The first partisan detachment 1812. The partisan movement is “the cudgel of the people’s war”

The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the entire people. In the overwhelming majority of areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the “Great Army” not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. The next invasion of “foreigners” was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population as an invasion aimed at eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing atheism.

Speaking about the partisan movement in the War of 1812, it should be clarified that the partisans themselves were temporary detachments of military personnel of regular units and Cossacks, purposefully and organizedly created by the Russian command for actions in the rear and on enemy communications. And to describe the actions of spontaneously created self-defense units of villagers, the term “people's war” was introduced. Therefore, the popular movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an integral part of the more general theme “The People in the War of the Twelfth Year.”

Some authors associate the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 with the manifesto of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality, things were somewhat different.

Even before the start of the war, the lieutenant colonel drew up a note on the conduct of an active guerrilla war. In 1811, the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, “The Little War,” was published in Russian. However, the Russian army looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement “a disastrous system of fragmentation of the army.”

People's War

With the invasion of Napoleonic hordes, local residents initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from military operations. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was apparently drawn up on the basis of the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to conduct guerrilla warfare.

It arose spontaneously and represented the actions of small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to memoirs, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms.”

French foragers sent to villages for food faced more than just passive resistance. In the area of ​​Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers.

Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. It was here that popular resistance acquired the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would later be brought to justice. However, this process subsequently intensified.

Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812
Unknown artist. 1st quarter of the 19th century

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked French parties making their way towards them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychev detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French and established proper order and discipline. Sychevsky partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they killed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several horse and foot peasant detachments, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many peasant detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydova.

Another detachment, created from peasants, was also active in the Gzhatsk district, headed by a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. Chetvertakov’s detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, throughout the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the residents of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side.”

Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner. In Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.

The actions of peasant detachments became especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.

The battle between Mozhaisk peasants and French soldiers during and after the Battle of Borodino. Colorized engraving by an unknown author. 1830s

In Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsy district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev.

Don't hesitate! Let me come! Artist V.V. Vereshchagin. 1887-1895

The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the head of the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya, the head of the centenary Ivan Chushkin and the peasant, the Amerevskaya head Emelyan Vasiliev, gathered the peasants subordinate to them, and also invited the neighboring ones.”

The detachment consisted of about 6 thousand people in its ranks, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into armed struggle with enemy troops.

It should be noted that even women took part in forays against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes became overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is s, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed no less than the leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality was not the case.

French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna. A.G. Venetsianov. 1813

A gift for children in memory of the events of 1812. Cartoon from the series I.I. Terebeneva

Peasant and partisan detachments constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to their raids. They intercepted French correspondence, delivering especially valuable ones to the headquarters of the Russian army.

The actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” he wrote, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and take those taken prisoner to the army.”

Partisans in 1812. Artist B. Zvorykin. 1911

According to various estimates, over 15 thousand people were captured by peasant formations, the same number were exterminated, and significant supplies of fodder and weapons were destroyed.

In 1812. French prisoners. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873

During the war, many active participants in peasant groups were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward the people subordinate to the count: 23 people “in charge” - with insignia of the Military Order (St. George Crosses), and the other 27 people - with a special silver medal “For Love of the Fatherland” on the Vladimir Ribbon.

Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militia warriors, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases to supply the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to obtain additional communications that would have connected the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv.

Army partisan units

Army partisan detachments also played a major role in the Patriotic War of 1812. The idea of ​​their creation arose even before the Battle of Borodino, and was the result of an analysis of the actions of individual cavalry units, which, by force of circumstances, ended up in the enemy’s rear communications.

The first to begin partisan actions was a cavalry general who formed a “flying corps.” Later, on August 2, already M.B. Barclay de Tolly ordered the creation of a detachment under the command of a general. He led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​Dukhovshchina on the flanks and behind enemy lines. Its strength was 1,300 people.

Later, the main task of partisan detachments was formulated by M.I. Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is approaching, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, for the separated forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him, and for this, being Now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving up important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk.”

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the most mobile Cossack units and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people or more. They were tasked with sudden actions behind enemy lines to disrupt communications, destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons and suitable reserves, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to obtain food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the main headquarters of the Russian army. Interaction was organized between the commanders of the partisan detachments whenever possible.

The main advantage of partisan units was their mobility. They never stood in one place, constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift.

The partisan detachments of D.V. became widely known. Davydova, etc.

The personification of the entire partisan movement was the detachment of the commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov.

The tactics of his partisan detachment combined rapid maneuver and striking an enemy unprepared for battle. To ensure secrecy, the partisan detachment had to be almost constantly on the march.

The first successful actions encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to attack some enemy convoy walking along the main Smolensk road. On September 3 (15), 1812, a battle took place near Tsarev-Zaimishcha on the great Smolensk road, during which the partisans captured 119 soldiers and two officers. The partisans had 10 supply wagons and a wagon with ammunition at their disposal.

M.I. Kutuzov closely followed Davydov's brave actions and attached great importance to the expansion of the partisan struggle.

In addition to Davydov’s detachment, there were many other well-known and successfully operating partisan detachments. In the fall of 1812, they surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. The flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and a light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Thus, Kutuzov gave partisan warfare a wider scope.

Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy transports and convoys, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. Every day, the commander-in-chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, captured mail, protocols of interrogation of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which was reflected in the log of military operations.

On the Mozhaisk road he acted partisan detachment Captain A.S. Figner. Young, educated, fluent in French, German and Italian, he found himself in the fight against a foreign enemy, without fear of dying.

From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of General F.F. Wintzingerode, who, by sending small detachments to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

When the main forces of the Russian army were withdrawn, Kutuzov advanced from the Krasnaya Pakhra area to the Mozhaisk road to the area of ​​the village. Perkhushkovo, located 27 versts from Moscow, a detachment of Major General I.S. Dorokhov, consisting of three Cossack, hussar and dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery with the goal of “making an attack, trying to destroy enemy parks.” Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to strike the enemy.

The actions of Dorokhov’s detachment received approval in the main headquarters of the Russian army. On the first day alone, he managed to destroy 2 cavalry squadrons, 86 charging wagons, capture 11 officers and 450 privates, intercept 3 couriers, and recapture 6 pounds of church silver.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular detachments, and. The actions of these detachments were important.

Colonel N.D. Kudashev with two Cossack regiments was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolskoye, suddenly attacked the enemy, destroyed more than 100 people and captured 200.

Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A.N. Seslavina. He and a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and a squadron of the Sumy Hussar Regiment) were assigned to operate in the area of ​​the road from Borovsk to Moscow, coordinating their actions with the detachment of A.S. Figner.

A detachment of Colonel I.M. operated in the Mozhaisk area and to the south. Vadbolsky as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. He advanced to the village of Kubinsky to attack enemy convoys and drive his parties away, taking possession of the road to Ruza.

In addition, a detachment of a lieutenant colonel of 300 people was also sent to the Mozhaisk area. To the north, in the area of ​​Volokolamsk, a detachment of a colonel operated, near Ruza - a major, behind Klin towards the Yaroslavl highway - Cossack detachments of a military foreman, and near Voskresensk - major Figlev.

Thus, the army was surrounded by a continuous ring of partisan detachments, which prevented it from foraging in the vicinity of Moscow, as a result of which the enemy troops experienced a massive loss of horses and increased demoralization. This was one of the reasons for Napoleon leaving Moscow.

The partisans A.N. were again the first to learn about the beginning of the advance of French troops from the capital. Seslavina. At the same time, he, being in the forest near the village. Fomichev, personally saw Napoleon himself, which he immediately reported. Napoleon’s advance to the new Kaluga road and the covering detachments (a corps with the remnants of the vanguard) were immediately reported to M.I.’s main apartment. Kutuzov.

An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.

Kutuzov sent Dokhturov to Borovsk. However, already on the way, Dokhturov learned about the occupation of Borovsk by the French. Then he went to Maloyaroslavets to prevent the enemy from advancing to Kaluga. The main forces of the Russian army also began to arrive there.

After a 12-hour march, D.S. By the evening of October 11 (23), Dokhturov approached Spassky and united with the Cossacks. And already in the morning he entered into battle on the streets of Maloyaroslavets, after which the French had only one escape route left - Old Smolenskaya. And then A.N.’s report will be late. Seslavin, the French would have bypassed the Russian army at Maloyaroslavets, and what the further course of the war would have been then is unknown...

By this time, the partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them under the command of Major General I.S. Dorokhova, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, launched an assault on the city of Vereya on September 28 (October 10), 1812. The enemy took up arms only when the Russian partisans had already broken into the city. Vereya was liberated, and about 400 people of the Westphalian regiment with the banner were taken prisoner.

Monument to I.S. Dorokhov in Vereya. Sculptor S.S. Aleshin. 1957

Continuous exposure to the enemy was of great importance. From September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), according to various estimates, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand French were captured. Their losses increased every day due to the active actions of peasant and partisan detachments.

To ensure the transportation of ammunition, food and fodder, as well as road safety, the French command had to allocate significant forces. Taken together, all this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army, which worsened every day.

The battle near the village is rightfully considered a great success for the partisans. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya, which occurred on October 28 (November 9). In it, partisans D.V. Davydova, A.N. Seslavin and A.S. Figner, reinforced by regiments, a total of 3,280 people, attacked Augereau's brigade. After a stubborn battle, the entire brigade (2 thousand soldiers, 60 officers and Augereau himself) surrendered. This was the first time an entire enemy military unit surrendered.

The remaining partisan forces also continuously appeared on both sides of the road and harassed the French vanguard with their shots. Davydov's detachment, like the detachments of other commanders, always followed on the heels of the enemy army. The colonel, following on the right flank of the Napoleonic army, was ordered to go forward, warning the enemy and to raid individual detachments when they stopped. A large partisan detachment was sent to Smolensk in order to destroy enemy stores, convoys and individual detachments. The Cossacks M.I. pursued the French from the rear. Platova.

No less energetically, partisan detachments were used to complete the campaign to expel Napoleonic army from Russia. Detachment A.P. Ozharovsky was supposed to capture the city of Mogilev, where large rear enemy warehouses were located. On November 12 (24), his cavalry broke into the city. And two days later the partisans D.V. Davydov interrupted communication between Orsha and Mogilev. Detachment A.N. Seslavin, together with the regular army, liberated the city of Borisov and, pursuing the enemy, approached the Berezina.

At the end of December, Davydov’s entire detachment, by order of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the army’s main forces as its advanced detachment.

The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and expelling the enemy from Russia.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

A war ends in victory when it has the contribution of every citizen who is able to resist the enemy. When studying the Napoleonic invasion of 1812, it is impossible to miss the partisan movement. Perhaps it did not develop as much as the underground of 1941-1945, but its united actions caused significant damage to Bonaparte’s motley army, collected from all over Europe.

Napoleon stubbornly walked towards Moscow following the retreating Russian army. Two corps sent to St. Petersburg got bogged down in sieges, and the French emperor was looking for another reason to strengthen his position. , he considered that the matter remained small, and even said to those close to him: “The company of 1812 is over.” However, Bonaparte did not take into account some details. His army found itself in the depths of a foreign country, supplies were getting worse, discipline was declining, and the soldiers began to loot. After this, the disobedience of the local population to the invaders, which had previously been episodic in nature, acquired the scale of a general uprising. Unharvested grain was rotting in the fields, attempts at trade deals were ignored, and it even got to the point where peasants burned their own food reserves and went into the forests so as not to give anything to the enemy. The partisan detachments, organized by the Russian command back in July, began to actively accept reinforcements. In addition to the actual combat forays, the partisans were good spies and repeatedly delivered very valuable information about the enemy to the army.

Units based on the regular army

The actions of army units are documented and known to many. Commanders F. F. Wintzingerode, A. S. Figner, A. N. Seslavin, from among the regular army officers, conducted many operations behind enemy lines. The most famous leader of these flying detachments was the dashing cavalryman Denis Davydov. Appointed after Borodino, he took their activities beyond the planned minor sabotage behind enemy lines. Initially, hussars and Cossacks were selected under Davydov’s command, but very soon they were diluted by representatives of the peasantry. The biggest success was the battle near Lyakhov, when, jointly with other partisan detachments, 2,000 Frenchmen led by General Augereau were captured. Napoleon gave a special order to hunt for the daring hussar commander, but no one managed to carry it out.

Civil uprising

Those villagers who did not want to leave their homes tried to defend their native villages on our own. Spontaneous self-defense units emerged. History has preserved many reliable names of the leaders of these associations. Among the first to distinguish themselves were the landowners brothers Leslie, who sent their peasants under the command of Major General A.I. Olenin. Residents of Bogorodsky district Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov received the Military Order insignia for their services. Ordinary soldiers Stepan Eremenko and Ermolai Chetverikov were presented with the same award and the rank of non-commissioned officer - both, independently of each other, managed to organize a real army of trained peasants in the Smolensk region. The story of Vasilisa Kozhina, who created a partisan detachment with the help of teenagers and women who remained in the village, spread widely. In addition to these leaders, thousands of their nameless subordinates contributed to the victory. But when

State educational institution

Education Center No. 000

Heroes - partisans Patriotic War 1812 D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner their role in the victory of Russia and the reflection of their names in the names of Moscow streets.

Students of grade 6 "A"

Degtyareva Anastasia

Grishchenko Valeria

Markosova Karina

Project leaders:

a history teacher

a history teacher

Ph.D. head Scientific and Information Department of the State Institution “Museum-Panorama “Battle of Borodino””

Moscow

Introduction

The Patriotic War of 1812 is one of the most striking events in Russian history. As the famous publicist and literary critic of the 19th century wrote. : “Every nation has its own history, and history has its own critical moments by which one can judge the strength and greatness of its spirit...” [Zaichenko[ In 1812, Russia showed the whole world the strength and greatness of its spirit and proved that it is impossible to defeat it , even striking to the very heart, capturing Moscow. From the first days of the war, the people rose up to fight the invaders; all classes of Russian society were united: nobles, peasants, commoners, clergy.

Having visited the Museum - the Battle of Borodino panorama, we wanted to learn more about the partisan heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. From the guide we learned that the partisan movement first arose during the Patriotic War of 1812. Kutuzov combined partisan warfare with the actions of the regular army; D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, and A. Figner played a major role in this.

Therefore, the choice of the topic of our project is not accidental. We turned to the head of the scientific and information department, Ph.D. State Institution "Museum-Panorama" Battle of Borodino" with a request to tell us about the partisan heroes and provide us with materials about the activities of partisan detachments.

The purpose of our research- show the need to create partisan detachments, the activities of their leaders D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, note their personal qualities and fully evaluate their contribution to the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.

In 2012 we will celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812. We became interested in how descendants paid tribute to the memory and honor and courage of the heroes who saved Russia in that terrible time.

Hence the theme of our project “Heroes - partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812 D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner - their role in the victory of Russia and the reflection of their names in the names of Moscow streets.”

Object of study are the activities of partisans in the Patriotic War.

Subject of research are the personalities of D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner and their activities in the Patriotic War of 1812.

We assume that without the action of the partisans, without their courage, heroism and dedication, the defeat of the Napoleonic army and its expulsion from Russia would not be possible.

Having studied literature, diaries, memoirs, letters and poems on this topic, we developed a research strategy and identified research objectives.

Tasks

1. Analyze the literature (essays, poems, stories, memoirs) and find out how partisan detachments acquired mass popularity and became widespread.

2. To study what ways and means the partisans acted to achieve their goals and victories in the war of 1812.

3. Study the biography and activities of D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner.

4. Name the character qualities of the partisan heroes (D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner), provide for discussion the appearance of the partisans, partisan detachments, show how necessary, difficult and heroic their work was.

5. Explore and visit memorable places in Moscow associated with the War of 1812.

6. Collect material for the school - military museum and speak to the students of the education center.

To solve these problems we used the following methods: definition of concepts, theoretical - analysis, synthesis, generalization, free interviewing, application of toponymic knowledge in the search for memorable places in Moscow.

The work was carried out in several stages:

First stage, organizational, visit to the Museum - Panorama "Battle of Borodino". Study planning. Finding sources of information (interviews, reading printed sources, viewing a map, finding Internet resources) to study. Determining in what form the result of the work can be presented. Distribution of responsibilities between team members.

Second phase, stating, selection required material. Interviewing (head of the scientific and information department, candidate of historical sciences, State Institution "Museum-Panorama" Battle of Borodino"). Studying the map of Moscow. Reading and analyzing information sources.

Third stage, formative, selection of necessary material, finding memorable places in Moscow related to the Patriotic War of 1812.

Fourth stage, control, report of each team member on the work done.

Fifth stage, implementation, creating a presentation, collecting material for the school - military museum and speaking to the students of the education center

Chapter 1

1.1 Basic concepts used in the work.

What is Guerrilla Warfare? How is it different from a conventional war? When and where did it appear? What are the goals and significance of Guerrilla Warfare? What is the difference between Guerrilla War and the Little War and the People's War? These questions appeared to us while studying the literature. In order to correctly understand and use these terms, we need to define their concepts. Using the encyclopedia “Patriotic War of 1812”: Encyclopedia. M., 2004., we learned that:

Guerrilla warfare

In the XVIII-XIX centuries. Guerrilla warfare was understood as the independent actions of small mobile army detachments on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. The purpose of the Guerrilla War was to disrupt the communication of enemy troops with each other and with the rear, with convoys, the destruction of supplies (shops) and rear military institutions, transports, reinforcements, as well as attacks on transit posts, the release of their prisoners, and the interception of couriers. The partisan detachments were entrusted with establishing communications between the separated parts of their army, initiating people's war behind enemy lines, obtaining information about the movement and size of the enemy army, as well as constantly disturbing the enemy in order to deprive him of the necessary rest and thereby lead him “to exhaustion and frustration.” Guerrilla warfare was seen as part small war, since the actions of the partisans did not lead to the defeat of the enemy, but only contributed to the achievement of this goal.

In the XVIII-XIX centuries. the concept of Small War denoted the actions of troops in small detachments, as opposed to the actions of large units and formations. The Small War included guarding one's own troops (service at outposts, guards, patrols, pickets, patrols, etc.) and actions by detachments (simple and enhanced reconnaissance, ambushes, attacks). Guerrilla warfare was carried out in the form of short-term raids by relatively strong “flying corps” or in the form of long-term “searches” of small partisan parties behind enemy lines.

Guerrilla actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Western Army, General. With permission, on August 25 (September 6), the lieutenant colonel’s party was sent out on a “search.”

The guerrilla war intensified in the fall of 1812, when the army stood near Tarutino. In September, a “flying corps” was sent to raid the Mozhaisk road. In September, a colonel’s party was sent to the enemy’s rear. September 23 (October 5) – captain’s party. September 26 (Oct 8) – colonel’s party, September 30 (Oct 12) – captain’s party.

Temporary army mobile detachments, created by the Russian command for short raids (“raids”, “expeditions”), were also called “small corps”, “detachments of light troops”. The “light corps” consisted of regular (light cavalry, dragoons, rangers, horse artillery) and irregular (Cossacks, Bashkirs, Kalmyks) troops. Average number: 2-3 thousand people. The actions of the “light corps” were a form of guerrilla warfare.

We learned that Guerrilla warfare refers to the independent actions of small mobile army units on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. We learned the goals of Guerrilla Warfare, that Guerrilla Warfare is part of a small war, that “flying corps” are temporary mobile units.

1.2 Biography of Denis Vasilyevich Davydov (1784 – 1839)

Nevstruev, 1998
Shmurzdyuk, 1998

1.3 Hero of the Partisans - A. Seslavin

Along with Denis Davydov, he is one of the most famous partisans of 1812. His name is inextricably linked with the events immediately preceding the transition of Russian troops to the offensive, which led to the death of Napoleonic army.

Only shortly before the Patriotic War, Seslavin was promoted to captain. Such modest advancement along the “ladder of ranks” was the result of a two-time break in military service. Having graduated from the Artillery and Engineering Cadet Corps in 1798, the best military educational institution At that time, Seslavin was released as a second lieutenant into the guards artillery, in which he served for 7 years, being promoted to the next rank for this, and at the beginning of 1805, “at the request of he resigned from service.” In the autumn of the same year, after the declaration of war with Napoleonic France, Seslavin returned to service and was assigned to the horse artillery.

He first took part in military action in the 1807 campaign in East Prussia. In the battle of Heilsberg he was seriously wounded and awarded a golden weapon for his bravery. Soon after the end of the war, he left the service for the second time and spent 3 years in retirement, recovering from the consequences of his wound.

In 1810, Seslavin returned to the army and fought against the Turks on the Danube. During the assault on Rushchuk, he walked at the head of one of the columns and, having already climbed the earthen rampart, was seriously wounded in his right hand. For his distinction in battles with the Turks, Seslavin was promoted to staff captain and soon afterwards to captain.

At the beginning of the Patriotic War, Seslavin was Barclay de Tolly's adjutant. Possessing good theoretical training, a broad military outlook and combat experience, he performed duties at the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly as a “quartermaster,” that is, an officer of the general staff. With units of the 1st Army, Seslavin took part in almost all the battles of the first period of the war - near Ostrovnaya, Smolensk, Valutina Mountain and others. In the battle near Shevardino he was wounded, but remained in service, participated in the Battle of Borodino and, among the most distinguished officers, was awarded the St. George Cross, 4th degree.

Soon after leaving Moscow, Seslavin received a “flying detachment” and began a partisan search, in which he fully demonstrated his brilliant military talents. His detachment, like other partisan detachments, attacked enemy transports, destroyed or captured parties of foragers and marauders. But Seslavin considered his main task to be tireless monitoring of the movements of large formations of the enemy army, believing that this reconnaissance activity could most contribute to the success of the operations of the main forces of the Russian army. It was these actions that glorified his name.

Having made the decision in Tarutino to unleash a “small war” and surround the Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, Kutuzov clearly organized their actions, allocating a certain area to each detachment. Thus, Denis Davydov was ordered to act between Mozhaisk and Vyazma, Dorokhov - in the Vereya - Gzhatsk area, Efremov - on the Ryazan road, Kudashev - on Tula, Seslavin and Fonvizin (the future Decembrist) - between Smolensk and Kaluga roads.

On October 7, the day after the battle of Murat's corps near Tarutino, Napoleon gave the order to abandon Moscow, intending to go to Smolensk through Kaluga and Yelnya. However, trying to preserve the morale of his army and at the same time mislead Kutuzov, Napoleon set out from Moscow along the old Kaluga road in the direction of Tarutin, thus giving his movement an “offensive character.” Halfway to Tarutino, he unexpectedly ordered his army to turn right at Krasnaya Pakhra, went out along the country roads onto the New Kaluga Road and moved along it to the south, to Maloyaroslavets, trying to bypass the main forces of the Russian army. Ney's corps at first continued to move along the Old Kaluga Road to Tarutino and linked up with Murat's troops. According to Napoleon's calculations, this was supposed to disorient Kutuzov and give him the impression that the entire Napoleonic army was going to Tarutin with the intention of imposing a general battle on the Russian army.

On October 10, Seslavin discovered the main forces of the French army near the village of Fominskoye and, having notified the command about this, gave the Russian troops the opportunity to forestall the enemy at Maloyaroslavets and block his path to Kaluga. Seslavin himself described this most important episode of his military activity as follows: “I was standing on a tree when I discovered the movement of the French army, which was stretching at my feet, where Napoleon himself was in a carriage. Several people (French) separated from the edge of the forest and the road, were captured and delivered to His Serene Highness, as proof of such an important discovery for Russia, deciding the fate of the Fatherland, Europe and Napoleon himself... I found General Dokhturov in Aristov by accident, not knowing at all about his stay there; I rushed to Kutuzov in Tarutino. Having handed over the prisoners to be presented to His Serene Highness, I went back to the detachment to observe Napoleon’s movements more closely.”

On the night of October 11, Major Bolgovskoy, sent by Dokhturov, notified Kutuzov about Seslavin’s “discovery.” Everyone remembers from “War and Peace” the meeting between Kutuzov and the messenger sent by Dokhturov (in the Bolkhovitinov novel), described by Tolstoy based on Bolgovsky’s memoirs.

For the next month and a half, Seslavin acted with his detachment with exceptional courage and energy, fully justifying the description given to him by one of the participants in the Patriotic War as an officer of “tested courage and zeal, extraordinary enterprise.” So, on October 22, near Vyazma, Seslavin, galloping between the enemy columns, discovered the beginning of their retreat and let the Russian troops know about it, and he himself and the Pernovsky regiment burst into the city. On October 28, near Lyakhov, together with Denis Davydov and Orlov-Denisov, he captured the brigade of General Augereau, for which he was promoted to colonel; together with another famous partisan, Figner, he recaptured from the French a transport with valuables looted in Moscow. On November 16, Seslavin broke into Borisov with his detachment, captured 3,000 prisoners, and established contact between the troops of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. Finally, on November 27, he was the first to attack French troops in Vilna and was seriously wounded.

In December 1812, Seslavin was appointed commander of the Sumy Hussar Regiment. In the autumn of 1813 and 1814, he commanded the advanced detachments of the Allied army and took part in the battles of Leipzig and Ferchampenoise; for military distinction he was promoted to major general.

Seslavin, according to him, took part “in 74 military battles” and was wounded 9 times. Intense combat service and severe wounds affected his health and mental balance. At the end of hostilities, he received a long leave for treatment abroad, visited France, Italy, Switzerland, where he walked along the path of Suvorov - through Saint Gotthard and the Devil's Bridge, was treated on the waters, but his health did not improve. In 1820, he left the service and retired to his small Tver estate, Esemovo, where he lived alone, without meeting any of the neighboring landowners, for more than 30 years.

Seslavin was distinguished by exceptional courage and energy, his courage fully justifying the description given to him by one of the participants in the Patriotic War, as an officer of “tested courage and zeal, extraordinary enterprise.” (Alexander Nikitich was a deeply educated person, interested in various sciences. After retiring, he wrote memoirs of which only fragments have survived. This man was undeservedly forgotten by his contemporaries, but deserves memory and study by his descendants.

Nevstruev, 1998
Shmurzdyuk, 1998

1.4 Hero of the Partisans - A. Figner

Famous partisan of the Patriotic War, descendant of an ancient German family that went to Russia under Peter I, b. in 1787, died on October 1, 1813. Figner’s grandfather, Baron Figner von Rutmersbach, lived in Livonia, and his father, Samuil Samuilovich, having begun his service with a private rank, reached the rank of staff officer, was appointed director of the state-owned crystal factory near St. Petersburg and soon after that, renamed state councilors, he was appointed in 1809 as vice-governor of the Pskov province (died July 8, 1811). Alexander Figner, having successfully completed the course in the 2nd Cadet Corps, was released on April 13, 1805 as a second lieutenant in the 6th Artillery Regiment and in the same year was sent to the Anglo-Russian expedition to the Mediterranean Sea. Here he found an opportunity to be in Italy and lived for several months in Milan, diligently studying the Italian language, with a thorough knowledge of which he was subsequently able to provide so many services to his fatherland. Upon returning to Russia, on January 17, 1807, Figner was promoted to lieutenant, and on March 16 he was transferred to the 13th artillery brigade. With the beginning of the Turkish campaign in 1810, he entered the Moldavian army, participated with the detachment of General Zass in the capture of the Turtukai fortress on May 19 and from June 14 to September 15 in the blockade and capitulation of the Rushchuk fortress by the troops of the gr. Kamensky. In a number of cases near Rushchuk, Figner managed to show excellent courage and bravery. Commanding 8 guns in the nearest flying glanders during the besieging of the fortress, he was seriously wounded in the chest while repelling one of the enemy’s attacks, but did not leave the formation, and soon volunteered for a new feat. When gr. Kamensky decided to storm Ruschuk, Figner volunteered to measure the depth of the fortress moat and did it with courage that amazed the Turks themselves. The assault on July 22 failed, but Figner, who brilliantly participated in it, was awarded the Order of St. George, removed by the commander-in-chief from the artillery general Sivers killed on the glacis of the fortress, and on December 8, 1810, he was honored to receive a personal All-Merciful Rescript. In 1811, Figner returned to his homeland to meet with his father and here he married the daughter of a Pskov landowner, retired state councilor Bibikov, Olga Mikhailovna Bibikova. On December 29, 1811, he was promoted to staff captain, with a transfer to the 11th artillery brigade, and soon received command of the same brigade of a light company. The Patriotic War again called Figner into combat. His first feat in this war was the courageous defense by fire of the guns of the left flank of the Russian troops in the case of the river. Stragani; here, having stopped the riflemen who had been overthrown by the French, he, at their head, recaptured one of his company’s guns from the enemy, for which the commander-in-chief personally congratulated Figner with the rank of captain. With the retreat of Russian troops through Moscow to Tarutino, Figner’s combat activity changed: he handed over command of the company to its senior officer, having recently entered the field of partisan operations. According to a secret order from Kutuzov, dressed as a peasant, Figner, accompanied by several Cossacks, went to Moscow, which was already occupied by the French. Figner failed to carry out his secret intention - to somehow get to Napoleon and kill him, but nevertheless his stay in Moscow was a true horror for the French. Having formed an armed party from the inhabitants remaining in the city, he made ambushes with it, exterminated lonely enemies, and after his night attacks, many corpses of killed French were found every morning. His actions instilled panic in the enemy. The French tried in vain to find the brave and secretive avenger: Figner was elusive. Knowing the languages ​​French, German, Italian and Polish perfectly, he, dressed in all sorts of costumes, wandered during the day among the soldiers of the Napoleonic army of different tribes and listened to their conversations, and at nightfall he ordered his daredevils to the death of the enemy he hated. At the same time, Figner found out everything necessary about the intentions of the French and with the important information collected, on September 20, having safely left Moscow, he arrived at the main headquarters of the Russian army, in Tarutino. Figner’s courageous enterprise and ingenuity attracted the attention of the commander-in-chief, and he was instructed, together with other partisans, Davydov and Seslavin, to develop partisan actions based on enemy messages. Gathering two hundred daredevils from hunters and stragglers, mounting the foot soldiers on peasant horses, Figner led this combined detachment onto the Mozhaisk road and began to carry out his destructive raids here in the rear of the enemy army. During the day, he hid a detachment somewhere in the nearest forest, and he himself, disguised as a Frenchman, Italian or Pole, sometimes accompanied by a trumpeter, drove around enemy outposts, looked out for their location and, with the onset of darkness, swooped down on the French with his partisans and sent them to the main apartment of hundreds of prisoners. Taking advantage of the enemy's oversight, Figner beat him wherever possible; In particular, his actions intensified when armed peasants near Moscow joined the detachment. 10 versts from Moscow he overtook an enemy transport, took away and riveted six 12-pounders. guns, blew up several charging trucks, killed up to 400 people on the spot. and about 200 people, together with the Hanoverian Colonel Tink, were captured. Napoleon placed a prize on Figner's head, but the latter did not stop his brave activities; Wanting to bring his diverse squad into a larger structure, he began to introduce order and discipline into it, which, however, his hunters did not like, and they fled. Then Kutuzov gave Figner 600 people at his disposal. regular cavalry and Cossacks, with officers of his choice. With this well-established detachment, Figner became even more terrible for the French, here his outstanding abilities as a partisan developed even more, and his enterprise, reaching the point of insane audacity, manifested itself in full brilliance. Deceiving the enemy's vigilance with skillful maneuvers and stealth of transitions and having good guides, he unexpectedly swooped down on the enemy, broke up foraging parties, burned carts, intercepted couriers and harassed the French day and night, appearing at different points and everywhere spreading death and captivity in his wake. Napoleon was forced to send infantry and Ornano's cavalry division to the Mozhaisk road against Figner and other partisans, but all searches for the enemy were in vain. Several times the French overtook the Figner detachment, surrounded it with superior forces, it seemed that the death of the brave partisan was inevitable, but he always managed to deceive the enemy with cunning maneuvers. Figner’s courage reached the point that one day, near Moscow itself, he attacked Napoleon’s guards cuirassiers, wounded their colonel and took him prisoner, along with 50 soldiers. Before the Battle of Tarutino, he passed “through all the French outposts,” made sure of the isolation of the French vanguard, reported this to the commander-in-chief, and thereby rendered considerable assistance in the complete defeat of Murat’s troops that followed the next day. With the beginning of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, a people's war broke out; Taking advantage of this favorable circumstance for the partisan, Figner acted tirelessly. Together with Seslavin, he recaptured an entire transport with jewelry looted by the French in Moscow; soon after, meeting with an enemy detachment near the village. Kamennogo, smashed it, put up to 350 people in its place. and took about the same number of lower ranks with 5 officers prisoner, and finally, on November 27, in the case of the village. Lyakhov, uniting with the partisan detachments of Count Orlov-Denisov, Seslavin and Denis Davydov, contributed to the defeat of the French General Augereau, who laid down his arms by the end of the battle. Admired by Figner's exploits, Emperor Alexander promoted him to lieutenant colonel, with transfer to the guards artillery, and awarded him 7,000 rubles. and, at the same time, at the request of the commander-in-chief and the English agent at the main apartment, R. Wilson, who was a witness to many of Figner’s exploits, released his father-in-law, the former Pskov vice-governor Bibikov, from trial and punishment. Upon returning from St. Petersburg, Figner overtook our army already in northern Germany, near besieged Danzig. Here he volunteered to carry out the brave assignment of Count. Wittgenstein - get into the fortress, collect everything necessary information about the strength and location of the fortress churches, the size of the garrison, the amount of military and food supplies, as well as secretly inciting the inhabitants of Danzig to revolt against the French. Only with extraordinary presence of mind and excellent knowledge of foreign languages ​​could Figner dare to carry out such a dangerous assignment. Under the guise of an unfortunate Italian, robbed by the Cossacks, he entered the city; here, however, they did not immediately believe his stories and put him in prison. Figner languished in it for two months, tormented by incessant interrogations; They demanded from him proof of his actual origin from Italy; at any moment he could be recognized as a spy and shot. The stern commandant of Danzig himself, General Rapp, interrogated him, but his extraordinary ingenuity and resourcefulness saved this time the brave daredevil. Remembering his long stay in Milan, he identified himself as the son of a well-known Italian family and told, in a confrontation with a native of Milan who happened to be in Danzig, all the smallest details about what age his father and mother were, what their condition was, on what street they were standing the house and even what color the roof and shutters were, and not only managed to justify himself, but, hiding behind his ardent devotion to the Emperor of the French, even crept into the confidence of Rapp so much that he sent him with important dispatches to Napoleon. Of course, Figner, having got out of Danzig, delivered the dispatches, along with the information he had obtained, to our main apartment. For his accomplished feat, he was promoted to colonel and temporarily left at the main apartment. However, following his calling, he again devoted himself to the activities of a partisan. At his suggestion, a detachment was formed from various deserters of the Napoleonic army, mainly Spaniards who were forcibly recruited into it, as well as from German volunteers, and was called the “legion of revenge”; To ensure the reliability of partisan actions, a combined team from various hussar and Cossack regiments was assigned to the detachment, which formed the core of the detachment. With this detachment, Figner again opened his destructive raids on the enemy in a new theater of war. On August 22, 1813, he defeated an enemy detachment he met at Cape Niske, three days later he appeared in the vicinity of Bautzen, on August 26, at Königsbrück, he passed 800 steps past the puzzled enemy, who did not even fire a single shot, and on August 29 he attacked the French General Mortier at Speirsweiler and took several hundred people prisoner. Continuing further movement ahead of the Silesian army, illuminating the area, the Figner partisan detachment on September 26 met at Eulenburg with the corps of General Sacken, but on the same day, separating from him, took the direction of the Elbe. Twice the detachment then encountered enemy detachments, so few in number that their extermination could have been certain, but Figner avoided attacks and did not even allow the Cossacks to chase after those lagging behind. The brave partisan was obviously saving his men and horses for some more important undertaking. Seeing from the movements of the warring parties that the fate of Germany would be decided between the Elbe and Sala, Figner assumed that at the beginning of October Napoleon, in view of the decisive battle, would remove his troops from the left bank of the Elbe, and therefore, in anticipation of this movement, he wanted to hold out for several days near Dessau, then invade Westphalia, which remained loyal to the Prussian government, and raise its population against the French. But his assumptions were not justified. Napoleon, due to changed circumstances, decided to move to the right bank of the Elbe, and, according to the orders given by him, Marshals Rainier and Ney moved towards Wittenberg and Dessau to take possession of the crossings. On September 30, one of the patrols notified Figner that several squadrons of enemy cavalry had appeared on the road from Leipzig to Dessau, but he, confident that the French troops had already begun a retreat towards Sale, explained the appearance of the squadrons as foragers sent from the enemy. Soon a party of Prussian black hussars came upon the detachment, explaining that the enemy squadrons belonged to a strong vanguard, followed by the entire army of Napoleon. Realizing the danger, Figner immediately turned the detachment between the main roads leading to Wörlitz and Dessau, and with a forced march approached the Elbe in the evening. Here news was received from the commander of the Prussian troops stationed at Dessau that, in view of the unexpected advance of the French army towards this city, Tauentsin's corps would retreat to the right bank of the river, without leaving a single detachment on the left. But the men and horses of Figner’s detachment were tired from the intensive march in the environs of Dessau, devastated by the French and allies; in addition, Figner was confident that the French movement was only a demonstration to divert the attention of Bernadotte and Blucher, and that Tauentsin, having convinced himself of this, would cancel the proposed retreat to the right bank of the Elbe. Figner decided to stay on the left bank. He planned to hide his detachment the next day in the dense bushes of a small island near Werlitz and then, having let the French through, rush, depending on the circumstances, either to Westphalia or to the Leipzig road to search for enemy convoys and parks. Based on all these considerations, Figner positioned his detachment seven versts above Dessau; the left flank of the detachment was adjacent to the coastal road to this city, the right to the forest, which stretched for a mile along the river; in front, seventy fathoms away, lay a small village; in it, as in the forest, the Spaniards were located, and two platoons of Mariupol and Belarusian hussars stood between the village and the forest, the Don Cossacks were on the left flank. The patrols sent in all directions reported that at a distance of 5 miles the enemy was nowhere to be seen, and the reassured Figner allowed the detachment to light a fire and indulge in rest. But, for almost the entire detachment, this vacation turned out to be the last. Before dawn on October 1, the partisans perked up at the drawn-out command: “to your horses!” Gun shots and screams from the combatants were heard in the village. It turned out that two or three platoons of enemy cavalry, taking advantage of the night and the carelessness of the Spaniards, broke their picket and rushed through the streets, but, met by the hussars, turned back and, pursued by shots, scattered across the field. Several captured Polish lancers showed that they belonged to the vanguard of Ney's corps advancing along the Dessau road. Meanwhile, dawn began, and a formation of enemy cavalry was discovered no more than a hundred fathoms from the village. The situation became critical, moreover, with sunrise, the presence of the enemy was discovered not on one, but on all sides. Obviously, the detachment of brave men was bypassed and pressed against the Elbe. Figner gathered the officers of the detachment. “Gentlemen,” he said, “we are surrounded; we need to break through; if the enemy breaks our ranks, then don’t think about me anymore, save yourself in all directions; I’ve told you about this many times. The gathering place is the village [Figner named it], it on the Torgau road, about ten versts from here...” The detachment entered the gap between the village occupied by a platoon of Spaniards and the forest and prepared for a united attack. The commanding words of enemy officers were heard in the fog. "Akhtyrtsy, Alexandrians, pikes at the ready, march - march!" Figner commanded, and the detachment cut into the enemy, paving the way for themselves with bayonets and pikes. Inspired by the example of their leader, a handful of brave men performed miracles of courage, but, suppressed by disproportionately superior forces, they were pushed back to the very banks of the Elbe. The partisans fought to the death: their ranks were broken, their flanks were captured, most of officers and lower ranks were killed. Finally, the detachment could not stand it and rushed into the river, seeking salvation by swimming. Weak and wounded people and horses were carried away by the current and died in the waves or from enemy bullets raining down on them from the shore. Figner was among the dead; On the shore they found only his saber, which he had taken from a French general in 1812. This is how the famous partisan ended his days. His name became the best asset in the history of the exploits of the Russian troops, to the increase of the glory of which, it seemed, he devoted all his strength.

Disregarding his life, he volunteered to carry out the most dangerous assignments, led the most risky enterprises, selflessly loving his homeland, he seemed to be looking for an opportunity to take cruel revenge on Napoleon and his hordes. The entire Russian army knew about his exploits and highly valued them. Back in 1812, Kutuzov, sending a letter to his wife with Figner, instructed her: “Look at him closely: he is an extraordinary man; I have never seen such a high soul; he is a fanatic in courage and patriotism, and God knows what he won't do it." , Comrade Figner. due to the nature of his activity, he decided to cast a shadow on the glorious partisan, explaining, in his letter to, all of Figner’s heroism was only a thirst for satisfying his immense feelings of ambition and pride. Figner is portrayed in different colors according to the testimony of his other comrades and contemporaries, who appreciated in the famous partisan his true heroism, bright mind, captivating eloquence and outstanding willpower.

Despite different opinions about Figner’s personal qualities, this man was bold, courageous, daring, and fearless. Knew several foreign languages. The French awarded a large sum for his capture and called him a “terrible robber” who is as elusive as the devil.” This man deserves the attention and memory of posterity.

Conclusion

During the preparation for the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militias and partisans constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The troops of the Tarutino camp firmly covered the routes to the southern regions that were not devastated by the war. During the French stay in Moscow, their army, without conducting open military operations, at the same time suffered significant losses every day. From Moscow, it became increasingly difficult for Napoleon to communicate with rear troops and send urgent dispatches to France and other Western European countries. The Smolensk road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.

The actions of the partisans forced Napoleon to send large forces to guard the roads. Thus, to ensure the safety of the Smolensk road, Napoleon advanced part of the corps of Marshal Victor to Mozhaisk. Marshals Junot and Murat were ordered to strengthen the security of the Borovskaya and Podolsk roads.

The heroic struggle of the army, partisans, people's militia, led by Kutuzov and his headquarters, the feat of the people in the rear created favorable conditions for the Russian army to launch a counteroffensive. The war was entering a new phase.

Analyzing the actions of military partisans and summing up the results of their activities during the army’s stay in the Tarutino camp, Kutuzov wrote: “During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.” This was how the foundation for the approaching victory was laid. The names of Davydov, Seslavin, Figner and other brave commanders became known throughout Russia.

Denis Davydov, one of the first theorists of partisan warfare in 1812, reasonably believed that during the retreat of Napoleonic army, partisans participated together with the main units of the Russian army in all the most important combat operations and inflicted enormous damage on the enemy. He emphasized that “guerrilla warfare also has an impact on the main operations of the enemy army” and that partisan detachments “help the pursuing army to push back the retreating army and take advantage of local advantages for its final destruction.” 55. More than a third of the prisoners, a huge number of rifles, even cannons, various carts were taken by partisans. During the retreat of Napoleon's army, the number of prisoners increased so quickly that the command of the advancing Russian troops did not have time to allocate detachments to escort them and left a significant part of the prisoners in the villages under the protection of armed villagers.

Kutuzov had every reason to inform the tsar that “my partisans instilled fear and terror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.”

Chapter 2 Gratitude of descendants to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

2.1 The Patriotic War of 1812 in the names of Moscow streets Many architectural ensembles and monuments of Moscow today remind us of the people's feat in 1812. The Triumphal Arch rises near Poklonnaya Hill on Kutuzovsky Prospekt. Not far from the Arc de Triomphe there is the Battle of Borodino panorama museum, a monument to the heroes of this battle and the famous Kutuzov Izba. The monument is installed on Victory Square.

From here the road to the center of Moscow leads through the monument to the heroes of Borodin - Borodinsky Bridge. And there it’s not far from Kropotkinskaya Street, where the house of the partisan of 1812 is located, and to the Khamovniki barracks (on Komsomolsky Prospekt), where the Moscow militia was formed in 1812. Not far from here is the Manege located next to the Kremlin - also a monument to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812, built for the 5th anniversary of the victory in this war.

Every place, every house or other monument associated with the time of the Patriotic War of 1812,

gives rise to a feeling of pride: for the heroic past of our people

The names of the streets also remind us of the War of 1812. Thus, in Moscow, a number of streets are named after the heroes of 1812: Kutuzovsky Prospect, Bagrationovsky, Platovsky, Barclay passages, streets of General Ermolov, D. Davydov, Seslavin, Vasilisa Kozhina, Gerasim Kurin, st. Bolshaya Filevskaya, st. Tuchkovskaya and many others.

Metro stations Bagrationovskaya, Kutuzovskaya, Fili, Filyovsky Park also remind of the war.

https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image002_13.jpg" align="left" width="329" height="221 src=">

Fig.1 Seslavinskaya Street

· Seslavinskaya Street (July 17, 1963) Named in honor of A N Seslavin () - Lieutenant General, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812

· Denis Davydov street (May 9, 1961) Named in honor of D. V. Davydov () - poet one of the organizers of the partisan movement in 1812

https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image005_7.jpg" align="left" width="294" height="221 src=">

Fig.2 Denis Davydov Street

· One thousand eight hundred and twelve (1812) street (May 12, 1959) Named in honor of the feat accomplished by the people of Russia in 1812 to defend their Fatherland

· Kutuzovsky Avenue (December 13, 1957). Named in honor of Kutuzov ()

Field Marshal General, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image007_5.jpg" width="296" height="222">

Rice. 3 House of Denis Davydov on the street. Prechistenka 17

2.2 Monuments to the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

· The 1812 Memorial at Poklonnaya Gora includes several objects.

Triumphal Arch

Kutuzovskaya hut

Temple of the Archangel Michael near Kutuzovskaya Izba

Museum-panorama "Battle of Borodino"

Kutuzov and the glorious sons of the Russian people

Fig.4 Arc de Triomphe

https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image011_4.jpg" align="left" width="235" height="312 src=">

Fig.5 Kutuzov and the glorious sons of the Russian people

Fig.6 Kutuzovskaya hut

Rice. 7 Temple of the Archangel Michael near Kutuzovskaya Izba

· Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Kremlin Arsenal

Moscow Manege

Alexander Garden

St. George's Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace

Borodinsky Bridge

Fig.8 Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Fig.9 Kremlin Arsenal

Rice. 10 Moscow Manege

Fig. 11Alexandrovsky Garden

Fig. 12 St. George's Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace

Fig. 13 Borodino Bridge

Conclusion

In the process of working on the project, we studied a lot of material about the partisans and their activities during the Patriotic War of 1812.

We know the name of Denis Davydov from literature lessons, but he was known as a poet. Having visited the Museum - the Battle of Borodino panorama, we recognized Denis Davydov from the other side - a brave, courageous partisan, a competent commander. Reading his biography in more detail, we became aware of the names of Alexander Seslavin,

Alexander Figner, who were also leaders of partisan detachments.

The partisans carried out daring raids on the enemy and obtained important information about the enemy’s activities. highly appreciated the activities of military partisans for their courage, unbridled bravery,

After the Patriotic War of 1812, Denis Davydov generalized and systematized

military results of the actions of military partisans in two works of 1821: “Experience in the theory of partisan actions” and “Diary of partisans”

actions of 1812”, where he rightly emphasized the significant effect of the new

for the 19th century forms of war to defeat the enemy. [12 p.181]

The collected material replenished the information fund of the school museum.

1. 1812 in Russian poetry and memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1987.

2. Volodin Alexander Figner. M.: Moscow worker, 1971.

3. Heroes of 1812: Collection. M.: Young Guard, 1987.

4. , . Military Gallery Winter Palace. L.: Publishing house "Aurora", 1974.

5. Davydov Denis. War notes. M.: Gospolitizdat, 1940.

6. Moscow. Large illustrated encyclopedia. Moscow studies from A to. Eksmo, 2007

7. Moscow magazine. History of Russian Goverment. 2001. No. 1. p.64

8. Moscow is modern. Atlas. M. Print", 2005.

9. “The Thunderstorm of the Twelfth Year...” M. “Science” 1987 p.192

10. Patriotic War of 1812: Encyclopedia. M., 2004.

11. Popov Davydov. M.: Education, 1971.

12. Sirotkin War of 1812: Book. For students of Art. classes of environments school-M.: Enlightenment, 198 p.: ill.

13. Khataevich. M.: Moscow worker, 1973.

14. Figner Posluzhn. list, storage in the archives of St. Petersburg. artillery museum. - I.R.: "Camping notes of an artilleryman from 1812 to 1816", Moscow, 1835 - "Northern Post", 1813, No. 49. - "Russian Inv.", 1838, No. No. 91-99. - "Military Collection.", 1870, No. 8. - "Everyone. Illustrated.", 1848, No. 35. - "Russian Star.", 1887, vol. 55, p. 321- 338. - "Military encyclical lexicon", St. Petersburg, 1857. D. S - century. [Polovtsov]

The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of Russian troops deep into the territory of the state showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of one regular army. To defeat strong enemy the efforts of the entire Russian people were needed. In the overwhelming majority of enemy-occupied counties, people perceived Napoleon's troops not as liberators from serfdom, but as rapists, robbers and enslavers. The actions of the invaders only confirmed the opinion of the people - the European hordes robbed, killed, raped, and committed outrages in churches. The next invasion of foreigners was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the people as an invasion that had the goal of eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing atheism.

When studying the topic of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, it should be remembered that partisans were then called temporary detachments of regular troops and Cossacks, which were purposefully created by the Russian command to operate on the flanks, in the rear and communications of the enemy. The actions of spontaneously organized self-defense units of local residents were designated by the term “people’s war.”

Some researchers associate the beginning of the partisan movement during the War of 1812 with the manifesto of the Russian Emperor Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which seemed to allow the people to take up and actively participate in the fight against the French. In reality, things were somewhat different; the first pockets of resistance to the occupiers appeared in Belarus and Lithuania. Moreover, often the peasants did not understand where the occupiers were and where their nobles collaborating with them were.

People's War

With the invasion of the “Great Army” into Russia, many local residents initially simply left the villages and went into forests and areas remote from military operations and took away their livestock. Retreating through the Smolensk region, the commander-in-chief of the Russian 1st Western Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly called on his compatriots to take up arms against the enemy. Barclay de Tolly's proclamation advised how to act against the enemy. The first detachments were created from local residents who wanted to protect themselves and their property. They were joined by soldiers who had fallen behind their units.

French foragers gradually began to face not only passive resistance, when cattle were driven into the forest and food was hidden, but also active actions of the peasants. In the area of ​​Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Orsha, peasant detachments themselves attacked the enemy, carrying out not only night but also daytime attacks on small enemy units. French soldiers were killed or captured. The people's war received its widest scope in the Smolensk province. It covered Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavlsky, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts.

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasants attacked parties of French foragers moving towards them. Police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov headed the Sychev detachments, establishing proper order and discipline in them. In just two weeks - from August 18 to September 1, they carried out 15 attacks on the enemy. During this time, they destroyed more than 500 enemy soldiers and captured over 300. Several horse and foot peasant detachments were created in the Roslavl district. They not only defended their district, but also attacked enemy detachments that were operating in the neighboring Elny district. Peasant detachments were also active in Yukhnovsky district, they interfered with the enemy’s advance to Kaluga, and assisted the army partisan detachment of D.V. Davydova. In Gzhatsk district, the detachment created by private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment Ermolai Chetvertakov gained great fame. He not only defended the lands near the Gzhatsk pier from enemy soldiers, but also attacked the enemy himself.

The people's war gained even greater scope during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, the peasant movement assumed a significant character not only in Smolensk, but also in Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Thus, in Zvenigorod district, people's detachments destroyed or captured more than 2 thousand enemy soldiers. The most famous detachments were led by the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk district there were detachments led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, local detachments included up to 2 thousand warriors. The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a union of Bogorodsk partisans; it included up to 6 thousand people. It was led by the peasant Gerasim Kurin. He not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district, but also struck the enemy himself.

It should be noted that Russian women also took part in the fight against the enemy. Peasant and army partisan detachments operated on enemy communications, constrained the actions of the “Great Army”, attacked individual enemy units, destroying the enemy’s manpower and property, and interfered with the collection of food and fodder. The Smolensk road, where the postal service was organized, was subject to regular attacks. The most valuable documents were delivered to the headquarters of the Russian army. According to some estimates, peasant detachments destroyed up to 15 thousand enemy soldiers, and about the same number were captured. Due to the actions of militia, partisan and peasant detachments, the enemy was unable to expand the zone under his control and gain additional opportunities to collect food and fodder. The French failed to gain a foothold in Bogorodsk, Dmitrov, Voskresensk, capture Bryansk and reach Kiev, or create additional communications to connect the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier.

Army units

Army partisan detachments also played a major role in the 1812 campaign. The idea of ​​their creation appeared even before the Battle of Borodino, when the command analyzed the actions of individual cavalry detachments that, by chance, ended up on enemy communications. The first to begin partisan actions was the commander of the 3rd Western Army, Alexander Petrovich Tormasov, who formed the “flying corps”. In early August, Barclay de Tolly formed a detachment under the command of General Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode. The number of the detachment was 1.3 thousand soldiers. Wintzingerode received the task of covering the St. Petersburg highway, operating on the flank and behind enemy lines.

M.I. Kutuzov attached great importance to the action of partisan detachments; they were supposed to wage a “small war”, exterminate individual enemy detachments. Detachments were usually created from mobile cavalry units, often Cossacks; they were most adapted to irregular warfare. Their numbers were usually small - 50-500 people. If necessary, they interacted and united into larger compounds. Army partisan detachments received the task of delivering surprise attacks behind enemy lines, destroying his manpower, disrupting communications, attacking garrisons, suitable reserves, and disrupting actions aimed at obtaining food and forage. In addition, the partisans served as army intelligence. The main advantage of partisan detachments was their speed and mobility. The most famous were the detachments under the command of Wintzingerode, Denis Vasilyevich Davydov, Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, Alexander Samoilovich Figner, Alexander Nikitich Seslavin and other commanders.

In the fall of 1812, the actions of partisan detachments took on a wide scope; the army flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 separate squadrons and a light horse artillery team, 5 infantry regiments, 3 ranger battalions and 22 regimental guns. The partisans set up ambushes, attacked enemy convoys, and intercepted couriers. They made daily reports on the movement of enemy forces, transmitted captured mail, and information received from prisoners. Alexander Figner, after the enemy captured Moscow, was sent to the city as a scout; he cherished the dream of killing Napoleon. He failed to eliminate the French emperor, but thanks to his extraordinary resourcefulness and knowledge of foreign languages, Figner was able to obtain important information, which he transmitted to the main apartment (headquarters). Then he formed a partisan (sabotage) detachment from volunteers and lagging soldiers, which operated on the Mozhaisk road. His enterprises so disturbed the enemy that he attracted the attention of Napoleon, who placed a reward on his head.

A large detachment of General Wintzingerode operated in the north of Moscow, which, having allocated small formations to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the enemy’s access to the northern regions of the Moscow region. Dorokhov's detachment was active and destroyed several enemy teams. A detachment under the command of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His partisans made a successful attack on the village of Nikolskoye, killing more than 100 people and capturing 200 enemy soldiers. Seslavin's partisans operated between Borovsk and Moscow, he had the task of coordinating his actions with Figner. Seslavin was the first to reveal the movement of Napoleon's troops to Kaluga. Thanks to this valuable report, the Russian army managed to block the enemy’s road at Maloyaroslavets. A detachment of Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky operated in the Mozhaisk area; under his command was the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and five hundred Cossacks. He established control over the Ruza road. In addition, a detachment of Ilya Fedorovich Chernozubov was sent to Mozhaisk, a detachment of Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf operated in the Volokolamsk area, Viktor Antonovich Prendel acted near Ruza, the Cossacks of Grigory Petrovich Pobednov acted beyond Klin towards the Yaroslavl highway, etc.

In fact, Napoleon’s “Grand Army” in Moscow was surrounded. Army and peasant detachments hindered the search for food and fodder, kept enemy units in constant tension, this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army. The active actions of the partisans were one of the reasons that forced Napoleon to decide to leave Moscow.

On September 28 (October 10), 1812, several united partisan detachments under the command of Dorokhov took Vereya by storm. The enemy was taken by surprise, and about 400 soldiers of the Westphalian regiment with a banner were captured. In total, in the period from September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), due to the actions of the partisans, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed and 6.5 thousand enemies were captured. To ensure security of communications, supply of ammunition, food and fodder, the French command had to allocate increasingly greater forces.

October 28 (November 9) near the village. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya partisans Davydov, Seslavin and Figner, reinforced by units of V.V. Orlov-Denisov, were able to defeat an entire enemy brigade (it was the vanguard of the 1st Infantry Division of Louis Barague d'Ilier). After a fierce battle, the French brigade under the command of Jean-Pierre Augereau capitulated. The commander himself and 2 thousand soldiers were captured. Napoleon was extremely angry when he learned of what had happened, he ordered the disbandment of the division and an investigation into the behavior of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, who showed indecisiveness and did not provide timely assistance to Augereau's brigade.The general was removed from command and placed under house arrest at his estate in France.

The partisans were also active during the retreat of the “Great Army”. Platov's Cossacks attacked enemy rear units. Davydov's detachment and other partisan formations operated from the flanks, followed the enemy army, carrying out raids on individual French units. Partisan and peasant detachments made a significant contribution to the common cause of victory over Napoleon's army and expelling the enemy from Russia.

The most massive form of struggle of the Russian people against the invaders was the struggle for food. From the first days of the invasion, the French demanded from the population large quantity bread and fodder to supply the army. But the peasants did not want to give their grain to the enemy. Despite the good harvest, most fields in Lithuania, Belarus and the Smolensk region remained unharvested. On October 4, the chief of police of the Berezinsky subprefecture, Dombrovsky, wrote: “I am ordered to deliver everything, but there is nowhere to take it from... There is a lot of grain in the fields that was not harvested due to the disobedience of the peasants.”

Peasants are increasingly beginning to move from passive forms of resistance to active, armed ones. Peasant partisan detachments are beginning to emerge everywhere - from the western border to Moscow. In the occupied territory there were even areas where there was neither French nor Russian administration and which were controlled by partisan detachments: Borisov district in the Minsk province, Gzhatsky and Sychevsky districts in Smolensk, Vokhonskaya volost and the environs of the Kolotsky monastery in Moscow. Typically, such detachments were led by wounded or lagged personnel soldiers or non-commissioned officers due to illness. One of these large partisan detachments (up to 4 thousand people) was led in the Gzhatsk region by soldier Eremey Chetvertakov.
Eremey Vasilyevich Chetvertakov was an ordinary soldier of the dragoon cavalry regiment, which was part of the rearguard of the Russian army under the command of General Konovnitsyn in August 1812. In one of these skirmishes on August 31 with the vanguard of the French troops rushing to Moscow, near the village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, the squadron in which Chetvertakov was located found itself in a difficult situation: it was surrounded by French dragoons. A bloody battle ensued. Making its way with sabers and pistol fire, the small Russian squadron escaped from the encirclement, but at the very last moment a horse was killed near Chetvertakov. Having fallen, she crushed the rider, and he was taken prisoner by the enemy dragoons who surrounded him. Chetvertakov was sent to a prisoner of war camp near Gzhatsk.

But the Russian soldier was not the type to accept captivity. Guard duty in the camp was carried out by 172 Dalmatian Slavs forcibly mobilized into the “great army”, who only became “French” in 1811 after the inclusion of the so-called Illyrian provinces on the Adriatic coast - Dalmatia - into the French Empire. Chetvertakov quickly found a common language with them and on the fourth day of captivity, with the help of one of the guard soldiers, he escaped.

At first, Eremey Vasilyevich tried to break through to his own people. But this turned out to be a difficult matter - enemy horse and foot patrols loomed everywhere. Then the savvy soldier made his way along forest paths from the Smolensk road to the south and reached the village of Zadkovo. Without waiting for any order, Chetvertakov, at his own peril and risk, began to create a partisan detachment from the residents of this village. The serf peasants all responded as one to the call of the experienced soldier, but Chetvertakov understood that to fight a strong and well-trained enemy, impulse alone is not enough. After all, none of these patriots knew how to wield a weapon, and for them a horse was only a draft force to plow, mow, and pull a cart or sleigh.

Almost no one knew how to ride a horse, and speed of movement and maneuverability were the key to success partisans. Chetvertakov began by creating a “partisan school.” To begin with, he taught his charges the elements of cavalry riding and simple commands. Then, under his supervision, the village blacksmith forged several homemade Cossack pikes. But it was necessary to get a firearm. Of course he was not in the village. Where to get? Only the enemy.

And so 50 of the best-trained partisans on horseback, armed with homemade pikes and axes, made their first raid under the cover of darkness. Napoleon's troops marched along the Smolensk road in a continuous stream towards the Borodino field. To attack such an armada would be suicide, although everyone was eager and eager to fight. Not far from the road, in the forest, Chetvertakov decided to set up an ambush, expecting that some small group of the enemy would deviate from the route in search of food and feed for the horses. And so it happened. About 12 French cuirassiers left the road and went deeper into the forest, heading towards the nearest village of Kravna. And suddenly trees fell in the path of the cavalrymen. With a cry of "Ambush! Ambush!" The cuirassiers turned back, but even here, on their way, centuries-old fir trees fell right onto the road. Trap! Before the French had time to come to their senses, bearded men with pikes and axes flew at them from all sides. The fight was short. All 12 died on a remote forest road. The partisans received ten excellent cavalry horses, 12 carbines and 24 pistols with a supply of charges for them.

But the Russian dragoon was in no hurry - after all, none of his army had ever held a cavalry carbine or pistol in their hands. First we had to learn how to wield a weapon. Chetvertakov himself went through this science for two whole years as recruits of the reserve dragoon regiment: he learned to load, shoot from a horse, from the ground, standing and lying down, and not just shoot into God’s light like a penny, but with precision. Eremey led his detachment back to the partisan base in Zadkovo. Here he opened the “second class” of his “partisan school” - he taught peasants how to use firearms. Time was running out, and there were few gunpowder charges. Therefore, the course is accelerated.

They hung armor on the trees and started shooting at them as if at targets. Before the peasants had time to practice shooting a couple of times, a patrolman galloped up on a lathered horse: “The French are coming to the village!” Indeed, a large detachment of French foragers, led by an officer and a whole column of food trucks, was moving through the forest towards Zadkovo.

Eremey Chetvertakov gave the first military command - “Get to the gun!” There are twice as many French, but the partisans have ingenuity and knowledge of the area on their side. Again an ambush, again a short battle, this time with shooting not at targets, and again success: 15 invaders remain lying on the road, the rest hastily flee, abandoning ammunition and weapons. Now we could fight in earnest!

Rumors about the successes of Zadkov's partisans under the command of a dashing dragoon who escaped from captivity spread widely throughout the district. Less than two weeks had passed since the last battle, when peasants from all the surrounding villages flocked to Chetvertakov: “Take him, father, under your command.” Soon Chetvertakov’s partisan detachment reached three hundred people. A simple soldier showed remarkable leadership thinking and ingenuity. He divided his squad into two parts. One carried out patrol duty on the border of the partisan area, preventing small groups of foragers and marauders from entering it.
The other became a “flying detachment” that carried out raids behind enemy lines, in the vicinity of Gzhatsk, to the Kolotsky monastery, and to the city of Medyn.

The partisan detachment grew continuously. By October 1812, he had already reached a strength of almost 4 thousand people (an entire partisan regiment!), this allowed Chetvertakov not to limit himself to the destruction of small gangs of marauders, but to smash large military formations. So, at the end of October, he completely defeated a battalion of French infantry with two cannons, captured food looted by the invaders and a whole herd of cattle taken from the peasants.

During the French occupation of the Smolensk province, most of the Gzhatsky district was free from invaders - the partisans vigilantly guarded the borders of their “partisan region”. Chetvertakov himself turned out to be an extremely modest person. When the army Napoleon hastily fled from Moscow along the Old Smolensk Road, the dragoon gathered his army, bowed low to them “for their service to the Tsar and the Fatherland,” dismissed the partisans to their homes, and he himself rushed to catch up with the Russian army. In Mogilev, where General A.S. Kologrivov formed reserve cavalry units, Chetvertakov was assigned to the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment, as an experienced soldier, and promoted to non-commissioned officer. But no one knew that he was one of the heroic partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812. Only in 1813, after the peasant partisans of the Gzhatsky district themselves turned to the authorities with a request to celebrate the merits of “Chetvertak” (this was his partisan nickname) as the “savior of the Gzhatsk district”, who again became commander-in-chief after the death of M. I. Kutuzov M. B. Barclay de Tolly awarded "the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment non-commissioned officer Chetvertakov for his exploits against the enemy in 1812, with the insignia of the Military Order" (the Cross of St. George, the highest award for soldiers of the Russian army). Chetvertakov fought bravely during the foreign campaign of the Russian army in 1813-1814. and ended the war in Paris. The partisan detachment of Eremey Chetvertakov was not the only one. In the same Smolensk province in Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of 400 people was led by a retired Suvorov soldier S. Emelyanov. The detachment fought 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and captured 325 people. But often ordinary peasants also became the leaders of partisan detachments. For example, a large detachment of the peasant Gerasim Kurin operated in the Moscow province. What especially amazed the occupiers was the participation of women in the partisan movement. History has preserved to this day the exploits of the village elder of Gorshkov, Sychevsky district, Smolensk province, Vasilisa Kozhina. “Praskoveya the lacemaker” (her last name remained unknown) from the village of Sokolovo in the same Smolensk province was also a match for her.

Especially many partisan detachments arose in the Moscow province after the French occupied Moscow. The partisans were no longer limited to ambushing individual foragers, but fought real battles with the invaders. For example, Gerasim Kurin’s detachment fought such continuous battles from September 25 to October 1, 1812. On October 1, partisans (500 horsemen and 5 thousand foot soldiers) defeated a large detachment of French foragers in a battle near the village of Pavlov Posad. 20 carts, 40 horses, 85 rifles, 120 pistols, etc. were captured. The enemy was missing more than two hundred soldiers.
For your selfless actions Gerasim Kurin received St. George's Cross from the hands of M.I. Kutuzov himself.

This was a rare case of awarding a non-military person, and even a serf. Along with peasant partisan detachments, on the initiative of Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov, in August 1812, so-called military (flying) partisan detachments from regular and irregular (Cossacks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kalmyks) troops began to be created.

Military partisan detachments. Seeing the stretched nature of the enemy's communications, the absence of a continuous line of defense, and roads not protected by the enemy, the Russian military command decided to use this to strike with small flying cavalry detachments sent to the rear." great army"The first such detachments were created even before the Battle of Smolensk by Barclay de Tolly (August 4 - the military partisan detachment of F.F. Wintzengerode). The Wintzengerode detachment initially operated in the rear of the French troops in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bVitebsk and Polotsk, and with the abandonment of Moscow it urgently moved on the St. Petersburg road directly in the vicinity of the “second capital". Then a detachment of military partisans by I. I. Dibich 1 was created, operating in the Smolensk province. These were large detachments, uniting from six, like Wintzingerode, to two, like at Dibich, cavalry regiments. Along with them, small (150-250 people) mobile mounted military partisan teams operated. The initiator of their creation was the famous partisan poet Denis Davydov, supported Bagration And Kutuzova. Davydov led the first such maneuverable detachment of 200 hussars and Cossacks shortly before the Battle of Borodino.

Davydov's detachment acted first against small 180 enemy groups (foraging teams, small convoys, etc.). Gradually, Davydov’s team grew in number due to the repulsed Russian prisoners. “In the absence of Russian uniforms, I dressed them in French uniforms and armed them with French guns, leaving them Russian caps instead of shakos for identification,” he later wrote D. Davydov. “Soon Davydov already had 500 people. This allowed him to increase the scope of operations. On September 12, 1812, Davydov’s detachment defeated a large enemy convoy in the Vyazma area. 276 soldiers, 32 carts, two wagons with cartridges and 340 guns were captured, which Davydov handed it over to the militia.

The French were seriously alarmed when they saw the successful actions of Davydov’s detachment in the Vyazma area. To defeat him, a 2,000-strong punitive detachment was allocated, but all efforts were in vain - local peasants warned Davydov in time, and he evaded the punitive forces, continuing to destroy the enemy’s convoys and repelling Russian prisoners of war. Subsequently, D. V. Davydov generalized and systematized the military results of the actions of military partisans in two of his works of 1821: “An Experience in the Theory of Partisan Actions” and “Diary of Partisan Actions in 1812,” where he rightly emphasized the significant effect of this new for the 19th century. forms of war to defeat the enemy.
The successes of the military partisans prompted Kutuzov to actively use this form of fighting the enemy during the retreat from Borodino to Moscow. This is how a large detachment of military partisans arose (4 cavalry regiments) under the command of another famous partisan, General I. S. Dorokhov.

Dorokhov's detachment successfully destroyed enemy transports on the Smolensk road from September to 14, capturing more than 1.4 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. Major squad operation Dorokhova The defeat of the French garrison in the city of Vereya occurred on September 19, 1812. The Westphalian regiment from Junot's corps guarding the city was completely defeated. It is characteristic that the peasant partisan detachment of Borovsky district also participated in the assault along with the military partisans.

The obvious successes of the detachments of Davydov and Dorokhov, and the rumor about their victories quickly spread throughout all the central provinces of Russia and in the Russian army, stimulated the creation of new detachments of military partisans. During his stay at the Tarutino position, Kutuzov created several more such detachments: captains A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner, colonels I. M. Vadbolsky, I. F. Chernozubov, V. I. Prendel, N. D. Kudashev and others. All of them operated on the roads leading to Moscow.
Figner's detachment acted especially boldly. The commander of this detachment himself was distinguished by his unbridled courage. Even during the retreat from Moscow, Figner obtained permission from Kutuzov to remain in the capital to commit an assassination attempt on Napoleon. Disguised as a merchant, he spied on Napoleon's headquarters in Moscow day after day, simultaneously creating a small detachment of urban partisans. The detachment smashed the occupiers' guards at night. Figner failed to assassinate Napoleon, but he successfully applied his experience as a military intelligence officer by leading the partisans. Having hidden his small team in the forest, the commander himself, in the uniform of a French officer, went to the Mozhaisk road, collecting intelligence data. It could never have occurred to Napoleonic soldiers that the brilliantly French-speaking officer was a partisan in disguise. After all, many of them (Germans, Italians, Poles, Dutch, etc.) understood only commands in French, explaining themselves to each other in that unimaginable jargon that could only conditionally be called French.

Figner and his squad more than once found themselves in difficult troubles. One day they were surrounded on three sides by punitive forces. It seemed like there was no way out, we had to give up. But Figner came up with a brilliant military trick: he dressed half of the detachment in French uniforms and staged a battle with the other part. The real French stopped, waiting for the end and preparing carts for trophies and prisoners. Meanwhile, the “French” pushed the Russians back to the forest, and then they disappeared together.

Kutuzov praised Figner's actions and placed him in charge of a larger detachment of 800 people. In a letter to his wife, sent with Figner, Kutuzov wrote: “Look at him closely, he is an extraordinary man. I have never seen such a height of soul, he is a fanatic in courage and patriotism...”

Setting a clear example of patriotism, M. I. Kutuzov sent his son-in-law and adjutant, Colonel Prince N. D. Kudashev, to join the military partisans. | Like Davydov, Kudashev led a small mobile detachment of 300 Don Cossacks and, leaving Tarutino in early October 1812, began to actively operate in the area of ​​​​the Serpukhov road.

On October 10, at night, with a sudden blow, the Donets defeated the French garrison in the village of Nikolskoye: out of more than 2 thousand, 100 were killed, 200 were captured, the rest fled in panic. On October 16, Kudashev’s detachment near the village of Lopasni scattered a large detachment of French cuirassiers, captured their convoy and 16 prisoners. On October 17, near the village of Alferovo, the Donets of Kudashev again ambushed another Napoleonic cavalry detachment stretched along the Serpukhov road and again captured 70 people.
Kutuzov closely followed the partisan combat successes of his beloved son-in-law (he called him “my eyes”) and wrote with pleasure to his wife - his daughter: “Kudashev is also a partisan and does a good job.”

On October 19, Kutuzov ordered the expansion of this “small war.” In his letter to his eldest daughter in St. Petersburg on October 13, he explained his intention this way: “We have been standing in one place for more than a week (in Tarutino - V.S.) and Napoleon and I are looking at each other, each is biding its time. Meanwhile, in small parts We fight every day and to this day everywhere successfully. Every day we take almost three hundred people in full and we lose so little that it’s almost nothing..."

But if Napoleon really waited (and in vain) for peace with Alexander I, then Kutuzov acted - he expanded the “small war” around Moscow. The detachments of Figner, Seslavin and Kudashev operating near Tarutin were ordered from October 20 to 27, 1812 to walk along the rear of the Napoleonic army - from Serpukhov to Vyazma - with small maneuverable detachments, no more than 100 people each. The main task is reconnaissance, but combat should not be neglected. The commanders of the military partisans did just that: smashing individual military units and foraging teams of the enemy along the road (Kudashev’s detachment alone captured 400 people and recaptured 100 food carts), they collected valuable information about the deployment of enemy troops. By the way, it was Kudashev, looking through the papers found on one of the murdered French staff officers, who discovered a secret order from the chief of staff of the “grand army,” Marshal Berthier, to send “all the burdens” (i.e., property looted in Moscow - V.S.) to Mozhaisk road and further to Smolensk, to the west. This meant that the French intended to leave Moscow soon. Kudashev immediately forwarded this letter to Kutuzov.

It confirmed the strategic calculation of the great Russian commander. Even on September 27, almost a month before the French left the “first throne,” he wrote to his eldest daughter (not without intent - she was a lady of state at court and was well known to the Tsar’s wife): “I won the battle before Moscow (on Borodino. - V . C), but it is necessary to save the army, and it is intact. Soon all our armies, that is, Tormasov, Chichagov, Wittgenstein and others will act towards the same goal, and Napoleon will not stay long in Moscow..."

Military partisans caused a lot of trouble and anxiety to Napoleon. He had to divert significant forces from Moscow to guard the roads. Thus, parts of Victor’s reserve corps were deployed to guard the section from Smolensk to Mozhaisk. Junot And Murat received an order to strengthen the security of Borovskaya and Podolskaya roads. But all efforts were in vain. Kutuzov had every reason to inform the tsar that “my partisans instilled fear and terror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.”