Who is Anatoly Chubais and why is “he to blame for everything”? Bulat Okudzhava dedicated his last poem to Chubais

I'm studying the technical catalog -
The price is amazing.
I sigh - there is not enough money to buy.
The phrase comes up: Chubais is to blame.

I'm working on a procurement plan for repairs,
The pen dances a waltz on paper.
But I know: even what I haven’t erased
We won't get it - Chubais is to blame.

I couldn’t buy a Volga with a voucher,
How Mercedes was allowed by burgher Weiss.
I invested it in shares, but what’s the point?
Emission...Who is to blame? Chubais!

He often appears on TV -
Confident, talkative, businesslike.
Having taken hold of something, it famously destroys it.
But Chubais’s appetite is only growing.

Why do our authorities cherish him?
Sometimes it even takes me by surprise,
How money disappears into a nanomouth -
Budget subsidies, a lot of quotas...

The brightest symbol of the Yeltsin era
Plays this role perfectly.
Having absorbed all the vices of power,
And the nanotroll doesn’t blow his own mustache.

I look at the price list - and there is Chubais as a fool.
The untouchable minister of EdRoss...
In Wonderland the swindler is always in favor -
Successful, businesslike, arrogant boss.

He will take on any task,
And the WTO usually inflates prices...
The people will exhale as usual: - Well, brothers,
The answer is clear: Chubais is to blame.

2011 - 2015

WE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MARKET!
Anatoly Chubais at the Rusnano corporate event:
- The first thing I wanted to say is: we have a lot of money! There are quite a lot of them,” said the head of the corporation. “That’s why we have the opportunity not only to “handle” a lot of money, but also to invest it in our long-term strategy! She completely solved all problems, including the problem of potential financial failure. Accordingly, we have a second prize. It won’t be instantaneous, but we will try to be responsible for the market.

For the sake of three hundred Rusnano employees, the newfangled metropolitan club Duran Bar was closed for special services, and the main star of the New Year's corporate party was the head of the state company, Anatoly Chubais. From the stage, he congratulated his subordinates on their outstanding successes, boasted of his enviable financial position, despite billions of dollars in losses, and uttered the words that millions of Russians are eager to hear from their employers: “Double bonus to everyone!”
As for Rusnano itself, the successes to which Chubais’ speech was devoted raise questions. According to media reports, in 2014 alone, the corporation’s net loss amounted to 14.57 billion rubles with revenue of 6.3 billion.
No, Chubais is still the same!
Having destroyed a huge country, a group of former young reformers continues to dance on its bones, milking the Russian budget and, it seems, they are taking milk from the second budget cow.
Deputy Prime Minister Golodets proposed
–...not to organize million-dollar corporate parties and not to pay double bonuses, but to help poor people, of whom there are many in Russia.
If you have a lot of money, then donate it to those who need it. Today we have a lot of people who live below the poverty line. There are almost 22 million people,” said Golodets, who oversees the social block in the government. - When someone goes out and has such a feast, it looks completely unethical.
The Accounts Chamber undertook to check Chubais’s work.
For me personally, the result is clear: they will scold and forget, like the former Minister of Defense or the former Minister of Agriculture Skrynnik, who stole 32 billion rubles. They scolded me and quietly moved me to another position.
Putin covers for his own.
Is this true?

Reviews

Very biting, witty and truthful, Vlad!
But only such “Chubais” have long since taken their place in the global system of Mammon and so firmly that nothing frightens or worries them, for this system has taken the whole world into its network, like a cancerous tumor. And it is very difficult to fight it. It requires Wisdom and Courage to at least restrain its metastases.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin allowed this infection to freely penetrate our “organism.” Easy. In one moment.
But it takes decades to “cure”...
And here it is important not to make a mistake! Because they suggest false ways of treatment. All the same “virtues”.
We ourselves almost found ourselves in the shoes of Ukraine. God had mercy.
Do not be fooled by the temptations of the “sweet life for the people.”
They promise! But they will never do it, especially the oligarchs!
There is already one - Mr. Poroshenko. Few?
The most important thing is the country's military power. The dead don't need "porridge"! And if we live, we won’t die!
Best wishes!
I respect you for your courage and openness.
Good luck!!!

You know, Olga, these Chubais even now, under Putin
They live happily, with millions in salaries and good government support.
Putin strengthened our oligarchy and impoverished our people -
hard-working people, mind you. I'm not talking about pensioners. They are telling us lies about the way out of the crisis, about budget growth and the welfare of the people. I live in the city. Industrial enterprises did not work in the 90s and still do not work. Handed out for bribes and kickbacks to the local oligarchy, people run away from them, because... Salaries have not been increased for several years. And life is becoming more and more expensive!
But the number of oligarchs and their welfare have increased!
Putin doesn’t touch “his” thieves, this is his principle.
He created a country of oligarchs and beggars, and he is proud of it.
It’s a pity, but he will sit back in his old chair, we won’t live richer.
With respect and warmth,

Somehow, in a series of events, what in my opinion was a significant date got blurred.
Anatoly Chubais turned 55 years old, and in connection with this small anniversary he was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, fourth degree - “for his great contribution to the implementation of state policy in the field of nanotechnology and many years of conscientious work.”

I don’t know about his contribution to nanotechnology, but he worked conscientiously, that’s for sure.

Of all the post-Soviet figures, Anatoly Chubais is the most attractive and likable character for me.
Naturally, I evaluate him exclusively as an ordinary person who has been living near Chubais for almost 20 years.

By the way, a small detail.
At the age of 55, Chubais received his first government award in his life. The detail is cute. We have amateurs who reward themselves with “tchotchkes” on every occasion. But this is true, just a detail, not the most significant one.

Anatoly Chubais is one of the few who in his work clearly answers three questions - Why? What? How?
The majority of the population does not like his answers, but these are no longer Anatoly Borisovich’s problems.

He attracted popular wrath primarily due to the privatization carried out in the early 90s.
I do not undertake to judge whether this privatization was the only correct option. I don’t know, but it sounded tempting - voucher - shares - two Volgas.

I judge by myself.
Receiving vouchers did not make my life better or worse. It didn’t improve – I invested it in the wrong place. It didn’t make it worse - I stayed with what I had, but the two Volgas were funny even then.

By the way, I laughed in vain.
My friends who wisely exchanged vouchers for shares (for example, Gazprom) are millionaires today. True, it’s in rubles, but it’s still nice.

And yet, I was not entirely accurate when I said that privatization did not improve or worsen my situation.
Improved. I was able, like millions of fellow citizens, to privatize an apartment. It was a gift for me. I sold the apartment, and with the proceeds I bought a piece of land in the village.
If it weren’t for Chubais, I would still be living in this resettled Moscow.

And I am grateful to him for the reorganization of RAO UES Russia.
Before Chubais, in the very village where I bought the land, systematic power outages in the house and voltage instead of 220 180-160 were the norm.
And now this happens, but this is the exception rather than the rule.

Why then is he so disliked?

Good question.
I’ll start with the fact that Chubais responded to the people’s love “deeply and from a high bell tower”...
I don't think I'm wrong. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the clear sequence and rigidity of his answers to the questions - Why? What? How?

We do not favor people who are not only convinced that they are right, but also know how to stand up for this rightness.

There is also a version of “people's dislike”.
Almost seditious. This type of person like Chubais is not loved by losers.
I'll put it mildly. Those people who are not accustomed to choice and responsibility for choice are hostile to him.
I'll add it even softer. The majority wants to live in a paternalistic state, in which everything is guaranteed—everyone is equally and equally poor.
Therefore, among such people, “Chubais is to blame for everything” always and everywhere.

But the first government award to Anatoly Borisovich Chubais is a hint that the state itself does not want to be like that.
Otherwise, why reward?

Survival game. Tragedy is terrible for everyone, except for one thing - lessons can be learned from it. And if not extracted, wait for the next one. While political games are going on in Moscow under the slogan “Chubais is to blame for everything!”, at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station they are waiting in horror for the spring flood, which the dam may not withstand. In games under the carpet, as well as in what these games can turn out to be for people, The New Times looked into

On October 3, a month and a half after the disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya station, the “Act of technical investigation into the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 at the branch of JSC RusHydro - Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P.S.” finally appeared on the Rostechnadzor website. Neporozhny” - that’s what it’s called. Appeared and after a little more than a day disappeared. And those who did not have time to read it had to be content with the following phrase: “Dear colleagues, due to technical problems caused by a large number of requests to the site upon the publication of the Act, it was decided that this document will be sent out upon contact with the press service of the department." However, the editors already had the text - thanks to unknown Internet figures who managed to download the document and make it available to everyone who might be interested in it, and there were many of them.

"Nonsense for amateurs"

Rostechnadzor's conclusion was awaited, not only by power engineers, but primarily by those whose loved ones - 75 people - died as a result of the accident. A person is designed like this: it is difficult for him to come to terms with the fact that his father or brother or sister left before their due date because someone somewhere overlooked or did something wrong - he wants to know who and what responsibility this person will bear . The act of Rostekhnadzor provided for this human instinct, but denied fellow citizens reason - because not only the ordinary reader, but even super-professionals, as The New Times had the opportunity to see, cannot extract anything from the act except that in everything, as always, Chubais is to blame: in section No. 7 “Events (persons) preceding and contributing to the accident,” his name is named in the top three as the chairman of the board of RAO UES, who in December 2000 approved the “Acceptance Certificate for the Sayano-Shushensky Hydroelectric Complex.” Before this, for 22 years (sic!), one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world operated, as it turned out, on the basis of a document on “temporary operation”. What does the 2000 act have to do with the tragedy that happened in the summer of 2009? “/.../ a proper assessment was not given of the actual state of safety of the SSHHPP” - this phrase from the act was immediately replicated by all state television channels: the document arrived just in time for the final Sunday programs (and then immediately disappeared). That is, the tragedy was inevitable and it was only by the will of Providence that it did not happen earlier? The New Times found the man who built the station. This Head of the Krasnoyarsk installation department Gidromontazh during the construction of the SSHHPP from 1978 to 1987 (remember, the first two units of the station were launched in 1979), and from 1987 to 1992 - chief engineer of the Gidromontazh trust of the USSR Ministry of Energy Evgeniy Lyubashevsky- a specialist who knows both the station and the industry thoroughly. Looking ahead, let's say: the act outraged Lyubashevsky so much that he wrote a letter to the acting. Chairman of the Board of JSC RusHydro Vasily Zubakin, in which he called the creation of Rostekhnadzor, “sanctified” by the signature of the head of the department Nikolai Kutyin, “nonsense, designed for amateurs.”

How is the fact that the station was put into operation in 2000 connected with the tragedy?
Not at all.
But perhaps there were problems at the station that ultimately led to the accident?
There were problems. And there is. But the accident happened for completely different reasons.
Then why did the high-level professionals on the commission, as far as one can judge by their positions, sign what you call “nonsense”?
Without a doubt, departmental interests played a role here: the majority of the commission members are employees of Rostekhnadzor, which should exercise control over the operation of the station and which did not provide this control. Perhaps some other factors were at work - pressure from above, for example. But, as an engineer, I am primarily interested not in the reasons for the appearance of such a document, but in the causes of the accident, and in this regard the act does not stand up to criticism.
Which one?
First of all, the document is poorly written. On one page, for example, the time is Moscow, on the other - local. To restore the chain of events, you need to constantly recalculate. The vibration amplitude is given either in millimeters or microns. In one place it is written that “the continuous vibration monitoring system installed on hydraulic unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and plant management when making decisions.” And below are the data of this vibration control. The impression is that different authors wrote different parts of this act and no one took the trouble to bring it all to a common denominator. Not to mention the fact that various irrelevant information was crammed into the document, as if the goal was to make it as unreadable as possible. Why, one might ask, describe in detail the vibration of the turbine of hydraulic unit (HA) No. 2 from the moment it was launched in 1979, if in 1986 the temporary impeller (turbine) was replaced with a new one, designed for the full head of the hydroelectric power station? * * HA-1 (hydraulic unit) and HA-2 were launched in 1978-1979, when the dam had not yet been completed, so at first the hydraulic units operated at reduced pressures and only in 1986-1987 were transferred to standard turbines.
But in essence?
The fact of the matter is that there is no creature. Imagine you are reading a report on the investigation of a serious accident that occurred as a result of a driver driving into the oncoming lane. And there is not a word about why he drove out: he was drunk, fell asleep, lost consciousness, or the car’s steering failed. Can this be called an investigation? This is exactly the situation here.
If we follow your analogy, what in the story of the SSHPP can be called driving into the oncoming lane?
Launch of HA-2 (the second hydraulic unit), the vibration of which significantly exceeded the maximum permissible. I can even assume that the station’s operating personnel stopped paying attention to the vibration level long ago. After all, just before the accident, the 1st, 3rd, 8th and 9th hydraulic units were operating with a slight excess of the maximum vibration level.
But it is impossible not to pay attention to the vibration, which is 3.7 times higher than permissible, as was the case on GA-2 and which is reflected in the report! With such vibration, the operational duty officer, according to all the technical instructions lying right in front of him on the console, was obliged to immediately stop the GA-2! But the act does not explain the reasons why this was not done. Moreover, the duty officer did not turn off the GA-2 even when the vibration level suddenly began to rise sharply and exceeded the permissible level by more than 5 times. That's when the accident happened.
Why did the duty officer or the chief engineer, who were present at the station at that moment, act contrary to the instructions, simply common sense, and did not lower the fast-falling valve on the GA-2 water intake? And there is not a word about this in the act. But this is the most important thing: if they had stopped the GA-2, transferring its load to others (hydraulic units), and this would take less than 10 minutes, the accident would not have happened. There is no answer in the act to another fundamental question: what prevented the duty officer from resetting the water intake valves of all nine operating hydraulic units in the first seconds after the accident, as the instructions instructed? Moreover, the drives of these gates are self-powered. After all, then the flooding would have been much less catastrophic. What kind of technical investigation is this if it does not reveal the reasons for flagrant violations by staff of job descriptions, violations that led to such serious consequences? Who is this intended for? The fact that Chubais will be called guilty and everyone will be satisfied with this?

In front of the dad

The Rostechnadzor act was initially supposed to appear on September 15: according to a very informed source, who spoke exclusively on condition of anonymity, the document was ready and was only awaiting instructions from above: however, its text was very different from what appeared on October 3. In the original version, responsibility for the accident was assigned primarily to those who directly violated the instructions, that is, following Lyubashevsky’s analogy, they drove into the oncoming lane. And from this it followed that it was Rostechnadzor, which monitors the operation of the station, its head Nikolai Kutin, as well as the head of the industry, Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who oversees the energy complex, bear, although in different proportions, responsibility for the death of people. While the document was being prepared, the Deputy Prime Minister was first in the hospital and then at the scene of the incident in Khakassia. Its secretariat refused to confirm information about the hospital, saying that this information is closed. Returning to Moscow, the industry curator finally got acquainted with the act and, allegedly, became angry. Very angry. The chairman of the commission, the head of Rostechnadzor Nikolai Kutyin, was called to the carpet, and was told something like the following: “That it’s only your pawns who have been appointed guilty. The people won't understand us. Or do you want to go to prison yourself?” Kutyin did not want to go to prison and understood everything correctly; in this he was also helped by the statement of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, made on September 21, that is, exactly between the writing of the first version of the act and the last: “The issue of strengthening state technological supervision has become urgent. Let me remind you that the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP had all the necessary permits and licenses, and was inspected in 2008. And this did not protect us from an accident, which means the supervision function did not work properly.” In accordance with the general line, the act was finalized, enriched with the names of the former head of RAO UES Anatoly Chubais, the former (2001-2004) Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Igor Yusufov (now Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) and other former ones. Of the current federal officials on this list of culprits - oh miracles! - only Deputy Minister of Energy Vyacheslav Sinyugin, who until August 2005 headed HydroOGK and was considered a protege of Chubais. The updated version immediately leaked to state television channels, and for the next few days, echoing them, the country talked about nothing more than Chubais and whether he would occupy a bunk next to Khodorkovsky or would they find another company for him? The former chief power engineer himself, and now the chief nanospecialist, immediately stated that “I am generally responsible for everything that happened under my watch in the industry.” Everyone saw and heard this. Meanwhile, events were developing under the carpet. Governmental. According to a source close to the Russian White House, Deputy Prime Minister Sechin was urgently summoned by the prime minister on Sunday, October 4. What exactly Putin said is unknown, but people who happened to be close to the cherished door at that moment claim that the curator of the Russian fuel and energy complex came out of Putin’s office white as chalk. Apparently, he received a serious beating. Moreover, the source of The New Times believes that Vladimir Vladimirovich’s anger was caused not only and not so much by the content of the document, but by the fact that it was made public and appeared on central television channels without the knowledge of the national leader. This was a violation of all the rules of today’s Russia: “political campaigns can begin and end only with the permission of the GDP” - quote.

Water destroyer

The accusation brought against Anatoly Chubais is serious - he signed the acceptance certificate for the faulty station, “at the same time, a proper assessment was not given of the actual safety state of the SSHHPP,” says the Rostechnadzor document. And indeed, there were problems at the station, and generic ones at that - serious mistakes were made both in the design of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station and during its construction. That is why, both in Soviet times and after, the operators refused to accept the station from the builders - so it worked for two decades on the basis of a temporary acceptance certificate, that is, they seemed to have accepted it, but it seemed not quite.
The main problems of the station are, firstly, the so-called filtration. Simply put, the dam is leaking: until the mid-90s, it flowed at a speed of 500 liters per second, eroding the concrete of the dam. This problem was dealt with in 1996, that is, four years before the ill-fated acceptance certificate was signed - filtration was reduced 100 times.
Another problem is that the turbines of the SSHHPP hydraulic units work well at low loads and at high loads, but at intermediate loads they work poorly - strong vibration occurs. The source of The New Times agrees with the conclusion of the commission that the accident was largely provoked by the fire that happened the night before at the Bratsk hydroelectric power station, because of which the operating mode of the SShHPP was changed, and the second hydraulic unit, which then collapsed, was caught several times during the last night “bad” mode: with an acceptable vibration level of 160 microns before the accident, it reached 840 microns. However, Evgeny Lyubashevsky believes that the accident is not connected with the fire: “I generally got the impression that this fire was brought in in order to completely fool everyone.” The third, much more serious problem is the so-called water well, into which a huge mass of Yenisei water falls from the height of the dam. So, according to the first director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, Valentin Bryzgalov (he wrote a book about the station), this same water well was originally designed incorrectly. Actually, it was mainly because of this well that the station operating at full load was not accepted for permanent operation (SShHPP is not the only one, for example, the Krasnoyarsk HPP was accepted 12 years after its launch).
The cyclopean concrete blocks with which this well is lined, during periods of large floods, when the amount of water increases, are destroyed, or even simply torn off from the concrete bed. The well had to be overhauled several times, and in the end it became clear that it could not be repaired - it was necessary to build an additional water drainage channel. All this is recorded in the station acceptance certificate, which was signed by Anatoly Chubais in 2000 (its full text is available to the editors). They started designing the canal already in 1997, but RusHydro was in no hurry with construction - it was expensive: 2 billion 100 thousand rubles in 2000 prices. Construction began in 2006 and was scheduled to be completed in 2010. We are obliged to finish: the August accident, superimposed on old problems, made this a matter of survival for thousands of people: according to one of the specialists who advised The New Times, if the diversion canal is not completed, then during the spring flood this could lead to disaster: the dam could simply be demolished. This conclusion is not in the Rostechnadzor act.

The price of politicking

According to experts (who emphasize that they are ready to talk about this topic only on the condition that their names and positions are not made public), now “no one knows how long the dam will stand in this condition. Maybe ten years, or maybe a month.” But if the dam breaks, then the August accident will seem like a smile from Gioconda: the lives of 75 thousand people will be at risk, experts estimate. The fact that such a scenario is by no means fantastic is indicated by some passages in the act of Rostechnadzor. In paragraph 6.4.14, for example, we read: “Obtain from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations a conclusion on the readiness of the operating organization to localize and eliminate emergency situations and protect the population and territories in the event of a hydraulic structure accident.” We can only hope that the people in charge of the industry know and understand more than what is written in the report. Actually, there is nothing left but to hope. “What do you want,” The New Times source shrugs, “if at the lower level the engineer does not consider it necessary to check the studs (on which the turbine cover of the second hydraulic unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was attached. - The New Times), which have stood for almost thirty years and on the strength of which the lives of dozens of people depend, and at the top everyone is busy politicking and shoving responsibility onto their neighbor.”

Is Chubais to blame for everything?

People often write to me about the need for personal responsibility, about the fact that you can’t get off with general words and nod at everyone in a circle. At the same time, some are asking a question about my more than critical attitude towards the professional qualities of Mr. Chubais.

I'll try to clarify my position.

There is not the slightest doubt that Anatoly Chubais is and has been for a long time a more than influential person in the country, whose opinion was listened to, to the point that it was often imposed and became a government decision. It was Chubais who ended up at the head of RAO UES. He began his work with loud statements about the disastrous state of the energy sector and about ways to save it.

Where does any competent leader begin his activities in a new place? From the analysis of the current state. For this purpose, various audits and studies are ordered. All available information is collected, after which a system of measures is developed, the necessary human and financial resources are determined, schedules are calculated, stage-by-stage tasks and control methods are set.

They begin implementation, constantly monitoring processes and checking them against the schedule, making sure that the assigned task will be completed on time and as efficiently as possible. The task was to create a powerful modern generating complex, the capabilities of which would be fully consistent with the real growth in consumption accompanying the growth in production. And the task is not new - it was successfully solved in Soviet times, using methods, albeit terrifying ones.

There is not the slightest doubt that Anatoly Chubais is and has been for a long time a more than influential person in the country, whose opinion was listened to, to the point that it was often imposed and became a government decision.

What did Chubais build? What really new, and not completed, Soviet generating capacities were introduced, what kind of distribution system was built, who was on the team and what did it become famous for?

You can find the answers yourself. Obviously, the reform turned out to be something akin to voucherization. The main task was being solved: changing the form of ownership from state to private. Not only were technical aspects left out of attention, but all alarms with seasonal failures and accidents were perceived in a non-systematic and non-engineering manner. The mistake lay in the formulation of the problem itself and was due to the lack of engineering thinking. After all, the money can safely lie in the safe, and physically it practically does not wear out, but with equipment, especially when operating under conditions of abnormal operation and insufficient preventive maintenance, disaster occurs.

I’m not even going to talk about the system of fees for connection and approval of technical conditions created by Chubais’ team. Everything is obvious here. Anyone who has ever encountered this will understand me without words. And for those who, by luck, are not yet in the know, I’ll say: imagine that in order to refuel, you have to pay money not only for gasoline and a car, but also pay for the entrance to the gas station, the technical conditions for approaching the tank and 20 meters oil pipeline.

Chubais was happy with everything, he promoted himself like crazy, but the result was disastrous. I’m not taking into account the financial component - all the potential advantages were killed not only by the crisis (everything will grow there along with the market), but the losses from the tragedy at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station are horrific.

“I believe that, as chairman of the board of RAO UES in 2000, I was obliged to sign the act of accepting the Sayano-Shushenskaya station into operation. By that time the station had already been in operation for more than 20 years. And a working station that has not been put into operation is the worst possible option.”

“As far as my responsibility is concerned, I am generally responsible for everything that happened during my time in the industry. It is little known, but for many years power engineers were forced to work with high risks - the available resources were only sufficient for the most critical components of the country’s energy system. Shutting down the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station at that time, in the context of growing electricity consumption, and waiting for years for investment to replace the impellers of hydraulic units would be a disaster for the economy of Siberia and the millions of citizens living there.”

“As a result of the reform, 930 billion rubles came into the electricity industry. private investment. At the same time, it was the reform that transferred corporate and administrative levers into the hands of the state to exercise direct control over the backbone elements of the electric power industry: hydroelectric power plants, transmission networks, and dispatch control. From the moment of its completion, the state has every opportunity to effectively monitor operational safety and strategically solve the problem of wear and tear of installed equipment.”

“I believe that Rostekhnadzor’s conclusions sufficiently fully reflect the technical causes of the accident. As far as my responsibility is concerned, I am generally responsible for everything that happened during my time in the industry. And the death of 75 of my energy colleagues is a grave tragedy for me personally.”

I have marked in bold the phrases that, in my opinion, are surprising, but clearly show who Chubais is.

Death of people or loss of money - which is the lesser evil?

Sign the act and actually ignore the highest risks of an accident, or not sign and screw up the power plant, the launch of which was presented as an achievement of RAO UES of the Chubais era?

Who needs Chubais's condolences? It will not bring back the dead or provide for their families. Responsibility had to be taken for the reform, but what happened cannot be called a reform. I'm not even talking about the fact that if the act is signed and the flaws are hidden, the sale of a obviously defective asset to private hands will require revaluation, lead to lawsuits and result in colossal monetary and reputational losses for the state.

There is one more aspect. Chubais is a verdict on our personnel appointment system, it is a verdict on political appointees, friends, like-minded people. A striking example is when a commissar, a technical amateur, is appointed to a responsible area of ​​work. And here it was necessary to understand and be, first of all, not a financier, but a technician (since the absolute priority in this area is safety, not money). We have this problem everywhere, that’s why we live like this – they are ruled by incompetent cronies.

Will there be a trial and will Chubais be prosecuted? Don't think. They won’t even ask him to leave his position - he’s one of his own.

And finally. 75 people died. It turned out that this citizen opposed the dead with 930 billion rubles... A new choice? Reminds me of the story of Sodom, when Abraham asked the Creator how many righteous people needed to be found in the city in order to save the lives of all its inhabitants. We settled on at least ten.

Chubais has his own account of money - it seems that for him it justifies the loss of lives. What other bloody harvest will this reform reap?

Chubais was obliged to shout at every corner not about his political views, not about financial plans, but about the need for urgent repair work at all generating facilities of the Soviet era. He should not have left the president’s office without a decision on the implementation of technical regulations and the allocation of funds for the creation of technical infrastructure.

The attempt to shift everything onto the shoulders of private owners is initially ridiculous - the experience of the oil industry has proven their desire to exploit, but not invest.

The salaries and bonuses of Chubais’ team delight fans of GlyukoZa and her husband, but leave everyone else perplexed - what are they doing there, that in such a terrible state of the industry they live like this? Where are they all? A team of reforming managers, drowning in gold, flying on airplanes. Where are these lions of the gossip column, all those who reformed RAO UES? How many more time bombs have they left us and who will hold them accountable?

Maybe they will return the money?

Chubais is to blame - he had powers, opportunities, trust. The result speaks for itself.

They played around with property issues and left the tragedy to be sorted out by the state, which will try to shift everything onto our shoulders by raising tariffs.

Voucherization was repeated. No lesson was learned, since both customers and performers were satisfied with the result. They stole the great heritage from their own people, and left grief and responsibility to strangers. Chubais came out unscathed, and even with a reputation as a great manager, and in my opinion, he is a brilliant PR man.

It’s just that his PR is bone-chilling.

KILLER CHUBAIS LONDON. Economic “shock therapy” and lightning-fast privatization carried out in the 80s - 90s of the last century in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR caused about one million premature deaths in these countries