” textbooks). This is also incorrect because there is a more important and socially significant aspect of this topic - that a “single” or “single in many faces” history textbook is the point of intersection of many different problems and interests, and its appearance will mean for our society another step (and a very large step!) towards the “introduction of unanimity” from above, towards strengthening and - most importantly - towards the conservation of authoritarian rule and the spirit of unfreedom.

This spirit of lack of freedom and unanimity will be reflected not only in school history textbooks written according to a single standard (Livanov has already considered a proposal for a unified literature textbook, but he will slightly adjust the plans and there will be a standard for literature), but the main thing is unanimity in one form or another will begin to be introduced in universities. Adjusting the standards and course programs and obliging the majority of university teachers to follow the new rules of the game and “wavering along with the party line” in a situation of civil infantilism, public disorientation and, especially, under the sword of Damocles of mass layoffs of teachers planned for the next five years - alas, will be not difficult! The university bureaucracy will not only not resist the “introduction of unanimity”, but will also zealously rush to introduce it in order to preserve the most important and dear thing to them in their native university - themselves! I'm not saying that the majority (probably still the majority!) of university history teachers come from the departments of the unforgettable “History of the CPSU,” and many of them will quickly remember old skills. However, what can we say about them if even quite “academic” historical leaders are in a hurry to get into line and are already reporting their readiness to “fulfill and exceed the party’s assignments.” Consider the statement of the dean of the history department of Moscow State University, S. Karpov, who, during a discussion of the concept of a future unified history textbook at a meeting of the Russian Historical Society, stated that (hereinafter we quote): “one must not be afraid and teach the point of view that corresponds to the geopolitical interests of the country. This must be done not only when it comes to interstate issues, but also about domestic Russian ones, the scientist told Vedomosti. The decision on Russia's geopolitical interests, in his opinion, should be made by society and the state. This approach was criticized by political scientist Alexei Makarkin. He notes that geopolitical interests are fickle: with this approach, now the relationship between Russia and the United States should be taught from a Cold War perspective, but after relations improve again, the textbook will have to be rewritten.”

But what is the irony of the situation: the political scientist (even if he received a history and archival education at the Russian State University for the Humanities) turned out to be smarter and more “historical” than the historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and dean of the “first history department” of all Rus'.

There is no need to talk about the media, especially television: censorship, officialdom and unanimity and myth-making have long been nestled there. Although there, including in the field of documentary cinema, there are people who have tried and are trying to resist lies and myth-making.

This introduction of unanimity will also affect historical science. There will also be a return to self-censorship, there will be hints (and not only) in academic institutions about what is relevant and what is not relevant for research, how topics should be formulated and how they should not be, there will be fears (God grant that they are in vain) that many topics of application to practically the only fund accessible to historians - the Russian Humanitarian Foundation, it is better not to submit, etc.

And this is very disappointing, since what perestroika gave us - the opening in 1989 of a number of state archives, and then the freedom to write and publish historical monographs without external censorship - was a very valuable achievement for historians, and partly reconciled with that poverty , in which we found ourselves in the 90s. Over these slightly less than a quarter of a century, historians, having gotten rid of the muzzle, have managed to do a lot, especially in research and publication of collections of archival documents on the history of the twentieth century, providing genuine scientific breakthroughs in a number of areas and topics. And these were not always young historians (as they think), often these were people who had dreamed all their lives about independent research and access to closed funds and archives, and who spared no effort and time to realize what they only dreamed of in Soviet times. time. And, thank God, the efforts of these passionate historians were not and will not be in vain. Both research and documents published in these two decades from the most inaccessible archives will be the frontier and the ammunition on which (and with which) we will have to defend ourselves against falsifications, “blank spots” and figures of silence that will rain down on us even more abundantly in the near future from the “Unified Historical and Cultural Standard” (UICS) and especially history textbooks that are uniform in their content (and not only from them, however).

Around the need to introduce a single history textbook (or several textbooks that are conceptually and content identical) there are several myths and cunning manipulations that were quite deliberately created and which the average person buys into! We are told that there is nothing wrong with a single history textbook (or several textbooks that are conceptually and content identical)! This is evidence of the consolidation and cohesion of society. And such textbooks are available in many developed countries, including European countries and the USA.

We are now being shown that this process was allegedly initiated by the historians themselves, who asked him about this at a meeting with V. Putin. Respected historical institutions and many high-ranking historians (and not only!) are ready to take part in working commissions, write concepts and compete in the competition for writing the texts of such textbooks. However, I’m unlikely to be mistaken if I say that government historians themselves are not averse to being useful to the authorities!

And yet, many may have the impression that everything is in order - both the concept of the UICS and the coverage of controversial issues itself will be written by historians from the standpoint of science and the latest achievements of modern historical thought.

So this is both deception and self-deception, a shell, an appearance presented as the essence.

The participation of heads of historical institutes, deans of history departments, corresponding members and academicians does not at all guarantee scientific quality.

The first time, the authorities acted more simply and rudely, for which both they and the authors themselves (Danilov and Filippov) paid, having undermined their authority in the eyes of historians.

This time the authorities acted much more subtly and smarter, as if giving the initiative itself into the hands of historians (and is it possible to refuse the “numerous demands of the people”), including bureaucratic historians in the Russian Historical Society (which in itself is drawing lessons from the straightforward Commission on combating falsifications of history) and involving historians in discussion, writing, participation, etc.

But here it is easy to become a victim of deception and self-deception if you do not know a few things.

First of all, consensus on issues that concern the nation is achieved by society itself, in broad, public and sometimes very lengthy discussions. And although historians take an active part in its development, and their role is very important, they are not the main ones in this process. Well, what if there is no consensus in our atomized, disoriented society that cannot find a common language? What if the government itself curtailed and suppressed in the public space and especially for broad sections of the people (on television) any discussions and reflection on historical, political and socially significant topics for the nation?

And if the question itself is relevant: did the Russian nation take shape in the twentieth century and does it exist now? Its individual elements seemed to exist in the form of the “Soviet people.”

But whether there is a nation today and whether it is ready to develop its own historical identity and agree on complex issues of its history is a very big question. By the way, pay attention - in the public space, and especially on television, in all kinds of shows they killed (in my opinion, deliberately) the language of dialogue and the ability to achieve consensus. Participants in discussions and TV shows behave aggressively, interrupt each other, are rude, and do not accept other people's arguments! Only the “Culture” channel and discussions on it, perhaps, remained a reserved zone.

How, under such conditions, can we achieve consensus on the sore and nagging issues of our history? But this is only part of the problem. What’s worse is that the authorities themselves are trying to prevent not only consensus, but even an opinion different from their own - they are trying to prevent it from reaching a wide audience, to drive this dissent into a cultural and political ghetto. But these processes of the formation of a civil society, a nation and the development of a view of oneself and one’s historical path began during the years of perestroika and continued until they began to be “frozen” both by the shocks that befell the country in the 90s and by the growing authoritarianism of power. And these processes have begun again in recent years and are very active! But the paradox is that they are suppressed by authoritarian power! The paradox is that these children born by society are not needed by the authorities at all, they are strangers to it, unloved stepchildren!

And the government actually performs an abortion, interrupts the processes in order to make a substitution and plant its own baby - its own view of our society today (this problem has been solved for a long time) and yesterday. And the substitution is done skillfully. Instead of a broad public national discussion, as was the case, say, in Germany in the 60s-70s, we will be depicted as a “broad public discussion” around the “Unified Historical and Cultural Standard” with the participation of several historians included in this game, and Historians, politicians and people with alternative points of view will not be allowed close to television.

So, the historians selected for the meeting with the president then asked him for a single history textbook (of course, without asking permission from their colleagues for such an action), the concept proposed by the historians will be agreed upon with the authorities and voiced again through the mouths of historians! And what does the formula sound like - “at a meeting of representatives of ministries and academic structures.”

Historians (albeit in the person of unnamed representatives of academic structures) are becoming the main active figures in front of the entire Russian society.

So, in fact, it turns out that “historical unanimity” in Russia is initiated and introduced by historians themselves. The historians themselves will make a muzzle and a collar with their own hands, which will be put on the entire society and, of course, on those historians who look with indignation at the behavior of their colleagues, who did not authorize them to do this at all.

And for most of society it is not at all obvious that there is no smell of science here, it’s just that historians-administrators and individual historians-scientists will fulfill the order of the authorities, passing it off as an achievement of the scientific thought of Russian historians. But will historians who are specialists in certain specific topics be involved in the discussions?

Both the authorities and a large part of society still succumb to the magic of sonorous positions and loud abbreviations, and very often in vain. One should also not think that if a person is a corresponding member or an academician, or the dean of the history department, then he at the same time knows all the topics and problems well. This is a deep misconception. History, like most sciences, is very seriously specialized. It takes a graduate student about five years just to get into the subject. There is no historian, even if he is an academician five times and a director eight times, who thoroughly knows the history of Ancient Rus' and at the same time the political parties of the twentieth century. There is not even a historian who knows thoroughly all the political parties of the beginning. XX century.

Kozma Prutkov was right - alas, any specialist is like gumboil. But management and journalists stubbornly consider academicians, directors, rectors and deans of history departments to be “in charge of the plates”! Neither the authorities nor the journalists are somehow still aware that each problem has its own circle of specialists, as they say, “widely known in narrow circles,” and calling an academician who does not understand this topic is simply the height of unprofessionalism the one who calls him! They don’t know specialists, they don’t know how to find them, and their names often don’t sound as attractive as the names of people with a big title or position. Unfortunately, many academics and administrators are sick with vanity and willingly talk about topics about which they understand nothing. It is clear that for a wide audience and journalists, the title of academician itself outweighs the modest title of a specialist scientist in this topic. Alas, but “they are greeted by their clothes, they are seen off by their minds!” What contribution to the study and understanding of the burning problems of Russian history (and most of them relate to the twentieth century) can the already mentioned S.P. Karpov, an unconditionally recognized specialist in medieval studies (the history of Byzantium, the Black Sea region and Italy in the Middle Ages) make?

Alas, many people don’t know, and many don’t even think about it, that historians (especially those on the history of Russia in the 20th century) are not doing very well with academics. With rare exceptions, they do not enjoy the authority of historical scientists. I know of only one or two exceptions. It does not add to their popularity that in the 90s and 2000s several very worthy Russian historians did not become corresponding members, but the list of corresponding members and academicians was replenished with the names of people whose scientific achievements experts speak with a grin, or even with irritation!

However, the government will soon put under its direct control not only property, but also all institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

And all scientific employees of these institutes will be obliged to fulfill the “state order” under pain of dismissal.

The “introduction of historical unanimity” is about to move forward by leaps and bounds. There is no doubt that the “ministerial” RAS property will quickly be acquired (in the blogosphere they have already come up with a name for the future structure - “Academservice”), just as there is no doubt about the dashing mergers of academies, institutes and the reduction of people and the final finishing off of science.

And also - we have been told for a long time - “God’s is God’s, Caesar’s is Caesar’s”, let science (and scientists) search for truth, but school history textbooks should not be scientific, they should educate patriotism and ultimately serve the interests of the state.

Sometimes this is said openly, sometimes veiled, but in both cases it implies their right to write lies. Yes, they tell us, it’s a lie, but “a lie for the greater good.”

They also talk about the traumatic effect of historical truth, and that there is no need for grandchildren and children to be ashamed of their fathers and grandfathers (and, in general, of their history, their country) and assert the appropriateness of forgetting everything that traumatizes a person (as psychoanalysts advise raped women ).

But it’s even somehow awkward to say that this won’t end well. Why do the authorities forget that just a quarter of a century ago we saw how one such big lie collapsed, burying the USSR with it. Is it really not clear to anyone how it all ends when history (and history textbooks) are built on lies, on white spots, on silent figures?

Truly, everything happens according to a very popular proverb today - “when you can’t, but really want to, then you can.”

But I want it for a long time and more and more. I want a single textbook and the “correct version” of history. Since the beginning of the 2000s. And there is no doubt that the authorities, using some historians, having staged the scientific nature of the creation of the UICS and its “wide public discussion,” will try hard to create several textbooks written according to this standard! And now, when historians from academic institutions will be put into the hands of a federal agency and the price for disobedience will be dismissal, now they will definitely create what their darling desires!

But even after the publication of these “like-minded” textbooks, will the authorities be able to rejoice at the introduction of historical unanimity in the country?

I think not very much and not for very long. Will the active part of society and historians resign themselves to having their vision of history forcefully imposed on them? The answer is obvious.

Such a wave of criticism of these textbooks will spread across the Internet and social networks that it will not pass by school teachers and students, so one cannot count on a positive attitude towards these textbooks in society and at school.

I am sure that there will be alternative versions of each of the 31 issues on the Internet and, probably, even a separate alternative Internet manual for teachers and schoolchildren on these controversial issues. But among the authors of these alternative opinions there will be many well-known and authoritative names. But in essence there will be nothing to object to.

Conclusion - in the presence of a society and the Internet that has not yet been completely strangled, these “like-minded” history textbooks will be discredited even in the eyes of teachers and schoolchildren (especially high school students) and one cannot expect much effect from them. Although, of course, the correct move was invented - hitting four or five textbooks is more difficult and more difficult than hitting one. But to say that these “like-minded” history textbooks, as well as the introduced historical unanimity, will not bring harm, alas, would be too optimistic. Alas, they will bring it. It will not be possible to completely stop the harm from these textbooks.

How neither historians nor public figures manage to curb or stop the harmful influence of that muddy wave of lies and falsifications that comes from TV screens. But why are historians unable to directly broadcast their knowledge and conclusions to Russian society via the same Internet? And here several very important questions arise related to the translation of historical knowledge in modern Russia.

How is everything that historians have developed perceived and used, on the one hand, by society (including its broadest strata), and on the other hand, by the authorities?

Nowadays there is a very widespread thesis in society that historians are not in demand by the mass reader because of their inability to write easily and vividly. This point of view is heard quite often, making the historian the only one responsible for things for which he cannot be held responsible. It seems that this point of view gives a very simplified view of a problem that is much more complex.

On the one hand, of course, even in history departments, historians are “sharpened” into a special language and style. And the style is not only of writing, but also of thinking. Anyone who breaks out of this style will always get bumps at all stages of their scientific career. Alas, this style becomes the only style for many. Let us note in passing that this is a problem not only for historians, but also for other humanities scholars, some of whom, to an even greater extent than historians, speak their own special “bird language”, which is no longer understood not only by the average person, but also by many colleagues. humanists. Yes, there are a lot of differences in both the style of thinking and methodological approaches, even for humanists. For example, some historians are reproached for clinging to facts and savoring them, and sometimes even using such strong phrases as “archival corpse deposition,” but they sincerely do not understand how one can “dance not from the stove” of historical reality, but soar away from sinful earth to heaven of abstract theories. But there are at least three more interconnected problems.

I would start with the fact that human society as an object of scientific research is much more complex than it is perceived both at the level of ordinary consciousness and by fellow natural scientists and techies who do not consider history to be a science. In Soviet times, humanists were so long and strenuously convinced of the inferiority of the humanities, say, in comparison with the natural sciences, that it is still psychologically difficult for us to loudly declare that the humanities, which study such a complex object as human society, are elitist sciences and not only not simpler than natural science and technical disciplines, but also somewhat more complex than them. It is high time to loudly declare that human society is an extremely difficult object to study. How to study the psychology of large masses of people and even individual people, when most of them cannot really understand themselves until death?! What is it like for researchers to study the world, mentality, and motives of another person’s actions? Absolutely alien, unfamiliar and, moreover, separated from the historian for decades and centuries. In addition, historians are in a more difficult position than, say, physicists, since they are deprived of the opportunity to study society experimentally. Added to this are the accompanying political circumstances, when, on the one hand, as they rightly said at the beginning of the twentieth century, “if mathematics affected class interests, then its axioms would still be argued about,” and on the other hand, from history instead of science trying to make a servant of politics. All this undermines the authority of history as a science.

The second problem lies in the degree of readiness and ability (including intellectual) of a wide audience to try to understand the most complex and tragic vicissitudes of our history. Alas, the majority are incapable of having a serious conversation and making their own efforts. It is high time to stop placing responsibility only on scientists and to say that a large part of society, due to its low cultural level, does not want and is not able to perceive everything that lies beyond its horizons. In the same way, most people do not perceive classical music, and instead of organ music by Bach they prefer the work of Kirkorov or pop groups. In the same way, the majority does not perceive the works of Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Chekhov or Shakespeare, but reads cheap detective stories. The same goes for cinema and television. For some reason we forget that Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Chekhov did not write for thirteen- and sixteen-year-old teenagers, they wrote for mature people and cultured people. Forcing today's schoolchildren to read them is an activity according to the saying - “Don't feed the horse!” Literature lessons turn most people away from classical literature forever. It’s time to admit that the fact that the majority of society does not understand and does not like classical literature, music, and art is not only to blame for teachers of literature and music, but also for the state of affairs itself.

It’s time to admit that a significant part of society and its institutions are not very ready to accept everything that historians have developed.

Some people want everything explained to them in the three minutes between their first and second drinks at dinner. A radio colleague told me in the early 1990s that a historian's “talk” should not exceed two minutes, otherwise most of the audience would not absorb it. Now it's even worse. A large part of the people have already switched to clip-based thinking and are demanding “broth cubes” of information.

How to convey in a nutshell all these nuances of historical reality, in which, as we know, the devil hides? How can you tell a wide audience in a few minutes about the two paths of Russia, laid down in February and October, if for historians themselves this is a very confusing and very debatable issue? Some people like the “one-man show” of Eduard Radzinsky, whose action has nothing to do with science. Others (and there are a lot of them) are ready to listen only to what confirms their beliefs.

There is a myth that society supposedly makes historians some kind of social order to tell the truth about our past. This is a myth, because the vast majority of society does not need this truth. An honest reconstruction of historical reality is not needed by ordinary people; it destroys the myth within which they live and within which they feel comfortable. Why is the truth dangerous for the average person? Because it forces you to take it into account and make decisions that destroy the familiar world. At the everyday level, a striking example of this is the situation when spouses sometimes ignore information and suspicions about adultery, since this truth will change the established and familiar reality! A similar mechanism also works at a higher level of rejection of any information that is potentially dangerous for the destruction of the established world and myth in which a person lives. This is a mechanism for people to protect their world and their myth. Pushkin’s words - “Ah, it’s not difficult to deceive me, I’m glad to be deceived myself!” have not lost their relevance.

Historical truth is not needed by politicians, who again find it easier to achieve their goals by creating a myth, rather than working with historical truth! By the way, most journalists, directors, screenwriters and the media in general do not need it either. Just look at how scripts are written and filmed, say, documentaries on history or talk shows, when the results of research by historians, as a rule, are not even involved. They all play by their own rules, and science in these games is used only to confirm the power of the next myth.

However, not everything is so pessimistic. It would be wrong to categorically state that no one reads the works of historians, and there is no benefit from the research of historians and the collections of archival documents they publish. Thank God this is not the case.

Our research and materials are already widely used in the underlying processes of developing one’s own view of oneself and one’s historical path, without which the formation of civil society and the formation of a nation is impossible.

Our research and materials (I hope that we ourselves) will also take part in the future broad public national discussion on issues of history that concern our society.

And it would be nice if these discussions begin now on certain topics.

But I want to repeat once again, the main thing is that there is no need for deception and self-deception, that highly qualified historians will sit down under the supervision of the Russian Historical Society, headed by Naryshkin, and... they will give out a bundle of modern knowledge on all problems. This is not what all this is intended for.

And, in addition, it should be noted that even if we gather historians-specialists on this particular topic, we still cannot expect absolute consensus. Both because the very nature of science works this way, and because, as in society, historians have different ideological views and different coordinate systems.

We need real broad public discussions with the participation of specialist historians (scattered across different institutions, cities and even countries), politicians, society in the broadest sense of the word and all its elites, including politicians (including opposition ones), in general everyone interested in understanding the history and destinies of their Fatherland.

Only in this case is it possible to develop consensus on at least some issues.

Perhaps these discussions will take more than one year, perhaps discussions on the most hot topics will reach a dead end, but they can be returned to later, at a different level of maturity of society.

The main thing is that there will be discussions and attempts to find consensus, the main thing is that, as one aphorism says, they will “open the eyes of the enemy, and not try to tear them out.”

Only on this path will Russian society ever find a real consensus on a number of issues in its very dramatic history, and not one urgently developed over the course of a year and imposed on society from above.

The author used a fragment of his article in the text: Morozov K.N. Problems of demand for the historian's writings and style in modern public space // Humanitarian readings of the Russian State University for the Humanities - 2012: [in 2 books. Book 1]: Theory and methodology of humanities: Collection of materials. M.: RSUH, 2013 - 416 p.

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  Born 08/07/1961 Kuibyshev

  Graduated from secondary school. No. 5 in Kuibyshev, then after serving in the army, he studied at the workers' faculty and at the history department of Kuibyshev (now Samara) State University, which he graduated in 1988. From 1990 to 1995 he studied in correspondence graduate school at Samara State university.

  • Topic of the candidate's dissertation: “The Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1907-1914.” (specialty 07.00.02 - Domestic history), defended in December 1995 at Samara State University. The topic of the doctoral dissertation is “The trial of the socialist revolutionaries and the prison confrontation (1922-1926): ethics and tactics of confrontation” (specialty 07.00.02 - Domestic history), defended in February 2007 at the Moscow State Pedagogical University. In 1988–1992 – worked as a history teacher at the Volga Region Institute of Informatics, Radio Engineering and Communications. In 1993-1995, he worked as a researcher at the Institute of National Problems of Education of the Ministry of Education. In 1996 - 2005 - worked at the Department of History of Moscow State Technical University named after. N.E. Bauman in the position of Art. teacher and then associate professor.
  • Since 2005, he has worked at the Scientific Information and Educational Center “Memorial” as the head of the program “Socialists and anarchists - participants in the resistance to the Bolshevik regime. October 25, 1917 - end of 30 of the twentieth century.” and hands international program “Support for young Russian researchers”. Member of the Council of the Scientific and Practical Center “Memorial” since 2002 (re-elected in 2006), Ch. editor of the historical, educational and biographical website of the NIPC “Memorial” “Russian socialists and anarchists after October 1917: history, ideas, traditions of democratic socialism and the fate of participants in the left resistance to the Bolshevik regime” (http://socialist.memo.ru/).
  • Professor of the Department of History of Russian Statehood, Department of History, School of Current Humanities Research, Institute of Social Sciences, RANEPA. Founding member and member of the Council of the Free Historical Society.

  Proceedings

  • B.N. Savinkov and the Combat Organization of the AKP in 1909-1911 / Publ. K.N.Morozova // The Past. Historical almanac. M.; St. Petersburg, 1995. Issue. 18. pp. 243-314.
  • Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1907-1914. M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. 624 p.
  • Trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries (June–August 1922): Preparation. Carrying out. Results / Comp. S.A. Krasilnikov, K.N. Morozov, I.V. Chubykin. M.: ROSSPEN, 2002. 1007 p. (Series “Kremlin Archives”).
  • Labor People's Socialist Party: Documents and materials / Comp. A.V.Sypchenko, K.N.Morozov. M.: ROSSPEN, 2003. 624 p.
  • The trial of the socialist revolutionaries and the prison confrontation (1922 - 1926): ethics and tactics of confrontation. M.: ROSSPEN, 2005. 736 p.
  • The son of a “free navigator” and the thirteenth “suicide bomber” of the Socialist-Revolutionary trial. 1922: Collection of documents and materials from the personal archive of V.N. Richter / Comp. K.N.Morozov, A.Yu.Morozova, T.A.Semenova (Richter). M.: ROSSPEN, 2005.655 p.
  • Features, paradoxes and results of the trial of the socialist revolutionaries in 1922 // Domestic history. 2006. No. 4. P. 12-25.
  • The trial of the Social Revolutionaries in 1922 “in the coverage” of the OGPU // Questions of history. 2006. No. 11. P. 3-20.
  • Socialist Revolutionary Party during and after the revolution of 1905-1907. as a sociocultural phenomenon in the context of the subculture of the Russian revolutionary // Cahiers du Monde Russe. 2007. Vol. 48. N 2-3. P. 301-331.
  • We need to learn to understand the world of the Russian revolutionary // Russian History. 2014. No. 1. P. 166-172.
  • Populism and populist parties in the history of Russia in the twentieth century: biobibliographic reference book. – M., Publishing house “New Chronograph”. 2016. – 544 p.