2. The President of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. In accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, it takes measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity, ensures the coordinated functioning and interaction of bodies state power.

3. The President of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, determines the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state.

4. The President of the Russian Federation, as the head of state, represents the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations.

1. The President of the Russian Federation is elected for a term of six years by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

2. A citizen of the Russian Federation who is at least 35 years old and has permanently resided in the Russian Federation for at least 10 years may be elected President of the Russian Federation.

3. The same person cannot hold the position of President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms.

4. The procedure for electing the President of the Russian Federation is determined by federal law.

1. Upon taking office, the President of the Russian Federation takes the following oath to the people:

“When exercising the powers of the President of the Russian Federation, I swear to respect and protect the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, to observe and defend the Constitution of the Russian Federation, to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state, to faithfully serve the people.”

2. The oath is taken in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma and judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

a) appoints, with the consent of the State Duma, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation;

b) has the right to chair meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation;

c) decides on the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation;

d) presents to the State Duma a candidacy for appointment to the post of Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; raises before the State Duma the question of dismissal of the Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation;

e) at the proposal of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, appoints and dismisses the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers;

f) submits to the Federation Council candidates for appointment to the position of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation; appoints judges of other federal courts;

f.1) presents to the Federation Council candidates for appointment to the position of Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and Deputy Prosecutors General of the Russian Federation; submits to the Federation Council proposals for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation and Deputy Prosecutors of the Russian Federation; appoints and dismisses prosecutors of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as other prosecutors, except for prosecutors of cities, districts and prosecutors equivalent to them;

g) forms and heads the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the status of which is determined by federal law;

h) approves the military doctrine of the Russian Federation;

i) forms the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;

j) appoints and dismisses authorized representatives of the President of the Russian Federation;

k) appoints and dismisses the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

l) appoints and recalls, after consultations with the relevant committees or commissions of the chambers of the Federal Assembly, diplomatic representatives of the Russian Federation in foreign states and international organizations.

President of Russian Federation:

a) calls elections of the State Duma in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law;

b) dissolves the State Duma in cases and in the manner provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation;

c) calls a referendum in the manner established by federal constitutional law;

d) introduces bills to the State Duma;

e) signs and promulgates federal laws;

f) addresses the Federal Assembly with annual messages on the situation in the country, on the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state.

1. The President of the Russian Federation may use conciliation procedures to resolve disagreements between state authorities of the Russian Federation and state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as between state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. If an agreed solution is not reached, he may refer the dispute to the appropriate court.

2. The President of the Russian Federation has the right to suspend the actions of executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the event of a conflict between these acts of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, international obligations of the Russian Federation or violation of human and civil rights and freedoms until this issue is resolved by the appropriate court.

President of Russian Federation:

a) provides leadership foreign policy Russian Federation;

b) negotiates and signs international treaties of the Russian Federation;

c) signs the instruments of ratification;

d) accepts credentials and letters of recall from diplomatic representatives accredited to him.

1. The President of the Russian Federation is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or an immediate threat of aggression, the President of the Russian Federation introduces martial law on the territory of the Russian Federation or in its individual localities with immediate notification of this to the Federation Council and the State Duma.

3. The martial law regime is determined by federal constitutional law.

The President of the Russian Federation, under the circumstances and in the manner provided for by the federal constitutional law, introduces a state of emergency on the territory of the Russian Federation or in its individual localities with immediate notification of this to the Federation Council and the State Duma.

President of Russian Federation:

a) resolves issues of citizenship of the Russian Federation and granting political asylum;

b) rewards state awards Russian Federation, assigns honorary titles Russian Federation, highest military and highest special ranks;

c) grants pardon.

1. The President of the Russian Federation issues decrees and orders.

2. Decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation are mandatory for execution throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

3. Decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation must not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

The President of the Russian Federation enjoys immunity.

1. The President of the Russian Federation begins to exercise his powers from the moment he takes the oath and ceases to exercise them with the expiration of his term in office from the moment the newly elected President of the Russian Federation takes the oath.

2. The President of the Russian Federation shall terminate the exercise of powers early in the event of his resignation, persistent inability for health reasons to exercise his powers, or removal from office. In this case, elections of the President of the Russian Federation must take place no later than three months from the date of early termination of the exercise of powers.

3. In all cases when the President of the Russian Federation is unable to fulfill his duties, they are temporarily performed by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Acting President of the Russian Federation does not have the right to dissolve the State Duma, call a referendum, or make proposals for amendments and revisions to the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

1. The President of the Russian Federation may be removed from office by the Federation Council only on the basis of a charge brought by the State Duma of high treason or committing another grave crime, confirmed by the conclusion of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the presence of signs of a crime in the actions of the President of the Russian Federation and by the conclusion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on compliance established order bringing charges.

2. The decision of the State Duma to bring charges and the decision of the Federation Council to remove the President from office must be adopted by two-thirds of the total votes in each chamber on the initiative of at least one third of the deputies of the State Duma and in the presence of the conclusion of a special commission formed by the State Duma.

3. The decision of the Federation Council to remove the President of the Russian Federation from office must be made no later than three months after the State Duma brings charges against the President. If a decision by the Federation Council is not made within this period, the charge against the President is considered rejected.

Yeltsin, Boris

First President of the Russian Federation

The first President of the Russian Federation (twice elected to this post in 1991 and 1996), former Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR (1990-1991), former First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee (1985-1987) and the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU (1976-1985), in 1981 -1990s was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, in 1986-1988 - a candidate for the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, left the party at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU. Since 1987, he had been in conflict with the party leadership, including the General Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, who later became president of the USSR. The conflict intensified after Yeltsin was elected president of the RSFSR in 1991. Yeltsin won his victory over Gorbachev after suppressing a coup attempt by members of the State Emergency Committee in August of the same year. He was one of the initiators of the liquidation of the Soviet Union and banned the activities of the CPSU. He supported the privatization of state property in the country under a voucher scheme and the transition to a market model of the economy, including the loans-for-shares auctions of 1995-96. He gave orders for the use of weapons during the parliamentary crisis of 1993 and for the entry of troops into Chechnya in 1994. In 1999, he voluntarily transferred presidential powers to his successor Vladimir Putin before the expiration of his presidential term. He died of cardiac arrest in April 2007.

Childhood, youth, studies (1931-1955)

Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin was born on February 1, 1931 in the village of Butka (emphasis on the last syllable) in the Talitsky district of the Sverdlovsk region. Since until 1935 all regions of the Urals - Sverdlovsk, Perm, Chelyabinsk, Kurgan and Tyumen regions - were part of one large Ural region, and Butka first went to Chelyabinsk, and later to Sverdlovsk region, Chelyabinsk local historians also call Yeltsin their fellow countryman. In 2005, Yeltsin’s small homeland was mentioned in the press in connection with the propaganda tour of the leader of the LDPR, vice-speaker of the State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky, around the cities of the Ural region. Zhirinovsky said that the village of Butka must be burned. He explained his call by hostility towards Yeltsin, “Russia is still reaping the consequences of whose actions.” A number of electronic media published information that not only residents of Butka, but also the neighboring village of Basmanovo also believe that Yeltsin was born in their locality.

Yeltsin's father, Nikolai Ignatievich, was a builder, his mother, Klavdia Vasilievna, was a dressmaker. In 1935, the family moved to the Perm region, to Berezniki, for the construction of the Berezniki potash plant. Boris was their first child; his brother and sister were born later.

"Nezavisimaya Gazeta", talking about Yeltsin's childhood, mentioned that as a result of his early childhood injuries: two fingers are missing on the left hand. During the war, Yeltsin stole two grenades from a guarded military warehouse in Berezniki - by his own admission, he and his friends wanted to take them apart in order to study and understand what was inside. One of the grenades exploded, and the fingers on my hand had to be amputated after gangrene began.

At school, Yeltsin, according to media reports, studied successfully, but was distinguished by impudent behavior and was pugnacious (in one of the “district to district” fights, Yeltsin’s nose was broken by a shaft). He had conflicts with teachers and was expelled from school after the seventh grade, but was then reinstated and graduated from school with excellent grades in almost all subjects. According to other sources, Yeltsin did not shine with excellent grades either at school or at university. After school, Eltsin continued his education in Sverdlovsk, at the construction department of the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after Kirov (now the Ural State Technical University- USTU-UPI) with a degree in "industrial and civil engineering", ". He graduated from the institute in 1955; the media called his topic thesis- “Television Tower” (Yeltsin himself called it in his book, claiming that he defended himself “excellently”).

Professional and party activities ("Ural period", 1955-1985)

In 1955, Yeltsin began working at the Uraltyazhtrubstroy trust as a foreman. Yeltsin’s official biography on the website of the foundation named after him indicated that, before taking this position, he alternately worked as a bricklayer, concrete worker, carpenter, joiner, glazier, painter, plasterer, crane operator, mastering blue-collar skills.

In 1968, Yeltsin switched to party work, on the recommendation of Ryabov, becoming the head of the construction department of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU. In 1975, he was appointed secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee, responsible for the industrial development of the region (“regional committee secretary for construction”). The media noted that the position was very high, since the region was one of the main centers of the Soviet military-industrial complex.

In 1976, Yeltsin was sent to courses at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow. Two weeks after the start of his training, a plenum was held at which the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee, Ryabov, was elected secretary of the Central Committee, and his place in Sverdlovsk became vacant. Yeltsin learned about his appointment to the post of first secretary of the regional committee from Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev (formal election took place a few days later - November 2, 1976). By Yeltsin’s own admission, this appointment came as a surprise to him: he was an ordinary secretary, and the place of second secretary was occupied by E.A. Korovin. Ryabov claimed in his memoirs that Yeltsin was promoted to the post of first secretary of the regional committee on his recommendation. Noting that Yeltsin has a difficult character, that he is not distinguished by his knowledge of industry and sufficient “cultural preparation,” Ryabov nevertheless emphasized: Yeltsin knows the region, and they know him there, he “wants and can work, is strong-willed enough and will be able to force anyone to work.” ". Soon after coming to the post of first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee, Yeltsin was elected as a deputy of the regional council - in the Serov electoral district (city of Severouralsk).

Residents of Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) remembered Yeltsin as a good first secretary of the regional committee. According to the recollections of Yeltsin’s wife Naina, in Sverdlovsk his stores always had milk and three types of poultry meat (although, as the media noted, there were also food coupons). On Yeltsin's initiative, a metro was built in Sverdlovsk. Unflattering details of his activities in this post were also mentioned. In 1977, by order of Yeltsin, in accordance with the resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (according to some sources, its appearance was preceded by a secret note from KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov), the “Ipatiev House” was demolished - the building in which the royal family was shot in 1918. Yeltsin himself noted that, as the first secretary of the regional committee, he could not disobey the Politburo resolution. A week after this - retroactively - the “Ipatiev House” was deprived of the status of a state-protected historical and architectural monument. The media wrote that Yeltsin subsequently made a public apology to the Russians for what he had done. Under Yeltsin, a twenty-story building of the regional committee of the CPSU was built in Sverdlovsk, the tallest in the USSR. According to some reports, Yeltsin, being a builder by profession, built the regional committee building according to his own design. According to some reports, in Sverdlovsk Yeltsin had the nickname “The Wizard of the Emerald City” - because before the next important meeting he ordered to paint all the fences from the airport to the city center with green paint pleasing to the eye. The media also wrote that under Yeltsin, a road from Sverdlovsk to Severouralsk was built using the “people’s construction” method, and old mines and factories were also reconstructed. It was noted that the bulky imported equipment turned out to be poorly adapted to work in cramped workshops and mines. The press published data that during Yeltsin's time an anthrax outbreak occurred in the city. Yeltsin himself wrote about this period in his book “Confession on a Given Topic”: “Yes, the power of the First is practically limitless. And the feeling of power is intoxicating.” At the same time, he emphasized that he used this power “only in the name of the people, and never for himself.”

In 1981, Yeltsin was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1977-1978, Yeltsin met the first secretary of the Stavropol regional committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev (the region supplied agricultural products to the Sverdlovsk region, and the Ural cities helped the southern regions with equipment). They also collaborated in the future, when Gorbachev became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and dealt with agricultural issues. According to some reports, back in the fall of 1983, Gorbachev included Yeltsin on the list for nomination to the party leadership, compiled at the request of the General Secretary of the Central Committee Yuri Andropov.

Party activities in Moscow (1985-1990)

In 1985, Yeltsin was offered a job in the party's central apparatus with a transfer to Moscow. The initiator of Yeltsin’s transfer to the capital, according to some media reports, was a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev. He, recalling party discipline, insisted on Yeltsin’s departure from Sverdlovsk when he tried to refuse the new position (a number of analysts explained Yeltsin’s refusal by his lack of confidence that in Moscow he would be able to stand out and make a career. One way or another, the media linked the transfer Yeltsin with the rise of Gorbachev, who came to power in March 1985. Yeltsin himself noted that he accepted Gorbachev’s election with enthusiasm, pinning on him the hope of “fixing things in agriculture"In April 1985, Yeltsin, at the suggestion of Gorbachev, was appointed head of the construction department of the CPSU Central Committee, and in July of the same year he became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for construction issues.

The media wrote that in January 1987, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which discussed the responsibility of senior party cadres, the first public conflict arose between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Yeltsin made extensive criticism, actually directed against the Secretary General, which Gorbachev’s entourage regarded as an attack on his powers of power. Subsequently, a number of observers expressed doubts about the authenticity of the confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, citing the words of former Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Mikhail Poltoranin (1990-1992), spoken by him in one of the documentaries. Poltoranin pointed out that the conflict between Yeltsin and Gorbachev at the Politburo meeting was specially invented for the media in order to create an image of Yeltsin as a leader who was not afraid to speak the truth and suffered for it. On September 12, 1987, Yeltsin wrote a letter to Gorbachev in which he complained about Ligachev's "undemocratic" style in leading the work of the secretariat and asked permission to leave his posts in the Politburo and the secretariat of the Central Committee. Gorbachev promised Yeltsin to discuss his letter later (according to other sources, Yeltsin’s letter remained unanswered). A number of media outlets noted that the conflict between Ligachev and Yeltsin was caused by the fact that Yeltsin’s idea of ​​organizational movements in the party apparatus did not find support in the secretariat headed by Ligachev. Analysts pointed out that in addition to ideological differences, Yeltsin and Ligachev found themselves different views on what betrayal on the part of a “party comrade” is. If Ligachev considered Yeltsin’s refusal to obediently follow the instructions of the people who “pulled” him out of Sverdlovsk a betrayal, then Yeltsin, in turn, considered it insulting that he was first thrown into solving the problems that had accumulated in Moscow, and then they began to sharply pull him back.

On October 21, 1987, at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin criticized Ligachev’s leadership style and the tactics of perestroika, which placed himself outside the country’s political leadership. He expressed dissatisfaction with the slow pace of change in society and the emerging "cult of personality" of Gorbachev. After this, he once again asked for his resignation from the Politburo, adding that the issue of his dismissal from the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Committee would be decided by the city committee. In response, Gorbachev accused Yeltsin of “wanting to fight with the Central Committee,” and accusations of “political immaturity” were also made. The Plenum recognized Yeltsin's speech as politically erroneous and instructed the Moscow City Committee to consider the issue of releasing him from his duties as First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee. On November 11, 1987, at the plenum of the Moscow City Committee, Yeltsin admitted the error of his speech and was removed from the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. Immediately after the plenum, he was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of worsening cerebral circulation. According to some reports, in November 1987, Yeltsin, while in the hospital, tried to commit suicide. In December 1987, he was appointed to the insignificant and non-political post of first deputy chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee - Minister of the USSR, which he held until 1989. In the spring of 1988, at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin was removed from the list of candidates for membership in the Politburo, but he remained a member of the Central Committee.

In 1988, Yeltsin was elected as a delegate to the 19th Party Conference from Karelia. In his speech at the conference, he stated that “perestroika should have started with the party.” He proposed introducing general, direct, secret elections of party bodies and raised the question of his own “political rehabilitation,” which, as the media pointed out, remained unanswered. At the party conference, Ligachev hurled the now famous remark at Yeltsin, “Boris, you’re wrong!” and accused Yeltsin of ruining work in the Sverdlovsk region, “putting” the region on coupons. The accusations were unfounded, since coupons for food and other goods as a consequence of an inefficient economic system were a union-wide phenomenon.

In the elections of people's deputies of the USSR in March 1989, Yeltsin was nominated as a candidate for deputy of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in the country's largest Moscow national-territorial district No. 1. The main emphasis in Yeltsin's political program was on the elimination of the privileges of the party nomenklatura. Subsequently, Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that Yeltsin’s program was of a moderate liberal-communist nature. In the elections, Yeltsin defeated his rival, director of the Likhachev Plant Evgeny Brakov, with a significant advantage. At the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in May-June 1989, Yeltsin was nominated by deputy Gennady Burbulis for the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as an alternative to Gorbachev, but Yeltsin recused himself, citing party discipline. He was elected a member of the USSR Supreme Council (initially he did not get enough votes; his place in the Supreme Council was given to Yeltsin by Alexey Kazannik, who served as the Prosecutor General of Russia in 1994-1993). In the Supreme Council, Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Committee on Construction and Architecture.

At the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May–June 1989), he became co-chairman of the opposition Interregional Deputy Group (MDG), which also included Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Sobchak, Yuri Afanasyev, Gavriil Popov, Galina Starovoitova,. The press that year wrote that the MDG could become “the most serious political opposition in the country” - “the second communist party,” pointing out that the MDG members themselves “still deny that they are oppositionists.” Later, the media claimed that Yeltsin did not take an active part in the activities of the MDG.

On September 29, 1989, the famous “river swimming” or “falling off the bridge” incident occurred. What actually happened is still unclear. According to Yeltsin’s description, he came to his friend’s dacha in the village of Uspenskoye, let the driver go and went on foot to visit. At this time, another car approached him from behind, and Yeltsin, as he himself said, “found himself in the river” (according to the press, Vadim Bakatin, who held the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR at that time, claimed that a bag had previously been placed on Yeltsin’s head) . Next, Yeltsin said, having climbed ashore, he went to the nearest police post, where he received help. He asked not to tell anyone about what happened and did not offer any explanations or versions. Democratic newspapers expressed a version of an attempt on Yeltsin’s life. However, two investigations conducted by Bakatin and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR under the leadership of the chairman of the ethics commission Anatoly Denisov did not confirm the version of the assassination attempt. On the eve of the 1991 presidential elections, Denisov claimed that Yeltsin allegedly came to visit a friend and, as a result of a fight that broke out with another of her guests, ended up in the water.

In March 1990, Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk, in the block of candidates for deputies "Democratic Russia", was elected people's deputy of the RSFSR. In May of the same year, at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, two rounds of voting were held to elect the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. By the beginning of the first round, of the eight initially nominated candidates, Yeltsin, Ivan Polozkov and self-nominated teacher from Kazan Vladimir Morokin remained. In reality, the struggle was only between the first two candidates. In those days, the Kommersant-weekly publication indicated that the nomination of such a “tough and unequivocally anti-reformist candidate” as Polozkov “frightened a significant part of the moderate apparatchiks and wavers.” On May 29, Yeltsin, with the support of the Democratic Russia bloc, was elected chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. On June 12, the congress adopted the Declaration of the Sovereignty of Russia, providing for the priority of republican legislation over union legislation. This marked the beginning of processes known as the “war of laws” and the “parade of sovereignties.” Having become chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Yeltsin announced his withdrawal from the Democratic Russia bloc.

In July 1990, at the XXVIII (last) Congress of the CPSU, Yeltsin left the party.

In January 1991, after the capture of the Vilnius television center by Soviet troops, Yeltsin's active intervention, including his trip to Tallinn, during which agreements were signed with the Baltic republics, according to some analysts, helped prevent the overthrow of established nationalities in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. -democratic regimes. In February 2000, Yeltsin was awarded the highest state award of Latvia - the Order of Three Stars, 1st degree, for his contribution to the restoration of Latvian independence, but refused this award due to anti-Russian manifestations in Latvia and the persecution of veterans of the Great Patriotic War (according to other sources, the order was given to him awarded in 2006).

On February 19, 1991, Yeltsin spoke on television. He criticized the policies of the USSR government and demanded Gorbachev's resignation and the transfer of power to the Federation Council, consisting of the leaders of the union republics. On March 17, 1991, an all-Union referendum was held, during which the majority of the population of the RSFSR spoke in favor of preserving the USSR, but at the same time advocated the introduction of the post of President of Russia, which created a situation of dual power and conflict between two presidents - the USSR and the RSFSR. The situation in Moscow and in the country as a whole at that time was extremely tense. "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" reported in March 1991 that Gorbachev, wanting to get rid of Yeltsin, sent troops into Moscow "for greater fidelity" during the emergency congress of people's deputies. On March 28, 1991, Yeltsin’s supporters went to a rally demanding the resignation of the leadership, which was “throwing troops against unarmed troops.”

First President of Russia (1991-1996)

On June 12, 1991, in the presidential elections of the RSFSR, Yeltsin ran together with Alexander Rutskoi and won in the first round (Rutskoi became vice-president).

In April 1991, Gorbachev signed agreements with the leaders of 10 union republics on the joint preparation of a draft of a new Union Treaty designed to preserve the Soviet Union. The signing of the agreement was scheduled for August 20 of the same year.

On August 19, 1991, a group of politicians from Gorbachev’s circle announced the creation of the State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP). They demanded that the USSR President, who was on vacation in Crimea, introduce a state of emergency in the country or temporarily transfer power to Vice President Gennady Yanaev. Gorbachev, according to the official version, did not accept the demands of the members of the Emergency Committee and was isolated for three days at the presidential dacha in Foros. On the same day, August 19, Yeltsin, as well as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Ivan Silaev and Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov addressed the people. Emphasizing that the legally elected president of the country had been removed from power, they stated: “Whatever the reasons may justify this removal, we are dealing with a right-wing, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup.” During the days of the rebellion on August 19-21, 1991, it was Yeltsin who suppressed the GKChP coup attempt. He was not arrested and had the opportunity to freely reach the House of Soviets of the RSFSR (White House), extinguish the panic in the ranks of supporters and begin organizing resistance. According to some reports, the putschists and Yeltsin’s team were negotiating by phone all the time. It was also reported that, according to some information, Yeltsin established contacts with the American embassy, ​​which was located next to the White House, and that the Americans allegedly agreed to accept him if he approached them.

During all three days of the confrontation, Yeltsin was in the House of Soviets of the RSFSR, and issued a number of decrees that expanded the powers of the President of the RSFSR in the management of the armed forces and internal affairs bodies, which reassigned a number of union ministries and departments to the President of the RSFSR. On the very first day, troops and military equipment entered Moscow, several dozen tanks surrounded the White House, but no attempt was made to storm it. According to the recollections of a member of the State Emergency Committee, former Minister of Finance of the USSR Valentin Pavlov, tanks and paratroopers were called to the White House by Yeltsin himself, who for this purpose contacted the commander of the Airborne Forces Pavel Grachev (later the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation), although according to other sources, Grachev initially acted on the orders of the State Emergency Committee and went over to Yeltsin’s side only the next day, August 20. Yeltsin’s first public speech on August 19 from the armor of tank No. 110 of the Taman Division, from where he addressed Muscovites and all Russian citizens with a call to give a worthy response to the putschists and demand that the country be returned to normal constitutional development, became a symbol of victory. On August 20, Yeltsin signed a decree “On ensuring the economic basis of the sovereignty of the RSFSR,” according to which all property on the territory of Russia came under the jurisdiction of the republic.

On August 21, 1991, after the putsch in Moscow was suppressed, Gorbachev returned to the capital and the next day resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. A few days after this, Kommersant wrote that, despite the abundance of interviews and published testimony, the answer to the main question was never given: how and why did the putsch end? It was known that at 4:30 am on August 21, the State Emergency Committee was meeting at the Oktyabrskaya party hotel. At 5:00, the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Nikolai Kalinin, gave the order to withdraw troops from Moscow, and at the same time the KGB divisions moving towards the capital were stopped. The situation was tense, but it remained under the control of the State Emergency Committee. The country did not unanimously condemn the coup; few supported Yeltsin’s call for an indefinite strike. According to the newspaper, the first page of the issue, which contained new, harsh orders of the putschists, as well as a statement by the military commandant of Moscow with his own interpretation of the events, was transferred from the printing house to the editorial office of Krasnaya Zvezda. The issue was supposed to be published on Thursday, August 22. But, nevertheless, the putschists hastily surrendered and withdrew their troops from Moscow, whereas, according to Kommersant, it was enough to “stop the attack on the White House and look around.” The newspaper suggested that they had obeyed someone's orders. In 2000, a number of publications expressed the opinion that the August putsch was prepared not without the participation of Gorbachev himself (according to them, this version was shared by a significant part of Gorbachev’s circle). In 2001, in an interview with the Italian publication Corriere Della Sera, former member of the State Emergency Committee, then chairman of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, said that on August 18, a “group of comrades” visited Foros, where Gorbachev was told about the existing plan. The President of the USSR listened to them, asked several questions, inquired about the details, but most of all, according to Kryuchkov, Yeltsin worried him. “For Gorbachev, the most important problem was Yeltsin, he was always very afraid of him,” said the former head of the KGB. Kryuchkov also stated: “And when our comrades began to say goodbye to Gorbachev, he said: “Come on!” Act!" In 2006, an interview with Yeltsin appeared in the media, in which he stated that Gorbachev knew about the impending putsch. Yeltsin said: "And during the putsch, he was informed about everything and all the time he was waiting for who would win, one or the other. In any case, he would have joined the winners - a win-win option."

Subsequently, Gorbachev explained the reasons for the August events. According to him, the putschists were afraid that after the signing of the Union Treaty there would be no place for them in the structures of the new government. Gorbachev stated that Yeltsin “at that moment played a decisive role in stopping these machinations, but he was so carried away that he could no longer stop.” In 2006, a witness to the putsch, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union Rodric Braithwaite, in an interview with Ogonyok, noted that Yeltsin skillfully took advantage of the situation that had arisen in Russia as a result of perestroika. According to him, Yeltsin “took advantage of the coup not only to destroy the old political machine, but also for personal career purposes.” Despite this, the British politician argued that at the time of the putsch, Yeltsin “was the man that this moment required Russian history", but later he "lost the thread" and "outlived his own image on the tank."

On August 23, 1991, Yeltsin signed a decree on the dissolution of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, and on November 6 of the same year, a decree on the termination of the activities of the structures of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR in Russia and the nationalization of their property. The media wrote that the events of 1991 finally destroyed the party vertical, after which the redistribution of powers began. Yeltsin began to appoint heads of regional executive power, and at the same time, the formation of local parliaments began. On March 31, 1992, a federal agreement was signed. Analysts noted that the meaning of this document was best reflected by Yeltsin’s words “take as much sovereignty as you can digest,” which he said during his trip to Tataria and Bashkiria in July-August 1990. According to analysts, this document at that time made it possible to maintain the unity of Russia and laid the foundation for federal relations between the center and the regions.

On December 7-8, 1991, a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine (Leonid Kravchuk) and the chairman of the Belarusian Armed Forces (Stanislav Shushkevich) took place in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, during which the Soviet Union was officially liquidated and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was proclaimed. As a result of the signing of the Alma-Ata Declaration by the heads of the union republics on December 21, 1991, the number of founding countries of the CIS increased to 11. After the Union collapsed, Gorbachev declared his disagreement with the dismemberment of the country and resigned as President of the USSR on December 25, 1991, signing a decree transferring control of strategic nuclear weapons to Yeltsin as President of Russia. In February 2004, Yeltsin's successor as President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, called the collapse of the USSR "a national tragedy of enormous proportions."

Speaking at the 5th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia in October 1991, Yeltsin publicly acknowledged the need for measures to financially stabilize the country. He stated that in this situation the government should be a team of like-minded people, and offered himself as its head. His first deputy - and the de facto head of the cabinet - was Burbulis, who was involved in the formation of the economic bloc of the new government based on a group of young economists led by Yegor Gaidar. At the same time, Yeltsin outlined a program of radical reforms, the goal of which was the transition to a market economy, and received emergency powers, in particular, the right to issue regulatory decrees, as the head of the government of reforms. Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote in October 1991 that Yeltsin’s name “can provide the reform with maximum support at the start,” but “his natural fears for his political rating may become in the future the most serious obstacle” to the consistent implementation of economic reform. Yeltsin terminated his powers as chairman of the government of the Russian Federation in June 1992, entrusting the duties of head of government to Gaidar, who, together with Anatoly Chubais and a number of other economists, took an active part in creating the privatization program and implementing it in practice. On August 19 of the same year, in accordance with Yeltsin’s decree, voucher privatization began. On the same day, the president made a televised address to the nation, in which he called the privatization check “a ticket to a free economy for each of us.” He said: “We need millions of owners, not a handful of millionaires,” repeating, in essence, the words he said on April 7, 1992 before the deputies of the Supreme Council.

In the period from March 16 to May 7, 1992, Yeltsin was the acting Minister of Defense of Russia, after which this post was taken by Pavel Grachev.

During 1992, the conflict between the legislative and executive powers grew, formally based on contradictions in the constitutional system of Russia. In fact, it was caused by the dissatisfaction of members of parliament with the ongoing reforms in the country. In December 1992, at the 7th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, Yeltsin proposed temporarily abandoning attempts to increase influence over the executive branch by using his right to amend the constitution. The congress rejected these proposals, abolished the institution of presidential representatives, abolished the special status of Moscow, deprived the president of the right to create new structures of executive power, and also adopted an amendment that provided for the automatic removal of the president from office in the event of the dissolution of any institution of representative power. The congress, by a majority vote, also rejected the candidacy of Gaidar, whom the president proposed for the post of prime minister. Then Yeltsin addressed the citizens of the country. In his address, he pointed out the threat to the policy of transformation from the congress and accused the deputies of attempting to carry out a “creeping coup.” But in the end, the crisis was overcome: on December 12, a decree “On the stabilization of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation” was signed - a kind of “peace agreement” that froze decisions on controversial issues until a referendum on the main provisions of the new constitution, which was scheduled for April 1993. The head of the cabinet was the chairman of the Gazprom concern Viktor Chernomyrdin. Kommersant noted that during the congress the division of responsibility among representatives of the executive branch was actually completed, since the president, without losing additional powers to carry out economic reform, ceased to be the head of government. The government received the right to act as an independent subject of the political structure of the presidential republic.

In March 1993, at the 8th Extraordinary Congress, deputies canceled the December agreement of the authorities and decided to consider holding a referendum on April 11 inappropriate. They also announced previously frozen constitutional amendments limiting the power of the president came into force. In this regard, on March 20, Yeltsin signed a decree calling for April 25, 1993 a referendum on confidence in the President of the Russian Federation and at the same time voting on the draft of a new constitution and the draft law on elections to the federal parliament. He distributed the text of the decree on television, and the official text was published later. The media noted that amendments were made to it, which narrowed the legal possibilities for impeaching the president for violating the constitution. In turn, on March 20, in a television speech, Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, Chairman of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin and Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov condemned the decisions of the Russian President, and Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov qualified Yeltsin’s actions as an attempted coup. On March 26, the 9th Congress of People's Deputies opened, at which Khasbulatov presented a draft resolution on holding early simultaneous presidential elections and the congress, agreed upon at the meeting between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin the night before. The deputies did not support the speaker, as a result of which both Yeltsin and Khasbulatov remained in their posts.

On April 25, 1993, an all-Russian referendum on confidence in the president took place. Russians were asked the following questions: “Do you trust the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin?”, “Do you approve of the social policy implemented by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation since 1992?”, “Do you think necessary early elections of the President of the Russian Federation?", "Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections of people's deputies of the Russian Federation?". The campaign launched by Yeltsin's supporters put forward the slogan: vote according to the formula "Yes, yes, no, yes", but the population said "yes, yes , no, no." The president received the necessary trust of his fellow citizens, but could consider himself only half victorious, since he failed to obtain the consent of voters to change the deputy corps. According to the media, the results of the referendum provided ample opportunity for interpretation by both sides of the conflict.

On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin signed a decree “On step-by-step constitutional reform in the Russian Federation.” According to this document, the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation were dissolved. Before the election of a new parliament, it was prescribed to be guided by presidential decrees and decrees of the government of the Russian Federation. The decree also stated that the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the legislation of the Russian Federation and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation “continue to be in force to the extent that does not contradict this decree.” Yeltsin vested the Federation Council with the functions of the upper house of the Federal Assembly, and scheduled elections for the lower house - the State Duma - for December 11–12, 1993. On September 22, 1993, parliamentarians declared Yeltsin's presidential powers terminated and adopted a resolution appointing Rutskoi as acting president. The defense of the White House was organized from among the parliament's supporters, around which a police cordon was set up. The confrontation between parliament and the president continued until the beginning of the next month: on October 3, Rutskoi, from the balcony of the White House, addressed supporters with a call to storm the mayor’s office and the building of the Ostankino television center. In turn, Gaidar called on Muscovites to take to the streets and defend democracy. After a crowd led by General Albert Makashov stormed and seized the city hall, Yeltsin returned from his country residence by helicopter to the Kremlin. He signed a decree releasing Rutskoi from his duties as vice president and dismissing him from the army, as well as a decree introducing a state of emergency in Moscow. On the same day, Makashov demanded that the military personnel present in the Ostankino building lay down their arms. After the building's security refused to comply, supporters of the Supreme Council began storming the television center, firing at it with a grenade launcher. Return fire was opened from Ostankino. After reinforcements approached the defenders of the television center, the attack was repulsed, and Makashov gave the order to retreat to the White House. On October 4, by order of the president, troops and heavy equipment entered Moscow. After the shooting of the White House building from tank guns, Rutskoy, Khasbulatov and Makashov were arrested (subsequently an amnesty was declared for them and a number of other arrested persons). The media wrote about the crowds of onlookers who flocked to the White House these days: they, as Vedomosti journalists put it, didn’t care what was happening with the confused branches of government - they were interested in watching the shooting in the center of Moscow. The country was able to follow the shelling of parliament thanks to the American channel CNN: Russian channels rebroadcast its signal, since it was the only one showing what was happening in live. According to some reports, a total of 60 people died during the confrontation between parliamentarians and the president, including participants in the battle for Ostankino, police officers, journalists and bystanders.

Yeltsin's actions were subsequently assessed ambiguously. Anatoly Chubais's memoirs argued that in 1993, the bourgeois revolution in Russia collided with the communist counter-revolution and won. But there were other opinions, in particular, “Moscow News” in 2006 noted that everything that happened in Moscow in the fall of 1993 cannot be classified as anything other than “ coup d'etat, carried out, moreover, by armed means and entailing human casualties." The parliamentary elections held on December 12, 1993 were assessed as a significant and positive step in the democratic development of Russia. In April 1994, the "Treaty on Social Accord" was signed, which a number of The media was called a tool for consolidating power, political elite and society in the interests of creating favorable conditions for the continuation of reforms, while others regarded it as another product of the state ideological apparatus. According to Kommersant, the final text of the agreement became a compromise for the “moderate” and “radical” groups around Yeltsin and was essentially devoid of any meaning.

According to some reports, in the winter of 1993-1994, businessman Boris Berezovsky entered Yeltsin’s inner circle, who became the sponsor of his book “Notes of the President.” According to other sources, Berezovsky helped finance the magazine of Valentin Yumashev, who was the screenwriter of the presidential election documentary "Boris Yeltsin. Portrait against the background of the struggle" and helped the politician in writing and publishing his first book "Confession on a given topic." Yumashev introduced Berezovsky to Yeltsin and his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko (in 2001, Yumashev and Dyachenko officially got married). Berezovsky and Yumashev subsequently became politicians with whom the concept of “Family” was associated in the public consciousness - Yeltsin’s immediate, trusted circle, which included the president’s relatives.

During Yeltsin's presidency, the first war in Chechnya occurred in 1994-96. The crisis in the republic arose against the backdrop of general conflicts within the framework of Soviet and Russian statehood, and the key point was the issue of delimitation of powers between the center and the regions. In October 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev became president of the Chechen Republic, after which Yeltsin issued a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. Dudayev, in turn, canceled the state of emergency imposed by the Russian President on the territory of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic and declared his own martial law.

Analysts noted that opportunities to resolve the conflict peacefully were not used. On November 26, 1994, forces opposing Dudayev, led by Umar Avturkhanov, with the support of Russian special services, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Grozny. On December 11, 1994, on the basis of Yeltsin’s decree “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict,” units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya. Historian Sergei Arutyunov noted in 2004 that the war in Chechnya was the result of “not just incompetent, but malicious, provocative policies.” The conflict was characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement officials. Novye Izvestia wrote in 2004 that there are no accurate data on losses during the ten years of military confrontation in Chechnya, since various sources name numbers that differ from each other by an order of magnitude. According to official statistics, the loss of personnel of all law enforcement agencies in Chechen campaign 1994–1996 there were 4,103 military personnel, 19,794 people were wounded, 1,906 people were missing. According to General Alexander Lebed, who held the post of Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 1996, 100 thousand people died during the first Chechen campaign, of which 80 thousand were civilians. The publication also cited data from Aslan Maskhadov, who at that time was the president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria - 120 thousand civilians and 2870 militants died. Human rights activist Elena Bonner pointed out that between 100 and 130 thousand people died in the first Chechen war.

During the first Chechen campaign, the first major terrorist attacks in Russia occurred. In June 1995, a detachment of Chechen militants led by Shamil Basayev took hostage more than one and a half thousand residents of the Stavropol city of Budennovsk,,. Attempts by federal forces to recapture the hostages by force failed, and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin entered into negotiations with the terrorists. Initially, Basayev stated that the purpose of his action was to achieve the withdrawal of parts of the Russian army from Chechnya, but in the end he agreed with Moscow that, under the cover of hostages, he would take his people to the territory of Chechnya. The media called this outcome a capitulation of the authorities to terrorists. Despite the fact that the hostages were released, due to the large number of dead and wounded during the terrorist attack itself (according to various sources, from 130 to 170 people were killed, more than 400 people were injured of varying severity, ,), Yeltsin dismissed the head FSB Sergei Stepashin, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Erin and Minister of Nationalities Nikolai Egorov,. In January 1996, Chechen militants under the command of Salman Raduev raided the Dagestan city of Kizlyar, taking more than 2 thousand people hostage. During the operation to oust the militants from the city, 24 local residents and 9 military personnel were killed, and after the terrorists, hiding behind hostages, captured the Dagestan village of Pervomaiskoye, another 13 hostages and 26 military personnel were killed, and 128 people were injured. There were no reports of related resignations.

The media wrote that on the eve of the 1996 presidential elections, the Kremlin faced an urgent need to end the war. On March 31, Yeltsin’s peace plan was announced, which, according to some analysts, expressed the Russian leader’s sincere intention to stop the fighting. On April 3, 1996, Lebed appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta with the article “Blood Games.” “Yeltsin made a fatal mistake by starting the war,” the general said. Another mistake Lebed called the “hasty and helpless plan for a way out” of the crisis - negotiations with the “bandit and terrorist Dudayev.” Fighting continued, on April 22, the separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was eliminated. But attempts to resolve the conflict continued, and at the end of May, a meeting between Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Dudayev’s successor Zelimkhan Yandarbiev took place in the Kremlin, which ended with the signing of peace agreements. Yeltsin himself made a pre-election trip to Chechnya (after the elections, the media noted that in Chechnya they voted very actively for Yeltsin’s candidacy).

On August 30, 1996, Lebed, who had been appointed shortly before as Secretary of the Security Council and received from the President unlimited powers in resolving the crisis, and the Chief of Staff of Dudayev’s troops, Aslan Maskhadov, signed the Khasavyurt Agreements on the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of federal forces from Chechnya, the holding of presidential elections there and the postponement of the issue of sovereignty Chechnya until December 31, 2001. The media wrote that in September 1999, after the explosions of residential buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk, the blame for which was placed on Chechen separatists, the Khasavyurt agreements were sharply criticized at all political levels - from meetings of the Federation Council to party congresses. Nezavisimaya Gazeta explained this criticism by the fact that with its help, “Russia actually freed its hands in anticipation of decisive action” in a new war with Chechnya. Elena Bonner, speaking in the US Senate, stated that the first Chechen war was needed before the election of Yeltsin for a second term, and the second - to increase the political rating of Yeltsin's successor. According to her, the military believed that “Swan, free journalists and public opinion” did not allow them to win in Chechnya. In this regard, she noted the attractiveness of the new war for the military, since it “gives the generals... hope for revenge.” Regarding freedom of journalism, a number of media outlets emphasized that Yeltsin, who started the “dirty Chechen war,” never prevented its coverage in the press. They also noted Yeltsin’s courage: he had the courage to admit defeat in the war and withdraw Russian troops from the territory of the rebellious republic.

By mid-1995, the state budget, the emission financing of which had then been stopped, in the words of Anatoly Chubais, who held the post of first deputy chairman of the government at that time, head of the Federal Commission for Securities and Stock Market, was bursting at the seams, and the plan for privatization income was completely failed. According to Chubais, in this situation the only possible way to replenish the budget and give a real start to cash privatization was the holding of loans-for-shares auctions. On March 31 (according to other sources - March 30), 1995, the chairman of the board of directors of the financial and industrial group Interros, Vladimir Potanin, at a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, offered the government a bank loan of 9 trillion rubles secured by stakes in elite joint-stock companies, and his proposal was accepted. On August 31 of the same year, Yeltsin signed decree No. 889 “On the procedure for transferring shares of federally owned enterprises as collateral.” The media noted that as a result of the holding of loans-for-shares auctions in conditions of a complete lack of control, the country's most powerful financiers divided the main Russian enterprises among themselves. The pledge expired on September 1, 1996, and under the terms of the agreement, the holders of shareholdings to whom the government failed to repay the loan received the right to sell the property obtained at auctions. Loans-for-shares auctions became the launching pad for the formation of the Russian oligarchy - a narrow stratum of very large owners. In 2004, Chubais in an interview English edition The Financial Times called the pledge privatization “a deal worthy of Faust” and admitted that its consequences haunt Russia to this day. He expressed regret that most Russians do not want to hear about positive results privatization of enterprises, “because the feeling of injustice of privatization has strengthened on a subconscious level.”

On January 16, 1996, the first deputy prime minister of the government, Chubais, resigned. A number of media outlets wrote about the existence of two draft decree regarding Chubais, proposed to Yeltsin for signature: the first of them suggested the wording “for the collapse of work”, and the second - “for financial abuses in the privatization process”, but Chubais left the post according to his own resignation letter, signed President of Russia. Yeltsin, speaking at a press conference on the same day, included major mistakes allowed by Chubais, noted the holding of auctions for the sale of state property. “This cannot be forgiven,” the president said.

Elections and second presidential term (1996-1999)

Analysts noted that the development of the special operation in Chechnya into a full-fledged military campaign, as well as the difficulties of the country's socio-economic development, affected the results of the State Duma elections in December 1995. The list of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation took first place in these elections, gaining 22.30 percent of the votes and receiving 158 mandates in the State Duma (99 mandates under the proportional system, 58 mandates in territorial majoritarian districts, plus one deputy formally nominated not by the party, but by voters). In addition to deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation itself, 23 candidates from among independents, agrarians and nominees of the “Power to the People!” bloc, whom the Communist Party officially supported during the election campaign, entered the Duma. The media wrote that in the situation of the threat of communist revenge, the presidential elections scheduled for June 1996 became very important.

In March 1996, Yeltsin met with a group of bankers and politicians, which included Chubais, Potanin, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Alexander Smolensky, Vladimir Vinogradov and Boris Berezovsky. At the meeting they discussed joining forces to re-elect the current president. As a result, an analytical group was created at Yeltsin’s election headquarters, headed by Chubais, who, according to a number of media outlets, was able to demonstrate his unique abilities as a crisis manager in this post. A number of media outlets suggested that Yeltsin had previously deliberately removed Chubais from the post of Deputy Prime Minister so that he could create the Center for the Protection of Private Property Foundation (according to other sources, the Foundation for the Protection of Private Property), which became a propaganda platform for the presidential headquarters. In addition to Chubais, the headquarters included Chernomyrdin and Tatyana Dyachenko (her presence gave the president direct access to information). In November 1996, in an interview with The Financial Times, Berezovsky said that more than half of the Russian economy was controlled by seven bankers who financed Yeltsin's election campaign. Subsequently, the term “seven bankers” appeared, the authorship of which was attributed to Berezovsky and the journalist and political scientist Andrei Fadin (according to another version, its authors were Fadin and Nikolai Troitsky. Recalling the March meeting with Yeltsin, Berezovsky said that it was unpleasant for the president. Yeltsin, according to entrepreneur, “perhaps for the first time I had to listen to such a tough position”: the conversation was about how low his chances of winning were and how low his popularity among the population was.

During Yeltsin's election campaign, the press wrote about the incident with the “copier box.” On June 19, 1996, after the first round of voting, an activist of the presidential election headquarters Arkady Evstafiev tried to take a Xerox box from the White House (according to other sources - a box of Xerox A4 paper; a number of media outlets, without specifying, indicated that it was “a large box with the inscription “Xerox””), which contained 500 thousand dollars (according to other sources, it contained 538 thousand dollars) in cash. Evstafiev was detained by security officers headed by the head of the president's personal security, General Alexander Korzhakov. Together with Evstafiev, the producer of Yeltsin’s advertising campaign and the leader of the campaign in his support “Vote or lose!” was taken into custody. Sergey Lisovsky. Novaya Gazeta wrote that as part of the campaign, commercials featuring pop stars and various advertising accessories were produced. The publication cited the words of employees of the Lisovsky advertising factory, who stated that they work for the president for free and that invited artists perform for free at concerts in support of the president.

On June 20, 1996, Yeltsin met in turn with Chernomyrdin, Chubais and Korzhakov and on the same day, “in order to strengthen and renew the team,” relieved his longtime associates from their positions - FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov, First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Korzhakov himself, his the “eternal bodyguard”, about whom the media wrote that he turned the presidential security service into a powerful power structure capable of solving any problems, including political ones. After this, Chubais spoke at a specially organized press conference, where he said that Evstafiev and Lisovsky did not have a box of dollars - it was allegedly planted by Korzhakov’s people. The presidential press service issued an official statement that the heads of the FSB and the Presidential Security Service “were fired according to the reports they submitted.” In April 1997, the case opened on the fact of “illegal transactions with currency on an especially large scale” was closed - the investigation did not establish the identity of the owner of the box. The media suggested that this incident (with a great risk for Yeltsin’s victory in the second round) was used only to provoke the resignation of the political opponents of the head of the election headquarters, Chubais. Novaya Gazeta explained Yeltsin's action by saying that his fate on the eve of the elections was in the hands of Lisovsky, Evstafiev, Chubais and Lebed. The president’s actions in the “copier box” story gave another reason for the media to write about Yeltsin as a person who tends to get carried away with people and then abandon them. Chubais later spoke about Yeltsin’s ability to make a decisive break with his former comrades, emphasizing that Korzhakov was “perhaps the person closest to Yeltsin” at that time. Chubais claimed that Yeltsin could not have lunch for several months afterwards, “because he was used to sitting at the table with Korzhakov.”

The first round of the presidential elections took place on June 16, 1996. According to its results, Yeltsin and communist leader Gennady Zyuganov advanced to the second round, maintaining a minimal gap (35.28 and 32.03 percent, respectively). In the second round, held on July 3, Yeltsin took first place with a result of 53.72 percent, while Zyuganov was supported by 40.41 percent of voters. After winning the elections, Yeltsin appointed Chubais to the post of head of the Russian Presidential Administration, and Berezovsky in October 1996, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

In 1998, the media wrote that the Russian presidential administration, created by Yeltsin’s decree in July 1991, had become an active participant in the country’s political life. Among the “first figures” in it during this period were Yumashev, Yuri Yarov, Tatyana Dyachenko, Mikhail Komissar, Alexander Livshits, Roman Abramovich, Alexander Voloshin, Ruslan Orekhov, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Evgeny Savostyanov and Vladimir Putin. In 2000, the magazine "Profile", describing the situation at that time, noted that a kind of triumvirate had formed at the top of power: Dyachenko, Yumashev and Voloshin. According to the publication, the latter surpassed his patron Boris Berezovsky with his ability to build complex intrigues. According to analysts, constant internal strife due to rivalry between various clan groups within the administration triggered the 1998–1999 government crisis.

In March 1998, Yeltsin dismissed Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. In April of the same year, he appointed Minister of Fuel and Energy Sergei Kiriyenko in his place. His appointment was so unexpected that the new prime minister was popularly nicknamed Kinder Surprise. On August 17, 1998, the government decided to freeze payments on government securities (GKOs and OFZs), external debts of commercial banks and companies and to expand the ruble currency corridor. This led to a sharp drop in the ruble exchange rate and a crisis in the banking system. On August 18, 1998, Kiriyenko and the head of the Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin, submitted their resignations to Yeltsin, which he did not accept. Five days later, Yeltsin dismissed the entire cabinet, and again appointed Chernomyrdin as acting prime minister. His candidacy had to be approved by parliament, and the media reported that representatives of the main Duma factions were preparing an agreement, which was supposed to guarantee Chernomyrdin’s approval as head of government. This agreement provided for the expansion of the constitutional powers of parliament and government, the irremovability of the cabinet until 2000, and the creation of supervisory boards for state media. On the same day that the press reported the signing of the agreement, on an NTV program, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov, the chairman of the LDPR Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the head of Yabloko Grigory Yavlinsky refused the said agreement and guaranteed the failure of Chernomyrdin’s candidacy in the State Duma. The magazine "Profile" wrote that if the left majority had been confident that after the approval of Yeltsin's proposed candidacy, the president would voluntarily resign, Chernomyrdin would have easily passed the Duma. But since the president said that he was not going to leave, the deputies were adamant. On September 10, after two unsuccessful attempts to gain support from the State Duma, Chernomyrdin withdrew his candidacy from the vote. On September 11, Yeltsin nominated Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov for the post of Prime Minister. It was approved, and on the same day Primakov was confirmed in office by presidential decree. The media wrote that in this situation Yeltsin was able to put forward the only figure against whom the leaders of the left had no serious arguments, but the subsequent inclusion of representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation into the government gave grounds to talk about a possible “leftward movement” of the Russian economy. Primakov was dismissed in May 1999, and in the same month he was replaced by Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin. Also in May, State Duma deputies made an unsuccessful attempt to impeach Yeltsin. He was blamed for the Belovezhsky Accords, the collapse of the army, the genocide of the Russian people, the events of September-October 1993 in Moscow and the Chechen military campaign. And although the majority of parliamentarians voted to remove the president from power, the impeachment failed, since none of the five charges against the head of state received the required 300 votes in parliament (even the main one, according to experts, the charge relating to the war in Chechnya, was supported by only 283 parliamentarian).

On August 9, 1999, Stepashin was dismissed, and Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Putin was appointed acting chairman of the government of the Russian Federation. In his televised address to the nation, Yeltsin introduced Putin as his successor as president, after which Putin announced his firm intention to run for president in 2000.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that in the last year of his stay in power, Yeltsin, wanting to some extent compensate in the eyes of society for all his previous mistakes, thought and acted primarily in the interests of the country and only secondarily in the interests of ensuring his own safety and security of your family. He, according to the publication, refused the option of retaining power according to the “Belarusian” scenario (by forcing the creation of a Union State consisting of Russia and Belarus with the occupation of the highest post in it). In addition, he tried to find his own successor. The change of government leaders, according to the publication, was the result of these searches. On the fifth attempt, having appointed Putin as head of government, Yeltsin, according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “hit the mark.”

Putin's appointment came against the backdrop of an invasion of Dagestan by Chechen fighters, and federal troops were sent to Chechnya in September. The decision to do this was made after a series of explosions of residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk that occurred in the same month, the blame for which was placed on Chechen separatists. A number of media outlets subsequently published materials about the involvement of the FSB in the events of September 1999 - it was alleged that the explosions were carried out by the special services to justify forceful actions against Chechnya. From the very beginning of the second Chechen campaign, Yeltsin withdrew from the leadership of military operations. In his book “From the First Person,” Putin noted that Yeltsin had completely transferred control of the military to him. “He trusted me, and that’s all,” wrote the future president. Journalists noted that Putin took a tough position regarding Chechnya and this is what allowed him to gain high popularity.

At noon on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin addressed the Russians on television with a New Year's greeting, in which he announced his early resignation as President of Russia. Without giving a name, he said that he did not want to interfere with the “strong man” that the country has and with whom “almost every Russian pins his hopes for the future.” He also asked the Russians for forgiveness for not living up to their hopes of “in one jerk, in one fell swoop... to jump from the gray, stagnant, totalitarian past into a bright, rich, civilized future.” Upon leaving, Yeltsin signed a decree assigning the duties of the President of Russia to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, , , . The first document signed by Putin in his new rank was a decree on material and other guarantees for Yeltsin, which caused discontent on the part of the left opposition. In November 2006, the RIA Novosti agency reported that the federal budget for 2007 allocated 2.8 million rubles for the maintenance of the first president of Russia.

The media wrote a lot about foreign policy during Yeltsin's reign. It was noted that the actual diplomatic recognition of Russia began after the events of August 1991, when the international community recognized Russia as the legal successor of the USSR, and Russia itself assumed the existing international obligations of the Soviet Union. Political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov noted that under Yeltsin, the decisive factors in shaping the country’s foreign policy course often became the personal characteristics of the head of a particular state, his character traits, human weaknesses and shortcomings. A number of analysts linked the country’s foreign policy course, first of all, with the position of the foreign ministers Andrei Kozyrev and Yevgeny Primakov who worked under Yeltsin, and called Yeltsin himself an amateur. According to observers, Yeltsin-Kozyrev's policy, to the detriment of Russia's national interests, was pro-American in nature, which was caused by outdated ideas about the world as an arena for the struggle of two ideologies - communist and capitalist. At the same time, analysts believe, the attitude towards communism in these years simply changed from “plus” to “minus”. A number of media outlets placed responsibility for the unilateral concessions to Russia and its losses that took place during this period without proper compensation from the United States and its allies on diplomats and the military, emphasizing that Yeltsin was a provincial party functionary who understood nothing about foreign policy. In the second half of the 90s, when the Foreign Ministry was headed by Primakov (1996-98), Russia, according to analysts, showed a desire to restore its role as a superpower with the second most powerful nuclear potential. The very appointment of Primakov to the post of head of the Foreign Ministry was regarded by a number of media outlets as a symbolic refusal of Moscow from its course towards integration with the West.

The contradictory assessments of Yeltsin’s foreign policy steps were fully revealed in 1999 during the “Allied Force” operation of NATO forces against Serbia (which became the final stage Yugoslav crisis of 1991-1999), when Russian paratroopers marched from Bosnia to Pristina Slatina airport. On the night of June 12, 1999, the Russian military, without coordination with NATO troops, was the first to enter the territory of the Kosovo region, from where Belgrade, under pressure from the West, withdrew its armed forces and police. Many assessed this step as an important political and psychological victory over the West; for others, it was an event that miraculously did not lead to the outbreak of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO. They wrote that Yeltsin did not make any decision about the start of this operation: the order was given by the head of the Main Directorate of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, and the very fact of the attack, in this case, was assessed as evidence of the degradation of the Yeltsin regime. Yeltsin himself, in his book “The Presidential Marathon,” claimed that he made the decision on the forced march himself, and it was not spontaneous: everything was planned at least a week, long before the start of negotiations on the format of the international presence in Kosovo. Yeltsin’s memoirs noted: “In an atmosphere of total rejection of our position by European public opinion, I decided that Russia was obliged to make a final gesture. Even if it had no military significance.” Subsequently, Yeltsin and his successor Putin, as the leaders of the state who made the political decision to conduct the forced march, were awarded a commemorative silver medal “Participant in the forced march on June 12, 1999 Bosnia-Kosovo.”

Many analysts pointed to the failures of Yeltsin's Russia's foreign policy in relations with the CIS countries. But opinions were also published that, thanks to Yeltsin’s position, the formation of new states took place relatively peacefully, while everything could have been different if Moscow had completely withdrawn from what was happening or, on the contrary, tried to intervene too rudely. Among the successes was the fact that under Yeltsin, Moscow achieved the nuclear-free status of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It was also noted that under Yeltsin, relations between Russia and Belarus developed most constructively, and in 1996, the presidents of the two states signed an agreement on the creation of the Community of Belarus and Russia (however, the unification process under Yeltsin was never completed). Yeltsin's authority as a person who laid the foundations of democracy in Russia is evidenced by the fact that in 2005, according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Yeltsin was invited to Azerbaijan by President Ilham Aliyev. Nothing was officially announced about the purpose of the visit, but, according to some reports, the discussion during the meeting was about Russia’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh - Baku needed the help of the retired president.

The media emphasized that Yeltsin linked the success of his foreign policy with the personal relationships he had established with the leaders of a number of states, and wrote a lot about the relationship of the Russian President with “friend Bill” (US President Bill Clinton), “friend Jacques” (French President Jacques Chirac ), “friend Helmut” (German leader Helmut Kohl) and “friend Ryu” (Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto). Since the mid-1990s, when Yeltsin's health deteriorated, the Russian president's foreign policy activities were practically limited to personal contacts with elected leaders, which were carried out in the style of a "meeting of old friends." According to a number of media outlets, Yeltsin’s friendship with the heads of the leading world powers was, from his point of view, the best means of confirming the legitimacy of his power, which was constantly questioned within the country. Despite the fact that Yeltsin failed to integrate Russia and the West, he managed to maintain warm relations with many of those whom he called his friends. Comparing Russia’s relations with other countries under Yeltsin and under his successor, a number of media outlets noted: in Russia’s foreign policy during the time of the first president, “there was at least an attempt to build relations on the basis of ideals and beliefs, and not divisions and exchanges.”

Almost the entire time Yeltsin was in power, reports appeared in the press about the poor state of his health, which, according to observers, Yeltsin showed a disdainful attitude. A number of media outlets indicated that Yeltsin for a long time I didn’t trust my doctors at all and was convinced that I couldn’t get sick from anything. According to some reports, he underwent two operations on his back in 1990 and 1993, and an operation on the nasal septum in December 1994. At the end of 1993, while in China, Yeltsin suffered a stroke. In 1995, he was hospitalized with an attack of coronary artery disease and was hospitalized again in October. In the summer of 1996, his health condition deteriorated again (at the same time, Yeltsin’s press service invariably reported that the president, who was not in the Kremlin, was “working with documents”). In September 1996, the media reported the results of the president's medical examination. It was stated that he suffered from coronary heart disease, angina pectoris, cardiosclerosis, posthemorrhagic anemia and thyroid dysfunction. Previously, the president had several severe attacks of angina pectoris, and minor scar changes on the heart indicated myocardial damage and, as a consequence, cardiosclerosis. Kommersant wrote that the 1996 election campaign caused significant damage to Yeltsin’s health and that responsibility for this largely lay with his associates. The publication also mentioned the consequences of attacks on Yeltsin by communists who sought to remove the president from power.

Based on the results of the examination, doctors came to the conclusion that Yeltsin needed urgent coronary artery bypass surgery. On September 5, 1996, Yeltsin, in an interview with RIA Novosti, announced his consent to its holding. The operation was carried out in Moscow (Yeltsin refused to go abroad) on November 5, 1996. The powers of the president for the duration of the operation were transferred to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. According to the Public Opinion Foundation, the act of the president, who decided to announce his illness and his upcoming operation, was approved by the majority of Russians. Still not recovering from the operation, Yeltsin fell ill with pneumonia, after which the press again began to write about the situation of anarchy in the country. In the summer of 1997, Izvestia wrote about “unprecedented publicity in covering the presidential everyday life” in order to create the feeling that even on vacation Yeltsin was working “for three” - “to spite all the presidential ill-wishers.” In 1998, Moskovsky Komsomolets reported that Yeltsin could not work more than 2-3 hours a day, and his residence in Gorki-9 “has long been turned into a branch of the Central Clinical Hospital.” The press wrote about Yeltsin's illnesses until his resignation in December 1999, but at the same time noting that the president's health had ceased to be a factor destabilizing the political situation in the country. After Yeltsin left his post, there were also reports in the press about the operations he had undergone: for example, in 2005, he underwent surgery on the femur, as well as surgery on the eye lens. In 2006, it was noted that Yeltsin appeared in public very cheerfully, and it was suggested that the “miracles of Chinese medicine” helped him maintain his health.

There were many publications in the press about Yeltsin’s “hobby” for alcohol. This was actively written about in 1994, when the Russian president, while seeing off Russian troops leaving the territory of East Germany, snatched the baton from the head of the Berlin orchestra and began conducting it himself, and also when Yeltsin was unable to get off the plane for pre-arranged negotiations with the Irish president who met him at Shannon Airport (according to the official version, Yeltsin simply overslept the meeting due to the fault of the security guards), . Yeltsin’s drinking of alcohol was also linked to his behavior during a meeting with US President Bill Clinton at the Roosevelt Museum in Hyde Park in October 1995 (at a press conference following the meeting, Yeltsin attacked journalists and, pointing his finger at the television camera, said: “Now, for the first time I can tell you that the disaster is you!"). Subsequently, Clinton, recalling this, remarked: “You know, we have to remember that Yeltsin has problems, but he good man. He is doing everything he can to try to solve the huge number of problems he has at home... We must never forget that drunk Yeltsin is better than most of the non-drinking alternative candidates."

In the press, alcohol was named as one of the reasons for the exacerbation of Yeltsin’s coronary heart disease, and Izvestia indicated that in 1995, a passion for alcohol combined with a refusal to take some of the prescribed medications led to the fact that not only the heart suffered, but also left hemisphere the president's brain. In the media, especially last years Yeltsin's reign, they talked about the "inadequacy of the behavior" of the president. They recalled how in 1996, during Raduev’s seizure of the hospital in Kizlyar, he portrayed to journalists how “38 snipers are watching, you know, every terrorist.” In the same year in May, Yeltsin, while riding a ship along the Yenisei, ordered his press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov to be thrown overboard (which was immediately carried out). It was mentioned that after heart surgery in the fall of 1996, Yeltsin, arriving in the Kremlin, first of all asked: “Where is Sasha?” (despite the fact that several months before this he himself dismissed Alexander Korzhakov). In February 1999, Zyuganov publicly called Yeltsin a “helpless drunkard.” Despite the indignation on the part of the presidential administration, a criminal case was never opened against the communist leader, since this required a personal statement from Yeltsin, which was not forthcoming.

Summing up the results of Yeltsin's rule, many media outlets emphasized such a feature of Yeltsin as the desire for personal power. Some of them called the desire to rule “the only strategy” of his life and political behavior, and Yeltsin himself was called an “autocrat” and “reigning president.” It was also pointed out that Yeltsin, since Soviet times, retained the habit of unconditional submission, which was expected to be demonstrated by those around him. As a clear confirmation of these qualities, the story of Yeltsin’s transfer of presidential powers to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin for the duration of the operation was cited: Yeltsin did not want to do this, but when he realized that the risk of an unfavorable outcome from the surgical intervention was too high, he agreed. At the same time, he demanded that two decrees be prepared simultaneously - on the transfer of power and on its return. He signed the second decree immediately after he regained consciousness after anesthesia.

Yeltsin's early resignation from the presidency and voluntary renunciation of power looked like an act outside the logic of his previous activities. But the press noted on this occasion that Yeltsin’s abdication fit well into his “strategy of maintaining power: your power, transferred by you, according to your Constitution, according to your free will... chosen by you... to a person who will not renounce either you or yours.” politics remains your power." Realizing that power was leaving his hands, Yeltsin, according to the press, decided to give it away spectacularly and not wait for it to be taken away. In 2006, on the eve of Yeltsin’s anniversary, the media wrote that the ex-president behaved as if he did not consider himself a “former”, showing extreme scrupulousness regarding “status privileges.”

Yeltsin died suddenly on April 23, 2007 at the Central Clinical Hospital. The official cause of death, the head of the medical center, the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Sergei Mironov, named the progression of cardiovascular multiple organ failure. In connection with the death of Yeltsin, President Putin declared April 25 a day of national mourning, and also moved the date of the announcement of the annual message to the Federal Assembly from April 25 to April 26, 2007.

Awards, publications, hobbies

Yeltsin was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 1st degree, as well as the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Badge of Honour, the Order of Gorchakov (the highest award of the Russian Foreign Ministry), the Order of the Royal Order of Peace and Justice (UNESCO) , medals "Shield of Freedom" and "For Dedication and Courage" (USA), Order of the Knight Grand Cross (Italy's highest state award). He is a Knight of the Order of Malta and was awarded the highest award in Belarus - the Order of Francis Skaryna. In April 2001, Yeltsin was awarded the Nikita Demidov honorary badge (the highest award of the International Demidov Foundation) for his contribution to strengthening Russian statehood. During Yeltsin's reign, tennis received the status of a prestigious "presidential sport" in Russia: it was indicated that not to play tennis Russian politicians, big businessmen, just VIPs at that time it was almost indecent. The media often emphasized the politician's personal contribution to the development of tennis in Russia. Yeltsin’s personal trainer Shamil Tarpishchev (who later became president of the Russian Tennis Federation) noted that on the court the president did not like to lose and could not stand it when someone tried to give in to him.

Family

Yeltsin was married; he met his wife Naina (Anastasia) Iosifovna Girina while studying at the institute. A number of publications noted Naina Yeltsina’s inherent wisdom and tact: it was pointed out that she gently moved her husband towards what he himself wanted. As an example, they cited data that after Yeltsin’s resignation in 1987, it was she who advised her husband to take the subway and go shopping, which became the reason for his popularity among the people.

The Yeltsins raised two daughters - Elena (born in 1957) and Tatyana (born in 1960). Elena, according to media reports in 2005, is the wife of the head of Aeroflot, Valery Okulov. Their family has three children: two daughters - Ekaterina and Maria - and a son, Ivan.

Youngest daughter, Tatyana, during Yeltsin’s reign bore the surname Dyachenko and was her father’s adviser. The media called her a “real informal leader” of the president’s entourage. In December 2001, she married Valentin Yumashev, taking his last name. Tatiana has three children. Her eldest son from her first marriage to Vilen Khairulin, Boris, was born in 1981. As of 2005, he was a graduate of the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University and was completing his master's degree at the Moscow State University Business School, intending to head the marketing department of the Midland-Formula-1 team, starting in Formula 1 racing. The second grandson of the first president, Gleb Dyachenko, Tatyana’s son from her marriage to Sergei Dyachenko, was born in 1995, and in April 2002 Tatyana Yumasheva gave birth to a daughter, Maria [40 Kompromat.Ru, 07/02/2006 Regnum Antikompromat, 01/01/2006

Yeltsin is recovering from operations. - Newsru.com, 26.11.2005

Biography of Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko. - IA Regnum, 15.11.2005

Zhirinovsky’s Ural voyage: the village where Yeltsin was born must be burned. - UralPolit.Ru, 25.08.2005

Medal "Participant of the forced march on June 12, 1999 Bosnia-Kosovo." - Russian civilization, 10.06.2005

Chubais and a copier box. - Panarin.com, 06.06.2005

Andrey Sharov. From Skuratov to Chaika. - Russian newspaper, 14.04.2005

Yeltsin returns to politics. - Independent newspaper, 07.04.2005

Dmitry Travin. Congress of winners. - Delo (idelo.ru), 14.02.2005

Irina Bobrova, Tatyana Fedotkina. Tatiana is the second. - Moscow's comsomolets, 17.01.2005

A statesman with military bearing. -

The establishment of the institution of presidential power in the Russian Federation occurred in 1991 as a result of a popular vote - a referendum. The reason for this was the strong weakening of executive power and the deepening economic and political crisis in society and the state. On June 12, 1991, direct elections of the first President of Russia took place.

Presidential power was called upon to establish effective public administration, strengthen executive discipline, and ensure law and order in the country. For this purpose, it was largely isolated from other government bodies and endowed with appropriate powers.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 made significant changes that affected the status of the President, the procedure for his election, powers and interaction with other government bodies.

According to the provisions of Chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President of Russia is the head of state. This determines its role and place in the system of state power. It occupies a special place in this system and is not directly included in any of the branches of government. The President is vested with independent powers, which makes him legally independent, but he is obliged to interact with all government bodies on the basis of the Constitution. The President of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. In accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution, it takes measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity, and ensures the coordinated functioning and interaction of state authorities of the Russian Federation.

The President is obliged to exercise his constitutional status only within the limits of his powers established by the Constitution.

The President of the Russian Federation, as the head of state, represents our country in domestic and international relations. Based on and in accordance with the Constitution and federal laws, it determines the main directions of the state’s domestic and foreign policy. They are formulated in the annual messages of the President of Russia to the Federal Assembly - Parliament.

In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President is elected for four years by citizens of Russia on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Only a Russian citizen who is at least 35 years old and has permanently resided in the Russian Federation for at least 10 years can be elected president. At the same time, the same person cannot hold the position of President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms (Article 81).

The procedure for electing the President of the Russian Federation is determined by the federal law “On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation” of January 10, 2003. In accordance with this law, a political party, an electoral bloc and directly voters who have formed an initiative group of at least 500 people have the right to nominate a candidate for the position of President. They are required to collect at least two million voter signatures in support of their candidate. In this case, one subject of the Russian Federation should account for no more than fifty thousand votes. The collection of signatures is not required if the candidate is nominated by a political party or electoral bloc admitted to the distribution of deputy mandates.

Elections are held only if at least two candidates are registered. The candidate who received more than half of the votes of the voters who took part in the voting is considered elected.

If none of the candidates is elected, then after 21 days a repeat vote (second round) is scheduled for the two registered candidates who received the largest number of votes in the first round, subject to their written consent to participate in the repeat vote. If, before the re-vote, one of these candidates withdrew his candidacy or dropped out due to other circumstances, then the candidate next by the number of votes received takes his place. Based on the results of the repeat voting, the registered candidate who received a greater number of votes from voters who took part in the voting in relation to the number of votes cast for another registered candidate is considered elected to the position of President of the Russian Federation. In this case, it is necessary that the number of votes cast for the registered candidate who received more votes be greater than the number of votes cast against all candidates. A repeat vote may be held for one candidate if, after the departure of registered candidates, only one registered candidate remains. In this case, a registered candidate is considered elected to the position of President of the Russian Federation if he received at least 50 percent of the votes of voters who took part in the voting.

The newly elected President of the Russian Federation takes office after the expiration of a 4-year term from the day the previous head of state took office. In the case of early elections, taking office occurs on the 30th day from the date of official publication of the general election results. The inauguration of the President of the Russian Federation takes place in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of representatives of government bodies and honored guests. Upon taking office, the head of state takes an oath to the people, in which he assumes obligations to protect the Constitution and protect the rights and freedoms of citizens.

The President of the Russian Federation has broad powers in accordance with his status as head of state. It implements them both independently and in cooperation with other government bodies.

The President of the Russian Federation has powers related to the formation of federal government bodies. Regarding the formation of the executive branch, he:

Appoints, with the consent of the State Duma, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation;

At the proposal of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, appoints and dismisses Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers;

Approves, at the proposal of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the structure of federal executive bodies;

Decides on the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation;

Has the right to chair Government meetings;

Forms and heads the Security Council of the Russian Federation;

Forms the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;

Appoints and dismisses authorized representatives of the President of the Russian Federation (in federal districts, State Duma, Federation Council, etc.).

In the field of defense and security of the country:

Approves the military doctrine and concept of Russian national security;

He is the Supreme Commander;

Appoints and dismisses the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

Introduces martial law on the territory of Russia or in its individual localities;

Introduces a state of emergency on the territory of Russia or in certain localities.

In the field of international relations:

Manages Russian foreign policy;

Negotiates and signs international treaties;

Signs the instruments of ratification;

Appoints and recalls Russian diplomatic representatives in foreign states and international organizations;

Receives credentials and letters of recall from diplomatic representatives accredited to him.

The President is entrusted with powers related to the activities of the State Duma. He:

Calls elections of the State Duma;

Dissolves the State Duma on the basis and in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation;

Calls a referendum;

Introduces bills to the State Duma;

Signs and promulgates laws, has the right of suspensive veto (i.e., the right to reject a law adopted by the State Duma).

In relation to the judiciary:

Proposes to the Federation Council candidates for appointment to the positions of judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Arbitration Court;

Appoints judges of other federal courts;

Submits proposals to the Federation Council on the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General of Russia.

In the social sphere:

Resolves citizenship issues;

Resolves issues of granting political asylum;

Gives state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;

Assigns the highest military and highest special ranks;

Grants pardon.

The President of Russia has the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with a request for compliance of normative acts with the Federal Constitution, as well as for the interpretation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In case of violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, the President has the right to issue a warning and remove from office the highest official of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation.

The President of the Russian Federation issues decrees and orders that are binding throughout Russia. Acts of the head of state must not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

The President of the Russian Federation terminates his powers upon expiration of a 4-year term in office from the moment the newly elected head of state takes the oath of office. Termination of his powers is also possible early in the following cases established by the Constitution: voluntary resignation, persistent inability for health reasons to exercise his powers, removal from office.

In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President can be removed from office on the basis of an accusation brought by the State Duma. The accusation must be confirmed by the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court gives an opinion on compliance with the established procedure for bringing charges. The Federation Council removes the President from office. In both chambers, the issue of removal from office is decided by a majority of 2/3 votes of the total number of deputies (members). According to the Constitution, removal is possible only on the basis of charges of treason or another serious crime.

In all cases when the President of the Russian Federation is unable to fulfill his duties, they are temporarily performed by the Chairman of the Government of Russia. But he cannot dissolve the State Duma, call a referendum, or make proposals for amendments and revision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Chapter 02

The first president of the new Russia

From the pinnacle of power that Boris Yeltsin ascended to by the end of 1991, he could already clearly see the abyss of future problems.

Having confidently won the first presidential election in Russian history on June 12, 1991, Boris Nikolayevich could not yet feel like a full-fledged master of the country. Above it stood the Union Center, headed by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, who did everything possible to preserve a single union state. The long-standing conflict between two politicians had reached the home stretch, and it became increasingly clear that “two bears in one den” could not get along.

The Kremlin “den” began to be divided in the literal sense of the word: after the elections on June 12, Gorbachev had to give up part of the premises for the working apartments of the head of the RSFSR. At the same time, the allied authorities started a subtle game to weaken their competitor. After all, Russia was also a complex country: just as the USSR consisted of union republics, so the RSFSR had many autonomous republics. Some leaders of these autonomies had ideas of sovereignty, which threatened the unity of Russia and the power of its new leader. The experienced apparatchik Gorbachev understood this perfectly.

However, time worked against him: the USSR was moving towards its collapse much faster than its constituent parts were heading towards theirs. The Baltic republics have already managed to fall away from the Union. Gorbachev tried to keep in his hands at least what was left. The signing of the new Union Treaty was scheduled for August 20, 1991.

And on August 19, along with the alarming melody of “Swan Lake” broadcast by Central Television, the country heard news about tanks in Moscow and the introduction of a state of emergency.

“To hell with you, act!”

Boris Yeltsin, of course, contributed a lot to ensuring that the conservative elite of the USSR decided to take such a desperate step. For example, in one of his first decrees he stopped the activities of organizational structures of parties and movements (mainly the CPSU) in government agencies, institutions and organizations of the RSFSR. This was a blow to the backbone of the old government: after all, cells of the Communist Party permeated the state apparatus, armed forces, plants and factories, collective farms and schools - the whole fabric of a huge country. As one of the figures of that time aptly put it, “with his decree, Yeltsin cut off all the tentacles of the system.” And the party nomenklatura could not forgive him for this.

However, there is an opinion that preparations for the putsch began long before the Russian presidential elections - back in March 1991. Allegedly, Gorbachev himself gave the sanction for the development of emergency measures to save the USSR. Indirectly, the preparation for an “emergency” was indicated by the increased attention to the security forces: a few months before the State Emergency Committee in a country that was on the verge of famine, the food supply standards of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army were suddenly sharply increased. They say that, meeting the day before with the conspirators from the State Emergency Committee in Crimea (where the Secretary General then very “timely” went on vacation), Gorbachev refused them direct support, but allegedly finally said in his heart: “To hell with you, act!”

Realizing the full risk of an adventure with the State Emergency Committee, the Soviet leader, obviously, could not help but see in this idea an “emergency” way to preserve the USSR - if the idea of ​​​​signing the Union Treaty failed. Soberly assessing the threat to his power, in the summer of 1991 he instructed KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov to organize wiretapping of his opponents’ telephone conversations. It is clear that No. 1 on this list should have been Boris Yeltsin. According to the latter, after the coup in the office of Valery Boldin, the head of the apparatus of the President of the USSR, investigators found mountains of folders with wiretap texts in safes.

It is also known that on August 18, the day before the announcement of the State Emergency Committee, Kryuchkov instructed his deputy to prepare for the detention of a number of persons from the KGB special list. There were 70 people on the list, and “at the top” was the name of the first president of Russia.

"Walked on the edge of an abyss"

Mountains of articles have been written about the reasons for the failure of the State Emergency Committee. The fact that the company of elderly conspirators was terribly frightened by their own insolence could be understood already from the shaking hands of one of its participants, Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev - footage of the first and last press conferences of the GKAC members went around the whole world. But it wasn't just their indecisiveness. The people, awakened by perestroika, who considered the party nomenclature to be the main culprit of the economic collapse, were skeptical about its attempt at revenge. The 45 million people who voted for Boris Yeltsin a couple of months ago pinned their hopes on him for overcoming the crisis and for a new, democratic life.

Feeling such powerful support behind him, Boris Nikolayevich challenged the putschists. He understood that not only his career was at stake, but also, possibly, freedom and even life. Yeltsin did not waste a minute making decisions that canceled the orders of the State Emergency Committee. He read out his decree directly from the armor of the tank, outlawing the putschists. Tens of thousands of Muscovites came to the White House, where the Russian government was then sitting, to “defend democracy.”

Meanwhile, the conspirators seemed frozen in mid-step and did not know what to do. Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Valentin Varennikov, who was in Kyiv, demanded in a coded message “to immediately take measures to eliminate the group of the adventurer B.N. Yeltsin.” But no such order came. And the verbal order to arrest Yeltsin at his dacha in Arkhangelskoye was ignored by the commander of the Alpha group of the KGB of the USSR. By that time, many middle-level security officials had also become disillusioned with the “talker” Gorbachev and his partyocracy and believed the popularly elected president of Russia.

“We were walking on the edge of an abyss,” Yeltsin would later write in his memoirs. But his energy and assertiveness, the ability to mobilize in a critical situation did their job: the State Emergency Committee did not survive even three days.

After the failure of the operation of former comrades sent to “Matrosskaya Tishina”, the President of the USSR returned to Moscow morally depressed. “Gorbachev looked at me carefully. It was the look of a man squeezed into a corner,” Yeltsin described their first meeting after the putsch. His time has come—the time of the president of the new Russia. Time to forge the “iron of independence” while the traces of the shameful failure of the Soviet nomenklatura were still hot.

Gorbachev looked more and more like a tsar without a kingdom. Yes, for several more months he sat in his Kremlin office, received calls and reports, and held meetings. But it seemed that the machine of the union power was spinning idle, that its levers were no longer connected to the gears of real politics and economics.

Soon after the events of “fateful August,” Yeltsin demanded that Gorbachev coordinate all serious personnel decisions with him. The Russian leader spoke to the head of the Union in a harsh tone, which Gorbachev could not get used to. Their disputes culminated in a meeting of the Russian Supreme Soviet on August 23, 1991, which was attended by both Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Russian President demanded that the head of the USSR condemn the CPSU headed by him. Gorbachev began to resist - and Yeltsin demonstratively signed a decree suspending the activities of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. The next day, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

At the same time, Yeltsin struck at the “enemy” headquarters, occupying (without much resistance) the Central Committee buildings on Old Square. By that time, the famous communist “Bastille” was already besieged by a crowd of democratically minded citizens - the seizure of this complex, in general, looked like saving party functionaries from popular lynching. They say that they were even taken to safety along a secret metro line connected to the underground of the Old Square.

And two weeks later, on November 6 - exactly before the anniversary of the October Revolution - Yeltsin issued a decree on the dissolution of all structures of the CPSU in Russia and the transfer of its property to the state. The dying “red empire” received another, almost fatal blow. She had just over a month to live...

“There is a collapse of economic activity”

Meanwhile, Yeltsin and his team had to deal with pressing economic problems. “The Soviet economic management system was completely bankrupt in 1991,” he recalled in an interview with AiF. Gennady Burbulis, then Russian Secretary of State. — Boris Yeltsin was faced with a task: how to feed people, how to prepare for heating season. But few people know that the Russian government could actually manage only 7% of the economy on Russian territory. Everything else was under the jurisdiction of the union government, which in fact could no longer manage anything. Back on June 15, 1991, Prime Minister of the USSR Pavlov demanded emergency powers, stating that the reserves of vital resources and the financial base were depleted, the country could not pay its loans and there was a collapse of economic activity... As Boris Nikolayevich’s first deputy in government, I then had the right signatures on special documents. I remember how every night they brought documents for my visa about the removal of the last reserves of flour, diesel fuel, specialized grades of metal... We resolved issues of survival in the face of the threat of famine and the complete collapse of economic life in the country.”

The Soviet economic management system was completely bankrupt in 1991. The task was: what to feed people, how to prepare for the heating season. We resolved issues of survival in the face of the threat of famine and the complete collapse of economic life in the country

Gennady Burbulis

The USSR state budget deficit in 1991 reached 20%. Foreign currency reserves were melting - only $60 million remained in the accounts of Vnesheconombank back in May! The Goznak printing press worked in 3 shifts, but little could be bought with unsecured money. The population stood in lines for hours to get the basic necessities. In Tver, for example, where almost all goods were already sold using coupons, coupons were introduced on April 1, 1991, even for salt, soap and washing powder. And this happened everywhere, distribution of products and “consumer cards” were introduced even in relatively prosperous Moscow.

However, despite the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy, despite even the failure of the Emergency Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev did not give up hope of preserving the Union. Did he fight for his position and privileges? Or did he sincerely believe (and today this point of view is shared by many, including V. Putin) that the destruction of the USSR was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” that had to be avoided at all costs?

"There will be no union"

The penultimate nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union can be considered the referendum that took place on December 1, 1991 in Ukraine. 90% of the republic's population spoke in favor of its complete independence. Long before this, Yeltsin warned Gorbachev: “Without Ukraine, signing an agreement is a useless undertaking. There will be no union."

All that remains is to issue a “death certificate” to the once united and great country. For this purpose, a “consilium” of three “doctors” - the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - met on December 8 in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. There, Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich signed a historic agreement that “the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist.”

A scarlet nylon cloth measuring 3*6 meters and weighing about 3.5 kilograms was lowered from the flagpole of one of the Kremlin buildings, which then housed the office of the first and last President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. The flag was removed, as is usually the case in Russia, without any ceremony, for some reason 38 minutes after Gorbachev addressed the people of the country explaining the reasons for his resignation. For about 5 minutes the Kremlin citadel stood without a flag at all, but in the foggy twilight of a bad evening, at 19:43 Moscow time, the tricolor banner of the Russian flag was raised over the Kremlin.

Boris Grishchenko. Outsider in the Kremlin.

Boris Yeltsin's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov (now the head of the AiF strategic planning center) against the backdrop of the very flag that is now kept at his home.

Yeltsin did not consider it necessary to personally inform Gorbachev about this. The delicate call was entrusted to Shushkevich. “Wait, have you already decided everything? Already two days ago? - Gorbachev was perplexed. “Yes, and we talked with Bush, he supports it.” “You are talking to the President of the United States, but you do not inform the President of your country... This is a shame! Shame! - Gorbachev scolded Shushkevich like a schoolboy. But he already understood: big game lost, the big country no longer exists.

Soon, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and others joined the three Slavic republics that formed the CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States. On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR, handing over the “nuclear briefcase” to the Russian leader. The red flag was lowered over the Kremlin without unnecessary ceremony.

Yeltsin won. But this victory was already pregnant with his future defeats. The collapse of the USSR, in the eyes of the growing left opposition, opened the list of “crimes of the Yeltsin regime.” Having defeated one powerful enemy - Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Nikolayevich will soon acquire a great many of them - starting with his once closest associates Alexander Rutsky and Ruslan Khasbulatov and ending with tens of thousands of communists “rising from the ashes”, led by G. Zyuganov. In less than a couple of years, fate will laugh evilly at Yeltsin: he will not come up with anything better than to shoot from tanks the very White House (the citadel of the opposition), which he himself defended from the tanks of the State Emergency Committee. And then the former main “separatist” of the USSR, who peacefully and almost without casualties achieved Russian independence, will arrange a bloodbath for his own rebels in Chechnya, at the cost of thousands of killed Russian soldiers.

Yeltsin will inherit from the USSR a national economy destroyed to the ground, and an attempt to carry out “shock” reforms will bring down his rating “below the plinth.” The battles with the State Emergency Committee and Gorbachev will seem like “flowers” ​​to him in comparison with the fierce resistance that his course will cause both in the elite and in society. Needless to say: retaining power is often much more difficult than gaining it.

In preparing the material, we used the memories of participants and eyewitnesses of the events from the book “The Era of Yeltsin. Essays on Political History". Moscow, Vagrius Publishing House, 2001."

The name of Boris Yeltsin is forever associated with Russian history. For some, he will remain simply the first president of the country. Others will remember him as a talented reformer who radically changed the political and economic systems of the post-Soviet state.

Childhood and family of the future president

The official biography of Boris Yeltsin says that his homeland is the village of Butka, located in the Sverdlovsk region. It was there, according to this source, that he was born on February 1, 1931.

But many researchers actively dispute this fact. After all, in this place, which is considered the birthplace of the politician, there was a maternity hospital. And his family lived in another place - the nearby village of Basmanovo. This is the reason for the fact that the names of both the first and second settlements are found in the sources.

The parents of the one who was the first president of Russia were simple villagers. My father was a builder who came under repression in the thirties and spent a very long time in Soviet camps. There he served his sentence. Having been granted an amnesty, he returned to his native village, where he first worked as an ordinary builder, and after some time took the position of head of a construction plant.

The politician's mother was a simple dressmaker.

Education of a future political leader

9 years after the birth of the boy, the family moved to the city of Berezniki. Here he started going to high school. The future first president of Russia was for a long time. But it is extremely difficult to call him a model student. Teachers remembered him as a pugnacious and restless boy.

Due to the presence of these qualities, the first serious problem arose in the life of Boris Nikolaevich. While playing with his peers, the future famous politician found an unexploded German grenade. This find interested him very much, and he made an attempt to disassemble it. As a result, Boris Yeltsin lost several fingers on his hand.

Later, this became the reason that the well-known first president of Russia never served in the army. After graduating from school, he became one of the students at the Ural Polytechnic Institute, which he successfully graduated from and received the specialty of civil engineer. Despite the missing fingers on his hand, Boris Nikolaevich became a master of sports in volleyball.

Career politician

After graduating from university, the future president of Russia became an employee of the Sverdlovsk construction trust. It was here that he first became a representative of the CPSU party, which had a positive impact on his career advancement. First, the chief engineer, and soon the director of the Sverdlovsk DSK, Boris Nikolaevich, quite often attended various party congresses.

In 1963, at one of the meetings, he became a member of the Kirov district committee of the CPSU. And after some time, Boris Yeltsin represented the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU. His party position included overseeing housing construction issues. But the career of the future great politician was rapidly gaining momentum.

In 1975, the one who was the first president of Russia holds the position of secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU. And after just a year, he already owned the chair of the chief secretary of this political organization. This position belonged to him for nine years.

During this time, issues directly related to food supply were resolved in the Sverdlovsk region. Tickets for milk and other types of goods were abolished, and some poultry factories and farms began to operate. In addition, it was because of Boris Yeltsin’s initiative that the construction of the metro began in Sverdlovsk. Cultural and sports complexes were also built.

After this time, Yeltsin becomes a representative, and over time he is appointed to the position of people's deputy and Chairman

Being in fact the leader of Soviet Russia, he very seriously and categorically criticized the communist system, which his voters could not help but notice. In addition, the future president earned respect among them after signing the Declaration of Sovereignty. This document legally established the supremacy of Russian laws over Soviet ones.

When on December 8, 1991, the President of the Soviet Socialist Republic, Mikhail Gorbachev, was isolated and effectively removed from power, the future first President of Russia, the leader of the RSFSR, was one of the signatories of the agreement on this event took place in Belovezhskaya Pushcha with the assistance of the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus.

This was the beginning of the career of the leader of independent Russia.

Presidential career

After the collapse of the USSR, many problems arose in the Russian state, the solution of which fell on the shoulders of Boris Yeltsin. During the first years of independence there were multiple problematic economic phenomena, harsh appeals from the population. The name of the first president of Russia is inextricably linked with the bloody military conflicts that began at that time on the territory of the Russian Federation and beyond its borders.

The conflict with Tatarstan was resolved peacefully. At the same time, resolving the issue with the Chechen people, who want to get rid of the status of a union autonomous republic and part of the Russian Federation, could not do without armed conflicts. Thus began the war in the Caucasus.

End of career

Availability large quantity problems significantly lowered Yeltsin's rating. But despite this, in 1996 he still remained president for a second term. His competitors then were V. Zhirinovsky and

The country continued to experience many crisis phenomena related to the political and economic systems. The first president of Russia was ill, his rating did not rise. The combination of all these factors led to Boris Yeltsin resigning on December 31, 1999. After him, Vladimir Putin took the chair.

After his resignation, the great politician was destined to live only eight years. His heart disease has become chronic. This provoked the death of the great on April 23, 2007. The first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin buried at the Novodevichy cemetery, which is located on the territory of Moscow.

Nowadays, there is a university named after the first president of Russia.