The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a criminal organization. Pros and cons. trial of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the street and in the hall. G. Starovoitova, Russian Deputy

Our correspondents talked with supporters and opponents of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, who gathered on the street and in the hall of the Constitutional Court, where its sessions are now taking place.

ON THE STREET

V. Solomatin, 48 years old:

What is needed is not a Constitutional one, but a real trial of all the “commies” and others like them. After all, give them time to recover - and they will show us such a grin... it will become scary. Only now they will come under new names and with new slogans.

Elderly man (refused to identify himself):

I hope that the court will make the only correct decision: the party must exist, it has the right to do so. I was a former member of the CPSU, and if the party had resumed its activities and offered a concrete way out of the crisis situation in which we found ourselves, many would have joined it. The trouble is one thing - the party today does not have a real leader.

G. Chekanov, student:

It’s strange and even funny for me to see people in black robes and judge’s hats with tassels on the screen. All this now resembles some kind of theatrical performance. When the decrees were issued, they were indeed necessary to neutralize the morale of the "vanguard" of the party. But the validity of the decrees had to be limited to a clear date. What danger does the party pose today? After all, this is just a bunch of blinkered, unhappy old people, although they can be controlled by all sorts of baburins or other, “younger” leaders. Young people will not go to them.

G. Komarovskaya, employee of commercial structures:

If this was a real trial of the party, it would make sense. I believe that the Presidential decree was correct and canceling it is immoral in relation to everyone who has ever suffered from the communists. If the party resumes its existence, it will be a new misfortune for Russia. Moreover, if its leader becomes a military man like B. Gromov or the commander of the 14th Army A. Lebed.

Pensioner with medal bars on his chest:

It is not the CPSU that should be judged, but the traitor Gorbachev!

This is what the two women who were arguing with each other said:

I, like many, want only one thing - order in the country. When the party was in power, everything was fine.

The communists have been our masters for almost eighty years, and how far have we come...

IN THE HALL

OPINIONS OF COMRADES

V. IVASHKO, pensioner (the XXIX Congress of the CPSU, which had just taken place underground, expelled him and M. Gorbachev from the ranks of the CPSU):

Probably someone wants to put the party on trial. But what kind of state do we and our children want to live in? If it is democratic and legal, then right and law must triumph.

As for exclusion from the CPSU, in a state governed by the rule of law, any group of people can gather and declare themselves to be whoever they want - be it Napoleon or Julius Caesar. There was no XXIX Congress. That's all!

E. LIGACHEV, pensioner:

The Constitutional Court believes that it must consider a legal issue, a legal one. And the court will do everything not to turn the process into a political one. But, generally speaking, it is very difficult to separate its legal side from the political. But let's see. As for the expulsion of Gorbachev at the XXIX Congress, I don’t know what kind of congress it is and I don’t recognize it. Gorbachev actually resolved this issue himself when he left the party in its most critical situation. I cannot understand him either from a human or political point of view.

Y. SLOBODKIN, Russian Deputy:

The ban on the CPSU is one of the greatest stupidities that people who come to power commit. It amazes me how ineradicable the Unterprishibeev’s intolerance of dissent is. Our politicians cannot overcome this disease.

If we follow the logic of our opponents, then the US Supreme Court also had a need to check the constitutionality, for example, of the US Democratic Party, when President Truman ordered the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It has already been recognized that this was an experiment on living people. There was no military necessity. But in America no one asks such a question.

OPPOSITE SIDE

G. BURBULIS, Secretary of State of the Russian Federation:

In fact, the necessary procedure is underway to understand the global problem of Russian history and the role in it of the communist regime and the political structures that embodied it. At the same time, we really hope that from the biased vagueness that is now being offered as arguments of both a political and legal nature, the Constitutional Court will be able to isolate the actual subject of the proceedings. He will make a decision worthy of both this highest body and our Russian reforms and their prospects.

S. SHAHRAI, Russian deputy, representative of the President at the trial:

In general, it is a little sad that some deputies are turning the meeting room of the Constitutional Court into an arena for settling group, factional and political scores. In this hall, one group of deputies defends the alleged unconstitutionality of the decrees, that is, they solve their political problems. Another group of deputies defends the unconstitutionality of the CPSU - also their own political goals. But none of the three legitimate branches of government declared that their prerogative was violated. This makes me sad.

There is no trial of the CPSU here. I hope that there will be no trial of the President.

And here are the feelings experienced by lawyer A. MAKAROV, known for his participation in the “Churbanov” trial:

Frankly speaking, I am deeply convinced that in both cases I am defending the right. But the strongest feeling that I experience right now, listening to my opponents, can be conveyed in the words of one famous person: “They understood nothing, they learned nothing.”

G. STAROVOYTOVA, Russian Deputy:

On the one hand, I am in a festive mood - we have waited for the historical trial. On the other hand, I am worried about its outcome and consequences. I am afraid that the parties will narrow their consideration without addressing questions about the criminal political practices of the CPSU. I mean inciting national hatred between the peoples of our republics within the USSR. I mean the blessings that the top party gave for the entry of troops into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for the introduction of martial law in Poland, for the beginning of the Afghan adventure. Witnesses of all these actions are alive. Why not invite Mr. Dubcek, Mr. Jaruzelski, Mr. Najibullah, our colleagues from Hungary, the Baltics and Transcaucasia to court?

Russian deputy O. RUMYANTSEV:

I feel a sense of deep empathy for the older generation, looking at the representatives of the opposite side. How can you think of your party as eternal if there are practically no young people in its ranks? I look at veterans with unconditional respect, but if a communist or socialist idea can live in Russia, then its bearer must first of all be young people, who, in turn, will decisively distance themselves from the anti-constitutional nature of the CPSU.

And in conclusion, the opinion of the Chairman of the Constitutional Court V. ZORKIN:

Passions should not run high. And no matter in what parts of the hall the parties sit, after the meeting they must sit down at a common table in a civilized manner and drink a cup of tea together. You see, in order for us to live together in the future on that piece of Earth called “Russia”, and not destroy each other like the whites and reds, I think we should use my recipe.

Their property and dissolution. The case was opened at the request of 37 people's deputies of Russia.

Participating in the process:

• representatives of 37 deputies.
• representatives of the interests of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR (partially coincided with the previous group).
• representatives of the President,
• representatives of a group of more than 70 people's deputies who demanded consideration of the issue of the constitutionality of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

According to the Decree on the suspension of the activities of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, the order to the Minister of Internal Affairs and the prosecutor's office to “conduct an investigation into the facts of anti-constitutional activities” of the party, as well as the clause on the entry into force of the decree from the moment of signing, was declared unconstitutional. According to other decrees, the court declared the dissolution of the organizational structures of primary party organizations formed on a territorial principle unconstitutional, but upheld the dissolution of the leading structures of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Orders on the transfer of Communist Party property to executive authorities were recognized as constitutional in relation to that part of the property managed by the CPSU that was state or municipal property, and unconstitutional in relation to that part that was either the property of the CPSU or was under its jurisdiction, although the rights of the owner were not documented at all. On the issue of verifying the constitutionality of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, the proceedings were discontinued due to the fact that in August-September 1991 the CPSU actually collapsed.

Judge Gadzhiev later noted that “the decision was largely dictated by political reasons - it was not born only from legal logic.”

Judges Kononov, Ebzeev and Luchin presented dissenting opinions.

Notes

Literature

• Materials of the case on the verification of the constitutionality of the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation concerning the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, as well as on the verification of the constitutionality of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR. - M.: Publishing house "Spark", 1996-1998. In 6 volumes
• Bukovsky V.K. Moscow process. - M.; Paris: MIC: Rus. thought, 1996. - 525 p. - ISBN 5-87902-071-1
• Judges' feedback:
  • A. Kononov. Fifth anniversary of the Constitutional Court in Russia. Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 2, 1997. Quoted in Bredikhin V. The unfinished “case of the CPSU.” Evidence from archival documents Citizen No. 1/2000
  • V. Zorkin Quoted in Trizna for the unburied ghost “Kommersant” No. 120 (1078) dated 07/17/1996
• Participants in the case from the president and a group of deputies who petitioned for an assessment of the constitutionality of the activities of the CPSU
• Participants in the case on the part of the applicants and the CPSU-CP of the RSFSR
  • Rudinsky F. M.“The Case of the CPSU” in the Constitutional Court: Notes of a participant in the process M.: Bylina, 1999
  • The CPSU is outlawed?! Constitutional Court in Moscow. - Comp. S. A. Bogolyubov. Issue I. - M.: Baikal Academy, 1992

Links

• Chapter 5. The trial of the CPSU // Sobchak A. A. Once upon a time there was a CPSU
• Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 9-P of November 30, 1992 (excerpts and links to certificates about judges, which briefly reflect the content of their dissenting opinions) The full text of the resolution without dissenting opinions is available by searching on the website of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
• Conclusion of experts of the Commission of the PVS of the Russian Federation on the transfer and acceptance of KGB and CPSU archives for state storage

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

See what the “CPSU Case” is in other dictionaries:

The ANT case was a high-profile criminal case in the early 1990s on charges that the management of the ANT cooperative was smuggling 12 T 72 tanks abroad. Contents 1 History of the case 2 Resonance of the case ... Wikipedia

Case of Rokotov Faibishenko Yakovlev trial in the USSR in 1961 on charges of Yan Rokotov, Vladislav Faibishenko and Dmitry Yakovlev of illegal currency transactions. Contents 1 History 1.1 First trial 1.2 Second trial ... Wikipedia

Case of Rokotov Faibishenko Yakovlev trial in the USSR in 1961 on charges of Yan Rokotov, Vladislav Faibishenko and Dmitry Yakovlev of illegal currency transactions. Contents 1 History 1.1 First trial 1.2 ... Wikipedia

THE CASE OF DOCTORS, arrests of doctors in the early 1950s who were responsible for treating senior leaders of the USSR on trumped-up charges of sabotage and deliberate killing of “party and government” figures. The “Doctors’ Case” was caused by an exacerbation... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

The “Xerox Box” case is an alleged violation of foreign exchange regulations and the financing of the 1996 Presidential election. Contents 1 1990s 2 2000s 3 2010s 4 ... Wikipedia

The Kalinin case is a criminal case from the 1980s on charges that the spouses Inna and Gennady Kalinin were accused of stealing state awards from veterans of the Great Patriotic War and committing three murders. Contents 1 Course of events 2 ... Wikipedia

The case of Estonian veteran Arnold Meri— The trial on charges of genocide against civilians, the first Estonian Hero of the Soviet Union, 88-year-old war veteran, will begin on May 20 in the city of Kärdla on the island of Hiiumaa, the press service of the Pärnu County Court reported. Hero... Encyclopedia of Newsmakers

Tukhachevsky at trial ... Wikipedia

Tukhachevsky on trial The Tukhachevsky case, or the case of the “anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization” is a case on charges of a group of major Soviet military leaders of organizing a military conspiracy to seize power. Accused in the case: Marshal... ... Wikipedia

Books

• The main witness. The case of the collapse of the USSR, Nikolai Ryzhkov. Thirty years ago, in April 1985, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which M. S. Gorbachev announced a program of broad reforms under the slogan of “accelerating the socio-economic development of the country.”…

Continuing the series of video conversations “Adults” with classics - scientists, cultural figures, public figures who have become national treasures - we talked with Doctor of Law, Professor, Head of the UNESCO Department of Copyright and other branches of intellectual property law, until recently - Secretary Union of Journalists of Russia Mikhail Alexandrovich Fedotov. Immediately during the conversationa message arrived that Mikhail Alexandrovich was appointed Chairman of the Council for Promoting the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights under the President of Russia and Advisor to the President on Human Rights. Immediately after this, the interview had to be interrupted, because people began to come to Fedotov’s office to congratulate him on his new position, and further conversation became impossible. However, we agreed to continue it and talk about his new work. We talked Lyubov Borusyak.

Lyubov Borusyak: Today we again came to visit Mikhail Aleksandrovich Fedotov, the author of the famous law on the media, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, former Minister of Press. Last time we focused on how Mikhail Alexandrovich completed his work as a minister, and he was faced with a completely new area of ​​​​life - he became an ambassador.

Mikhail Alexandrovich, first I would like you to talk about the trial of the CPSU and the notorious “gold of the party.” This is a sensational story that at one time everyone was very interested in, but it ended in a not very clear way. You were an important participant in those events.

M.F.: Yes, I even wanted to write a book, and I didn’t just want to. Wanted - this is in the past tense, but if we speak in the present tense, then I not only want to write this book, but I still hope to write it. A book that should be called “The Trial of the CPSU: Notes of an Accomplice.”

L.B.: That is, the name is already there, it’s just a matter of small things.

M.F.: Yes, there is a name. There are a lot of materials, there are a lot of notebooks, notepads, printed texts, I have everything I need, except for one thing - I don’t have time. Unfortunately, my wife makes me go to bed at one in the morning at the latest. She says that otherwise she will break my computer, and this is the worst punishment.

L.B.: Well, you need to sleep too.

M.F.: It's a shame. No time. I constantly talk about where I can buy a little free time. I'm missing about sixty hours in a day.

L.B.: So it's not a little bit. If it had only been an hour or two, it would probably have been possible to buy it somewhere else, but it’s unlikely that much more.

M.F.: And it is very necessary. If you want to get everything done, please hurry up. Because time is the most terrible limiter.

L.B.: But, nevertheless, there is no book yet...

M.F.: The process was interesting, there is a lot to talk about. For example, how I got into this process. It was the spring of 1992. At that moment, I was appointed general director of the Russian Intellectual Property Agency under the President of the Russian Federation.

L.B.: Which has just been created, and largely through your efforts.

M.F.: Through my efforts, absolutely right. I wrote a decree, I figured out how to make RAIS out of VAAP. Moreover, I said that RAIS is a shortened name, and the full name is RAIS Maksimovich, since at that time we had just parted with the Soviet Union and its president. I was very glad that I would be doing a good, useful, clean job, far from all these political squabbles, from political struggle. Because politics, as I have always understood it, is a concern for the country and its inhabitants to live well. This is where politics lies. And the struggle between this party and that party is not politics. This is politicking, squabbles, dumping - anything but politics. Politics is when a statesman thinks about how to change the economy, how to make sure that cultural creators can create freely and receive normal money for it. Therefore, I believed that I would finally calmly get involved in politics, that is, issues of copyright, issues of collecting royalties in favor of our composers, poets, writers, and so on.

But it was not there. Unfortunately, I had to do all this in my free time, because my main job at that time was the trial of the CPSU case. My participation in the process began with a call from Burbulis, who was then the Secretary of State of the Russian Federation, that is, the second or third person in the state. By this time, we not only met him, but also became friends. My acquaintance with him began when Yeltsin was preparing for his speech at the Third Congress of People's Deputies. I then worked as Poltoranin’s deputy. Burbulis came to Poltoranin: they discussed who should be involved in working on the text of the presidential report. Poltoranin called me. And my friend and co-author Baturin was sitting in my office at that time, and we went into Poltoranin’s office together. There we met Burbulis. More precisely, we met with him for the second time, because before that we met with him in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Burbulis asked: “Well, are you ready to take part in the preparation of this report?” I replied that we were ready. Then we left Poltoranin’s office. As I remember now, Burbulis sat down on the table - Yura and I stood opposite. Burbulis turned to me:

But as You Can you imagine the main points of this report?

I don’t like it when people suddenly start talking to me, even if it’s the Secretary of State of the Russian Federation. So I answered:

I can tell you how I imagine it, but I'd like to hear it first your opinion.

That's how he and I switched to you. We are friends to this day, I love him very much and consider him one of the smartest people in our country.

So here it is. In 1992 he called me and said:

Listen, now the communists have filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, and it is obvious that the process will take place. How about taking part in the process as one of the president's representatives?

I answered:

Gen, I'll be there now.

When I arrived, he asked:

Well, have you decided?

I said:

Yes, I decided, I'm ready. This is very interesting, it will be a high point, you can’t miss it.

And in general, for a lawyer to participate in such a process... Well, it’s like the joke about two violinists. One of them received second place at the international competition, and the other - the last, twenty-second. Soviet times, they return to Moscow together after this competition. They are flying on a plane, and the one who got second place says:

What a pity that I only took second place and got this damn Mercedes. After all, for first place there was such a great prize - a Stradivarius violin!

Another asks:

I'm sorry, what?

And he answers him:

How can I explain this to you? Well, it's the same as a Dzerzhinsky pistol for you.

So here it is. For a lawyer to take part in the trial of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Constitutional Court is like shooting with a Dzerzhinsky pistol for these guys. So, of course, I agreed.

Burbulis said:

Well, okay, you'll be second.

I speak:

Okay, I'll be second. Who will be first?

Burbulis:

And the first will be Seryozha Shakhrai.

I answer:

Great. Seryozha and I are old friends - there are no problems. Who will be third?

He says:

I don't know.

I speak:

After all, Sergei and I are theorists, scientists, we are not practicing lawyers. You need to call a practicing lawyer.

Burbulis asks:

I speak:

I would call Andryusha Makarov. Because Andryusha Makarov is an excellent lawyer, very knowledgeable, very professional. And most importantly, he knows lawyer technology, the lawyer's craft, the art of a lawyer, whom Seryozha and I do not know.

Burbulis called Yeltsin, and he said no.

Then I say:

Gena, this will be very difficult. We need Makarov.

L.B.: Why didn’t you want to hire another lawyer instead of him? One that would suit Yeltsin?

M.F.: Because I saw Makarov in this role. I know a lot of other lawyers, but he was the right one for this role.

Burbulis asks:

Have you even talked to Makarov about this topic?

I answer:

Not yet. I don't have his phone number, but I'll try to find it.

And it just had to happen that I was walking along Vasilyevskaya Street - this is next to the House of Cinema - and Makarov was walking towards me. This happened literally on the same day, or the next. I grab him and say:

Andryusha, dear, I have this idea.

He asks several questions. What do you think could be expected from a lawyer? Perhaps he should have asked what the fee was? But he does not ask about the fee, because he was talking about a historical action. And he agrees. And then we already figured out how to introduce it into the process. He was not Yeltsin's representative at this trial.

L.B.: Was not?! Everyone knew about his serious participation in this process.

M.F.: Yes, sure. He was a representative of a group of deputies. Because a second complaint appeared there: a group of deputies filed a petition to recognize the CPSU as an unconstitutional organization. And this petition was just presented by Makarov, who played a huge role in the process, simply huge. But in this part the process ended in complete failure, because this group of deputies was refused for one simple reason. The Constitutional Court said that we can consider the constitutionality of an existing political party, but we cannot consider a request for the unconstitutionality of a non-existent political party. And by this time the CPSU was banned and did not exist. Therefore, the decision of the Constitutional Court was absolutely lawful.

L.B.: Has this been since August 1991?

M.F.: Yes, since August 1991. I wrote in some note that it was not he who left the CPSU, but the CPSU that left him.

And we came up with this option: Andryusha Makarov will be a representative of this group of deputies. And the president’s representatives were three people: Seryozha Shakhrai, Gennady Eduardovich Burbulis and me. The three of us worked, although in fact there were at least five of us. Because Sasha Kotenkov, who was then Shakhrai’s right hand, also played a huge role. This is the kind of team we worked with.

We were taken to an empty dacha in Arkhangelskoye - there was a government dacha village there, and we lived in this dacha. From time to time my wife came to see me and brought me fresh shirts and fresh linen. There was no place to do laundry, naturally.

L.B.: When you hear or read about that time, everything happened at some dachas. The team would gather, they would lock it, and so on.

M.F.: And you know, now, probably, the same thing is happening.

L.B.: There is less public politics. What is happening and where is simply not reported.

M.F.: We just don't know. I’ll tell you, when Baturin and I wrote our version of President Yeltsin’s report at the Third Congress of Deputies, we were also not sitting in Moscow. We were taken - as I remember now - to the “Sanatorium named after the 60th anniversary of the GOELRO plan.”

I remember that we called all our files: GOELRO-1, GOELRO-2, GOELRO-3 and so on. Yura and I spoke texts into the recorder, then the driver came and took the tapes. Then they were deciphered in Moscow at the White House, then the texts were brought to us again, and we edited them. It must be said that Yura participated in the writing of similar texts many times. He was Shakhnazarov’s assistant, and Shakhnazarov was Gorbachev’s assistant, and Yura actually participated in the preparation of a variety of Gorbachev’s speeches. Usually, those who participated in the preparation of such texts were especially proud if some of his phrases or even a whole paragraph passed through. So here it is. Yura and I calculated that Yeltsin spoke in our text for twenty-three minutes. For us it was just a record.

We lived in this very sanatorium without any registration, so that, God forbid, no one knew where we worked, so that they could not overhear us or spy on us. After all, at that time everything was still in place - the KGB, the CPSU, all Soviet affairs were still in full swing. We acted as if it were an official, but at the same time underground group, or officially underground.

L.B.: When did you develop your projects?

M.F.: Not anymore. Because there were no longer those forces that were supposed to monitor us according to their functional responsibilities. But they were probably watching us anyway. I will never forget how joyful I burst into Poltoranin’s office and said:

Misha, I congratulate you. Created by the KGB of the Russian Federation, the KGB of the RSFSR. Now we have our own, Russian State Security Committee!

He says:

Why do you care who listens to you?

L.B.: Why did this make you so happy? Did you think it would be something different?

M.F.: Yes. I thought that we had created our own security system “from them.”

L.B.:“God, what we were...

M.F.:...naive?" In fact, we were not so naive. I later talked with the people who headed this very Russian state security system, which was separated from the Soviet one. These were people with a different understanding of life, these were people with our ideas about the benefits of the country.

L.B.: Mikhail Alexandrovich, but still tell us about the trial of the CPSU. What were you developing?

M.F.: First, we developed our legal position. Secondly, we selected evidence and selected documents to suit this legal position. We realized that we needed archives.

L.B.: I was just about to ask if you worked with archives?

M.F.: Yes, I worked with archives because Yeltsin’s decree was issued. I think that now we can already say about this. This was a secret decree, and a secret commission was created to declassify the archives stored in the CPSU Central Committee.

L.B.: Secret declassification commission?

M.F.: Yes. By the way, I don’t see anything unnatural in this, because it’s normal. People who have access to the most important state secrets should not be known. How else?

L.B.: Clearly, otherwise it’s simply dangerous.

M.F.: Yes, it's dangerous.

L.B.: Then the process of declassifying the archives began, which at first went quickly, and then everything rolled back?

M.F.: Yes. But, you see, it is very difficult to quickly put toothpaste back into the tube. This also applies to archives. If a document is declassified, you will not classify it back. It has already become public, and nothing can be done about it. We then declassified a huge number of documents. Huge! And I think it was absolutely the right thing to do. Another thing is that it stopped. This process was stopped, and stopped not least for mercantile reasons.

L.B.: By mercantile ones? What does it mean?

M.F.: Because people began to think: how can this be?! I have such valuable documents in my hands. Now I will declassify all this, and according to the law on archival affairs, on the archival fund, anyone and everyone can use this. What about me? And I won’t earn anything from this? It was then, by the way - although this had already begun a little earlier - that documents began to disappear from the archives. They were simply sold. They stole and sold. The business was so small, but they stole.

L.B.: Most likely archivists?

M.F.: Apparently yes. Or, at least, those who had access to these documents.

L.B.: What you protect is what you have.

M.F.: Yes. That’s why they said that they would declassify it little by little, in small portions. So we declassified a portion of documents - we made money on this matter, then the next portion - again we earned a little money, and so on.

L.B.: And so on for three lives, because there is a huge amount of documents.

M.F.: For thirty lives. We encountered such documents that we did not even imagine that such a form of secrecy existed. This is what was called a “sealed envelope.”

L.B.: Burn without reading?

M.F.: Approximately. We knew that there was “secret”, “top secret”, but it turns out there was also such a thing as a “special folder”. A "special folder" is a higher level of secrecy, followed by an even higher level of secrecy - a "sealed envelope". This "sealed envelope" - I've seen these envelopes - doesn't say what's inside. There could be a secret to the atomic bomb, for example. But this was not written on the envelope. It says: envelope number such and such, enveloped then, head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee such and such, enveloped then by such and such, and enveloped again... That is, someone got acquainted with it, and it was enveloped again.

L.B.: And what happened in those folded envelopes?

M.F.: In one of these folded envelopes a document was found called “Towards the position in “A”.

L.B.: Did you ask archivists to select any specific documents?

M.F.: No. We said: “Guys, sort out the documents.” Because after August 1991, a huge amount of documents ended up in the hands of archivists. These were not only ordered, folder-folded, numbered documents, but also bags and bags of documents.

L.B.: That is, much of what you needed to conduct the process could not be found?

M.F.: I'll tell you now. When the process began, or more precisely, in the days of preparation for the process, I went on a business trip on the affairs of the Intellectual Property Agency. Before leaving, I went to see the head of the government apparatus, Alexei Leonardovich Golovkov. For me he was just Lyosha, and for him I was Misha. We were young, and with high status, we remained normal people; Our relationship was absolutely human. I tell him:

Lyosha, I have information that after August 1991, there were many unopened safes left in the complex of buildings on Old Square. We should open them.

He is asking:

How to open them?

I speak:

You know, I once wrote a note about one master who works in an ordinary “Metal repair shop”. He knows how to open safes, and he always helped when a safe needed to be opened. Not to bandits, of course, but if someone lost a key, for example, or, conversely, if the police needed to open some kind of safe. And he always helped.

I speak:

I can give you his phone number.

He answers:

I give him this phone number, and he asks me:

What are you looking for in these locked safes?

I speak:

I'm looking for an egg.

Golovkov:

What egg?

That egg with the needle in it. And at its tip is the death of Kashchei under the name of the CPSU.

He says:

Clear, but very abstract.

I answer:

Sorry, but I can't tell you anything in more detail. Because I don't know what we're looking for, but we have to look at all the documents. Because we understand that there is this egg there, and more than one.

I went on a business trip. A few days later I return and visit Lyosha Golovkov. I say:

Lesha, well, what?

And he answers:

The egg was not found. There were mostly empty bottles and shoes.

L.B.: Why put shoes in safes?

M.F.: Don't know. You need to ask the employees of the CPSU Central Committee about this.

And Golovkov continues:

True, they found one metal cabinet there. He stood in the corridor and disturbed everyone, because everyone was bumping into him. They opened it, and there were several leaves there. The pieces of paper read: “State archives of the Russian Federation, to which the archives of the fraternal communist parties were transferred.”

You see, the German Socialist Party, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Romanian Party and so on and so on. That is, now we knew where to look for all the archives of the communist parties of the fraternal socialist countries, because before this was unknown. This is the first thing. And second. There was another, also iron, cabinet with filing cabinets. And in this file cabinet there were cards that could be used to determine where the money was transferred. Because, being the head of the Russian Intellectual Property Agency, having the VAAP archives in my hands, I understood that there was something there. That there are so-called “firms of friends” to which money was transferred from the CPSU Central Committee. “Companies of friends” are semi-underground structures that worked for communist parties in other countries. And when we saw all this, we realized: the guys were managing the state budget for their own purposes. Why did they take money from the budget? They took foreign exchange reserves from the state budget and spent them on supporting the communist parties of other countries. Including support for terrorist organizations. You see, these were very important documents.

As for the document in the envelope, that’s how it was. There was one day of the trial during which the interrogation of one of the former members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took place. I don’t remember now who exactly - you can look at it from the transcripts. I’m conducting an interrogation, asking one question, a second, a third... During the break, one of our assistants comes up to me and says:

Mikhail Alexandrovich, you were urgently asked to call Rudolf Germanovich Pihoya at the Federal Archive. It is very important. They say they found it.

Pihoy was then headed by Rosarkhiv. I look at my watch - there are still about forty minutes left until the lunch break. I understand that it is important for me not to let the witness go. Because if I finish the interrogation now, the court will say: “That’s it, thank you. You are free,” and this witness will leave. And I may need this witness when considering this document. I don’t yet know what my dear Rudolf Germanovich found. I don’t know, but I understand that the witness cannot be released. And I start chasing him through various documents, asking him questions that might not have been asked. In short, when it’s time for lunch, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court Zorkin asks:

Mikhail Alexandrovich, do you still have many questions?

I answer:

Yes, there are still a few questions left.

Zorkin asks:

Well, how much? Two or three?

Yes, two or three, or maybe ten or fifteen.

Then everything is clear. Thank you. Break.

And a lunch break is announced. And he’s short - everything was very strict back then. And so I run with my not very athletic build along Ilyinka, from the building of the Constitutional Court - fortunately not far away - to the building of the Federal Archive. I ran, out of breath, into Pihoya’s office, and he told me:

And he gives me a copy of a handwritten document, already certified, with a seal, with all the files, which is called “To the position in “A”. It also says: “Resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee,” and on the side are the signatures of those members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee who signed this document.

L.B.: With such a mysterious name.

M.F.: Yes, with the mysterious title “Towards the position in “A”. Written by the hand of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.

L.B.: What year is this document?

M.F.: The text is as follows: “... having considered it, the Politburo considers it necessary to introduce a limited contingent into “A”. Well, it is clear that we are talking about sending troops into Afghanistan.

L.B.: I understand, of course.

M.F.: But this is clear to us now. And it was absolutely obvious to me at that moment, because everything came together. And now the lunch break ends. I continue the interrogation of this member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and at some point, like a magician from a top hat, I take out a copy of this very document. The copy was certified, so everything was procedurally as it should be. I hand him this document and say:

Please check it out. I think your signature is there.

He looks at me and asks: - What is this?

I answer: - This is a document that was found in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee. Is this your signature?

Him: Well, maybe mine too.

Me: Could you tell me what this document is about?

Him: I don't know.

Me: Well, how come you don’t know if you signed it? “About the position in “A”. "And what's that?

Him: I don't know.

Me: Maybe the Arctic?

He can be.

Me: We sent troops to the Arctic? Tell me.

Well, Zorkin understands that this is already theater at the microphone, and not a serious trial. He says:

All clear. It is clear to the court what is at stake. Witness, do you understand?

Witness: I see.

Zorkin: Then tell us how you adopted this resolution “On the situation in Afghanistan»?

So working with archival documents was very important. Since I was a member of the declassification commission, I also saw those documents that were not declassified. And I must say that representatives of the special services - and they were also part of this commission, naturally - they insisted every time that there was no need to declassify these documents. And in general, they were basically in favor of not declassifying anything.

From their point of view, there was a need for as much secrecy as possible and as little openness as possible. But besides me, there were other members of the commission who insisted that declassification was necessary. Among them was Rudolf Germanovich Pihoya. And we declassified quite a lot of documents, with the exception of those that related to specific people. We understood that if the document named the name of a foreign figure and indicated how he collaborated with the Soviet intelligence services and the CPSU, he could get into trouble, including very serious ones. That's why we kept these matters classified.

A lot of documents related to ancient years, times of political repression, documents signed by Stalin, documents with Stalin’s resolutions. I will never forget one document. It was a letter from the first secretary of some provincial committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, dated 1937. There he reports that a lot of work is being done in the province to identify counter-revolutionary elements. According to the 1st category, so many thousands of people were repressed there, according to the 2nd category - so many tens of thousands of people. The 1st category is execution, the 2nd category is the Gulag. And then he writes that they are asking the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to increase their quota for the 1st category by 15 thousand, for the 2nd category - by some more, I don’t remember now. And then comes Stalin’s red pencil: “I allow you to increase by 50 thousand.”

You see, when cannibalism is not just put on stream, it is put on a planned basis, it produces a terrible impression. I must say that every time I came home after working in the archives, I could not eat, I could not sleep. I wanted only one thing - to quickly get into the shower to wash away all the horror that I had read. This is very difficult, it is not for the human mind. And the fact that Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev dealt with the problem of rehabilitation for many years, and thousands of such documents passed through him, is a great feat on his part. Simply a great feat. I only worked on this commission for a few months, but it lasted me a lifetime. Let me tell you, it's very hard work. Very!

L.B.: Mikhail Alexandrovich, and yet, why did this trial not fulfill its historical role? All this did not fully play its role. What do you think prevented this? After all, the point was not made.

M.F.: Because it is very difficult to carry out the Nuremberg trials according to the laws of the German Reich. Imagine, the Nuremberg trials were conducted according to the laws that the winners established for the Nuremberg Tribunal. And these laws were based on international law. Those laws according to which the Constitutional Court considered the case of banning the CPSU were laws written by the CPSU itself. These laws were written under the leadership of the CPSU. And if the Constitution stated that the CPSU represents the guiding and guiding force of society, proving its unconstitutionality is a very difficult task. Moreover, the majority of the members of the Constitutional Court left the CPSU not because they ideologically disagreed with it, but because they had to choose: either you are a member of the Constitutional Court, or you are a member of the party. The mandate of a constitutional judge is incompatible with membership in any political party. So it was a very difficult process.

And I don’t think we lost it. I think we won it. We didn't win with a clean sheet, of course. I would say that we won it with a score of 7:3, well, maybe 6:4. Because, for example, questions about the property of the CPSU were resolved in favor of the state. It was recognized that the CPSU cannot lay claim to those properties and real estate that they had at that time. This also extended to financial resources. And this is for one simple reason: all the wealth of the CPSU came not from party contributions, but from the state treasury. They simply selected the best pieces for themselves, and then these best pieces made a profit. Forgive me, if I took something from someone, it is not mine, but criminally acquired property. Therefore, naturally, it had to be taken away. And this issue was resolved in favor of the state, and not in favor of the CPSU.

And most importantly, the decision of the Constitutional Court in the CPSU case contains a very important phrase. One of the sections of the resolution begins with the words: “In the Soviet Union, for many decades, there was a dictatorship regime based on violence and headed by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.” You understand, it is said in black and white that there was dictatorial regime. And this is the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Russia. When they now say: “Well, yes, the Soviet regime, there were some shortcomings, but it was a completely democratic regime,” my dears, you are contradicting the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court said differently.

In the same way, we have a law on the rehabilitation of victims of political repression, on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples, and so on. The same thing was said there, and in approximately the same wording. It gives clear characteristics of what the Soviet regime was.

L.B.: What didn't work? You say that the score was not dry.

M.F.: Yes, the score was not dry, of course. It was not possible to recognize the CPSU as a criminal organization. Every time we said that this process was similar to Nuremberg, they shouted at us, shushed us, and stomped their feet. This was done, among other things, by the judges of the Constitutional Court. And even when we gave specific examples. For example, when we said: look at the constitutional formula about the leading and guiding role of the CPSU. Where do the legs of this formula come from? Where did it come from in our constitution? It first appeared in the 1936 Constitution. But where did she get there from? And we found where it came from.

I found this - I can say this with pride. She got there from the “Law on the Unity of Party and State”. This law, in my opinion, was dated December 1, 1934. You can look more accurately. This law contains these words... Let’s stop for a moment, I’ll now take the book and quote them exactly.

L.B.: Wow! Right during our conversation, Mikhail Alexandrovich received a letter that information was posted on the president’s website that Mikhail Fedotov had been appointed chairman of the Council for Promoting the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights. Can we congratulate you on this? After all, this is a very serious thing.

M.F.: This is a very serious thing. There is probably no need to congratulate you on this. This is a very responsible thing, very serious, very important. Will be working.

L.B.: But let's finish the conversation we started. You wanted to find the exact text of the law.

M.F.: Yes. The constitutional formula about the CPSU as a leading and directing force came into the Constitution of 1936 from paragraph N3 of the Law of the German Reich “On Ensuring the Unity of the Party and the State” of December 1, 1934. There the Nazi Party is called “the guiding and leading force of the National Socialist state.” Have questions? I think this is a direct quote. The document was signed by Adolf Hitler.

When I was working on the materials of the trial in the CPSU case, I always remembered what the wonderful French jurist and political scientist Maurice Duverger wrote in his book about political parties. There he had a chapter on monoparties, where he compared the CPSU with the Nazi Party of Germany and the Fascist Party of Italy. He found many similarities, but also found certain differences. The chapter ends with these words: “The difference between German Nazism and Russian Bolshevism is no more than the difference between German and Russian temperament.”

L.B.: But this is some kind of non-legal conclusion.

M.F.: In fact, this is a very serious scientist, Maurice Duverger, and his work is very serious. He wrote it back in the 50s. And so I understood it. Therefore, when I raised the topic of the Nuremberg trials, it always caused terrible displeasure and opposition.

L.B.: What else hasn't been done yet? Probably, first of all, it was not possible - although the process was supposed to fulfill this role - to change public opinion, or to influence it strongly. It was 1992, right?

M.F.: It was 1992, yes.

L.B.: Only four years will pass, and in 1996 a strong, catastrophic rollback will begin.

M.F.: When the process began, there was one situation, and when the process ended, it was completely different. When the process ended, there were already very strong protest sentiments in the country. Very strong! The communists were already on horseback again, in addition, they were blocking with the red-browns. The situation was very tense. At this moment, the so-called National Salvation Front appeared, and Yeltsin issued a decree in which he banned this Front. This decree was also appealed to the Constitutional Court, and Boris Nikolaevich instructed me to be his representative in this process.

Tomorrow we begin considering the case to ban the National Salvation Front.

And some members of the Constitutional Court, as far as I know, said:

Fine. We will support the decision regarding the CPSU, but on the condition that we further consider the case regarding the National Salvation Front. And here we are going to give Yeltsin some heat!

And after this, the next congress immediately opened, and the communists wanted to overthrow Yeltsin. They wanted to impeach him. My task was to leave the trial of the CPSU without losing anything and continue working on the cause of the National Salvation Front. And, most importantly, to delay the process so that the decision of the Constitutional Court is not made before the congress. So that the communists could not use it at the congress. And I succeeded.

L.B.: Mikhail Alexandrovich, I understand that you are in a hurry due to your new appointment. But still, please tell us about Paris and Okudzhava.

M.F.: No, next time. More about this next time.

L.B.: Well, then let's finish our conversation. I congratulate you. I understand that everything is changing dramatically for you. Thank you very much. Then next time we can also talk about your work in your new position.

Initiator of the case: People's Deputies of the RSFSR

The court's decision: merger of security forces declared unconstitutional

Decree of the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin dated December 19, 1991 No. 289 “On the formation of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR” was recognized as inconsistent with the Constitution in terms of the division of branches of power and the division of competencies enshrined in the Constitution between the highest bodies of state power and administration. The Constitutional Court decided that the President of the RSFSR exceeded his powers, and the division and mutual restraint of security forces, whose activities are associated with real restrictions on the rights and freedoms of citizens, ensures a democratic system and is one of the guarantees against the usurpation of power. On January 15, 1992, Mr. Yeltsin canceled the decree.

About the CPSU

Initiator of the case: People's Deputies of the RSFSR

The court's decision: the dissolution of the central organizational structures of the CPSU was recognized as constitutional

The Constitutional Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the decrees of RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 on the suspension of the activities of the Communist Party, the property and activities of the Communist Parties of the RSFSR and the CPSU, since the union party had already collapsed and the Russian organization was not independently formed. The issue of the former property of the CPSU has been transferred to the discretion of the arbitration courts. The dissolution of the central organizational structures of the CPSU was recognized as constitutional, but regional organizations were allowed to recreate the party: the organizing committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR was created, and on February 13–14, 1993, at the second emergency congress, the name of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was adopted. Three judges who disagreed with the decision of the Constitutional Court expressed dissenting opinions on the case.

On the President's televised address to the people

Initiator of the case: Supreme Council of the RSFSR

The court's decision: Boris Yeltsin's televised address declared unconstitutional

The Constitutional Court found the actions of the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin related to his appeal to the citizens of the country on March 20, 1993 on the introduction of “a special order of governance until the crisis of power is overcome”, inconsistent with the Constitution and the Federal Treaty. Three judges issued dissenting opinions, pointing out that the televised address related to political issues that the Constitutional Court does not have the right to consider, and the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, had previously violated the law himself by publicly accusing the president on behalf of the court of an “attempted coup” and failing to recuse himself. As a result, Boris Yeltsin did not cancel his decrees, and the mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, stated that “there was nothing unconstitutional in the televised address.”

About constitutional reform

Initiator of the case: constitutional Court

The court's decision: the introduction of presidential rule was recognized as the basis for the removal of Boris Yeltsin from office

The Constitutional Court recognized as unconstitutional the address of the President of the Russian Federation to the citizens of Russia on September 21, 1993 and his decree “On step-by-step constitutional reform”, which abolished the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, and considered this the basis for the removal of Boris Yeltsin from office. Four judges gave dissenting opinions. The head of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, was accused of publicly giving a sharply negative assessment of the appeal and the decree before the meeting, but did not recuse himself. Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Court Nikolai Vitruk stated that “the constant whipping up of psychosis on the part of the presiding officer about the complete collapse of the constitutional system” did not make it possible to fully study the case. On October 7, Boris Yeltsin suspended the work of the Constitutional Court until the adoption of a new Constitution. In the spring of 1995, the Constitutional Court staff was increased to 19 people, which ensured a majority loyal to the president.

About the Chechen conflict

Initiators of the case: Federation Council and State Duma

The court's decision: the decree on the counter-terrorism operation was recognized as constitutional

The Constitutional Court recognized as constitutional the decree of President Boris Yeltsin of December 9, 1994 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict” and stopped checking other decrees that marked the beginning of the counter-terrorism operation in the region. Only two points of the government resolution were recognized as inconsistent with the Constitution: on the deportation of citizens not living there from the republic and on the deprivation of accreditation of journalists without a court decision. Eight of the 18 judges issued dissenting opinions. A month and a half after the decision, which was loyal to the president, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to ensure material guarantees of the independence of judges of the Constitutional Court.”

About restitution

Initiators of the case: Parliament / President of the Russian Federation

The court's decision: obligated to sign the law on restitution and recognized it as constitutional

Resolution No. 11-P of the Constitutional Court, at the request of the Federation Council and the State Duma to resolve the dispute with the President of the Russian Federation, obliged Boris Yeltsin to sign the law adopted by parliamentarians “On cultural values ​​moved to the USSR as a result of the Second World War.” Mr. Yeltsin tried to challenge the forcedly signed law in the Constitutional Court, which, by Resolution No. 12-P, introduced a number of amendments, but left unchanged the clause, undesirable for the President of the Russian Federation, that the countries of the Hitlerite coalition do not have the right to the return of cultural property. At the same time, the Constitutional Court refrained from declaring the law unconstitutional “despite the violations that took place in the State Duma” and turned a blind eye to the illegitimate procedure for absentee voting of deputies.

About the terms of government

Initiators of the case: State Duma

The court's decision: It is prohibited to serve as President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms

Eight months after the State Duma deputies appealed to interpret the final and transitional provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court terminated consideration of the case, ruling No. 134-O that Boris Yeltsin no longer has the right to run for president. At the same time, the judicial body found that the Constitution prohibits leading the state only more than two times in a row. This decision opened up the opportunity for the presidents of the Russian Federation to run for a third time after one missed term, which was first used by Vladimir Putin in 2012, having previously lost the presidential post for one term to the then Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev.

About the death penalty

Initiators of the case: Moscow City Court and Supreme Court

The court's decision: moratorium on death penalty extended

Resolution No. 3-P, at the request of the Moscow City Court and citizens, prohibited the imposition of death sentences until cases were universally considered by jury. And on the eve of the introduction of such courts from January 1, 2010 throughout Russia, with a ruling on clarification No. 1344-O-R dated November 19, 2009, at the request of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court declared the return of the death penalty impossible. The moratorium has been extended until Russia either ratifies Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, signed in 1997, or waives its obligations to implement it. Formally, this type of punishment remains in the Criminal Code, but it is replaced by life imprisonment.

About amnesty

Initiators of the case: Sovetsky District Court of Chelyabinsk

The court's decision: State Duma resolutions on amnesty were declared unconstitutional

Resolution No. 11-P, at the request of the Sovetsky District Court of Chelyabinsk and complaints from citizens of the Russian Federation, annulled the State Duma resolution of May 26, 2000 on the amnesty in honor of the 55th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the amendments made to it on June 28, 2000. The Constitutional Court prohibited amnesty for persons who had not yet been released from punishment and recognized the original version of the State Duma act as “inadequate to the purposes of the amnesty.” Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Court Tamara Morshchakova explained that “the violations committed by the State Duma are very diverse.” Answering a question about the fate of those prisoners who have already been released under the amnesty, Mrs. Morshchakova emphasized that we are not talking about their return to places of detention: “They were lucky, and others may still be lucky.”

About YUKOS

Initiators of the case: YUKOS and the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District

The court's decision: permission to collect taxes beyond the statute of limitations

The Constitutional Court issued ruling No. 36-O of January 18, 2005, refusing to consider YUKOS’s complaint about the non-application of the statute of limitations for tax liability in its case, but declared unacceptable the “universalization” by arbitration courts of the concept of “unfair taxpayer” introduced by the ruling of the Constitutional Court No. 138 -O dated July 21, 2001 at the request of the Ministry of Taxes and Duties in connection with another norm of tax legislation. However, by Resolution No. 9-P of July 14, 2005, at the request of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District in connection with the YUKOS case of deliberate non-payment of taxes, the Constitutional Court allowed the collection of tax sanctions beyond the statute of limitations “in the event of the taxpayer’s obstruction of tax control.” This allowed the courts to recover 38.7 billion rubles from Yukos, which the European Court of Human Rights did not agree with in 2011.

On the cancellation of gubernatorial elections

Initiators of the case: Vladimir Grishkevich and the SPS party

The court's decision: the new procedure for approving governors (previously there were direct elections) was recognized as constitutional

Resolution No. 13-P, following a complaint from Tyumen geologist Vladimir Grishkevich and SPS party activists, recognized the new procedure for approving governors as constitutional and confirmed the president’s right to submit their candidacies for consideration by the regional parliament. The Constitutional Court stated that the provisions of the Constitution should be assessed “in the developing socio-historical context”, abandoning its previous positions in resolutions No. 2-P of January 18, 1996 banning the election of the governor of the Altai Territory by the regional parliament and No. 11-P of April 30, 1996 year, where the “principle of electing heads of executive power” is called “arising from the Constitution.”

About the precedents of YOU

Initiators of the case: JSC "Karbolit" and other enterprises

The court's decision: The precedent system formed by the Supreme Court is recognized as acceptable

Based on complaints from a number of enterprises about the system of reviewing court decisions that have entered into legal force due to a subsequent change in the position of the Supreme Arbitration Court in similar cases, the Constitutional Court issued Resolution No. 1-P, which allows review only in exceptional cases and provided that in the decisions of the presidium and plenum YOU will be expressly advised of the retroactive effect. In fact, the precedent system of court decisions formed by the Supreme Court was recognized as acceptable. Chairman of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin said that this compromise decision “opened the way to legitimize the precedent in Russia,” but in fact its application led to new complaints against the Supreme Arbitration Court in the Constitutional Court, and in 2014 the Supreme Arbitration Court was abolished by an amendment to the Constitution.

About arbitration courts

Initiators of the case: Superior Court of Arbitration

The court's decision: expansion of arbitrability of civil law disputes

The Constitutional Court issued Resolution No. 10-P at the request of the Supreme Arbitration Court, which challenged the competence of arbitration courts in considering real estate disputes, supporting arbitration courts as an alternative method of resolving civil disputes. Valery Zorkin stated that “the institution of arbitration within civil society is a democratic principle, generally recognized in the world, and the fact that it is not part of the state court system does not reduce its importance and role in our lives.” And the head of the Supreme Arbitration Court, Anton Ivanov, warned that “the state may ultimately lose large assets.”

About rallies

Initiators of the case: a group of State Duma deputies and Eduard Limonov

The court's decision: Some provisions of the law “on rallies” were declared unconstitutional

The Constitutional Court issued Resolution No. 4-P on the complaint of State Duma deputies and Eduard Limonov against amendments to the law “On meetings, rallies, demonstrations, processions and picketing” and the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO). A number of the most scandalous norms were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court or their “constitutional and legal meaning” was adjusted. But many of the controversial rules were found to be consistent with the Constitution. Three judges disagreed with the decision and advocated a complete abolition of the imposed bans and sanctions against the protesters. “The scale and massive nature” of the violations committed by the State Duma “manifold increase the concentration of negative energy, exploding the law from within,” said one of the dissenting opinions.

About "foreign agents"

Initiators of the case: NGO and Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin

The court's decision: the law on “foreign agents” is recognized as constitutional

In its ruling, the Constitutional Court refused to recognize the law on “foreign agents” as violating the Constitution, and their status as a “negative assessment.” The Constitutional Court considered activities “for the purpose of exerting influence,” including through the formation of public opinion, “on the decisions taken by government bodies and the policies pursued by them” to be political, but indicated that this definition should not apply to human rights and charitable organizations. Human rights activists called the decision of the Constitutional Court “the worst in its entire history,” accusing the court of subordinating the executive branch, but hoped that it would still block “punitive prosecutorial practices” against NGOs. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe did not agree with the decision of the Constitutional Court.

About the annexation of Crimea

Initiators of the case: President of the Russian Federation

The court's decision: the agreement on the admission of Crimea to the Russian Federation was recognized as constitutional

Resolution No. 6-P on checking the constitutionality of the international treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea was issued at the request of President Vladimir Putin. A positive decision was made without appointing a rapporteur judge or preliminary hearings “taking into account the current situation around Crimea and Sevastopol.” The judges also did not resort to the help of experts. It took the judges about three hours to study the request and issue a 14-page approval ruling. This sparked a discussion between HSE professor Elena Lukyanova, who criticized the procedure for adopting the resolution, and Valery Zorkin, who called Ms. Lukyanova “an accomplice of foreign power.”

About business harassment

Initiators of the case: Salekhard City Court

The court's decision: led to the revocation of the article on business fraud

On December 11, 2014, the Constitutional Court declared Art. 159.4 of the Criminal Code (CC) on liability for fraud in business, adopted as part of the liberalization of legislation in 2012 in response to complaints about “harassment of business.” Despite the president’s call to “remove restrictions on business as much as possible,” a week later the Constitutional Court demanded tougher punishment for deliberate failure by entrepreneurs to fulfill contractual obligations on a particularly large scale within six months, warning that if amendments are not made on time, the privileged norm will cease to apply. The legislative bodies did not comply with the requirement, and Art. 159.4 was repealed.

In July 2016, Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was supplemented with three new parts, providing for liability for committing fraud in the business sphere. Legislators clearly defined the elements of the crime, and also separately prescribed sanctions for large-scale and especially large-scale fraud. Now, for conscious and intentional non-compliance with contracts and agreements, you can receive a penalty ranging from a fine of up to 300 thousand rubles. to imprisonment for a term of up to 10 years.

On non-execution of ECHR decisions

Initiators of the case: group of State Duma deputies

The court's decision: gave itself the authority to declare unenforceable decisions of the ECHR at the request of government agencies

By Resolution 21-P, the Constitutional Court rejected the demand of 93 State Duma deputies to declare unconstitutional federal laws obliging Russia to comply with rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), but gave itself the authority to declare unenforceable decisions of the ECHR at the request of the president, government and other government bodies. Thus, in April 2016, the Constitutional Court upheld the complaint of the Ministry of Justice, declaring it impossible to implement the ECHR ruling in the case “Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia,” which ordered differentiation of the prohibition enshrined in the Constitution for prisoners to vote in elections. In October 2016, the Ministry of Justice applied for permission not to pay compensation of €1.866 billion to ex-YUKOS shareholders. The case has not yet been accepted for consideration.

The presentation of a book about the trials of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which took place in the building of the Constitutional Court on Ilyinka, was an event in itself almost sensational for several reasons. Firstly, perhaps for the first time in the entire existence of the Constitutional Court, the judges decided to take off their black robes and, in the presence of a large audience, discuss over a glass of champagne on topics that were more political than legal. Secondly, journalists and all those present were given a rare opportunity to remember the times of Valery Zorkin. The ex-chairman said what he thought about matters long past, which evoked a number of pleasant and unpleasant memories.
It is worth recalling briefly the essence of the case, which ended in November 1992. Four years ago, the Constitutional Court checked the decrees of President Yeltsin on the suspension of the activities of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, on the property of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, on the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, as well as on checking the actual constitutionality of the Communist Party (as a result, the court did not make any decision on the latter, citing the fact that that the CPSU did not formally exist by that time, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was not formalized as an independent unit).
As a result, the Constitutional Court recognized the decrees banning the CPSU and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. But only insofar as it concerns, for example, the dissolution of the organizational structures of the CPSU and the confiscation of property from the party that was owned by the state. The court did not actually prohibit the activities of primary territorial organizations. Thus, the CPSU seemed to have disappeared, but at the same time nothing prevented the structure from being revived. Which was then done successfully (or without problems).
The process lasted a little over six months; breaks were announced several times for various reasons. A total of 52 hearings were held in the case—an unprecedented number. No less unprecedented was the decision, which immediately after its promulgation on November 30 caused heated debate. Many called the verdict vague and uncertain, and its consequences undesirable for society.
Judging by the rather lengthy monologue of the ex-chairman of the court, he is not inclined to change his opinion, even after four years. Zorkin said that the trial of the CPSU-CPRF "was the first experience of political compromise in Russia." And that the Constitutional Court “did not follow the lead of supporters of two extremes: to ban the Communist Party or to justify it.” “It is a strategic compromise that we are now looking for, that our country so needs.” And, finally, the most important thing, which apparently all those present paid attention to, judging by the dialogues that followed later, Zorkin said quite definitely and without unnecessary floridity. If a similar problem (the jurisdiction or non-jurisdiction of the Communist Party) had to be resolved now, then he, as a constitutional judge, has no doubt that “strategically, the course of solving the problem was chosen correctly.”
As in 1992, Gennady Burbulis, who defended Yeltsin’s decrees in court, again became his opponent. Speaking at the presentation, he said that as a result of the half-hearted and vague decision, “we got what we got.” He said (admitting, despite everything, his respect for the “high court”) that “the degree of risk that we all experienced in the elections on June 16 is impossible in a normal civilized society, and the Constitutional Court could have reduced this degree in its time , but did not take advantage of the opportunity."
The risk, which Burbulis mentioned with a fair amount of emotion, is not considered a risk as such by Zorkin, insisting on the experience of a “political compromise” and a “large positive school” in the decision of the Constitutional Court. According to Zorkin, if the court had imposed a complete ban on the functioning of the Communist Party, the effect would have been an increase in extremism and political confrontation. It is difficult to argue with a famous scientist and lawyer. But it is still unclear what meaning the judge puts into the concept of “aggravated political confrontation.” And it is not clear what else one can call political life in Russia on the eve of the recent presidential elections, and even after them.
It would not be entirely fair to consider that there are only two fundamental points of view on the question of the “correctness” or “incorrectness” of the decision of the Constitutional Court four years ago: the Constitutional Court had every right to put an end to the ghost in Russia forever, or it could not formally and purely legally get rid of the CPSU- -Communist Party of the Russian Federation, while ensuring political stability and order. There is one more. And it lies in the following - the court made a half-hearted decision, thanks to which the revival of the Communist Party became possible, including in the form of primary organizations in production (which is a direct violation of the court decision). And the revival is in its old form. In Eastern Europe, whose countries took the path of more decisively eradicating the legacy of communism, communist parties were simply forced to transform into new and different political movements.