Crossing the Danube, siege of Plevna, defense of Shipka. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops: description, history and interesting facts

Tragedy near Plevna

After the capture of Nikopol, Lieutenant General Kridener had to occupy Plevna, which was not defended by anyone, as quickly as possible. The fact is that this city was of strategic importance as a junction of roads leading to Sofia, Lovcha, Tarnovo, Shipka Pass, etc. In addition, on July 5, the forward patrols of the 9th Cavalry Division reported movement towards Plevna great forces enemy. These were the troops of Osman Pasha, urgently transferred from Western Bulgaria. Initially, Osman Pasha had 17 thousand people with 30 field guns.

The Chief of Staff of the Active Army, General Nepokochitsky, sent a telegram to Kridener on July 4: “...immediately move a Cossack brigade, two infantry regiments with artillery to occupy Plevna.” On July 5, General Kridener received a telegram from the commander-in-chief, in which he demanded to immediately occupy Plevna and “cover in Plevno from a possible offensive of troops from Vidin.” Finally, on July 6, Nepokochitsky sent another telegram, which said: “If you cannot immediately march to Plevno with all the troops, then send there immediately Tutolmin’s Cossack brigade and part of the infantry.”

The troops of Osman Pasha, making daily 33-kilometer marches, covered a 200-kilometer path in 6 days and occupied Plevna, while General Kridener failed to cover a distance of 40 km in the same time. When the units allocated to them finally approached Plevna, they were met by fire from mounted Turkish reconnaissance. The troops of Osman Pasha had already settled on the hills surrounding Plevna and began to equip positions there. Until July 1877, the city had no fortifications. However, from the north, east and south, Plevna was covered by dominant heights. Having successfully used them, Osman Pasha erected field fortifications around Plevna.

Turkish general Osman Pasha (1877-1878)

To capture Plevna, Kridener sent a detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner, who only approached the Turkish fortifications on the evening of July 7. The detachment numbered 8,600 people with 46 field guns. The next day, July 8, Schilder-Schuldner attacked the Turks, but was unsuccessful. In this battle, called “First Plevna,” the Russians lost 75 officers and 2,326 lower ranks killed and wounded. According to Russian data, Turkish losses amounted to less than two thousand people.

The presence of Turkish troops at a distance of only two days' march from the only crossing of the Danube near Sistovo greatly worried Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. The Turks could threaten from Plevna the entire Russian army and especially the troops advanced beyond the Balkans, not to mention the headquarters. Therefore, the commander demanded that the troops of Osman Pasha (whose forces were significantly exaggerated) be defeated and Plevna captured.

By mid-July, the Russian command concentrated 26 thousand people with 184 field guns near Plevna.

It should be noted that the Russian generals did not think of encircling Plevna. Reinforcements freely approached Osman Pasha, ammunition and food were delivered. By the beginning of the second assault, his forces in Plevna had increased to 22 thousand people with 58 guns. As we see, the Russian troops did not have an advantage in numbers, and the almost triple superiority in artillery did not play a decisive role, since the field artillery of that time was powerless against well-made earthen fortifications, even of the field type. In addition, the artillery commanders near Plevna did not risk sending cannons into the first ranks of the attackers and shooting the defenders of the redoubts at point-blank range, as was the case near Kars.

However, on July 18, Kridener launched a second assault on Plevna. The assault ended in disaster - 168 officers and 7,167 lower ranks were killed and wounded, while Turkish losses did not exceed 1,200 people. During the assault, Kridener gave confused orders, the artillery as a whole acted sluggishly and spent only 4073 shells during the entire battle.

After the Second Plevna, panic began in the Russian rear. In Sistovo they mistook the approaching Cossack unit for Turks and were about to surrender to them. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich turned to the Romanian King Charles with a tearful request for help. By the way, the Romanians themselves had offered their troops before, but Chancellor Gorchakov categorically did not agree to the Romanians crossing the Danube for some political reasons known to him alone. Turkish generals had the opportunity to defeat the Russian army and throw its remnants over the Danube. But they also did not like to take risks, and they also intrigued against each other. Therefore, despite the absence of a continuous front line, for several weeks there was only a positional war in the theater.

On July 19, 1877, Tsar Alexander II, deeply depressed by the “Second Plevna,” ordered the mobilization of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, the 24th, 26th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, a total of 110 thousand people with 440 guns. However, they could not arrive before September - October. In addition, it was ordered to move to the front the already mobilized 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Infantry Brigade, but these units could not arrive before mid-August. Until reinforcements arrived, they decided to confine themselves to defense everywhere.

By August 25, significant forces of Russians and Romanians were concentrated near Plevna: 75,500 bayonets, 8,600 sabers and 424 guns, including more than 20 siege guns. The Turkish forces numbered 29,400 bayonets, 1,500 sabers and 70 field guns. On August 30, the third assault on Plevna took place. The date of the assault was timed to coincide with the tsar’s name day. Alexander II, the Romanian King Charles and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich personally arrived to observe the assault.

The generals did not bother to provide massive artillery fire, and there were very few mortars near Plevna; as a result, the enemy fire was not suppressed, and the troops suffered huge losses. The Turks repulsed the assault. The Russians lost two generals, 295 officers and 12,471 lower ranks killed and wounded; their Romanian allies lost approximately three thousand people. A total of about 16 thousand against three thousand Turkish losses.

Alexander II and Prince Charles of Romania near Plevna

“Third Plevna” made a stunning impression on the army and the whole country. On September 1, Alexander II convened a military council in the town of Poradim. At the council, the commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, suggested immediately retreating back across the Danube. In this he was actually supported by Generals Zotov and Massalsky, while Minister of War Milyutin and General Levitsky categorically opposed the retreat. After much reflection, Alexander II agreed with the latter’s opinion. It was decided to go on the defensive again until new reinforcements arrived.

Despite the successful defense, Osman Pasha was aware of the riskiness of his position in Plevna and asked permission to retreat until he was blocked there. However, he was ordered to remain where he was. From the garrisons of Western Bulgaria, the Turks urgently formed the army of Shefket Pasha in the Sofia region, as reinforcement for Osman Pasha. On September 8, Shevket Pasha sent the Akhmet-Hivzi division (10 thousand bayonets with 12 guns) with a huge food transport to Plevna. The collection of this transport went unnoticed by the Russians, and when the lines of convoys stretched past the Russian cavalry (6 thousand sabers, 40 guns), its mediocre and timid commander, General Krylov, did not dare to attack them. Encouraged by this, Shevket Pasha sent another transport on September 23, with which he went himself, and this time the entire guard of the convoy consisted of only one cavalry regiment! General Krylov let both transport and Shevket Pasha through, not only to Plevna, but also back to Sofia. Truly, even an enemy agent in his place could not have done more! Due to Krylov’s criminal inaction, Osman Pasha’s army received food for two months.

On September 15, General E.I. arrived near Plevna. Totleben, summoned by the Tsar's telegram from St. Petersburg. Having toured the positions, Totleben categorically spoke out against a new assault on Plevna. Instead, he proposed tightly blockading the city and starving the Turks, i.e. something that should have started right away! By the beginning of October, Plevna was completely blocked. By mid-October, there were 170 thousand Russian troops there against 47 thousand Osman Pasha.

To relieve Plevna, the Turks created the 35,000-strong so-called “Sofia Army” under the command of Mehmed-Ali. Mehmed-Ali slowly moved towards Plevna, but on November 10-11 his units were thrown back near Novagan by the western detachment of General I.V. Gurko (Gurko also had 35 thousand people). Gurko wanted to pursue and finish off Mehmed-Ali, but Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich forbade this. Having burned himself at Plevna, the Grand Duke was now cautious.

By mid-November, surrounded Plevna began to run out of ammunition and food. Then, on the night of November 28, Osman Pasha left the city and went for a breakthrough. The 3rd Grenadier Division, vigorously supported by artillery, stopped the Turks. And in the middle of the day the main forces of the Russian army approached the battlefield. The wounded Osman Pasha gave the order to surrender. In total, more than 43 thousand people surrendered: 10 pashas, ​​2128 officers, 41,200 lower ranks. 77 guns were taken. The Turks lost about six thousand people killed and wounded. Russian losses in this battle did not exceed 1,700 people.

The stubborn resistance of Osman Pasha in Plevna cost the Russian army huge losses in manpower (22.5 thousand killed and wounded!) and a five-month delay in the offensive. This delay, in turn, negated the opportunity quick victory in the war, which was created thanks to the capture of the Shipka Pass by units of General Gurko back on July 18-19.

The main reason for the tragedy at Plevna was the illiteracy, indecisiveness and outright stupidity of such Russian generals as Kridener, Krylov, Zotov, Massalsky and the like. This is especially true for the use of artillery. The clueless generals did not know what to do with a large number of field guns, although they could at least remember how Napoleon concentrated batteries of 200-300 guns in the decisive place of the battle and literally swept away the enemy with artillery fire.

On the other hand, long-range, rapid-fire rifles and effective shrapnel made it almost impossible for infantry to attack fortifications without first suppressing them with artillery. And field guns are physically unable to reliably suppress even earthen fortifications. For this you need mortars or howitzers of 6-8 inch caliber. And there were such mortars in Russia. In the western fortresses of Russia and in the siege park of Brest-Litovsk, about 200 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model stood idle. These mortars were quite mobile, it was not difficult to transfer even all of them to Plevna. In addition, on June 1, 1877, the siege artillery of the Danube Army had 16 units of 8-inch and 36 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model. Finally, close combat guns could be used to fight infantry and artillery hidden in earthen fortifications - half-pound smooth mortars, hundreds of which were available in fortresses and siege parks. Their firing range did not exceed 960 meters, but the half-pound mortars easily fit into trenches; crews carried them to the battlefield manually (this is a kind of prototype of mortars).

The Turks in Plevna did not have mortars, so Russian 8-inch and 6-inch mortars from closed positions could shoot Turkish fortifications with almost impunity. After 6 hours of continuous bombardment, the success of the attacking troops could be guaranteed. Especially if the 3-pound mountain and 4-pound field guns supported the attackers with fire, moving in the advanced infantry formations on horseback or human traction.

By the way, back in the late 50s of the 19th century, tests of chemical munitions were carried out near St. Petersburg on Volkovo Pole. Bombs from a half-pound (152 mm) unicorn were filled with cyanide cacodyle. In one of the experiments, such a bomb was exploded in a log house, where there were twelve cats protected from shrapnel. A few hours later, a commission headed by Adjutant General Barantsev visited the site of the explosion. All the cats lay motionless on the floor, their eyes were watering, but they were all alive. Upset by this fact, Barantsev wrote a resolution stating that it was impossible to use chemical ammunition either now or in the future due to the fact that they do not have a lethal effect. It did not occur to the adjutant general that it is not always necessary to kill the enemy. Sometimes it is enough to temporarily disable him or force him to flee by throwing away his weapon. Apparently, the general actually had sheep in his family. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of the massive use of chemical shells near Plevna. In the absence of gas masks, even field artillery can force any fortress to surrender.

In addition to all that has been said, the true disaster for the Russian army in this war was the invasion of the titular locusts. Before the start of the war, the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, addressed a letter to Alexander II, in which he argued the undesirability of the Tsar’s presence in the army, and also asked not to send the Grand Dukes there. Alexander II answered his brother that “the upcoming campaign is of a religious-national character,” and therefore he “cannot remain in St. Petersburg,” but promised not to interfere with the orders of the commander-in-chief. The Tsar was going to start rewarding distinguished military personnel and visiting the wounded and sick. “I will be a brother of mercy,” Alexander finished the letter. He also refused the second request. They say, in view special character campaigns, absence of grand dukes in the army Russian society can understand how they are evading their patriotic and military duty. “In any case,” wrote Alexander I, “Sasha [Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, future Tsar Alexander III], as the future Emperor, cannot help but participate in the campaign, and at least in this way I hope to make a man out of him.”

Alexander II still went to the army. The Tsarevich, Grand Dukes Alexei Alexandrovich, Vladimir Alexandrovich, Sergei Alexandrovich, Konstantin Konstantinovich and others were also there. They all tried to give advice, if not to command. The trouble from the Tsar and the Grand Dukes was not only incompetent advice. With each of them rode a large retinue of confidants, lackeys, cooks, their own guards, etc. Together with the emperor, there were always ministers in the army - military, internal and foreign affairs, and other ministers visited regularly. The tsar's stay in the army cost the treasury one and a half million rubles. And it’s not just about money - there were no military operations in the theater railways. The army experienced constant supply shortages; there were not enough horses, oxen, fodder, carts, etc. The terrible roads were clogged with troops and vehicles. Is there any need to explain the chaos caused by the thousands of horses and carts that served the Tsar and the Grand Dukes?

December 10, 1877 during Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 Russian troops, after a difficult siege, captured Plevna, forcing the surrender of the 40,000-strong Turkish army. This was an important victory for Russia, but it came at a considerable price.

“Defeated. Memorial Service"

Heavy battles near Plevna, which cost the Russian army tens of thousands of killed and wounded, are reflected in painting. The famous battle painter V.V. Vereshchagin, former member siege of Plevna (one of his brothers was killed during the Third Assault on the fortress, and the other was wounded), dedicated the canvas “The Vanquished. Requiem service." Much later, after the death of V.V. Vereshchagin himself in 1904, another participant in the events near Plevna, scientist V.M. Bekhterev, responded to this picture with the following poem:

The entire field is covered with thick grass.
Not roses, but corpses cover it
The priest stands with his head naked.
While swinging the censer he reads....
And the choir behind him sings together, drawn out
One after another prayers.
He rewards eternal memory and sorrow
To all those who fell for their homeland in battle.

Under a hail of bullets

One of the factors that determined the high losses of the Russian army during the three unsuccessful assaults on Plevna and a number of other battles for the capture of Turkish strongholds around this fortress was the high density of fire from the Turkish infantry. Often, Turkish soldiers had two types of firearms at the same time - the American Peabody-Martini rifle for long-range shooting and Winchester repeating carbines for close combat, which made it possible to create high density fire. Of the famous battle paintings where the Turks are depicted simultaneously with rifles and carbines is the painting by A. N. Popov “Defense of the Eagle’s Nest by the Oryol and Bryants on August 12, 1877” (events at the Shipka Pass) - the appearance of the Turkish soldiers near Plevna was similar .

In the 16th division

A number of striking episodes of the Russian-Turkish war are associated with the name of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev. Noteworthy is the preparation of Skobelev's 16th division for the crossing of the Balkans after the capture of Plevna. Firstly, Skobelev rearmed his division with Peabody-Martini rifles, which were taken in huge quantities from the Plevna arsenals. Most Russian infantry units in the Balkans were armed with the Krynka rifle, and only the Guard and the Grenadier Corps had more modern Berdan rifles. Unfortunately, other Russian military leaders did not follow Skobelev’s example. Secondly, Skobelev, using the shops (warehouses) of Plevna, provided his soldiers with warm clothing, and when moving to the Balkans also with firewood - therefore, moving along one of the most difficult sections of the Balkans - the Imetli Pass, the 16th Division did not lose a single person to frostbite .

Troop supply

The Russo-Turkish War and the siege of Plevna were marked by enormous difficulties in military supply, which, under very dark circumstances, was entrusted to the Greger-Gerwitz-Cogan Partnership. The siege of Plevna was carried out in extremely difficult conditions of the beginning of the autumn thaw. Diseases increased and there was a threat of famine. Up to 200 people were out of action every day. During the war, the size of the Russian army near Plevna constantly increased, and its needs increased. Therefore, in September 1877, two civilian transports were formed, consisting of 23 departments of 350 horse-drawn carts each, and in November 1877, two more transports, consisting of 28 departments of the same composition. By the end of the siege of Plevna in November, 26 thousand 850 civilian carts and a large number of other transport. The fighting in the autumn of 1877 was also marked by the first appearance of field kitchens in the Russian army much earlier than other European countries.

E. I. Totleben

After the Third unsuccessful assault on Plevna on August 30-31, 1877, the famous engineer, hero of the defense of Sevastopol E. I. Totleben was called to lead the siege work. He managed to establish a tight blockade of the fortress, destroy Turkish water mills in Plevna by releasing streams of water from open dams, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to bake bread. The outstanding fortifier did a lot to improve the life of the troops besieging Plevna, preparing the Russian camp for the inclement autumn and the approaching cold weather. Refusing frontal attacks on Plevna, Totleben organized constant military demonstrations in front of the fortress, forcing the Turks to maintain significant forces in the first line of defense and carry big losses from concentrated Russian artillery fire. Totleben himself noted: “The enemy is only defensive, and I conduct continuous demonstrations against him so that he assumes on our part the intention to storm. When the Turks fill the redoubts and trenches with men, and their reserves approach, I order volleys of a hundred or more guns to be fired. In this way I am trying to avoid losses on our part, thereby inflicting daily losses on the Turks.”

November 28 (December 11 according to the “new style”), 1877. Capture of Plevna by Russian troops. Surrender Turkish army Osman Pasha

Monument to the heroes of Plevna in Moscow (1887)

During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. For the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, the Turkish fortress of Plevna in Bulgaria was a serious threat to the right flank and rear of the Russian army, it riveted its main forces to itself and slowed down the offensive in the Balkans.

After a bloody four-month siege and three unsuccessful attacks, the besieged army of Osman Pasha ran out of food supplies, and on November 28 at 7 o’clock in the morning he made the last attempt to break through to the west of Plevna, where he threw all his forces. The first furious onslaught forced our troops to retreat from the forward fortifications. But artillery fire from the second line of fortifications did not allow the Turks to escape from the encirclement. The grenadiers went on the attack and drove the Turks back. From the north, the Romanians attacked the Turkish line, and from the south, General Skobelev burst into the city.

Osman Pasha was wounded in the leg. Realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he threw out in several places White flag. When Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich appeared on the battlefield, the Turks had already surrendered. The last assault on Plevna cost the Russians 192 killed and 1,252 wounded, the Turks lost up to 4,000 people. 44 thousand surrendered, including Osman Pasha. However, by personal order of Emperor Alexander II, for the courage shown by the Turks, his saber was returned to the wounded and captured Turkish general.

In just four months of the siege and fighting near Plevna, about 31 thousand Russian soldiers died. However, this became a turning point in the war: the capture of this fortress allowed the Russian command to free up over 100 thousand people for the offensive, and a month later the Turks requested a truce. The Russian army occupied Andrianople without a fight and approached Constantinople, but the Western powers did not allow Russia to occupy it, threatening a severance of diplomatic relations (and England with mobilization). Emperor Alexander II did not risk a new war, since the main goal was achieved: the defeat of Turkey and the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. So it seemed. Negotiations have begun on this. On February 19, 1878, peace with Turkey was signed in San Stefano. And although the Western powers did not allow the complete unification of the Bulgarian lands to be achieved at that time, this war became the basis for the future independence of a united Bulgaria.

Battle of Plevna November 28, 1877

On the day of the decade heroic battle, in the center of Moscow at the beginning of Ilyinsky Square, a chapel-monument to the grenadiers who fell in the battle near Plevna was consecrated. The chapel was built on the initiative and with voluntary donations from the surviving grenadiers who took part in the Battle of Plevna. The author of the project was academician of architecture V.O. Sherwood. The cast-iron octagonal chapel ends with a tent with an Orthodox cross trampling the Muslim crescent. Its side faces are decorated with 4 high reliefs: a Russian peasant blessing his grenadier son before a campaign; a Janissary snatching a child from the arms of a Bulgarian mother; a grenadier capturing a Turkish soldier; a Russian warrior tearing the chains off a woman representing Bulgaria. On the edges of the tent there are inscriptions: “Grenadiers to their comrades who fell in the glorious battle near Plevna on November 28, 1877”, “In memory of the war with Turkey of 1877-78” and a list of the main battles - “Plevna, Kars, Aladzha, Hadji Vali” . In front of the monument there are cast-iron pedestals with the inscription “In favor of crippled grenadiers and their families” (there were donation mugs on them). The interior of the chapel, decorated with polychrome tiles, contained picturesque images of saints Alexander Nevsky, John the Warrior, Nicholas the Wonderworker, Cyril and Methodius, and bronze plates with the names of the fallen grenadiers - 18 officers and 542 soldiers.

Background

Third assault

Returning to Pleven, surrounded by superior enemy forces, Osman Pasha began to prepare to repel a new attack. His army was replenished and reached 25,000 people, the minarets of Pleven began to be used as observation posts, the wounded were evacuated from Pleven, and signs with the names of fortifications were installed in the city.

To lock the Turks in Pleven, the Russians moved to Gorny Dubnyak and Telish. To capture Mountain Dubnyak, 20,000 people and 60 guns were allocated; they were opposed by a garrison of 3,500 soldiers and 4 guns. Having started the battle on the morning of October 24, the Russian grenadiers captured both redoubts at the cost of huge losses. The Turks put up fierce resistance and fought to the last bullet, but, having lost their redoubts, capitulated. The losses were: 1,500 Turks (another 2,300 were captured), 3,600 Russians.

In Telish, the defense was successful, the Turkish garrison repelled the attack, inflicting huge losses on the attackers in manpower. About 1,000 Russian soldiers died in the battle versus 200 among the Turks. Telish was captured only with the help of powerful artillery fire, but the success of this shelling lay not so much in the number of killed Turkish defenders, which was small, but in the demoralizing effect it produced, forcing the garrison to surrender.

A complete blockade of Pleven began, Russian guns periodically struck the city. The Russian-Romanian army besieging Pleven consisted of 122 thousand people against 50 thousand Turks who had taken refuge in Pleven. The blockade of the city led to the depletion of provisions in it; Osman Pasha's army suffered from disease, lack of food and medicine. Meanwhile, Russian troops carry out a series of attacks: in early November, Skobelev’s troops occupied and held the first ridge of the Green Mountains, repelling enemy counterattacks. On November 9, the Russians attacked in the direction of the Southern Front, but the Turks repelled the attack, losing 200 soldiers versus 600 for the Russians. Russian attacks on the fortifications of Yunus-Tabiya and Gazi-Osman-Tabiya were also unsuccessful. On the thirteenth, the Russians launched an attack on the fortification of Yunus Bey Tabiy, losing 500 people, the Turks lost 100 defenders. On the fourteenth, at midnight, the Turks repelled the attack on Gazi-Osman-Tabiya. As a result of these actions, the Russians lost 2,300 people, the Turks - 1,000. Starting from the next day, there was a lull. Pleven was surrounded by a 125,000-strong Russian-Romanian army with 496 guns, its garrison was completely cut off from outside world. Knowing that the food in the city would sooner or later run out, the Russians invited the defenders of Pleven to surrender, to which Osman Pasha responded with a decisive refusal:

“... I prefer to sacrifice our lives for the benefit of the people and in defense of the truth, and with the greatest joy and happiness I am ready to shed blood rather than shamefully lay down my arms.”

(quoted from N.V. Skritsky “Balkan Gambit”).

Monument in Moscow

Due to a lack of food in the besieged city, shops were closed, soldiers' rations were reduced, most of the inhabitants suffered from disease, the army was exhausted

None of the people knows anything in advance. And the greatest misfortune can befall a person in best place, and the greatest happiness will find him - in the worst...

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

In foreign policy Russian Empire In the 19th century there were four wars with the Ottoman Empire. Russia won three of them and lost one. The last war in the 19th century, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 broke out between the two countries, in which Russia won. The victory was one of the results of the military reform of Alexander 2. As a result of the war, the Russian Empire regained a number of territories, and also helped to gain the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania. In addition, for non-intervention in the war, Austria-Hungary received Bosnia, and England received Cyprus. The article is devoted to a description of the causes of the war between Russia and Turkey, its stages and main battles, the results and historical consequences of the war, as well as an analysis of the countries' reactions Western Europe to strengthen Russia's influence in the Balkans.

What were the causes of the Russo-Turkish War?

Historians highlight following reasons Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878:

1. Exacerbation of the “Balkan” issue.
2. Russia's desire to regain its status as an influential player in the foreign arena.
3. Russian support for the national movement of Slavic peoples in the Balkans, seeking to expand its influence in this region. This caused intense resistance from European countries and Ottoman Empire.
4. The conflict between Russia and Turkey over the status of the straits, as well as the desire for revenge for the defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
5. Turkey's unwillingness to compromise, ignoring not only the demands of Russia, but also the European community.

Now let's look at the reasons for the war between Russia and Turkey in more detail, since it is important to know them and interpret them correctly. Despite the loss Crimean War, Russia, thanks to some reforms (primarily military) of Alexander 2, again became an influential and strong state in Europe. This forced many politicians in Russia to think about revenge for the lost war. But this was not even the most important thing - much more important was the desire to regain the right to have Black Sea Fleet. In many ways, it was to achieve this goal that the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was unleashed, which we will talk briefly about later.

In 1875, an uprising against Turkish rule began in Bosnia. The army of the Ottoman Empire brutally suppressed it, but already in April 1876 an uprising began in Bulgaria. Türkiye also cracked down on this national movement. As a sign of protest against the policy towards the southern Slavs, and also wanting to realize its territorial goals, Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in June 1876. The Serbian army was much weaker than the Turkish one. Russia with early XIX century, positioned itself as a defender of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans, so Chernyaev, as well as several thousand Russian volunteers, went to Serbia.

After the defeat of the Serbian army in October 1876 near Dyuniš, Russia called on Turkey to stop fighting and guarantee the cultural rights of the Slavic people. The Ottomans, feeling the support of Britain, ignored the ideas of Russia. Despite the obviousness of the conflict, the Russian Empire tried to resolve the issue peacefully. Proof of this are several conferences convened by Alexander 2, in particular in January 1877 in Istanbul. Ambassadors and representatives of key European countries gathered there, but general decision did not come.

In March, an agreement was signed in London, which obligated Turkey to carry out reforms, but the latter completely ignored it. Thus, Russia has only one option left for resolving the conflict - military. Before the last Alexander 2 did not dare to start a war with Turkey, because he was worried that the war would again turn into resistance of European countries to Russian foreign policy. On April 12, 1877, Alexander 2 signed a manifesto declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the emperor concluded an agreement with Austria-Hungary on the latter’s non-entry on the side of Turkey. In exchange for neutrality, Austria-Hungary was to receive Bosnia.

Map of the Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878

Main battles of the war

Several important battles took place between April and August 1877:

• Already on the first day of the war, Russian troops captured key Turkish fortresses on the Danube and also crossed the Caucasian border.
• On April 18, Russian troops captured Boyazet, an important Turkish fortress in Armenia. However, already in the period June 7-28, the Turks tried to carry out a counter-offensive; Russian troops survived the heroic struggle.
• At the beginning of the summer, General Gurko's troops captured the ancient Bulgarian capital of Tarnovo, and on July 5 they established control over the Shipka Pass, through which the road to Istanbul went.
• During May-August, Romanians and Bulgarians began to create en masse partisan detachments to help the Russians in the war with the Ottomans.

Battle of Plevna in 1877

The main problem for Russia was that the emperor’s inexperienced brother, Nikolai Nikolaevich, commanded the troops. Therefore, individual Russian troops actually acted without a center, which means they acted as uncoordinated units. As a result, on July 7-18, two unsuccessful attempts were made to storm Plevna, as a result of which about 10 thousand Russians died. In August, the third assault began, which turned into a protracted blockade. At the same time, from August 9 until December 28, the heroic defense of the Shipka Pass lasted. In this sense, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, even briefly, seems very contradictory in events and personalities.

In the autumn of 1877, the key battle took place near the Plevna fortress. By order of the Minister of War D. Milyutin, the army abandoned the assault on the fortress and moved on to a systematic siege. The army of Russia, as well as its ally Romania, numbered about 83 thousand people, and the garrison of the fortress consisted of 34 thousand soldiers. The last battle near Plevna took place on November 28, Russian army emerged victorious and was finally able to capture the impregnable fortress. This was one of the largest defeats of the Turkish army: 10 generals and several thousand officers were captured. In addition, Russia was establishing control over an important fortress, opening its way to Sofia. This was the beginning of a turning point in the Russian-Turkish war.

Eastern front

On eastern front the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 also developed rapidly. At the beginning of November, another important strategic fortress was captured - Kars. Due to simultaneous failures on two fronts, Turkey completely lost control over the movement of its own troops. On December 23, the Russian army entered Sofia.

Russia entered 1878 with a complete advantage over the enemy. On January 3, the assault on Phillipopolis began, and already on the 5th the city was taken, and the road to Istanbul was opened for the Russian Empire. On January 10, Russia enters Adrianople, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire is a fact, the Sultan is ready to sign peace on Russia’s terms. Already on January 19, the parties agreed on a preliminary agreement, which significantly strengthened Russia’s role in the Black and Marmara Seas, as well as in the Balkans. This caused great concern in European countries.

Reaction of major European powers to the successes of Russian troops

England expressed its dissatisfaction most of all, which already at the end of January sent a fleet into the Sea of ​​Marmara, threatening an attack in the event of a Russian invasion of Istanbul. England demanded that Russian troops be withdrawn from the Turkish capital, and also begin to develop a new treaty. Russia found itself in a difficult situation, which threatened to repeat the scenario of 1853-1856, when the entry of European troops violated Russia's advantage, which led to defeat. Taking this into account, Alexander 2 agreed to revise the treaty.

On February 19, 1878, in a suburb of Istanbul, San Stefano, a new treaty was signed with the participation of England.

The main results of the war were recorded in the San Stefano Peace Treaty:

• Russia annexed Bessarabia, as well as part of Turkish Armenia.
• Türkiye paid an indemnity of 310 million rubles to the Russian Empire.
• Russia received the right to have a Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol.
• Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained independence, and Bulgaria received this status 2 years later, after the final withdrawal of Russian troops from there (who were there in case Turkey tried to return the territory).
• Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy status, but were actually occupied by Austria-Hungary.
• In peacetime, Turkey was supposed to open ports to all ships heading to Russia.
• Turkey was obliged to organize reforms in the cultural sphere (in particular for the Slavs and Armenians).

However, these conditions did not suit the European states. As a result, in June-July 1878, a congress was held in Berlin, at which some decisions were revised:

1. Bulgaria was divided into several parts, and only the northern part received independence, while the southern part was returned to Turkey.
2. The amount of indemnity decreased.
3. England received Cyprus, and Austria-Hungary received the official right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Heroes of War

The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 traditionally became a “minute of glory” for many soldiers and military leaders. In particular, several Russian generals became famous:

• Joseph Gurko. Hero of the capture of the Shipka Pass, as well as the capture of Adrianople.
• Mikhail Skobilev. He led the heroic defense of the Shipka Pass, as well as the capture of Sofia. He received the nickname “White General”, and is considered a national hero among the Bulgarians.
• Mikhail Loris-Melikov. Hero of the battles for Boyazet in the Caucasus.

In Bulgaria there are over 400 monuments erected in honor of the Russians who fought in the war with the Ottomans in 1877-1878. There are many memorial plaques, mass graves, etc. One of the most famous monuments is the Freedom Monument on the Shipka Pass. There is also a monument to Emperor Alexander 2. There are also many settlements, named after Russians. Thus Bulgarian people thanks the Russians for the liberation of Bulgaria from Turkey, and the end of Muslim rule, which lasted more than five centuries. During the war, the Bulgarians called the Russians themselves “brothers,” and this word remained in the Bulgarian language as a synonym for “Russians.”

Historical reference

Historical significance of the war

The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 ended with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian Empire, however, despite the military success, European states quickly resisted the strengthening of Russia's role in Europe. In an effort to weaken Russia, England and Turkey insisted that not all the aspirations of the southern Slavs were realized, in particular, not the entire territory of Bulgaria received independence, and Bosnia passed from Ottoman occupation to Austrian occupation. As a result, the national problems of the Balkans became even more complicated, eventually turning the region into the “powder keg of Europe.” It was here that the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne took place, becoming the reason for the outbreak of the First World War. This is generally a funny and paradoxical situation - Russia wins victories on the battlefields, but over and over again suffers defeats in the diplomatic fields.

Russia regained its lost territories and the Black Sea Fleet, but never achieved the desire to dominate the Balkan Peninsula. This factor was also used by Russia when joining the First world war. For the Ottoman Empire, which was completely defeated, the idea of ​​revenge persisted, which forced it to enter into a world war against Russia. These were the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which we briefly reviewed today.