Crimean campaigns of Russian troops. Crimean campaigns

CRIMINAL CAMPAIGNS, campaigns of Russian troops under the command of the boyar Prince V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate during the Russian-Turkish war of 1686-1700. According to the articles of the “Eternal Peace” of 1686, the Russian state pledged to break the Bakhchisarai Peace of 1681 with the Ottoman Empire, protect the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the raids of the Crimean Khans, and also encourage the Don Cossacks to make a campaign against the Crimean Khanate in 1687. The Crimean campaigns were undertaken to stop the Crimean and Turkish raids on the southern outskirts of Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and protect trade routes, as well as to divert the forces of the Crimean Tatars from their possible participation in military operations on the Dniester and Prut.

The plan of the first campaign of 1687 provided for the offensive of Russian troops in combination with the actions of the Don and Ukrainian Cossacks. Don Cossacks, led by Ataman F. M. Minaev, were sent to strike the right flank of the Crimean Tatars, and Ukrainian Cossacks Chernigov colonel G.I. Samoilovich, together with the governor of the Sevsky regiment, Okolnichy L.R. Neplyuev, was sent to the lower reaches of the Dnieper to the Tatar fortress Kyzy-Kermen (Kazy-Kermen). These actions forced the Crimean Khan Selim Girey I to concentrate all his efforts on the defense of his possessions, and as a result he was unable to provide assistance to the Turkish troops operating against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria and Venice. Russian troops gathered in several places: the Big Regiment (close boyar Prince V.V. Golitsyn, boyar Prince K.O. Shcherbatov, okolnichy V.A. Zmeev) - in Akhtyrka; Novgorod category (boyar A.S. Shein, okolnichy prince D.A. Baryatinsky) - in Sumy; Ryazan category (boyar Prince V.D. Dolgorukov, okolnichy P.D. Skuratov) - in Khotmyzhsk; Sevsky Regiment - in Krasny Kut. The regimental commanders set out from Moscow on 22.2 (4.3).1687. At the beginning of May 1687, about 60 thousand soldiers, archers, spearmen, reiters, as well as 50 thousand noble cavalry and artillery were concentrated on the Merlo River. Approximately 67% of the Russian army were regiments of the new system. On the Samara River she was joined by Ukrainian Cossacks (up to 50 thousand) under the command of Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine I.S. Samoilovich. On June 13 (23), 1687, the Russian army, having covered only 300 km in 6 weeks, camped in the Bolshoy Lug tract. The next day, the Russian army began moving towards the Or (Perekop) fortress. Having learned about the approach of the Russians, the Tatars burned the grass over a large area, depriving the Russian army of pasture for their horses. On June 14-15 (24-25), the army advanced less than 13 km, experiencing great difficulties due to the lack of water and fodder. Golitsyn convened a military council at the Karachakrak River, at which it was decided to return to the Russian state. On July 12 (22), Duma clerk F.L. Shaklovity arrived at Golitsyn on the Orel River with proposals from Princess Sofia Alekseevna to continue military operations, and if impossible, to build fortresses on the Samara and Orel rivers and leave garrisons and equipment there to protect the Left Bank Ukraine from raids of the Crimean Tatars [in the summer of 1688, the Novobogoroditskaya fortress was built (now on the territory of the village of Shevchenko, Dnepropetrovsk region of Ukraine), where the Russian-Cossack garrison was located and over 5.7 thousand tons of food were concentrated]. During their return from the 1st Crimean campaign, I. S. Mazepa and V. L. Kochubey drew up a false denunciation against Hetman I. S. Samoilovich, in which, among other things, they accused the hetman of being an opponent of the Russian-Polish alliance, erroneously advised to go on a campaign in the spring, initiated the arson of the steppe. 22-25.7 (1-4.8).1687 at the so-called Kolomak Rada, I. S. Samoilovich was deposed, and Mazepa was elected the new hetman. 14(24).8.1687 the Russian army returned to the bank of the Merlo River, where it was dispersed to their homes. The government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna, despite the obvious failure of the enterprise, recognized the campaign as a success and awarded its participants.

Sofya Alekseevna 18(28).9.1688 announced the need for a new Crimean campaign. The Russian command took into account the lessons of the first campaign and planned to begin the second in early spring, so that the cavalry in the steppe would be provided with pasture. At the same time, in 1689, the foreign policy situation of the Russian state became more complicated, since, contrary to the conditions of the “Eternal Peace” of 1686, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. To set out on the second campaign in 1689, Russian troops again gathered in different places: Large regiment (Golitsyn, steward Prince Ya. F. Dolgorukov, Zmeev) - in Sumy; Novgorod category (Shane, steward Prince F. Yu. Baryatinsky) - in Rylsk; Ryazan category (V.D. Dolgorukov, Duma nobleman A.I. Khitrovo) - in Oboyan; Sevsky Regiment (L. R. Neplyuev) - in Mezherechy; The Kazan regiment (boyar B.P. Sheremetev), including a special regiment of the Lower Nobles (okolnichy I.Yu. Leontyev, steward Dmitriev-Mamonov), is in Chuguev. On April 15-18 (25-28), troops (about 112 thousand people) united on the Orel River, artillery numbered up to 350 guns. On the Samara River on April 20 (30), the army was joined by a detachment of Cossacks (about 40 thousand people) of the Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine I. S. Mazepa. The Russian army advanced south in the same marching order as in 1687. To repel the offensive of the Russian army, Selim Giray I gathered an army numbering up to 160 thousand people. On May 13 (23), a Tatar detachment (10 thousand people) attacked the Russian camp located on the Koirka River. The next day, the main forces of the Tatars attacked Golitsyn’s army at the Black Valley tract, but, having suffered heavy losses from Russian artillery fire, retreated. Having repulsed the attacks of the Tatar cavalry, the Russian army moved in the direction of the Kalanchak River and on May 20 (30) approached Perekop. The main forces of the Tatars surrounded the Russian army, but their attacks were again repelled mainly by artillery fire. Golitsyn entered into negotiations with representatives of the khan, demanding the return of all Russian prisoners captured during the Crimean raids, stopping the raids, refusing tribute, not attacking the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and not helping the Ottoman Empire. On May 22 (June 1) the demand was rejected by the khan. The power of the Perekop fortifications and the fact that the Russian army was weakened by disease and lack of water forced Golitsyn to retreat, abandoning some of the guns. On May 29 (June 8), Russian regiments pursued by the Tatar cavalry reached the southern borders of the Russian state. On June 19 (29), the army was disbanded. The government of Sofia Alekseevna solemnly welcomed Golitsyn in Moscow.

Despite the ineffectiveness of the Crimean campaigns, the Russian state made a significant contribution to the fight against Turkish aggression in Europe. It diverted the main forces of the Crimean Tatars, and the Ottoman Empire lost the support of the numerous Crimean cavalry. However, the Crimean campaigns did not solve the problems of protecting the southern borders of the Russian state and eliminating the source of possible aggression in Crimea. The main reasons for the failures of the Crimean campaigns were: the incompleteness of military reforms of the mid-17th century in the Russian state; the existence, along with the regiments of the new system, of the outdated noble local army and detachments of archers, distinguished by poor discipline; insufficient experience of V.V. Golitsyn as an army commander; dispersion of army control between different government agencies and others. The lessons of the Crimean campaigns were taken into account by Tsar Peter I in the Azov campaigns of 1695-96.

Source: Correspondence of Patriarch Joachim with the governors who were in the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689. / Comp. L. M. Savelov. Simferopol, 1906; Neuville de la. Notes about Muscovy. M., 1996.

Lit.: Ustryalov N. G. History of the reign of Peter the Great. St. Petersburg, 1858. T. 1; Golitsyn N.S. Russian military history. St. Petersburg, 1878. Part 2; Belov M.I. On the history of diplomatic relations of Russia during the Crimean campaigns // Uch. zap. LSU. 1949. T. 112; Babushkina G.K. International significance of the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 // Historical notes. 1950. T. 33; Bogdanov A.P. “True and true legend” about the 1st Crimean campaign // Problems of studying narrative sources on the history of the Russian Middle Ages. M., 1982; aka. Moscow journalism of the last quarter of the 17th century. M., 2001; Lavrentyev A.V. “Note to the sovereign’s measuring versts and camp of that Crimean campaign along the measuring versts wheel” 1689 // Natural scientific ideas Ancient Rus'. M., 1988; Artamonov V. A. Russia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Crimea 1686-1699 // Slavic collection. Saratov, 1993. Issue. 5; Stevens S. V. Soldiers on the steppe: army reform and social change in early modern Russia. DeKalb, 1995.

Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the larger European Great Turkish War.

First Crimean campaign

Second Crimean Campaign

Results

The Crimean campaigns made it possible to divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimeans for some time and benefited Russia’s European allies. Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved.

According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689:

My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello, having defeated the Hagarians by the grace of God and the Most Holy Theotokos and with your reason and happiness! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies!

There is an opinion that the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated after Peter I lost half of his entire army in the second Azov campaign, although he only received access to the inland Sea of ​​Azov.

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Notes

Literature

• Bogdanov A.P.“The true and true story of the Crimean campaign of 1687.” - a monument to journalism of the Ambassadorial Prikaz // Problems of studying narrative sources on the history of the Russian Middle Ages: Collection. articles / USSR Academy of Sciences. Institute of History of the USSR; Rep. ed. V. T. Pashuto. - M., 1982. - P. 57–84. - 100 s.

An excerpt characterizing the Crimean campaigns

Mom was completely captivated by dad's poems... And he wrote them to her a lot and brought them to her work every day along with huge posters drawn by his own hand (dad was a great drawer), which he unrolled right on her desktop, and on which , among all kinds of painted flowers, it was written in large letters: “Annushka, my star, I love you!” Naturally, what woman could withstand this for a long time and not give up?.. They never parted again... Using every free minute to spend it together, as if someone could take it away from them. Together they went to the movies, to dances (which they both loved very much), walked in the charming Alytus city park, until one fine day they decided that enough dates were enough and that it was time to look at life a little more seriously. Soon they got married. But only my father’s friend (my mother’s younger brother) Jonas knew about this, since this union did not cause much delight on either my mother’s or my father’s side of the family... My mother’s parents predicted for her a rich neighbor-teacher, whom they really liked, as her groom and, in their opinion, he “suited” his mother perfectly, and in his father’s family at that time there was no time for marriage, since grandfather was sent to prison at that time as an “accomplice of the nobles” (by which, they probably tried to “break” the stubbornly resisting dad), and my grandmother ended up in the hospital from a nervous shock and was very sick. Dad was left with his little brother in his arms and now had to run the entire household alone, which was very difficult, since the Seryogins at that time lived in a large two-story house (in which I later lived), with a huge old garden around. And, naturally, such a farm required good care...
So three long months passed, and my dad and mom, already married, were still going on dates, until my mom accidentally went to my dad’s house one day and found a very touching picture there... Dad stood in the kitchen in front of the stove, looking unhappy “replenishing” the hopelessly growing number of pots of semolina porridge, which at that moment he was cooking for his little brother. But for some reason the “evil” porridge became more and more, and poor dad could not understand what was happening... Mom, trying with all her might to hide a smile so as not to offend the unlucky “cook,” immediately rolled up her sleeves began to put this whole “stagnant household mess” in order, starting with the completely occupied, “porridge-filled” pots, the indignantly sizzling stove... Of course, after such an “emergency”, my mother could no longer calmly observe such a “heart-tugging” male helplessness, and decided to immediately move to this territory, which was still completely foreign and unfamiliar to her... And although it was not very easy for her at that time either - she worked at the post office (to support herself), and in the evenings she went to preparatory classes classes for medical school exams.

She, without hesitation, gave all her remaining strength to her exhausted young husband and his family. The house immediately came to life. The kitchen smelled overwhelmingly of delicious Lithuanian zeppelins, which my dad’s little brother adored and, just like dad, who had been sitting on dry food for a long time, he literally gorged himself on them to the “unreasonable” limit. Everything became more or less normal, except for the absence of my grandparents, about whom my poor dad was very worried, and sincerely missed them all this time. But now he already had a young, beautiful wife, who, as best she could, tried in every possible way to brighten up his temporary loss, and looking at my father’s smiling face, it was clear that she succeeded quite well. Dad’s little brother very soon got used to his new aunt and followed her tail, hoping to get something tasty or at least a beautiful “evening fairy tale”, which his mother read to him in great abundance before bed.
Days and then weeks passed so calmly in everyday worries. Grandmother, by that time, had already returned from the hospital and, to her great surprise, found her newly-made daughter-in-law at home... And since it was too late to change anything, they simply tried to get to know each other better, avoiding unwanted conflicts (which inevitably appear with any new, too close acquaintance). More precisely, they were simply getting used to each other, trying to honestly avoid any possible “underwater reefs”... I was always sincerely sorry that my mother and grandmother never fell in love with each other... They were both (or rather, my mother still are) wonderful people, and I loved them both very much. But if the grandmother, throughout their entire life together, somehow tried to adapt to her mother, then the mother - on the contrary, in the end grandma's life, sometimes showed her my irritation too openly, which deeply hurt me, since I was very attached to both of them and really did not like to fall, as they say, “between two fires” or forcibly take sides. I could never understand what caused this constant “quiet” war between these two wonderful women, but apparently there were some very good reasons for this, or perhaps my poor mother and grandmother were simply truly “incompatible” , as happens quite often with strangers living together. One way or another, it was a great pity, because, in general, it was a very friendly and faithful family, in which everyone stood up for each other and went through every trouble or misfortune together.
But let's go back to those days when all this was just beginning, and when each member of this new family honestly tried to “live together”, without creating any trouble for the others... Grandfather was already at home, but his health, to the great regret of everyone else , after the days spent in custody, it deteriorated sharply. Apparently, including the difficult days spent in Siberia, all the long ordeals of the Seryogins in unfamiliar cities did not spare the poor, life-torn grandfather’s heart - he began to have recurring micro-infarctions...
Mom became very friendly with him and tried as best she could to help him forget all the bad things as soon as possible, although she herself had a very, very difficult time. Over the past months, she managed to pass the preparatory and entrance exams for medical school. But, to her great regret, her long-time dream was not destined to come true for the simple reason that at that time in Lithuania she still had to pay for the institute, and her mother’s family (which had nine children) did not have enough finances for this.. In the same year, her still very young mother, my grandmother on my mother’s side, whom I also never saw, died from a severe nervous shock that happened several years ago. She fell ill during the war, on the day when she learned that there was a heavy bombing in the pioneer camp, in the seaside town of Palanga, and all the surviving children were taken to an unknown location... And among these children was her son , the youngest and favorite of all nine children. A few years later he returned, but, unfortunately, this could no longer help my grandmother. And in the first year of mom and dad life together, she slowly faded away... My mother's father - my grandfather - was left with a large family, of which only one of my mother's sisters - Domitsela - was married at that time.

Eternal peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was concluded on April 26, 1686. It assumed the possibility of joint actions by Russia and the Holy League as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria, the Holy See and Venice against the Ottomans. Pope Innocent XI (pontificate 1676–1689) was considered the nominal head of the Holy League. Russia's accession to the struggle of the Holy League became a turning point in the history of Russian-Polish relations: from the centuries-old struggle between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth up to the partitions of Poland late XVIII V. moved to the union. Strategically, it turned out to be much more beneficial for Russia than for Poland. The Polish historian Zbigniew Wojczek, who studied the development of Russian-Polish relations in the second half of the 17th century, stated that the war of 1654–1667. and the Eternal Peace of 1686 ended with “that the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden, Turkey and eo ipso the Crimean Khanate lost their positions in relation to Russia,” which through its actions won “hegemony among the Slavic peoples.” And University of London professor Lindsay Hughes summed up her analysis of foreign policy during Sophia's regency with the conclusion: “From now on, Russia took a strong position in Europe, which it never lost.” It is fair to recognize the Perpetual Peace of 1686 as the most important contribution of the Sophia regency to the long-term strategy of turning Russia into the main pole of geopolitical power in Eastern Europe and a Great European Power.

Patrick Gordon, who was in Russian service, made efforts to actually join Russia to the Holy League. From 1685 to 1699 he became one of the leading Moscow military leaders. It was Gordon who persuaded the head of the government of Sophia, Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, to pursue an alliance with the Holy League. This alliance of Christian states against the Ottomans and Crimea arose in 1683-1684. Gordon was a supporter of pan-Christian unity in repelling Turkish expansion. (In life, a zealous Catholic, Gordon always communicated tolerantly with Orthodox and Protestants, unless it concerned a religious issue in Britain. There Gordon wanted to stop “Protestant aggression.”) The idea of ​​a union between Russia and the Holy League permeates Gordon’s memorandum submitted to V.V. Golitsyn in January 1684

N.G. Ustryalov, citing Gordon’s memorandum of 1684 in its entirety, noted that V.V. Golitsyn treated him “indifferently.” This is an obvious misunderstanding, dictated and inspired by apologetics for Peter I, which demanded that all recent predecessors or opponents of Peter I be perceived as narrow-minded and useless for Russia. Another explanation for Ustryalov’s conclusion may be his understanding of the fact of unsuccessful Russian-Austrian negotiations in 1684. Imperial ambassadors Johann Christoph Zhirovsky and Sebastian Blumberg failed to conclude an alliance between the Habsburgs and Russia in Moscow in May 1684. Golitsyn's actions in 1685–1689, especially the conclusion of the Eternal Peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on April 26 (May 6, Gregorian style) 1686 and the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689. fully agree with the proposals of the Scottish general of 1684.

In a memorandum of 1684, the major general analyzed all the arguments for peace with the Ottoman Empire and in favor of war with it in alliance with the Holy League. Gordon, who served at one time in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, always paid tribute to Polish love of freedom, courage and cordiality, but he warned the Russian government that only the joint struggle of Christians with the Turks would make the Russian authorities’ fears about the anti-Russian plans of the Poles “unreasonable misunderstandings.” “Suspicion and distrust between neighboring states were, are and will continue to be,” noted Gordon. “Even the sacredness of so close a League cannot remove it, and I have no doubt that the Poles will retain such thoughts and grievances, for discord is weeds, nourished by the memory of past rivalries, unfriendliness and insults.” However, keep in mind that by doing a favor and helping them now, you will be able to erase, at least to a greater extent, soften the anger from past enmity, and if they turn out to be ungrateful, then you will have the advantage of a just cause, which is the main thing for waging war.

Patrick Gordon insisted on instilling in the Russian people the idea of ​​the need for victory over the Crimea, as well as on continuing to improve Russian military affairs. “...It is a very mistaken idea to think that you can always or for a long time live in peace among so many warlike and restless peoples who are your neighbors,” warns Gordon. He ends his message to V.V. Golitsyn in the words: “I will add that it is very dangerous to allow soldiers and people to get out of the habit of owning weapons when all your neighbors use them so diligently.” Gordon's memorandum also proposed a plan for the defeat of Crimea, which in 1687–1689. unsuccessfully tried to implement V.V. Golitsyn.

Gordon believed that the flat steppe surface would facilitate the movement of the Russian army to Perekop. “...With 40,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, you can easily accomplish this in one or at most two years. And the way there is not so difficult, only a two-day march without water, even so comfortable that you can walk the whole way in combat formation, except for very few places, and even there there are no forests, hills, crossings or swamps.” The international situation should also have made the campaign “easier.” The Ottoman expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was put to a limit. In the fall of 1683, the troops of the Holy Roman Empire and the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, led by King John Sobieski, defeated huge Turkish forces near Vienna. As subsequent history showed, the growth of Turkish possessions in European space ceased. The Ottoman Empire moved to maintain its conquests, but its military and economic backwardness, progressing against the backdrop of the rapid development of the European powers, doomed Turkey to a gradual but continuous weakening of its position as an empire and a great power.

This opened up brilliant strategic prospects for Russia to recapture Ottoman possessions in the Black Sea region. The Scottish commander felt them. But with “ease” he was clearly mistaken. The Russians were able to implement his plan to defeat the Crimean army and occupy Crimea for the first time only during the next (5th) Russian-Turkish War of 1735–1739. during the reign of Peter I's niece, Anna Ivanovna (1730–1740). The campaign of 1735 under the leadership of General Leontyev almost completely repeated the campaign of V.V. Golitsyn 1687 Russian troops reached Perekop and returned. In 1736, Field Marshal Minikh, president of the Military Collegium, who himself led the troops, defeated the Tatars, entered Crimea, took and burned Bakhchisarai, but was forced to leave the Crimean peninsula. Having no fleet either in Black or in Seas of Azov, the Russian forces in Crimea could have been blocked from the side of Perekop by the Crimean cavalry hastily returning from the Persian campaign.

The annexation of Crimea to Russia in 1783 was still a long way off. But this goal, proposed by Gordon as the immediate tactical task in 1684, has been around since the end of the 17th century. became strategic for the southern direction of Russian foreign policy.

Campaigns of V.V. Golitsyn to the Crimea in 1687 and 1689 became a real confirmation of Russia’s alliance with the anti-Turkish coalition. Golitsyn's offensive Crimean campaigns opened a new era in Russian foreign policy, which lasted until the First World War inclusive. The international meaning of the tactics of the Crimean campaigns as part of the international actions of the Holy League was to prevent the Tatar cavalry from helping the Turks in their actions in Central Europe. Internal tasks were reduced to the defeat of the Crimean cavalry and the occupation of Crimea. If the first international part of the Crimean campaigns was a success, then the second part was much worse.

Russian army after military reforms of the 17th century. was stronger than the Crimean one. Crimea had neither infantry nor modern artillery. All its power consisted of maneuverable medieval cavalry, which, having no convoys, moved quickly. The surprise of the attack was its main trump card, and the capture of people, livestock and some other booty was the main goal of the military campaigns of the Crimea. Creation by Russia in the 17th century. Four serrated defensive lines on the southern borders made it impossible for the Crimean cavalry to make an unexpected deep breakthrough into Russia. Only border raids by small Crimean detachments were carried out, and the scale of their production was incomparable with the 16th century, when the Crimeans reached Moscow. The reliability of Russian defense to a large extent provoked Crimean and Turkish aggression against the more accessible Little Russia. The Crimean campaigns were the first attempt at large offensive operations involving more than 100 thousand people on foreign territory.

The backbone of Golitsyn's army in both 1687 and 1689 were regiments of the new system. The army moved all the way to Perekop under the cover of the Wagenburg, a mobile fortification of 20 thousand carts. It is significant that the Tatars did not dare to give battle. In the 17th century In general, without European allies (for example, the Zaporozhye Cossacks) or their Turkish patrons, they did not dare to engage in general battles. It is no coincidence that General Gordon noted about the Crimeans: “Their former courage has been lost and the sudden invasions to which they previously subjected the Great Russians have been forgotten...”. The real enemies of the Russian army in the campaigns of 1687 and 1689. the heat and scorched steppe became. Lack of food for horses turned out to be a big problem for the Russian army. Food and water spoiled by the heat, as well as the hardships of marching high temperature and under the scorching sun were the second major problem. The Second Moscow Butyrsky Elected Soldiers' Regiment, distinguished by impeccable discipline and training, lost more than 100 out of 900 people on the march to the Russian border in April 1687. (By the way, losses on the march, even during the Napoleonic Wars, accounted for the majority of losses of all European armies, often exceeding combat losses.) The third group of problems was a consequence of the preservation of many medieval relics in the Russian army. “Noness” immediately surfaced, i.e. absenteeism or desertion of many service people. Conclusion by nobles, especially noble ones, large number The armed, but in fact completely useless servants accompanying them only delayed the movement of the already huge and slow army. But these were already minor costs. In essence, Golitsyn’s army fought not with the enemy, but with the climate and terrain. It turned out that in the conditions of the Wild Field these are much more powerful opponents than the Crimean Tatars.

It was the natural factor that Patrick Gordon did not appreciate in his project for the Crimean campaign in 1684, and in 1687 the main organizer of the Russian offensive, V.V., did not take it into account. Golitsyn. And no wonder. After all, this was the first large-scale rush of the Russians across the Wild Field to Perekop.

The scorched Wild Field met the Russian soldiers with completely unbearable conditions for a campaign. This is clearly reflected in the letters to the homeland of Franz Lefort, a lieutenant colonel and participant in the events. Lefort points out that the border river Samara met the Russian army with “not quite... healthy water. Having passed several more rivers, we reached the Konskaya Voda River, which concealed a strong poison in itself, which was discovered immediately when they began to drink from it... Nothing could be more terrible than what I saw here. Entire crowds of unfortunate warriors, exhausted by marching in the scorching heat, could not resist swallowing this poison, for death was only a consolation for them. Some drank from stinking puddles or swamps; others took off their hats filled with breadcrumbs and said goodbye to their comrades; they remained where they lay, not having the strength to walk due to the excessive excitement of the blood... We reached the Olba River, but its water also turned out to be poisonous, and everything around was destroyed: we saw only black earth and dust and could barely see each other. In addition, the whirlwinds raged constantly. All the horses were exhausted and fell in large numbers. We lost our heads. They looked everywhere for the enemy or the khan himself to give battle. Several Tatars were captured and one hundred and twenty of them were exterminated. The prisoners showed that the khan was coming at us with 80,000 thousand Tatars. However, his horde also suffered severely, because everything up to Perekop was burned out.”

Lefort reports huge losses of the Russian army, but not from battles that did not occur on the way to Perekop, and even greater losses when returning from there. Many German officers also fell. Death “kidnapped our best officers,” states Lefort, “among other things, three colonels: Vaugh, Flivers, Balzer and up to twenty German lieutenant colonels, majors and captains.”

The question of who set the steppe on fire is still controversial. A number of researchers believe that the Tatars did this, seeing no other opportunity to stop the Russians. But the fire doomed the Crimeans themselves to inaction. They also had nothing to feed their horses, and they found themselves locked on the Crimean peninsula. The second version comes from the assessment of what happened by the Russian authorities and now has more and more supporters. The fire was organized by the Cossacks, who were not interested in this war, since it led to the strengthening of Moscow’s position, its dictatorship over the Cossack elders, and the distraction of the Cossacks from the defense of Ukrainian territories proper.

In addition, many Ukrainians still saw the Poles as their main enemy, and the Crimean Campaign of 1687 also involved actions to protect Poland and Hungary, where the troops of the Holy League fought the Ottomans. Gordon constantly reports on Russia's allied obligations. For example, describing the retreat of the Russian army in 1687, he stated: “So, we slowly went back to the Samara River, from where we sent 20 thousand Cossacks beyond Borysthenes to monitor the actions of the Tatars and guard so that they did not invade Poland or Hungary , and in order to firmly block all crossings.” The anti-Polish sentiments of the “Russian Cossacks” were generated not only by old grievances and religious enmity. The “Russian Cossacks” saw in the robbery of Polish possessions their “legitimate booty,” which they were clearly deprived of by the alliance of Russia and the Holy League.

Patrick Gordon, in one of his letters to Earl Middleton, a high-ranking nobleman at the court of the English king James II, wrote on July 26, 1687: “The Ukrainian hetman Ivan Samoilovich (a man with great power and influence) was very opposed to peace with the Poles and this campaign, everyone measures hindered and slowed down our progress.” This message from Gordon, a direct participant in the events, whose “Diary” is usually confirmed by information from other sources, is a serious indirect confirmation of Samoilovich’s guilt. True, it was in relation to Hetman Samoilovich that Patrick Gordon could have a biased opinion. At one time, the hetman offended his son-in-law, the Kyiv governor F.P. Sheremetev, with whom Gordon was friends. After the death of Sheremetev’s wife, the hetman’s daughter, Samoilovich demanded that his daughter’s dowry be returned to him and his grandson be raised.

However, rumors that it was the Ukrainian Cossacks, with the connivance, if not the direct command of Hetman Samoilovich, who burned the steppe, besides Gordon, are also reported by the “neutral” Lefort: “They could not understand how the Tatars managed to burn out all the grass. The Cossack hetman was suspected of complicity with the Tatar Khan.” For example, after the Cossacks crossed the bridges over the Samara River, for some reason the bridges burned down, and the Russians had to build a new crossing in order to move on.

One way or another, Hetman I.S. had to answer for the return of Russian troops without victories over the Tatars. Samoilovich. He was unpopular among Ukrainians. The hetman's son Semyon (died in 1685) carried out in February-March 1679 the population of the “Turkish” Right Bank Ukraine behind the left bank of the Dnieper. Moscow did not leave the settlers under the rule of the hetman. They wandered around the “Russian” Sloboda Ukraine until 1682, until, finally, in 1682, a decree came about the places of settlement allocated to them there. The foreman was strained by Samoilovich’s despotic temper. Having lost the support of Moscow, Ivan Samoilovich could not stay in power. V.V. Golitsyn gave rise to the denunciation of the Zaporozhye general foremen and a number of colonels about the alleged betrayal of the hetman of Russia. As a result, Ivan Samoilovich lost his mace, his son Gregory was executed in Sevsk for “thieves’, fanciful” speeches about Russian sovereigns. Considerable wealth of the Samoilovichs was confiscated - half went to the royal treasury, half to the treasury of the Zaporozhye army. The hetman himself (without investigation into his case) and his son Yakov were sent into Siberian exile, where he died in 1690.

Mazepa became the new hetman of “Russian Ukraine”. Gordon characterizes him as a great supporter of the union of Russia and the Holy League. “Yesterday, someone named Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa,” Gordon informed Middleton, “a former adjutant general, was elected to his (Samoilovich’s) place. This person is more committed to the Christian cause and, we hope, will be more active and diligent in stopping the Tatar raids on Poland and Hungary...” This refers to the participation of the Cossacks in operations directed against the participation of the Crimean Tatars in the actions of the Ottomans in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or in Hungary. The government of Sophia had some doubts about Ivan Mazepa’s loyalty to Russia. The princess's trusted associate, Duma nobleman Fyodor Leontyevich Shaklovity, went to Ukraine to investigate this matter. “Having returned,” Gordon reports, “he gave a favorable report about the hetman, but with an admixture of some guesses and suspicions about him because of his origin (he is a Pole), and therefore about his possible goodwill, if not secret relations with this people "

The campaign of 1687 made a due impression on the Tatars. They did not risk organizing a large-scale counter-offensive in 1688, limiting themselves to the traditional raids of individual detachments on the Russian border. The serif lines did not allow the Tatars to break through into the depths Russian territory. In view of a possible new Russian offensive, the khan did not dare to go far from his own borders.

This certainly contributed to the victories of other members of the Holy League in 1687–1688. Gordon defined the Ottoman army without the Crimean cavalry as “a bird without wings.” After the capture of Buda (1686), Prince Ludwig of Baden with 3-4 thousand of his people defeated 15 thousand Turks in Bosnia near the village of Trivenic in 1688. In the same year, General von Scherfen captured Belgrade from the Ottomans after a 27-day siege. The losses of the imperial troops were several times less than the Turkish ones. Things were worse for the Poles. They were defeated at Kamenets, where the Ottomans acted with the Crimean Tatars. It is noteworthy that the Poles explained their defeat precisely by the fact that the Muscovites did not distract the Tatars this time. Gordon shared the same opinion. However, the Ottoman victory at Kamenets did not radically change the picture of the failures of the Turkish Empire in 1687–1688. Back in November 1687, the Janissaries overthrew Sultan Mehmed IV and elevated his brother Suleiman II to the throne. Turkish ambassadors arrived in Bratislava in 1688. Formally, they wanted to notify the emperor about their new ruler. The main goal was to probe the question of peace.

Rumors about a possible truce between the Holy League and Turkey alarmed Russia. She was preparing for the second Crimean campaign. The government of Sophia hoped that Holy League will also continue fighting. In 1688, the Holy Roman Emperor assured the Russian Tsars that this would be the case. The imperial message was transmitted to the Russian resident in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prokofy Bogdanovich Voznitsyn (future one of the three “great ambassadors” of 1697–1698). Austrian victories over the Turks were halted not because of their collusion with the Ottomans, but because the French, longtime European allies of the Turks and opponents of the Empire, invaded its possessions. The French king Louis XIV began the War of the Palatinate Succession (1688–1698). He soon captured Philipsburg, a city in Baden.

The ambassadorial order obliged P.B. Voznitsyn, as well as the Greek Orthodox scholar monk I. Likhud, sent by the tsarist government to Venice in 1688, to convince the imperial government to take into account Russian interests in the event of peace. Looking ahead, we note that Peter’s diplomacy will do exactly the same, having discovered in 1697–1698. the impossibility for their Western allies to continue the war with Turkey due to the expectation in Europe of the war “for the Spanish succession”. The Truce of Karlowitz of 1699 will be represented by a number of separate treaties between the League participants and Turkey. Russia will be able to secure Azov, captured in 1696, and the Peace of Constantinople in 1700, in addition to Azov, will bring Russia the official cessation of payments for “commemorations” to Crimea and the liquidation of Turkish fortresses near the Dnieper. Peter's policy on the southern borders was not some new turn, but a logical continuation of the course begun by the government of Sophia and Golitsyn.

Another indicator of this continuity can be Russian diplomatic activity on the eve of the First Crimean Campaign. Russian Ambassador V.T. Postnikov negotiated the expansion of the anti-Turkish alliance in England, Holland, Bradenburg (Prussia) and Florence. B. Mikhailov went to Sweden and Denmark for the same purpose; to Venice - I. Volkov, to France and Spain - Ya.F. Dolgorukov and Y. Myshetsky, to Austria - B.P. Sheremetev and I.I. Chaadaev. All these embassies had the same official tasks as the Grand Embassy of Peter I - they tried to expand the circle of their Western allies in the war with Turkey.

In the spring of 1688, Hetman Ivan Mazepa and okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev insisted on attacking the Belgorod regiments of Kazy-Kermen. They proposed appointing Patrick Gordon as one of the main military leaders. His authority increased after the campaign of 1687 V.V. Golitsyn rejected this proposal, focusing on the construction of the large Novobogoroditsk fortress on the Samara River, which strengthened Russia's border defense system. Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, an undeniably talented diplomat and administrator, did not have the abilities of a major military leader, although he spent most of his life in military service. The Old Moscow unification of military and civil service demanded that such a large-scale expedition of Russian troops into foreign lands be led by the head of government. As an experienced politician, Golitsyn could not ignore this. A number of historians, in particular Ustryalov, suggested that exorbitant ambition forced Golitsyn to aspire to the post of commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, the Frenchman Neville, ambassador of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, who was admitted to the house of V.V. Golitsyn, completely refutes this version. “Golitsyn did everything,” recalls Neville, “to reject this position, because... he rightly assumed that he would have a lot of difficulties, and that all responsibility for failure would fall on him, no matter what measures of foresight and precautions he took, and that it would be difficult for him to maintain his glory if the campaign was unsuccessful... Having been a greater statesman rather than a commander, he foresaw that his absence from Moscow would cause him more harm than the conquest of Crimea itself would have brought glory, since it would not have placed him higher, and the title of commander of the troops did not add anything to his power.”

V.V. Golitsyn decided to take the same route a second time. Gordon in 1688 no longer found the previous path, which he himself had proposed in 1684, successful. The Scotsman describes the reasons for choosing the old route: “Antony, an experienced Cossack, sent on reconnaissance towards the Crimea, returned and reported that all the way to Perekop he discovered places where you can get water either from springs or by digging the ground an elbow deep. This became a strong incentive for our gullible and crazy people to undertake another campaign along the same path that we went through before.” It was decided to increase the number of participants in the campaign to 117.5 thousand people. Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Mazepa fielded up to 50 thousand more. Troops began gathering in Sumy in February 1689. A decree was sent out, “... that from those who do not appear... lands will be taken away in the name of Their Majesties.” Gordon commanded three regiments of soldiers on the left flank. He has already said goodbye, as can be seen from his “Diary,” with the version about the ease of conquering Crimea. In March 1689, Gordon advised “Generalissimo” Golitsyn to go not through the steppe, as before, but along the Dnieper, having previously organized outposts there with reliable garrisons, “every four days of marching.” Gordon advised to reinforce the regiments of the new formation with grenadier companies. But V.V. Golitsyn did not follow these ideas from Gordon.

When the Russian army, having made a difficult march in the heat across the steppe, successfully reached Perekop (May 20, 1689), Golitsyn did not dare to storm its outdated fortifications, although the skirmishes with the Tatars that took place this time testified to the superiority of Russian weapons. On May 15, the Tatar cavalry tried to attack the Russian right flank, but was repulsed with heavy losses by Russian marching artillery fire. The regiments of the new system performed well, which indicated the correctness of the course towards the gradual professionalization of the Russian army. The Russians had a chance for a successful breakthrough to the Crimean Peninsula, but V.V. Golitsyn preferred negotiations. He demanded surrender from the khan, and having received a refusal, he gave the order to retreat in view of big losses people from the heat, illness and hardships of the campaign.

This was a fatal mistake by the commander-in-chief. There were even rumors about his khan bribing him. During the retreat, the regiments of the new formation again distinguished themselves. “...There was great danger and even greater fear, lest the khan pursue us with all his might,” wrote Patrick Gordon later (January 28, 1690) in his message to Earl Erroll, “so I was detached from the left wing with 7 registrants infantry and several cavalry (although all were dismounted) in order to guard the rearguard. They pursued us very zealously for 8 days in a row, but achieved little..."

Princess Sophia, as in 1687, ordered that the troops be met as victors, which, in essence, they were. For the second time in Russian history, it was not the Crimeans who attacked Russian soil, but the Russians who fought within the Crimean borders, making their contribution to the common cause of the Holy League. This is exactly how A.S. assessed the Crimean campaign of 1689. Pushkin, collecting material for his “History of Peter the Great.” “This campaign brought great benefit to Austria, for it destroyed the alliance concluded in Adrianople between the Crimean Khan, the French ambassador and the glorious Transylvanian prince Tekeli. According to this alliance, the khan was supposed to give 30,000 troops to help the high vizier enter Hungary; The khan himself, with the same number, was to attack Transylvania together with Tekeli. France pledged to help Tekeli with money and give him skilled officers.”

But all these international multi-step combinations were little understood by the population of Russia in the 17th century, especially against the background of the entry into the final stage of the conflict of two court “parties” - the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins. Without the occupation of Crimea by the “Naryshchkin party,” it was easy to imagine V.V.’s campaign. Golitsyn failure. It is no coincidence that young Peter, as Gordon’s Diary reports, did not even allow V.V. Golitsyn upon his return from Crimea to his hand. True, such a recognized expert on the history of Peter I as N.I. Pavlenko, based on other sources, claims that Peter only “intended to refuse Golitsyn and his retinue an audience, but he was hardly dissuaded from this step, which meant a break with Sophia. Reluctantly, Peter accepted Golitsyn and those accompanying him. Among the latter was Colonel Franz Lefort.” A participant in the Crimean campaign, Lefort, along with Patrick Gordon, in a few months would turn into the closest friend and mentor of Peter I. The colossal losses of Golitsyn’s army from heat, bad water, food and disease made a grave impression on ordinary Muscovites. The “Naryshkin party,” whose leadership included cousin V.V. Golitsyna B.A. Golitsyn, a good chance arose for the overthrow of Sophia, which was realized during the August coup of 1689.

It was in the interests of the victors to “denigrate” the history of the Crimean campaigns in every possible way, which did not prevent Peter I, 6 years later, from continuing the offensive launched by his sister’s government on the southern borders of Russia, as well as on other borders, for during the entire second half of the 17th century. Russia has not known a single strategic defeat. She won the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, taking away half of Ukraine and Kyiv from it. It reduced the war with Sweden to a draw, without winning or losing any of the territories it had after the Time of Troubles. Forced Turkey to recognize Russian citizenship of Left-Bank Ukraine, Zaporozhye and Kyiv and, finally, attacked Crimea twice, forcing it to permanently switch from attack to defense. Peter would take into account the difficulties of a foot march across the Wild Field discovered during the Crimean campaigns and shift the direction of the main attack in the south directly to the Turkish outpost of Azov, where troops could be transported along the Don. Among the main leaders of the Azov campaigns of 1695 and 1696. we will see V.V.’s closest associates. Golitsyn on the Crimean campaigns - “service Germans” Pyotr Ivanovich Gordon and Franz Yakovlevich Lefort.

The Bakhchisarai peace did not bring peace to the Ottoman Empire. Disillusioned with the Ukrainian lands, the Sultan turned his eyes to the west, where another seeker of Ottoman vassalage appeared - the Hungarian Calvinist nobleman Imre Tekeli. In 1678, he led an uprising in Hungary against the Austrian Habsburgs, and four years later he called on the Sultan for help, becoming his vassal. The support of part of the Hungarian nobility led by Tekeli gave the Turks the opportunity to conquer all of Hungary and defeat the Austrian Habsburgs.

However, the Turkish campaign against Vienna in 1683 ended in disaster for them. They were defeated at the walls of the Austrian capital by an army of Austrians, Germans and Poles led by the Polish king Jan Sobieski who came to its aid. This victory marked the beginning of the gradual ousting of the Turks from Central Europe. In 1684, the Catholic Holy League was created to combat them, consisting of Austria, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Venice.

Representatives of the League, primarily Poland, invited Russia to join as allies. For her, participation in a large European coalition gave her a chance to defeat the Crimean Khanate. Moscow agreed, subject to the settlement of relations with Warsaw. After two years of negotiations, the Poles, who were experiencing difficulties in the war with the Turks, agreed to sign the “Eternal Peace” (1686) with the government of the Russian princess Sophia. It meant Poland’s recognition of the borders outlined by the Andrusovo Truce, as well as the assignment of Kyiv and Zaporozhye to Russia.

For the first time since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the policy of the Russian State in relation to the Crimean Khanate is acquiring an active offensive character. The government of Princess Sophia, whose foreign policy activities were in charge of Prince Vasily Golitsyn, sets the task of conquering Crimea and access to the Black Sea.

From this moment a new stage of the Russian-Crimean struggle begins. Now, to its main task - the protection of peasant labor - is added the goal of access to the southern sea, which was associated with the economic growth of the country and the expansion of its needs foreign trade. To achieve this new strategic goal, Russia already needed to crush the power of the Ottoman Empire. And in this historical period, the Crimean Khanate was destined for almost a whole century to play the role of the leading edge of Turkish defense or a buffer on the path of the economic and military-political aspirations of the Russian State.

But the Khanate became a barrier on Russia’s path not only to the sea. The attack on Crimea was also seen in Moscow as a step towards the spread of Russian influence on the Orthodox Christians of South-Eastern Europe, who were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. It is unlikely that the government of Sophia suspected that by joining the Holy League, Russia was embarking on a long and complicated path of dividing the Ottoman possessions. It will stretch for more than two centuries, becoming one of the most important areas of Russian foreign policy. On this path she will be destined to win glorious victories, endure heavy losses, bitter disappointments and fierce rivalry between European powers.

And it was Crimea that was destined by historical fate to become the first center around which, at the end of the 17th century, the Eastern Question began to arise for Moscow, which meant the struggle for the division of the possessions of the Ottoman Empire and the liberation of Orthodox peoples from its power. Subsequently, this led Russia to a series of sentimental alliances, often based not on practical goals, but on issues of ideology and assistance to Orthodox brothers. Built on spiritual connections and emotions, such alliances were characterized by high expectations, but instead sometimes brought grief and problems. During the period of the country's economic lag behind the leading world powers, the continuation of such a policy began to border on adventurism, which ended in defeat in the Eastern War (1853-1856).

But all this was still far away. In the meantime, the beginning of the journey was laid by the royal decree of October 22, 1686 on the campaign to Crimea. The royal letter explained the reasons for the break in peace this way. It noted that the war begins to rid the Russian land of unbearable insults and humiliation; Nowhere do the Crimeans take so many prisoners as from here, they sell Christians like cattle, they curse the Orthodox faith. But this is not enough: the Russian kingdom pays an annual tribute to Crimea, for which it suffers shame and reproaches from neighboring sovereigns, but still does not protect its borders with this tribute: the khan takes money and dishonors Russian messengers, ruins Russian cities; there is no authority over him from the Turkish Sultan.

However, not everyone in the Russian State was supporters of the coming war. Thus, in a conversation with the Moscow clerk E. Ukraintsev, the Ukrainian hetman I. Samoilovich put forward reasons for the unprofitability of this conflict for Russia: “There will be no profit for the states of expansion, there is nothing to own before the Danube - everything is empty, and beyond the Danube it is far away. The Wallachians have all disappeared, and even if they were, they are fickle people, they succumb to everything; The Polish king will take them for himself: why should they quarrel with him over them? Enough of the old quarrels! Crimea cannot be conquered or retained by any means. Fight for the Church of God? A holy and great intention, but not without difficulty. The Greek Church remains oppressed there, and until the holy will of God it remains so; and here, near the great sovereigns, the Polish king is persecuting the Church of God; he has ruined all Orthodoxy in Poland and Lithuania, despite treaties with the great sovereigns.” The Hetman believed that “The whole of Crimea cannot be conquered with one campaign; Let's take the towns - the Turks will come and begin to mine them, but it is difficult for us to defend them, because the army must be withdrawn from there for the winter, and if we leave them there, then from hunger and from the pestilence there, many will die and become extinguished. “And most importantly,” the hetman finished his speech, “I don’t trust the Poles: they are deceitful and fickle people and eternal enemies to the people of Moscow and our Cossacks.” In response, Ukrainians could put forward mainly only ideological motives: “if we are not in this union, then there will be shame and hatred from all Christians, everyone will think that we are closer to the Busurmans than to Christians.”

However, on this issue Samoilovich had his own opinion. “Under the Turkish yoke,” the hetman noted in a letter to Moscow, “there are peoples of the Orthodox Greek faith, Wallachians, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Serbs, followed by numerous Greeks, who are all hiding from their father’s authorities and are consoled by the name of the Russian tsars, hoping someday get joy from them. If, through the entry of the royal majesties into an alliance, the Caesar of Rome and the King of Poland were lucky enough to take possession of the Turkish regions and force the local peoples to a union, in Jerusalem itself to raise the Roman Church and lower Orthodoxy, then all Orthodox peoples would receive insatiable pity from this.”

In general, the hetman considered this war unnecessary, ruinous and capable of doing more harm than good. According to a number of researchers, the defeat of the Crimean Khanate, which maintained the balance of power in the region, was also disadvantageous to him. The disappearance of Crimea meant the strengthening of Moscow’s regional influence, and, accordingly, the possibility of limiting the autonomy of Ukraine. Many subsequent events showed the foresight of the Ukrainian hetman, who knew the problems of the region closely. But they didn’t listen to him then.

The first campaign against Crimea took place in May 1687. It was attended by Russian-Ukrainian troops under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn and Hetman Ivan Samoilovich. Up to 100 thousand people set out on the campaign. More than half of the Russian army consisted of regiments of the new system. For the first time, the number of cavalry units was lower than the infantry units, which are gradually becoming the backbone of the Russian armed forces.

Meanwhile, the collected power, sufficient for a military victory over the Khanate, turned out to be powerless in the face of nature. The troops had to go through tens of kilometers of deserted, sun-scorched steppe, malarial swamps and salt marshes, where there was not a drop of fresh water. In such conditions, issues of supply and studying the specifics of a given theater of military operations came to the fore. Their insufficient elaboration by Golitsyn, who, being a good diplomat, turned out to be an inexperienced military leader, contributed to the failure of his undertaking. Striving for military glory and strengthening the position of Princess Sophia, the prince did not bother to calculate all the “ravines” of his enterprise.

As people and horses moved deeper into the steppe, they began to feel a lack of food and fodder. Having reached the Bolshoi Log tract on July 13, the troops were faced with a new disaster - steppe fires. Unable to fight the heat and the soot that covered the sun, people literally fell off their feet. Hundreds of kilometers of open steppe turned into a nightmare for infantry and artillery. Finally, Golitsyn, seeing that his army could die before seeing the Crimeans, ordered to turn back.

The unsuccessful campaign caused the intensification of raids by Crimean troops on the territory of Ukraine and the removal of Hetman Samoilovich, who openly expressed disagreement with Moscow’s policies in his circle. According to some participants in the campaign (for example, General P. Gordon), the hetman initiated the burning of the steppe because he did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khanate, which served as a counterweight to Moscow in the south. The Cossacks elected I.S. as the new hetman. Mazepa.

The second campaign began in February 1689. Now Golitsyn, taught by bitter experience, set out into the steppe on the eve of spring, so as not to have a shortage of water and grass, and also not to be afraid of steppe fires. An army of 112 thousand people was assembled for the campaign. Such a huge mass of people slowed down their movement speed. The trek to Perekop lasted almost three months. The troops approached Crimea on the eve of the hot summer.

On May 16, Golitsyn had a skirmish with the Khan’s troops in the Black Valley. The Crimean cavalry overthrew the Russians and drove them into the convoy. However, after volleys of Russian artillery, the Crimean attack fizzled out and was never resumed. Having repulsed the onslaught, Golitsyn approached the Perekop fortifications on May 20. The governor did not dare to storm them. He was confused not so much by the fortifications as by the steppes lying beyond Perekop. The coveted Crimea turned out to be the same sun-scorched land where there was a lack of fresh water. WITH right side Perekop stretches across the expanse of the Black Sea. On the left is Lake Sivash. The water in them was salty and undrinkable. It turned out that in Crimea a huge army could find itself in a terrible waterless trap.

Hoping to intimidate Khan Selim-Girey, Golitsyn began negotiations with him. But the owner of Crimea began to delay them, waiting until hunger and thirst would force the Russians to leave. Having stood for several days at the Perekop walls to no avail and drank supplies of fresh water, Golitsyn’s army hastily went home. What saved him from a larger failure was the lack of pursuit by the Khan's cavalry.

In the Crimean campaigns the main emphasis was placed on military power. Having decided to conquer Crimea “with one thunderclap,” the Russian command did not sufficiently develop the plan for the campaign itself, the features of the theater of military operations and the mechanism for implementing the planned tasks. And when nature and the defenders of Crimea presented unexpected obstacles to Golitsyn, he was not ready to overcome them. “The main question was not resolved in advance: what is Crimea and how to conquer it? They thought that as soon as they invaded Crimea with a large army, the Tatars would get scared and surrender to the will of the winner; They didn’t think about one thing: beyond Perekop’ there is the same waterless steppe as on the road to the peninsula,” noted S.M. Soloviev.

The results of both campaigns were insignificant in comparison with the costs of their implementation. Of course, they made a certain contribution to the common cause, since they diverted the Crimean cavalry from other theaters of military operations. But these campaigns did not decide the outcome of the Russian-Crimean struggle. However, they testified to a radical change in forces in the southern direction. If a hundred years ago Crimean troops reached Moscow, now Russian troops have already come close to the walls of Crimea. Since then, according to the Turkish historian Seyid-Muhammad-Riza, “the inhabitants of Crimea began to look through the doors of fear and expectations at the events of the time.”

The Crimean campaigns had a much greater impact on the situation inside Russia. Their unsuccessful outcome became an important reason for the overthrow of Princess Sophia and the rise to power of Peter I. There was a six-year lull in the war, when the country was actually ruled by the mother of Peter I, Natalya Naryshkina (1688-1694).

In Zaporozhye during this period there was a mutiny of the military clerk Petrik. Accompanied by 60 Cossacks, he set out for Kyzy-Kermen, where he concluded Eternal Peace between Ukraine and Crimea. While on the territory of the Khanate, Petrik declared Ukraine a “separate” (independent) power and, with the help of the Crimean army, began the fight against Moscow and Mazepa. However, wide sections of the Cossacks did not support the new “Tatar hetman”. It relied on the forces of the Khanate and was used by it to give some legitimacy to the Crimean raids on Ukrainian lands. According to one version, Petrik was hacked to death during the Crimean raid of 1696.

After the death of Queen Natalie, Peter, who led the country, resumes hostilities. Golitsyn's disastrous experience predetermined the tsar's choice of a more modest object of attack. It became not the center of the Khanate, but its eastern flank with the Azov fortress. Its capture disrupted the land connection between the possessions of the Crimean Khanate in the Northern Azov region and the Caucasus. Owning this support base, the tsar strengthened control not only over the Khanate, but also over the Don Cossacks.

The relative convenience of the message also played an important role in the choice. Unlike the road to Perekop, the path to Azov ran along rivers (Don, Volga) and through relatively populated areas. This freed the troops from unnecessary convoys and long marches across the sultry steppe. To divert the Crimean forces from Azov, a group of governor B.P. acted in the lower reaches of the Dnieper. Sheremetev and Hetman I.S. Mazepa.

The Azov campaign began in March 1695. The Russian army (31 thousand people) was commanded by generals Avton Golovin, Franz Lefort and Patrick Gordon. The Tsar himself served as commander of the bombardment company in the army. In July, Azov was besieged. It was defended by a 7,000-strong garrison. The Russians did not have a fleet, and the besieged could receive support from the sea. The delivery of food to the Russian camp along the river was prevented by towers with chains. We managed to take them. But this was the only serious success of the campaign. Both assaults on the fortress (August 5 and September 25) ended in failure. In October, the siege was lifted and the troops returned to Moscow.

Actions in the lower reaches of the Dnieper were more successful. Sheremetev and Mazepa took Kyzy-Kermen, after which the rest of the lower Dnieper towns (Mustrit-Kermen, Islam-Kermen, etc.) were abandoned by their garrisons and occupied by the Russian-Ukrainian army without a fight. Having strengthened these towns (especially the Tavansk fortress that arose on the site of Musritt-Kermen) and leaving garrisons there, the Russian-Ukrainian army left the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

Returning from the Azov campaign, the king began to prepare for a new campaign. It was supposed to use the fleet as well. The place of its creation was Voronezh. By the spring of 1696, 2 ships, 23 galleys, 4 fire ships, as well as a significant number of plows, on which Peter set out on a new campaign, had been built. To distract the Crimean troops, Sheremetev’s group was again sent to the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

In the second Azov campaign Russian forces, led by governor Alexei Shein, were brought to 75 thousand people. As a result of joint actions of the army and navy, Azov was completely blocked. The attacks of the Crimean troops, who tried to put the siege under control, were repulsed. The onslaught from the sea was also repelled. On June 14, 1696, Cossack plows attacked a Turkish squadron with a 4,000-strong landing force that had entered the mouth of the Don. Having lost two ships, she went to sea and left the combat area.

Then the Azov garrison tried to establish contact with the Kuban Tatars. This was prevented by the Ukrainian and Don Cossacks. Having repelled the attempts of the Kuban Tatars to break through to the fortress, the Cossack detachments of Yakov Lizogub and Frol Minaev (2 thousand people) on their own initiative went on July 17 to attack the Azov stronghold. They knocked the defenders off the rampart and rushed onto the stone walls. The Turks, due to a lack of lead, fired back with anything, even coins, and threw burning bags filled with gunpowder at the attackers. The Cossacks, not supported by the main forces, returned to the rampart, from where direct shelling of the fortress began. Peter ordered the troops to prepare for a general assault. But it didn't come. Deprived of support, the garrison surrendered on July 19.

Access to the Sea of ​​Azov did not solve the problem of communication between Russia and the Black Sea. Access to it required a larger-scale war with Turkey and the attraction of much greater resources. In an effort to find strong allies to solve this problem, Peter in 1697 organized the Great Embassy to European countries in order to, with their help, achieve access to the zone of ice-free seas. This mission did not live up to Peter's hopes. The collapse of the Black Sea plans leads to a reorientation of the tsar's foreign policy towards the Baltic shores.

When Peter replaced military activity with diplomatic activity, the Crimean side tried to seize the initiative. In the summer of 1697, Azov was attacked by a large Crimean army. On August 1, after a stubborn 11-hour battle with Shein’s army, the Crimeans retreated. The Russians pursued them all the way to Kagalnik (a river south of the lower Don). After this battle, the Crimean Khanate made no more serious attempts to recapture Azov.

In the lower reaches of the Dnieper, the campaign of 1697 was marked by the heroic defense of the Russian-Ukrainian garrison of the Tavansk fortress, which withstood a three-month siege and a series of attacks by the Crimean-Turkish army under the command of Duma nobleman Vasily Bukhvostov. The response of the Tavanians to the demand to surrender has been preserved, showing a worthy example of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood in arms: “We do not believe your false prophets, we hope in Almighty God and His Most Pure Mother, we firmly hope that you will not take our city until our sabers rust and Our hands have not weakened, and we have a lot of grain and military supplies. Do not frighten us with threats and do not seduce us with deceptions. Do what you want, but we will not think of giving this city to your region, but every hour we expect troops to come to us and are ready to stand courageously until our strength lasts, for the Orthodox faith, for the honor and for the name of our sovereign. We hope, with God’s help, to inflict a great defeat on you and you will have eternal shame.”

The assault on Tavansk that followed on September 25 was repulsed. The explosion of a tunnel under the fortress carried out on October 1 did not affect the determination of the garrison. Its defenders were preparing to fight on the ruins when, on October 10, the troops of Prince Y. Dolgoruky and Hetman I. Mazepa came to their aid. This forced the besiegers to retreat. The defense of Tavansk and the defeat at Kagalnik did not allow the Crimean-Turkish army to seize the initiative in the 1697 campaign. IN next year Dolgoruky and Mazepa went to Perekop. The campaign ended in failure.

In January 1699, the countries of the Holy League, with the exception of Russia, signed the Treaty of Karlowitz with the Ottoman Empire. According to it, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth regained the lands lost to it under the Buchach Peace. The Allies did not support Moscow’s demand to obtain Kerch, which opened the Russians’ access to the Black Sea. On July 3, 1700, Russia also made peace with Turkey, which received Azov and stopped sending commemorations to the Crimean Khan. The lower reaches of the Dnieper returned to the rule of the Sultan with the obligation to destroy all towns and fortifications there.

The Treaty of Karlowitz put an end to Ottoman expansion in Europe. The era of great conquests of the empire is over. Türkiye no longer posed a serious threat to its European neighbors and assumed a defensive position. Due to its growing weakness, it becomes an object of expansion by stronger powers.

All these changes affected the Crimean Khanate, which repeated the fate of the overlord. Now Istanbul needed Crimea less and less and restrained its military activity. This was reflected in the decrease in the regional weight of the Crimean Khanate. If in 1681 it was a full participant in the Peace of Bakhchisarai, now it has been excluded from the number of subjects of international law. As the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey II lamented: “We were not included in the world. No matter how much we asked, our request was not heeded and they showed us complete contempt.” Russian-Crimean problems were now resolved directly by Russia and Türkiye.

Historian V.D. Smirnov summed up the previous period of the Khanate’s life this way: “Serving the interests of the sovereign Porte without any visible benefit for their own country, the vassal Crimean khans killed all the forces of their people in continuous wars in the political forms of Turkey, themselves being content only with plunder during military raids. Either rushing towards separatism, or, on the contrary, relying on the firmness of support in unity with the Otoman Empire, the Crimean Tatars did not develop strong foundations for the identity of their state, having done nothing fundamental either in its internal organization or in terms of merging its various constituent national elements, nor in creating a reasonable and expedient modus vivendi with neighboring states. The short-sightedness of the Crimean politicians broke the friendly relationship with Russia, established by the clever organizer of the Crimean Khanate Mengli-Gerai I, and after hesitations, always harmful in international politics, inclined them to rapprochement with Poland, whose days were also numbered in history. When, at the end of the 17th century, Russia, gradually gathering its strength, at once deployed it in all its formidability in front of the Turks and together in front of the Tatars, the former were stunned by this formidability, but did nothing; the latter, having come to their senses, wanted to do something, but the time had already been lost. The Tatars had neither fortresses nor weapons, and they did not have the means to establish either, for even if there were some internal sources, such as industry and trade, they were not in the hands of the Tatar population of the country, which was very indifferent to the strengthening or decline of the sovereign power of the Tatar aliens. The source of enrichment of the Tatars themselves through raids has now been closed due to the international obligations that the Ottoman Porte was forced to undertake.”

OBLIGATIONS FOR PEACE WITH POLAND 1686

In 1686, Jan Sobieski agreed to an eternal peace, according to which he forever ceded to Moscow everything that it had won from Poland in the 17th century. (Kyiv is most important). This peace of 1686 was a very major diplomatic victory, which Moscow owed to V.V. Golitsyn. But according to this world, Moscow had to start a war with Turkey and Crimea, its subordinates. It was decided to march to the Crimea. Involuntarily, Golitsyn accepted command of the troops and made two campaigns to the Crimea (1687–1689). Both of them were unsuccessful (only the second time, in 1689, the Russians managed to reach Perekop across the steppe, but could not penetrate further). Lacking military abilities, Golitsyn could not cope with the difficulties of the steppe campaigns, lost many people, aroused the murmur of the army and brought accusations of negligence on the part of Peter. However, before the overthrow of Sophia, her government tried to hide the failure, celebrated the transition through the steppes to Perekop as a victory and showered Golitsyn and the troops with awards. But the failure was clear to everyone: below we will see that Peter took advantage of it and left Crimea alone in his offensive to the south.

[…] The annexation of Little Russia moved Moscow even more towards Crimea, and at the very end of the 17th century. (1687–1689) Moscow troops for the first time undertake campaigns against the Crimea itself. However, there was no luck yet - the steppe got in the way. This is where Moscow policy stopped before Peter.

Platonov S.F. A complete course of lectures on Russian history. SPb., 2000 http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/platonov/plats005.htm#gl2

PREPARATION FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1687

After long meetings, the Muscovites decided at the military council to send a significant army against the Small Tatars. Prince Golitsyn was appointed governor of the Bolshoi [regiment], that is, commander-in-chief, boyar Alexei Semenovich Shein - governor of Novgorod, that is, general of the Novgorod army, boyar Prince Dmitry Dmitrievich Dolgorukov, governor of Kazan, that is, general of the Kazan army, Prince Mikhail Andreevich Golitsyn - governor of Belgorod (this cousin of the great Golitsyn. He had such a great inclination towards foreigners that, leaving for the voivodeship, he took all those who wanted to follow him, including the Frenchman, who taught him the language in 6 months), Duma nobleman Ivan Yuryevich Leontyev - voivode Ertaul, that is, the general of a small Cossack army and other civilian detachments, which always go ahead of the army of the commander-in-chief, and consist of those who can be called hunters and the okolnichy Leonty Romanovich Neplyuev - the Sevsky governor, that is, the general of the Sevsky army.

All the troops of White Russia were also equipped with commanders, and the Cossacks had their usual hetman, they also thought about ways to have and receive military supplies and food. All residents great Empire The kings were forced to pay a ruble from the court, and the ruble corresponds in value to almost five French livres; From this we can judge the enormous sums that were collected.

De la Neuville. Notes about Muscovy. M.. 1996 http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus6/Nevill/frametext4.htm

ADDRESS BY IGNATIUS RIMSKY-KORSAKOV\

However, the abbot of the royal monastery was not only a talented polemicist, but also a preacher. […] On February 21, 1687, the archimandrite of the Novospassky Monastery spoke to the troops setting off on the first Crimean campaign with an extensive sermon: “A word to the pious and Christ-loving Russian army,” and on March 14, a richly decorated copy of this word was presented to Princess Sofya Alekseevna.

That same spring […] the Novospassky preacher, presenting an icon to a huge gathering of troops in the suburbs of Moscow Mother of God Hodegetria, delivered a “Word to the Orthodox army about the help of the Most Holy Theotokos...”. […] In “Words” the author convinces his listeners of the inalienability of God’s help in the coming war, proving this with examples from the Old Testament and Russian history.

Nikulin I.A. Review of the life and work of Metropolitan Ignatius (Rimsky-Korsakov) before his appointment to the Tobolsk See http://www.bogoslov.ru/text/774364.html

The 112,000-strong army, which Prince V.V. Golitsyn led on the second Crimean campaign in 1689, included the same 63 regiments of the foreign system, as according to the list of 1681, only numbering up to 80 thousand, with a decreased composition of the regiments , although the noble mounted militia of the Russian system numbered no more than 8 thousand, 10 times less than the foreign system, and according to the list of 1681 it was only 5-6 times less.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

CRIMINAL CAMPAIGNS OF 1687 and 1689.

Having concluded the “Eternal Peace” of 1686 with Poland, Russia joined the coalition of powers (“Holy League” - Austria, Venice and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) that fought against the aggression of Sultan Turkey and its vassal - the Crimean Khanate. Prince V.V. was placed at the head of the Russian troops. Golitsyn. At the same time, the Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks were supposed to strike. In May 1687, the Russian army (about 100 thousand people) set out from Ukraine. After it crossed the river in mid-June. Konskie Vody (modern name - Konskaya, a tributary of the Dnieper), the Crimean Tatars set fire to the steppe. The Russian army lost food for its horses. On June 17, the decision was made to return. Soon the government, at the request of the Cossack foreman, supported by V.V. Golitsyn, removed Hetman I. Samoilovich, who had a negative attitude towards the war with Turkey and Crimea. In his place was put I.S. Mazepa. The instability of the position of the government of Sofia Alekseevna - Golitsyn forced it to continue military operations. In 1688, preparations were underway for a new campaign to the south. During this period, international the situation worsened as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began negotiations with Turkey for peace. Russia bore the brunt of the war. The campaign began in the early spring of 1689, a Russian army of approx. moved south. 150 thousand people On May 15, in the Green Valley tract (north of the Perekop Isthmus), a stubborn battle took place with the detachments of the Crimean Khan attacking the Russian army, which were repulsed. After fighting with the Crimean detachments, the Russian army approached the Perekop fortress on May 20, but due to the unfavorable balance of forces, it did not besiege it and began to retreat on May 21.

The Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 provided serious assistance to Russia's allies, as they diverted the forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars. But the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 did not lead to the elimination of a dangerous source of aggression in the south and generally ended in failure, which was one of the reasons for the fall of the government of Sofia Alekseevna-Golitsyn.

Soviet Historical Encyclopedia http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/sie/8966#sel=3:198,3:214

GOLITSYN'S SECOND CAMPAIGN

Taught by experience, Golitsyn wanted to undertake a campaign in early spring, so as not to have a shortage of water and grass and not be afraid of steppe fires. The military men were ordered to assemble no later than February 1689. On November 8, a tenth collection of money for the army was announced from the townspeople and all merchants. Golitsyn needed to defeat the Tatars in order to defeat internal enemies who never ceased to remind him of themselves. They say that the murderer rushed towards him in the sleigh and was barely restrained by the prince’s servants; the murderer was executed in prison after torture, without publicity; shortly before setting off on a campaign, a coffin was found at the Golitsyn gate with a note that if this campaign was as unsuccessful as the first, then a coffin would await the chief governor. […]

Under such unfavorable conditions for the main leaders, the second Crimean campaign began. In February 1689, 112,000 troops moved to the steppe under the main command of the Guardian. On March 20, Golitsyn wrote to the tsars from Akhtyrka that “the campaign is being slowed down due to the great cold and snow, and the treasury has not yet been sent to the regiment and there is nothing to give to the military men, reiters and soldiers.” The cold and snow did not stop Hetman Mazepa, and his first thing when meeting with Golitsyn was to petition so that the great sovereigns would grant him, the hetman, and the entire Little Russian army, order to put the state coat of arms on the towers and town halls of the Little Russian cities. Golitsyn, of course, hastened to reassure Mazepa that his request would be fulfilled by the great sovereigns. In mid-April, news was received that there were no fires in the steppes, but that the khan was going to burn the grass as Golitsyn approached Perekop. When Moscow learned about this, they sent a letter to the Protector so that, after consulting with the hetman, he would send knowledgeable people beyond Samara to burn the steppe all the way to Perekop and to the Turkish towns on the Dnieper: by the time the Russian army arrived in those places, new grass would ripen. Golitsyn went to Perekop and in mid-May he met the khan with the hordes. The barbarians, as usual, quickly attacked the Russian army, but, fired from cannons, they left and did not resume their attacks; only at the edge of the horizon, in front and behind, like clouds, crowds of them could be seen: predators circled over their prey, the Scythians lured the enemy into their hopeless steppes.

Having repulsed the khan, Golitsyn hastened to send news of his triumph to Moscow, and wrote to the ruler to pray for his safe return. Sophia answered: “My light, brother Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And hello again, by God and Holy Mother of God by mercy and your intelligence and happiness, having defeated the Hagarians! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies! And I, my light, cannot believe that you will return to us; Then I will believe when I see you, my light, in my arms. Well, my light, you write to ask me to pray: as if I am truly a sinner before God and unworthy; however, although I am a sinner, I dare to hope for his benevolence. To her! I always ask you to see my light in joy. Therefore, hello, my light, forever and ever."

[…] On May 20, the troops approached the famous Perekop, to a fortified castle that protected a ditch that cut through the isthmus: beyond Perekop is the treasured Crimea, the goal of the campaign. But what is Crimea? The best, most experienced people, like Gordon, for example, had long explained to Golitsyn that it was easy to conquer the Crimea, only the steppe road to it was somewhat difficult. Golitsyn experienced this difficulty in the first campaign, avoided it in the second, reached the Crimea and only then saw that the main question had not been resolved in advance: what is Crimea and how to conquer it? They thought that as soon as they invaded Crimea with a large army, the Tatars would get scared and surrender to the will of the winner; They didn’t think about one thing, that beyond Perekop there was the same waterless steppe as on the road to the peninsula, that the Tatars could destroy everything and starve the enemy to death with hunger and thirst. Golitsyn stood at Perekop: it was necessary to take the fortress, but the army had already been without water for two days; They hurried to Perekop, thinking that there would be an end to their hardships, and what did they see? On one side is the Black Sea, on the other is the Rotten Sea, there is salty water everywhere, there are no wells, horses are falling, a few more days - and how will they retreat, what will the outfit be carried on? In order to return with something, Golitsyn started peace negotiations with the khan in the hope that he, frightened by the invasion, would agree to conditions favorable to Russia: but the negotiations dragged on, and Golitsyn could not wait any longer. and he turned back without peace; We were glad for one thing that in the steppe, in terrible heat, with the painful languor of thirst, the Tatars pursued easily, not with all their strength.