The Chechen war and who fought as a mercenary. Terrorists “made in USA”: a bloody trail of American mercenaries from the Caucasus to Ukraine

09:45 28.04.2015

American mercenaries have made their mark in the North Caucasus. Now they are “watching” in Ukraine. During both military campaigns in Chechnya, the United States provided support to illegal armed groups with both material and human resources.

Bloody trail of mercenaries During the two Chechen wars, mercenaries from 52 foreign countries and almost all regions of the world operated in the North Caucasus. This was stated in 2005, after the end of the active phase of hostilities, by FSB Major General Ilya Shabalkin, who at that time held the position of deputy head of the Regional Operational Headquarters (the structure that coordinated the actions of all Russian security forces in the North Caucasus). “The basis for asserting this is provided by an analysis of the existing operational information,” the general said then. At the same time, the United States was named among the countries whose “envoys” most actively showed themselves in battles on the side of gangs. Also, according to the deputy head of the Regional Headquarters, his bloody trail in Chechnya were left by mercenaries with passports of Canada, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and in addition - persons living in Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia...According to the assistant to the President of Russia (in 2000-2008 d.) Sergei Yastrzhembsky, by the beginning of the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus, the number of mercenaries from near and far abroad countries reached, according to various estimates, 800 people. As Yastrzhembsky noted, the connection between the separatists and international Islamic terrorists was clearly established, which, according to the assistant to the head of state, became “one of the main factors influencing the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus and in the Chechen Republic in particular.” Accomplices: how US intelligence agencies collaborated with militants Vladimir Putin spoke about the fact that there were direct contacts between militants from the North Caucasus and US intelligence services in the documentary film “President” released this Sunday on the Russia 1 channel. Such connections, according to the head of state, were established by Russian special services. “Once, simply direct contacts were recorded between militants from the North Caucasus and representatives of the United States intelligence service in Azerbaijan,” the Russian leader gave an example. “There they really just helped, even with transport.” Vladimir Putin added that he informed the then-current American president about this, who “promised to look into it.” However, after some time, Washington made it clear that not only would it not punish those responsible for what happened, but it would also encourage such support for the militants with all its might. “Ten days later, our subordinates, the leaders of the FSB, received a letter from their colleagues from Washington: “We have maintained and will maintain relations with all opposition forces in Russia. And we believe that we have the right to do this and will continue to do so in the future,” said the President of Russia. The agreements are still in force According to media reports, over 100 foreign firms (including banking groups), most of which had offices in the USA and Europe, took part in providing material, financial and other assistance to terrorists in the North Caucasus. In the United States alone, about fifty organizations were collecting funds for North Caucasian extremists. Among them are the American Muslim Bar Association, the American Islamic center, American Muslim Council, Islamic Charitable Organization “Voice of Chechnya”, Islamic American Foundation “Zakat”, Islamic Global Relief, Benevolence International Foundation. In January 2003, the head of the fund was an American eastern origin Enaam Arnaut admitted during the investigation that his structure finances militants in Chechnya. It is interesting that before this, in October 2002, US Attorney General Ashcroft charged Arnaut with financing Osama bin Laden, but when the head of the fund said that the money was not going to bin Laden, but to Chechen terrorists, all charges were dropped. Purposeful propaganda and political Amina Network, Human Assistance Development International, and Islamic Information Server companies were involved in activities in the interests of Chechen separatists in the United States. And an organization such as Advantage Associates, Inc. still has an agreement concluded by Aslan Maskhadov with the “Ambassador of Ichkeria to the USA” Lema Osmurov, according to which the organization pledged to “put pressure on the US government in order to support the efforts of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria to winning independence and secession from Russia.” There is also information about direct contacts between representatives of the American leadership and Chechen separatists. Thus, according to some reports, Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives of the Congress, met with the so-called “Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ichkeria” Akhmadov. Marked “made in USA” In 2005, former school system official Keefa Jayousi was arrested in Detroit. He was charged with assisting terrorists, conspiring to commit murder and kidnapping outside the United States, and recruiting Islamic militants to fight in Chechnya, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia. As the American intelligence services themselves established, funds collected by Jayousi in the United States through the charitable Islamic society Global Relief Foundation were transferred to militants in Chechnya. In 1995 and 1996, Jayousi recruited at least two people for militant groups in Chechnya, and also organized the sending of equipment to the Chechen field commanders. By the way, back in the 1990s, Shamil Basayev and his bandits received US Army uniforms, as well as night vision binoculars and satellite phones marked “made in USA.” This property was brought to the militants of the Ichkerian army in caravans from Turkey through the south of Chechnya and Dagestan. The Global Relief Foundation also transferred money and medical equipment to the militants. Volunteers were also recruited through the website of this structure. The foundation took upon itself the processing of Russian entry documents and accommodation in the territory of Ingushetia, neighboring Chechnya. By the way, according to the foundation’s website, it spent over $1.3 million on servicing its “Caucasian” projects in 2000-2001 alone. Khattab and his American past The most famous international terrorist who operated in Chechnya in the 1990-2000s also had a dark past associated with his stay in the United States. Khattab, aka Amir ibn al-Khattab, aka Samer Saleh al-Suwailem, aka Habib Abd al-Rahman. This bandit is responsible for dozens of bloody terrorist attacks and hundreds of ruined lives of Russian military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians. It is known that in 1987, relatives from Jordan sent him to study in New York. He was supposed to study at college, but during his stay in the United States, Khattab was infected with completely different ideas. He went to Afghanistan, where he took an active part in the fighting against Soviet troops. He fought in Jalalabad, in Kabul, and was seriously wounded. Then Khattab’s bloody trail was noticed in Nagorno-Karabakh, Iraq, Tajikistan. The American college dropout took part in attacks on Russian border guards, including the 12th outpost of the Moscow border detachment, which killed 25 Russian servicemen. Since January 1995 - in the North Caucasus. He is a trained terrorist, proficient in mine-explosive “craft” and all types of small arms. By the way, he was living in the USA at that time Native sister, which, according to the commander of the United Group of Russian Forces in the North Caucasus, Colonel General Gennady Troshev, owned a weapons store. Khattab personally trained militants, created camps, and arranged for their foreign financing. In August and September 1999, he, together with Basayev, organized and led raids into Dagestan. And all this time, it was Khattab who acted as a link between the militants in Chechnya and international terrorist structures. In April 2002, he was killed, and the poison was given to him by his own assistant, who was later also killed by militants. "Crazy American" no longer kills Russian soldiers US citizen Aukai Collins also fought in Chechnya under Khattab’s leadership. As a child, he was involved in street gangs, and while serving time in San Diego, he converted to Islam. He fought in Chechnya in 1995-1996 and 1999, during one of the bandit attacks he lost his leg. Interestingly, my first trip to North Caucasus Collins committed this under the guise of an employee of an American humanitarian foundation: his documents were processed in the States by the same “Islamic humanitarians.” The mercenary got to Chechnya through Azerbaijan along with a load of body armor and night vision devices. He was called a “crazy American”: even Chechen militants His aggressiveness frightened me. A US citizen fought evilly and cruelly on Russian soil, personally killing Russian soldiers, which he later wrote about in the book “My Jihad,” where he described in detail many of his atrocities. Russian law enforcement agencies are seeking the extradition of this thug, but all requests remain unsuccessful. According to some reports, Collins is a full-time informant for US intelligence agencies and has collaborated with the CIA and FBI. He also wrote about this in his book, although he left reviews about his “curators” mainly in a derogatory tone. Today, the former militant lives in Baltimore with his wife and four-year-old son. He is a quiet American: he does not drink or smoke, as the Koran prescribes... Where does the “lad” get his New York sadness?..“Wild geese” is what mercenaries are called all over the world. Their “nesting sites” are areas of armed conflicts all over the planet. Recently, a representative of the Donetsk Ministry of Defense People's Republic Eduard Basurin reported that in the area of ​​the village of Volnovakha there could be up to 70 mercenaries from the American private military company Academi (previously this armed formation was called Blackwater). As is known, Volnovakha is controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. There is information from other sources that Americans are participating in the fighting on Kyiv’s side. Thus, German political scientist Michael Lüders confirmed the information about the presence of mercenaries from a private company in the conflict area in the South-East of Ukraine American army Academi, however, he estimates their number to be no less than 500 “bayonets”. According to Lueders, the presence of American mercenaries in the conflict zone is “a dangerous development of the situation, which does not exclude the possibility of escalation.” Last December, Academi announced its readiness to begin training a battalion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for urban battles. And regarding the participation of US mercenaries from another private military company, Greystone, in the Ukrainian conflict, even the Russian Foreign Ministry was forced to make a statement. By the way, Greystone's website states that "they can provide the best military from around the world" who can "operate anywhere." At the same time, the White House denies information about the presence of American mercenaries in Ukraine.

Currently full swing New combat manuals are being developed for the Russian Armed Forces. In this regard, I would like to bring up for discussion a rather interesting document that came into my hands during a business trip to the Chechen Republic. This is a letter from a mercenary fighter who fought in Chechnya. He addresses not just anyone, but the general of the Russian Army. Of course, some thoughts expressed by a former member of illegal armed groups can be questioned. But on the whole he is right. We do not always take into account the experience of combat operations and continue to suffer losses. It's a pity. Perhaps this letter, while new combat regulations have not yet been approved, will help some commanders avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The letter is published with virtually no editing. Only spelling errors have been corrected.
- Citizen General! I can say that I am a former fighter. But first of all, I am a former SA senior sergeant who was thrown onto the battlefield in the DRA a few weeks before (as I later learned) the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.
So, with three fractures of limbs, ribs, and a severe concussion, at the age of 27 I became a gray-haired Muslim. I was “sheltered” by a Khazarian who once lived in the USSR and knew a little Russian. He walked me out. When I began to understand Pashto a little, I learned that the war in Afghanistan was over, the USSR was gone, and so on.
Soon I became a member of his family, but this did not last long. With the death of Najib, everything changed. First, my father-in-law did not return from a trip to Pakistan. By that time we had moved from near Kandahar to Kunduz. And when I returned to my house with spare parts at night, the neighbor’s boy told me in confidence that they were asking and looking for me. Two days later the Taliban took me too. So I became a “voluntary” mercenary fighter.
There was a war in Chechnya - the first. People like me, Arab-Chechens, began to be trained for jihad in Chechnya. They were prepared in camps near Mazar-i-Sharif, then sent to Kandahar. Among us there were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, many Jordanians, and so on.
After preparation last instruction given by NATO instructors. They transferred us to Turkey, where there are camps for transfer, rest and treatment of “Chechens”. They said that highly qualified doctors were also former Soviet citizens.
We were transported across the state border by rail. They drove us non-stop across Georgia. There we were given Russian passports. In Georgia we were treated like heroes. We went through acclimatization, but then the first war in Chechnya ended.
They continued to prepare us. It started in the camp combat training- mountain. Then they transported weapons to Chechnya - through Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Argun Gorge, the Pankisi Gorge and through Ingushetia.
Soon they started talking about a new war. Europe and the USA gave the go-ahead and guaranteed political support. The Chechens should have started. The Ingush were ready to support them. The final preparations began - studying the region, entering it, bases, warehouses (we did many of them ourselves), issued uniforms, satellite phones. The Chechen-NATO command wanted to forestall events. They were afraid that before the start of hostilities the borders with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ingushetia and Dagestan would be closed. The strike was expected along the Terek. Department of the plain part. Destruction enveloping the outer ring and the inner mesh - with a general seizure, a general search of buildings, farmsteads, etc. But no one did this. Then they expected that, having narrowed the outer ring along the Terek with captured crossings, dividing three directions along the ridges, the Russian Federation would move along the gorges to the already tightly closed border. But that didn't happen either. Apparently, our generals, excuse the freethinking, neither in the DRA nor in Chechnya have ever learned to fight in the mountains, especially not in open battle, but with gangs that know the terrain well, are well armed, and most importantly, knowledgeable. Observation and reconnaissance are carried out by absolutely everyone - women, children, who are ready to die for the praise of a Wahhabi - he is a horseman!!!
Even on the way to Chechnya, I decided that at the slightest opportunity I would return home. I took almost all my savings out of Afghanistan and hoped that 11 thousand dollars would be enough for me.
Back in Georgia, I was appointed assistant field commander. With the beginning of the second war, our group was first abandoned near Gudermes, then we entered Shali. Many of the gang were locals. They received money for the fight and went home. You search, and he sits, waits for a signal, and bargains for food from the rear for money received in battle - dry rations, stewed meat, and sometimes ammunition “for self-defense from bandits.”
I was in battles, but I didn’t kill. Mostly he carried out the wounded and dead. After one battle they tried to pursue us, and then he slapped the Arab cashier, and before dawn he left through the Kharami to Shamilka. Then for 250 bucks he sailed to Kazakhstan, then moved to Bishkek. Called himself a refugee. After working a little, I settled in and went to Alma-Ata. My colleagues lived there, and I hoped to find them. I even met Afghans, they helped me.
This is all good, but the main thing is about the tactics of both sides:
1. The bandits know the tactics of the Soviet army well, starting with the Benderaites. NATO analysts studied it, summarized it and gave us instructions back at the bases. They know and directly say that “the Russians do not study or take these issues into account,” but it’s a pity, it’s very bad.
2. The bandits know that the Russian Army is not prepared for night operations. Neither soldiers nor officers are trained to operate at night, and there is no material support. During the first war, entire gangs of 200-300 people passed through the battle formations. They know that the Russian Army does not have PSNR (ground reconnaissance radars), no night vision devices, or silent firing devices. And if so, the bandits carry out all their attacks and prepare them at night - the Russians sleep. During the day, bandits carry out forays only if they are well prepared and for sure, but otherwise they are serving time, resting, collecting information is carried out, as I already said, by children and women, especially from among the “victims,” that is, those whose husband, brother, son, etc. have already been killed. etc.
These children are undergoing intense ideological indoctrination, after which they may even commit self-sacrifice (jihad, ghazavat). And the ambushes come out at dawn. At the appointed time or on a signal - from the cache the weapon and forward. They put up “beacons” - they stand on the road or on a high-rise, from where everything can be seen. How our troops appeared and left is a signal. Almost all field commanders have satellite radio stations. Data received from NATO bases in Turkey from satellites is immediately transmitted to field workers, and they know when which column went where, what is being done in the places of deployment. Indicate the direction of exit from the battle, etc. All movements are controlled. As the instructors said, the Russians do not carry out radio control and direction finding, and Yeltsin “helped” them with this by destroying the KGB.
3. Why the huge losses of our troops on the march? Because you transport living corpses in a car, that is, under an awning. Remove awnings from vehicles in combat areas. Turn the fighters to face the enemy. Seat people facing the board, benches in the middle. The weapon is at the ready, and not like firewood, at random. The bandits' tactics are an ambush with a two-echelon arrangement: the 1st echelon opens fire first. In
The 2nd are snipers. Having killed the airborne ones, they blocked the exit, and no one will get out from under the awning, but if they try, they finish off the 1st echelon. Under the awning, people, as if in a bag, do not see who is shooting and from where. And they themselves cannot shoot. By the time we turn around, we’re ready.
Next: the first echelon shoots one at a time: one shoots, the second reloads - continuous fire is created and the effect of “many bandits”, etc. As a rule, this spreads fear and panic. As soon as the ammunition, 2-3 magazines, is consumed, the 1st echelon retreats, carries out the dead and wounded, and the 2nd echelon finishes off and covers the retreat. Therefore, it seems that there were many militants, and before they knew it, there were no bandits, and if there were, then they were 70-100 meters away, and there was not a single corpse on the battlefield.
In each echelon, carriers are appointed, who do not shoot so much as monitor the battle and immediately pull out the wounded and dead. They appoint strong men. And if they had pursued the gang after the battle, there would have been corpses, and the gang would not have left. But sometimes there is no one left to pursue. Everyone is resting in the back under the awning. That's all the tactics.
4. Taking hostages and prisoners. There are instructions for this too. It says to watch out for "wet chicken." This is what bazaar lovers are called. Since the rear doesn’t work, take a careless, careless scoundrel with a weapon “by the back” and back to the market, get lost in the crowd. And they were like that. This was the same in Afghanistan. Here is your experience, father commanders.
5. Command error - and the bandits were afraid of it. It is necessary to immediately conduct a population census along with the “cleansing operations.” We came to the village and wrote down in each house how many were where, and along the way, through the remains of documents in the administrations and through neighbors, it was necessary to clarify the actual situation in each yard. Control - the police or the same troops came to the village and checked - there were no men. Here is a list of a ready-made gang. New ones have arrived - who are you, “brothers”, and where will you be from? Inspecting them and searching the house - where did he hide the gun?!
Any departure and arrival is through registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He joined the gang - fuck him! Wait - come - spanked. To do this, it was necessary to assign to each unit settlements and establish control over any movement, especially at night with night vision devices, and systematic shooting of bandits going out to gather. No one else will come out at night, no one will come from the gang.
Half of the bandits feed themselves at home on this account, so less problems with food. The rest is decided by our rear people, selling products on the sly. And if there was a zone of responsibility, the army commander, the military and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would control the situation through mutual efforts, and the appearance of any new one would be taken away (look for Khattab, Basayev and others from their wives, they are there in winter).
And again, don't disperse the gangs. You plant them like seedlings in a garden. Example: in the gang I was in, we were once told to urgently go out and destroy a convoy. But the informants gave inaccurate information (the observer had a walkie-talkie about the exit of the first cars, he reported and left, the rest were delayed, apparently). So the battalion hit the gang, “scattered” and “defeated”. Yeah! Each subgroup always has the task of retreating to the general gathering area of ​​the gang. And if they chased us, there was almost “0” ammunition - they fired. You need to drag two wounded and a dead man. If they hadn’t gone far, of course they would have abandoned everyone and then, perhaps, they would have left.
And so in Ingushetia, in a former sanatorium, the wounded were treated - and back into service. This is the result of “dispersion” - sowing - after 1 month the gang, rested, is assembled. This is why warlords remain alive and elusive for so long. There would be groups rapid response, with dogs, in a helicopter, and urgently to the area of ​​​​the collision with the support of the “beaten” - that is, those who were fired upon, and in pursuit. There are none.

A blue-eyed bearded guy in a camouflage jacket gives an interview. The image is blurry, the recording is rare, it is 20 years old. But on his hat you can see a green bandage with the inscription “Ukraine”. His brothers in arms wear the same ones. But their armbands say “Allahu Akbar.”

- What are you doing here? - the journalist asks him.

“We are stealing the freedom of the Chechen-Ukrainian people against Moscow aggression,” the guy answers confidently.

-Are there many of your people here?

“200 guys,” the fighter switches to Russian.

- How do they fight?

- As the others. Like the Chechens, so are the Ukrainians. They fight well. And when we attack Moscow, we will fight even better,” it’s not easy for him to speak perfect Russian. It is obvious that his native language is Ukrainian.

This person is Alexander Muzychko, aka Sashko Bily, a Rivne activist of the right-wing radical organization UNA-UNSO, who was killed by Kyiv special forces in March 2014 during his arrest. In the video, he is a little over 30, he is the commander of the Viking detachment, which fights against the Russian army during the first Chechen war.

If he had remained alive, he would probably have become one of the main defendants in the “large-scale criminal case about Ukrainian militants,” which began to be considered in the Grozny court this week.

According to Russian human rights activists, it was discovered back in 2001, but the investigation was not very active. Events on the Maidan, the situation in Crimea and the war in Donbass contributed to the fact that Russian investigators have shaken off the dust from the yellowed pages.

In the dock were the famous Unsovite, ally of Dmitry Yarosh Nikolai Karpyuk and journalist Stanislav Klykh. Karpyuk is accused of creating a gang of mercenaries to travel to Chechnya and killing Russian soldiers during the 1994-1995 war. Klykh is charged with participation in a gang and torture (Article 209 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - leadership and participation in a gang and Article 102 - murder of two or more military personnel).

For more than a year, neither lawyers nor human rights activists could approach both prisoners. Klykh has already stated that he gave all his confessions under torture.

Companions of those arrested unanimously assure that neither Karpyuk nor Klykh were in Chechnya during the war. But recently Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Tyagnibok brothers and Dmitry Yarosh, who, according to Investigative Committee Russian Federation also fought on the side of Chechen militants. Their names were given to the case " Caucasian captives"political coloring.

In any case, Sashko Bily is far from the only Ukrainian who has made his mark in Chechnya. What were the Ukrainians looking for in that war? What do you remember about your comrades and enemies? Many participants in those events for a long time hid the details of their stay in Chechnya. While in Grozny, the Ukrainians tried not to be included in photographs and videos.

And amateur photographs were carefully stored in their photo archives. Excessive attention could cost them their freedom in Ukraine, where Article 447 “Mercenarism” appeared in the Criminal Code. In connection with a criminal case in Russia, some of them, without denying “ Chechen stage” in their lives, refuse to share memories for fear of persecution. Those who agreed often avoid tough questions. But still, they shared their memories with journalists from the Reporter publication.

Road

Evgeny Diky, then a journalist and head of the humanitarian mission of the Ukrainian human rights committee “Helsinki-90,” recalls. He arrived in Grozny at the beginning of 1995. He accompanied a cargo of medicines, collected information as a journalist and human rights activist at the front and in the rear. He left Chechnya in April 1996, when the active phase of the war ended.

— The desire to go to Chechnya was spontaneous. When Ukraine learned that Russia did not recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and was going to suppress the rebellion, those who wanted to go had only one question: who would be better at negotiating the transfer? The core of the “Ukrainian corps” is several dozen people with combat experience in Afghanistan, Transnistria, and Abkhazia. Ours reached the border of Dagestan with Chechnya. Transfer is a big word. In fact, they could drive through a mountain river at night on a tractor. This was done brazenly - there was a bridge a kilometer away that was controlled by the Russians.

Among the Ukrainians there were those who made themselves newspaper employee IDs, which were a good screen. They really made good reports without letting go of the machine gun.

“The day before New Year’s 1995, we arrived in Baku and met with Chechen friends there,” recalls Igor Mazur (call sign Topol), head of the Kyiv branch of UNA-UNSO, one of the defendants in the Russian criminal case. — At that time, tank columns were already heading towards Grozny, and it was possible to get to Chechnya through Dagestan. We drove through normally, but several of our guys were taken from Grozny by their parents. When they found out where their sons were going, they came to the leadership of UNA-UNSO and demanded that the children be returned back.

During the war, the Chechens found themselves under an information blockade. Ukrainian journalists tried to break through it

Motive

The main motive for the Ukrainians’ trip to Chechnya was cited by the Russian media as money, which the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev allegedly generously gifted to foreign specialists. But not everything is so simple. Some Ukrainians already had military experience, first gained in Afghanistan. UNSO activists, in turn, polished it in Transnistria and Abkhazia.

- Just not most of people who passed through Chechnya fall under the definition of “mercenaries,” says Evgeniy Dikiy. “They received a handsome reward.” But the overwhelming majority were ordinary volunteers who fought for free. They received clothing and food allowances, like other soldiers. The Chechens did not throw money away. What's the point of paying for something that a local will do for free? And to get money, you had to have unique skills. For example, to be a sapper or a MANPADS operator.

There were certainly such people among Ukrainians. We are talking about military personnel who went through Afghanistan. Obviously, it was not only money or an idea that forced them to change one war to another. But rather a post-war syndrome.

Azerbaijani photographer Tagi Jafarov, who worked in Grozny during the first Chechen war, wrote about one of these Ukrainians in his memoirs:

“Victor, on the contrary, is silent. He is originally from Kharkov. Victor does not make noise, does not share his emotional impressions of the battle. He speaks quietly, taking his time. He is a professional man, Afghanistan has passed. There is a wife and children at home... And not a crest, a Russian.

- Vit, how did you get here? Also for money?

“No, money has nothing to do with it,” pause. I'm waiting for him to speak. - You see, we put so many of them in Afghanistan. Villages were swept to the ground and burned. For what? In the name of what? There are many of them on my conscience. This is where I atone for Afghan sins. Maybe I’ll get credit for it.”

UNSO activists never denied that they went to Chechnya because of ideological anti-imperial views. They saw that war through the prism of Ukrainian independence, obtained bloodlessly. For the same reason, the passionate Balts ended up in Chechnya.

“Then it seemed to us like this: in order not to have a front in Crimea, we need to keep it in the Caucasus,” recalls former head of UNA-UNSO Dmitry Korchinsky.

“It may be difficult to understand now, but many were emotionally inclined to say: “You can’t crush people with tanks because they wanted independence!” - says Wild. — Ukraine and the Baltic countries also chose independence. So now they will be pressured like this too? That’s why they went to help, fearing the return of the empire.

“Hundreds of our wounded soldiers received treatment in Ukraine,” recalls Musa Taipov, a member of the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. — They brought us humanitarian aid. And Ukrainian journalists broke through the information blockade, telling the world about the true events in the Russian-Chechen war. It was extremely difficult to get to us and then take out the footage.

300 Ukrainians

Data on how many Ukrainians went to Chechnya as fighters varies.

The representative of the ChRI government, Musa Taipov, speaks of two dozen people, four of whom died. One was captured.

According to Evgeniy Diky’s calculations, about 300 Ukrainians visited Chechnya during the war, 70 of whom passed through the Unsov detachment. One of the UNSO commanders Valery Bobrovich, who fought
in Abkhazia (he led the Argo detachment), gives a figure of 100 people.

“They treated the wounded, provided security, sent out humanitarian aid,” Dmytro Yarosh, whose patriotic organization “Trident” collaborated with Dzhokhar Dudayev, recalled in an interview with Hromadske. “I turned to Dudayev with a request to form a Ukrainian unit. But I received the answer: “Thank you, but we have fewer weapons than people willing.” That's why we didn't go.

Igor Mazur assures that he, like other Ukrainians, accompanied foreign journalists more than he fought.

“The journalists still trusted us, the Slavs, more than the Caucasians,” recalls Mazur.

“The wounded were transported through Georgia,” he says. — In Ukraine, besides ours, Chechens were also treated. Mostly they received assistance in Western Ukraine. This was done seemingly secretly, but it only seemed so. Everyone knew. Official position Ukraine was as follows: we categorically deny Ichkeria, have no contacts with them, condemn the participation of Ukrainians, and can give an article to mercenaries. In practice, there were no trials; no one was extradited to Russia.

Meeting

Evgeniy Dikiy recalls that in Chechnya any person of Slavic appearance raised a lot of questions. But as soon as they said that he was Ukrainian, he immediately became a dear guest.

“The Ukrainian passport was a universal pass,” says Diky. — The Chechens really appreciated the fact that Ukrainians were practically the only volunteers from non-Muslim countries who came to fight on their side. They understood that no one owed them anything, that coming here was the highest manifestation of friendship.

This same factor became the reason for hatred on the part of Russians.

“They could not understand why the Slavs turned against them, why they became traitors,” continues Evgeniy. “In order not to be captured by them, ours always had the last grenade with them.” They understood: if they were taken prisoner, there would be no trial.

And in order not to stand out among the Caucasians, Ukrainians grew beards. Following the example of the Chechens, green ribbons were tied to machine guns and uniforms.

Kharkov resident Oleg Chelnov (call sign Berkut) stood out more than others among the Ukrainians.
Among nationalists and participants in those events, he is considered an even more iconic figure than Sashko Bily. Both were awarded the highest award by Dzhokhar Dudayev - the Order of Honor of the Nation.

“He was not a member of the UNSO when he arrived in Chechnya,” recalls Igor Mazur. - But before this war, I went through hot spots, was a liquidator at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. I could never sit in one place: I wanted to figure out where the truth was and where the lies were.

There were legends about his dashing character in Chechnya.

When there were street battles and the Chechens and Russians were in the neighboring front doors, in this chaos and confusion Chelnov could fly up to the Russian paratroopers and shout: “Why are you still here? Behind me!"

“He was fair-haired, blue-eyed, dressed in a trophy uniform,” recalls Dikiy. - They believed him. And he brought these Russians to the Chechens, who then “packed” them. Chelnov also found out that many of the Russian military’s call signs have not changed since Afghanistan. He took advantage of it. He went on the air under the call sign of the commander and caused crossfire so that one battery “kneaded” the other.

Chelnov died in Grozny in 1996. Sashko Bily said in one of his interviews that
the government of Ichkeria named a street in honor of Oleg, and his daughter was given a lifelong allowance. Naturally, after the second Chechen war, these privileges for the Ukrainian family were eliminated. The street named after him, like the street named after Muzychko, no longer exists in Grozny.

A detachment of Unsovites arrived in Grozny in the winter of 1995. According to unofficial data, about 300 Ukrainians passed through Chechnya

Torture

In the Russian media, Sashko Bily appeared as the personal security guard of Dzhokhar Dudayev. He was portrayed as an extremely cruel person who practiced sophisticated torture on prisoners.

- His easy person you can’t name it,” recalls Dikiy. - Heavy character. A commander who does not spare himself, first of all, and then his soldiers. He didn’t give a damn about laws, but he didn’t give a damn about concepts. He did not torture prisoners. Moreover, it was an invaluable exchange fund. I can be a living witness to those events, I communicated with prisoners, including those who were with Bily.

“Bily was among the three dozen fighters who guarded the building of the Republican Committee,” says Dikiy. - But this is not Dudayev’s personal security. Moreover, Bily did not command her.

Ukrainian journalist Viktor Minyailo, who visited Chechnya twice during the 1994-1996 war, recalls how one of Chechnya’s military leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, wrote a note in which he addressed all his subordinates with the order to release any Ukrainian from captivity, no matter who he was.

“This concerned the Ukrainians fighting on the side of the federals,” says Minyailo. — Those who were born in Ukraine. They were indeed released unconditionally.

“The torture took place during the second Chechen war,” assures Musa Taipov. “But it was a different war - fierce and outside the rules. As for the first war, Ukrainian volunteers did not torture Russian soldiers.

“The brutality occurred as peaceful villages were bombed,” Dikiy recalls. “The secular Chechens, most of whom died in the first Chechen war, were replaced by “wolf cubs” - teenagers who grew up under bombs and listened to preachers instead of lessons. Their teenage cruelty
and low cultural level ultimately formed the image of a “Chechen bandit.”

Return

According to the recollections of the fighters, the UNSO detachment returned home in the spring of 1995, when the war turned from open to partisan.

Musa Taipov says that this was the desire of the Chechen military command.

“In the second Chechen war there were fewer Ukrainians—two to three dozen,” says Yevgeny Dikiy. “These are those who could not stand it and returned to the field commanders, under whose leadership they fought in the first Chechen war. Some of them already lived in Chechnya, having converted to Islam.

Members of the UNSO, recalling those days, say that their participation in the Chechen war, as well as their attitude
to them in Ukraine, was under the close attention of the SBU, which has not lost close ties with its Russian colleagues.

“Those who returned from Chechnya tried not to advertise their exploits,” recalls journalist Viktor Minyailo. — They were afraid of criminal liability.

And loud legal proceedings there really wasn't any on this matter. Although the Ukrainians who participated in the Georgian-Abkhaz war served four months behind bars on suspicion of mercenarism.

“We were released at the request of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze,” recalls the head of the Ukrainian Argo detachment, Valery Bobrovich. — He said that he would keep us, the heroes of Georgia, awarded state awards, in custody - disrespectful on the part of Ukraine.

The past is with us again

The participation of Ukrainians in wars in the post-Soviet space after Afghanistan has long been an irrelevant topic in most Ukrainian media. There was no widespread support or condemnation on television.

“This was interesting only to those who were aware of the events,” says political scientist Mikhail Pogrebinsky. “The special services didn’t pay much attention to this either.

“Ukraine was a “sleeping” country then,” adds political scientist Vadim Karasev. — We were more concerned then about the issue of Crimea, “bagism” — Yuri Meshkov at that time was a representative of the pro-Russian bloc “Russia”, served as president of the Republic of Crimea in 1994-1995. And for us, the situation then unfolded according to the separatist scenario.

History develops in a spiral. The ideas of the UNSO radicals about the coming war, which were laughed at in Ukraine 20 years ago, have become a reality. Ukraine and Russia are not officially at war, but battles are taking place on all fronts - informational, economic, for territories and for the souls of those who live on them.

The paradox is that at that time passionate Ukrainians supported the Chechens’ right to self-determination, although for the majority of the population television painted a different picture. Today Russia, in justifying Crimea and Donbass, talks about the people’s right to self-determination. Historical parallels suggest themselves. The counterattack of Chechen militants on Grozny during Operation Jihad ended with the retreat of Russian troops and huge losses (about 2 thousand people). This defeat can be compared with the Ilovaisk tragedy. In 1996, Russia was forced to sign the Khasavyurt agreements, which actually opened the way to the independence of Ichkeria. After Ilovaisk, a battle that changed the course of the military campaign, Ukraine signed the Minsk agreements, which are comparable in meaning to the agreements in Khasavyurt.

Russia returned to Chechnya a few years later, starting the flywheel of a bloody and destructive war. When exiting the Ukrainian crisis, we must not repeat the mistakes of the past.

MERCENARY

Jordanian Khalid al-Hayad had an affair in his country. A small company selling office equipment and a hairdressing salon provided good profits. In addition, the connections acquired while studying at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute helped open a branch in Ukraine. There, in Kyiv, he met resourceful guys from Chechnya. They helped establish close commercial relations with the relatives of Ruslan Gelayev. At that time, it seemed to Khalid that the Russians were oppressing a small, unfortunate people, trampling on ancient customs and destroying the Muslim faith. Without much hesitation, he accepted the offer to go to Chechnya, especially since the trip promised not only moral satisfaction for providing all possible assistance and spiritual support to the long-suffering Chechens, but also, in the Jordanian’s opinion, should have resulted in considerable profit - the militants were in dire need of satellite communications.

Khalid al-Khayad spent several months among the Chechen bandits. He fought with them, suffered from hunger and suffered hardships in the mountains, and left Grozny through minefields. A zealous Islamist, he was sure that every devout Muslim should fight Russia. However, after the defeat of Gelayev’s gang in the village of Komsomolskoye, Khalid decided to surrender to Russian troops. Voluntarily. After everything he saw in Chechnya, his beliefs changed radically.

Mercenaries, of course, are different. For most people, money is the main measure of life. But there are also convinced enemies of Russia, Russians, and Christians. The motivation here is political. Such are, for example, the Kosovo Albanians, who cannot forgive Russia for its sympathy for the Serbs. Most of them arrived in Chechnya before the start of the war, in the summer of 1999. Khattab established connections, and the guys from the Kosovo Liberation Army went to the North Caucasus - some through Azerbaijan, some through Georgia - to slaughter the Russians. Most of the Albanians have already been killed. So are the Taliban. They seem to be fighting here for faith, that is, they are killing Christians. But how they explain to themselves the aggression against Dagestan (almost entirely Muslim) is unknown. There are haters of everything Russian from among the Baltic states and Ukrainians. According to some reports, in December 1999 in Grozny, about 300 mercenaries from Ukraine were under the arms of bandits. Some of them fought in the first Chechen war. First of all, these are representatives of the extremely nationalist organization UNA-UNSO, which actively supplies live goods to the “Chechen front”.

“Lard in the trenches,” is what Russian soldiers in Chechnya call Ukrainian mercenaries. And our closest neighbors and blood brothers do not expect mercy from the “federals.” That's why they fight desperately. As a rule, they do not surrender. Firstly, legally they are not subject to amnesty (like citizens of another country). Secondly, every mercenary, in theory, is devoid of moral principles, since he fights only for money. Romance and thirst for adventure do not count here. The boys from Ukraine, unlike the Chechens, cannot say that they are defending their land and their families, the sovereignty of their republic and the honor of the mountaineers (despite the dubiousness of these arguments). They, Christians, cannot defend Islamic values ​​against the “aggression of Orthodoxy,” which is the ideological basis of the Wahhabis.

It is this betrayal of brothers by faith and blood that most irritates the Russian military. Moreover, there are many Ukrainians in the ranks of the federal army - soldiers, officers, and generals. And they serve heroically. However, even on the bandit side, Ukrainians fight to the last bullet. For example, female snipers from Poltava and Nikolaev acted desperately: they killed more than one Russian fighter with their rifles. They were tracked for a long time, hunted and eventually killed.

The Russians who are fighting in Chechnya against the “federals” stand apart. These are mostly criminals hiding in territory not controlled by the Russian authorities. By the will of fate, they were forced to take up arms and found themselves in the same trench with local “thugs.” There are also drug addicts among Russians who are addicted to the Chechen drug. Among them there are also former Russian military personnel who, for one reason or another, converted to Islam and fought on the side of the militants. Two of these, former servicemen of the internal troops from the Sofrinsky brigade, were recently sentenced by a military court to long terms of imprisonment.

However, the most surprising thing is that among the mercenaries there are also romances. A. Korchinsky, the former leader of UNA-UNSO, who has now fallen out with his comrades, wrote about them in his book of memoirs. At one time, the Una-Uns fought in Transnistria, in Abkhazia, in the first Chechen war, and are still fighting in the mountains of Chechnya. Many of them, when signing a contract, were guided more by a thirst for adventure than by a desire to make money. The former leader of UNA-UNSO recalls an incident when his squad, planning to fight on the side of the Abkhazians, ended up on the Georgian side. They stayed there. They shot at the Abkhazians and their allies solely due to ridiculous circumstances. By by and large, they didn’t care which side to fight on.

Before the second Chechen war the republic has essentially turned into an international gangster enclave. There you could meet mercenaries from all over the world. True, during the counter-terrorist operation, there was a noticeable decrease in mercenaries from foreign countries. Firstly, due to the active and successful actions of federal forces. There are fewer and fewer people from Arab countries, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Kosovo willing to go to Chechnya for slaughter. In addition, the appearance of Arabs and Taliban differs from the appearance of Chechens. And if the latter have the opportunity to disguise themselves as a local civilian, then no makeup will help an Arab, Taliban or Kosovo Albanian with a characteristic “face”, and even without knowledge of the Chechen and Russian languages. They have no escape routes. There are very few Arabs left in the ranks of the militants, mostly Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Latvians.

Secondly, the material incentive - the main motive for the actions of the mercenary - is clearly discredited by Basayev and Khattab and “swindlers” like them. Mercenaries were often paid in counterfeit dollars printed in Urus-Martan.

In addition, most contracts specifically stipulated that the militant receives money only if he proves the murder of a Russian soldier or officer. A separate fee for a damaged tank or armored personnel carrier. In general, the payment system is quite strict. Radio interceptions of militants' conversations indicate the complete disappointment of the mercenaries.

“We didn’t agree like that,” the foreigners reproach the Chechen field commanders, “you promised that there would be military equipment, but there is none, you said that the aviation would not attack, but it does not give us a break.

What did the militant commanders answer? They said that the Russians themselves deceived them - they fought too competently. But it is not in their power to revise the contract.

In general, in addition to the natural loss of mercenaries from the attacks of the “federals,” there was also an outflow of them from the trenches for financial reasons.

The mercenaries also became outcasts among the local population, that is, among the Chechens themselves, because they were engaged in robberies, taking everything in sight: both clothes and food. Some apartments and houses in Grozny were raided two or three times. Even field commanders tried to stop the theft: they only allowed people to take food and forbade people from entering locked doors. The mercenaries understood these orders in their own way: if they could not enter the doors, they climbed through the windows.

Among them, I repeat, there were many drug addicts. After federal troops captured Grozny in a tight ring, the potion became in great short supply, and its prices increased fabulously. Even under air and artillery fire, the mercenaries were ready to carry bags of loot to the market all day long, so that by the evening, having sold all their belongings, they would receive a syringe with a dose and relax.

No matter how the mercenaries hide in the caves of mountainous Chechnya, a terrible ending awaits them. This is not just my conclusion. This is also the opinion of the Jordanian Khalid I mentioned, who said at a press conference: “Those Muslims who are going to go to Chechnya to fight will only face death. The same fate will befall the Slavic mercenaries. If such volunteers are not killed by Chechen militants, they will inevitably come under fire from Russian aviation and artillery. It's better to sit at home and live a normal life. Those who still hold weapons actually don’t want to fight anymore. I just don't advise anyone to go here. In Chechnya, many people die in vain. A person here is like a commodity. People are stolen and trafficked here.”

This was said not by me, a Russian general, but by a former Wahhabi, an anti-Russian Muslim, a recent ally of the Basayevs and Khattabs.

Russian intelligence services have launched a large-scale campaign to identify connections between nationalist groups and North Caucasian separatists. It turns out that Russian nationalists and North Caucasian militants acted hand in hand for many years and continue to cooperate to this day. And some ethnic Russians, who fought on the side of the Chechens out of conviction, even became field commanders, accepting new Arabic names. For many years this information was considered closed, but today we have the opportunity to talk about the history of such strange cooperation and about today. The correspondent of “Our Version” looked into why ethnic Russians are fighting for the separation of the Caucasus from Russia?

During an operation carried out in June of this year by a special unit of federal forces in the high-mountainous Vedeno region of Chechnya, 10 militants were killed, one of whom was a native of Jordan, Yasir Amarat, better known in the Caucasus as “Amir Yasir.” Two of those who were killed with him were clearly of Slavic appearance. Rumors that Russians serve under Yasser have been circulating for a long time, and now confirmation of this has been found. In early July, militants from the detachment of field commander Muslim Gakaev came under fire not far from Shali - two more Slavs were killed. It is said that Gakaev's squad consists of approximately half ethnic Russians. Some of them converted to Islam, and some were Russian nationalists who came to the Caucasus to hone their fighting skills.

The fact that Slavs are fighting on the side of Chechen militants is far from news. During the first Chechen campaign, our soldiers had to fight both with a small group of Belarusian nationalists “Partyyot”, who came to Grozny to support Dudayev, and there, according to rumors, disappeared in full force, and with much more numerous and successful Ukrainian extremists from the UNA** -UNSO* – by the “Argo”, “Viking” and “Mriya” detachments. If you believe Andrei Shkil and Dmitry Korchinsky, in different time who led the Ukrainian nationalists, at least 10 thousand members of their organization crossed Chechnya. Many of them were awarded Ichkerian insignia for valor shown in battle. And almost every one of them had the opportunity to shoot at Russian soldiers. But these are Belarusians and Ukrainians, it is still possible to understand their motives, albeit with difficulty, and why do Russians go to the North Caucasus to shoot their own?

The activities carried out by the special services in the spring of this year as part of the fight against radical nationalist organizations revealed that every year at least a hundred young guys from Russia go to the Caucasus not at all to improve their health in local sanatoriums. The groups “White Society-88” and “BTO – Combat Terrorist Organization” from Nizhny Novgorod, “Volkssturm” from Yekaterinburg, “Iron Dockers” from Murmansk, “Detachment-88” from Moscow and many others organized forays into the North Caucasus with the aim of practicing skills in using small arms and bladed weapons in conditions as close as possible to combat. And for several years they did this completely unhindered. And our soldiers were only amazed when they found guys of clearly Slavic appearance among the killed Caucasian militants.

Of course, you can’t interrogate the dead. But they managed to get the living to talk: several members of the radical Caucasian nationalist organization “Black Hawks” caught in 2008–2009 gave confessions to the investigative authorities, in which, in particular, they mentioned that they had helped comrades from the opposite camp in establishing contacts with the leaders of the separatist underground in the Caucasus. And they named the main “bridge builder” between Caucasian and Russian nationalists as a native of Azerbaijan, Rasul Khalilov, who was killed last fall, who was a defendant in the case of an attack in the spring of 2008 by a group of nationalists from the Black Hawks organization on two Moscow students. Khalilov began to be dragged for interrogations, and those who interacted with him in the Russian nationalist movement began to fear: would he hand over their entire chain to law enforcement agencies?

On this topic

A resident of Great Britain, who fought in the American army in his youth, has been experiencing difficulties interacting with various services for several years because of his first and last name. As it turned out, a Chechen militant had previously used a similar pseudonym.

Khalilov was waylaid on Altufevskoye Highway and shot at him several times with a pistol. Most likely, the sins of others were blamed on the dead Khalilov, because it is difficult to believe that one person was involved in contacts with North Caucasian militants and organized trips for Russian nationalists. Nevertheless, it was after Khalilov’s accomplices “leaked” information to the special services that FSB officers began closely tracking the chain of Russian ultra-right - Caucasian separatists.

Another character has also been identified who could be involved in organizing the transfer of Russian nationalists from the Volkssturm and Detachment 88 to the North Caucasus for training with local separatists. This is a native of Dagestan, Ismail Kadiev, who was shot dead a year ago in Moscow. The fifty-year-old businessman, as it turned out, used the services of thugs from Russian radical organizations - they protected him outlets. The investigation is now establishing which of the militants Kadiev knew, but, according to preliminary data, it was he who paved the way for Russian extremists to join Muslim Gakaev’s detachment.

But the history of connections between Caucasian militants and Russian nationalists began much earlier than the activity in this field between Gakaev and Khalilov. In 1995, the first UNA-UNSO detachment - about 150 people - set out from Crimea to Georgia by sea, and from there through the Argun Gorge to Chechnya. The former commander of a detachment called "Argo" Soviet officer Valery Bobrovich, who had experience of the Vietnam War and took part in the Georgian-Abkhaz war on the side of the Georgians. The departure of Ukrainian nationalists to the Caucasus was organized by the Soviet dissident Anatoly Lupinos, who spent about a quarter of a century in the camps. Lupinos was friends with the leader of the Georgian paramilitary units “Mkhedrioni” Jaba Ioseliani - they sat together. He also knew Bobrovich - after his discharge from the army, he became seriously interested in nationalist ideas, and he and Lupinos found mutual friends. First, the Unsovites went to shoot in Georgia - this trip was organized by Ioseliani, Bobrovich and Lupinos, and then paved the way to Chechnya.

In Russia, the then plenipotentiary representative of the UNSO was the leader of the extremist People's National Party (PNP) Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky, who was also recently released from places not so remote, where he was imprisoned for extremist statements. Ivanov-Sukharevsky toyed with the idea of ​​gathering a Russian liberation army- from among the agitated soldiers of the federal forces - and, according to rumors, received a lot of money for this from the financiers of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Ivanov-Sukharevsky never realized his idea - there weren’t enough volunteers, but the 25 people he collected still went to Chechnya, where they fought against the Russian army as part of the Viking detachment of Ukrainian nationalists under the command of the head of the Rivne UNSO, the editor-in-chief of the nationalists’ printed organ – newspaper “Nasha Prava” (“Our Business”) by Alexander Muzychko. In Grozny, Muzychko’s detachment defended the headquarters of Aslan Maskhadov and became famous for the fact that, under the guise of refugees, its fighters penetrated the location of Russian units and, volunteering to become guides, led them into an ambush. Dudayev introduced Muzychko to highest award CRI - Order of the Hero of the Chechen Nation.

Muzychko did not have time to receive the order - Dudayev was liquidated, and Muzychko himself went to prison for participating in a gang war. Fighters from the NNP were also supposed to take part in Shamil Basayev’s campaign against Budennovsk: the operation was developed by the already mentioned ex-dissident Anatoly Lupinos, who became friends with Ivanov-Sukharevsky, but he again did not have enough volunteers.

The NPP is still campaigning on the Internet today - the party, which was denied re-registration, has many supporters. Some of these supporters travel to the North Caucasus “to shoot.” Printouts of materials from the NNP website were found on the dead Slavic-looking militants from Gakaev’s detachment, so establishing the relationship between Slavic and Caucasian extremists in this case is not at all difficult. It was much more difficult to trace the routes of penetration of Ivanov-Sukharevsky’s supporters into the Caucasus. But they tracked it. It turns out that they were helped by the same trusted people from the UNA-UNSO, and the dispatch was directly coordinated by the military assistant of the UNSO, Colonel Viktor Chechillo, by the way, until recently a career employee of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

“It’s easy to understand why Russian nationalists began to use the North Caucasus to hone their fighting skills,” the famous Ukrainian nationalist Dmitry Korchinsky, who once fought in Chechnya on the side of Dudayev, shared with the Our Version correspondent. – In the Caucasus, the situation is as comfortable as possible, military operations are ongoing, but the death toll is not always counted. It’s convenient, you can shoot, learn to wield a knife, but not on dummies or on your comrades, simulating a blow, but on living people. Such experience is worth a lot, which is why such a symbiosis appeared. On the other hand, it also plays into the hands of the Caucasians: we can say that not all Russians are against them, that there are also supporters of the independence of the Caucasus who fight for it with arms in hand. It is beneficial for both. This means that cooperation will not end tomorrow.”

* On November 17, 2014, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation recognized five Ukrainian nationalist organizations as extremist: the activities of the Right Sector, UNA-UNSO, UPA, Tryzub im. Stepan Bandera" and "Brotherhood" were banned in Russia. ** Ukrainian organization "Ukrainian National Assembly - Ukrainian People's Self-Defense" (UNA - UNSO). Recognized as extremist by decision Supreme Court Russian Federation dated 11/17/2014.